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Tobacco and alcohol are responsible for an estimated 12.5% of global deaths, a 
percentage which is set to rise. Evidence shows that tobacco and alcohol industry 
marketing influences smoking and drinking initiation and prevalence, and although 
tobacco marketing is increasingly regulated (including through the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), a legally binding global treaty) controls on 
alcohol marketing remain more limited.  
There are three novel strands to this thesis. First, systematic reviews examining 
how the tobacco and alcohol industries have attempted to influence marketing 
regulations, and the development of two new taxonomies for tactic and argument 
categorisation. Second, a statistical analysis of the tobacco and alcohol marketing 
environments across a diverse range of countries, including the extent of any 
geographic or urban/rural differences. And third, an assessment of tobacco and 
alcohol industry compliance with national marketing regulations. 
Substantial commonalities between tobacco and alcohol industry activity were 
identified, suggesting that alcohol policy may benefit from reproducing efforts in 
tobacco control aimed at excluding industry from policy discussions. Additionally, 
data analysis showed that there were high levels of tobacco marketing despite 
FCTC ratification, and that exposure to alcohol marketing was even higher. Tobacco 
marketing was greatest whereas alcohol marketing was lowest in lower income 
countries, and both were significantly more common in urban communities. All 
FCTC-ratified countries had some tobacco marketing bans in place, whereas few 
countries had any comprehensive bans on alcohol marketing. Compliance was 
often poor, and exposure to tobacco marketing was commonly higher within 
countries with a full or partial ban compared to those without, whereas all forms of 
alcohol marketing were lower in countries with a full ban or some restrictions. The 
high levels of tobacco and alcohol marketing, and the generally low levels of 
compliance, highlight the urgent need for countries to implement and enforce 
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Chapter 1: Overview of Thesis 
1.1 Overview of Thesis 
The 2011 United Nations (UN) High-Level Meeting on Non-Communicable Diseases 
(NCDs) was unprecedented; only 28 high-level meetings had previously occurred 
and only one of these had focussed on a health issue (HIV/AIDS)[2]. Four main 
types of NCDs, in terms of their contribution to global mortality, were discussed: 
cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancers, and chronic respiratory diseases[7]. 
The four main risk factors common to all of these NCDs were identified as tobacco 
use, unhealthy diets, physical inactivity, and the harmful use of alcohol[7, 8]. If these 
main risk factors were lessened, these NCD’s would be largely preventable. This 
thesis focuses on two of these risk factors: tobacco and alcohol.  
Tobacco and alcohol are responsible for a large (approximately 12.5% of global 
deaths[9]) and growing proportion of the global burden of disease. An important 
challenge for public health advocates and policymakers is, therefore, to reduce 
tobacco and alcohol use across the world, a challenge which, in turn, requires an 
understanding of the tobacco and alcohol industries (TI and AI). As stated in a 
recent editorial[10], there is “a pressing need to improve our understanding of how 
corporations contribute to this disease burden, both directly through the promotion 
of products damaging to health and indirectly through influence over public policy”; 
this thesis addresses both of these elements. 
Efforts by public health advocates to minimise the damage from products which 
have the potential to harm health are undermined by “large, well-funded, organized 
corporate opposition”[11]. Freudenberg and Galea[12] claim that in the United 
States of America (US/USA) “[c]orporate managers have made decisions that have 
contributed to tens of thousands of preventable deaths, injuries, and illnesses”. 
Although not all the deaths associated with a particular product can be attributable 
directly to the corporation[13], the corporation clearly plays an important role by 
producing and promoting their products and influencing regulation that governs their 
conduct. 
The TI and AI commonly use corporate practices that have been shown to increase 
morbidity and mortality such as the targeting of marketing towards young people, 
designing and promoting products to appeal to new markets including youth, 
sponsorship (AI sponsorship of sporting events aims to create the ‘norm’ that sports 
Chapter 1: Overview of Thesis 
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and alcohol go together), opposing public health legislation, misrepresenting and 
withholding evidence relating to the health impacts of their products, shifting focus 
away from their corporate practices and towards consumer responsibility (for 
example, excessive consumption), and making their products more available in low-
income communities[14-16]. 
As marketing is the main way in which companies communicate with current and 
potential consumers, and has been shown to have a direct effect on tobacco and 
alcohol consumption[17-23], this thesis is about TI and AI marketing. The following 
section will outline the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Chapter Summaries 
Part 1 provides introductory and background information regarding the tobacco and 
alcohol epidemics, the TI and AI, the different types of industry marketing, what is 
already known about the impact and extent of TI and AI marketing, an introduction 
to global tobacco and alcohol marketing-related regulations, and how industry 
attempts to influence regulation. This information provides the necessary 
background to situate the analysis presented in Parts 2 and 3, and the discussion 
and conclusion presented in Part 4. 
Part 2 aims to understand how the TI and AI attempt to influence policies that intend 
to curb industry marketing practices. To meet this aim, systematic reviews of both TI 
(Chapter 5) and AI (Chapter 6) political activity are completed. Two new taxonomies 
for tactic and argument categorisation are developed through these systematic 
reviews, the final versions of which are presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 also 
outlines the similarities and differences in TI and AI political activity when they 
attempt to influence marketing regulations. 
Part 3 focuses on analysis of the Environmental Profile of a Community’s Health 
(EPOCH) study data. Chapter 8 outlines the EPOCH study, which is the main data 
used in Chapters 9-12. Chapters 9 and 10 focus on the TI. Chapter 9 describes and 
explores the nature of the tobacco marketing environment across and within 16 
countries, and Chapter 10 outlines levels of tobacco marketing regulations and 
explores levels of TI regulatory compliance within these same 16 countries. 
Chapters 11 and 12 focus on the AI. Chapter 11 describes and explores the nature 
of the alcohol marketing environment across and within 13 countries, and Chapter 
12 outlines levels of alcohol marketing regulations and explores levels of AI 
regulatory compliance within 16 countries. Chapter 13 builds on the findings from 
Chapter 1: Overview of Thesis 
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Chapters 9-12 and presents comparisons of the similarities and differences in the 
amount of tobacco and alcohol marketing within the EPOCH countries, the number 
of tobacco and alcohol marketing regulations in place within the 16 countries, and 
levels of TI and AI regulatory compliance. 
Part 4 brings together the findings from Parts 2 and 3. The main findings and policy 
implications of the work presented in the thesis are first discussed, followed by an 
outline of the limitations and recommendations for future research. Chapter 14 then 
revisits the thesis’ objectives and ends with a final discussion about TI and AI global 
policy. 
 
Chapters 5, 6, 9 and 11 are closely based on published, submitted and completed 
papers. Chapter 5 has been published in PLOS ONE, Chapter 6 is under review by 
Addiction, Chapter 9 will shortly be submitted to The Lancet, and Chapter 11 has 
been prepared for submission. 
1.3 Thesis Aim and Objectives 
The specific aim and objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
The aim of this thesis is: 
To develop understanding of the tobacco and alcohol industries as 
determinants of health by exploring how they attempt to influence 
marketing regulations, their marketing practices, the extent to which 
they comply with marketing policy, and whether these practices differ 
by geography (between and within countries) and by industry. 
This aim will be met though the completion of the following seven objectives: 
1. To collate and describe background information and data relevant to 
objectives 2-6. 
2. To use the existing literature to systematically review the ways in which the 
tobacco and alcohol industries have attempted to influence marketing 
policies globally, identifying similarities and differences by industry and 
geography. 
3. To develop taxonomies to categorise the tactics and arguments used by 
the tobacco and alcohol industries when they attempt to influence 
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marketing policies, and to develop the taxonomies in a way which allows 
them to be applied to other policy areas and industries. 
4. To use new data to examine levels of tobacco and alcohol industry 
marketing across and within a diverse range of countries, the nature of this 
marketing, and the extent to which it varies by industry, country, level of 
development (high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, 
and low income), and urban and rural communities. 
5. To explore the extent of tobacco and alcohol marketing regulations across 
a diverse range of countries. 
6. To use new data to explore the extent to which the tobacco and alcohol 
industries comply with marketing regulations across and within a diverse 
range of countries, identifying whether this varies by industry, country, level 
of development (high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, 
and low income), and urban and rural communities. 
7. To explore the implications of the findings for global tobacco and alcohol 
control policy. 
Chapter 2: Tobacco and Alcohol, and the Determinants of Health 
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Chapter 2: Tobacco and Alcohol, 
and the Determinants of Health 
2.1 Prevalence of Tobacco and Alcohol Use, and Tobacco 
and Alcohol’s Impact on Health 
2.1.1 Tobacco  
Tobacco is the only consumer product that kills half of its long-term users[24, 25] 
when used exactly as the manufacturers intend. Between 2002 and 2011, 
approximately 50 million people worldwide were killed as a result of using tobacco 
products[2]. A 2010 report by the US Surgeon General stated that “[t]here is no risk-
free level of exposure to tobacco smoke, and there is no safe tobacco product”[26]; 
tobacco smoke contains over 7,000 chemicals, many of which are toxic to humans 
and at least 69 of which are carcinogenic[2]. 
Smoking is addictive and causes a wide range of diseases including lung cancer, 
heart disease, bronchitis, emphysema, stroke, and can affect fertility[27]. Although 
the relationship between smoking and lung cancer is the most well-known, and has 
the largest impact (smoking causes almost 90% of all lung cancer deaths[28]), 
smoking also causes cancer of the mouth, lip, throat, bladder, kidney, stomach and 
liver; in total approximately one in three of all deaths from cancer can be attributed 
to smoking[28].  
Smoking does not only affect the smoker; exposure to other people’s tobacco 
smoke (secondhand smoke) has also been shown to cause ill-health and death. 
Secondhand smoke is estimated to cause 600,000 deaths per year globally[28] and, 
as with direct smoking, there is no safe level of exposure[24]. Figure 1 shows the 
main health outcomes linked to smoking and secondhand smoke exposure. 
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Globally tobacco is responsible for 9% of all deaths, and is the world’s second 
largest killer after high blood pressure[9]. It is the leading cause of death in high 
income countries (HICs) (responsible for 18% of deaths), the second largest killer in 
middle income countries (MICs) (11%), and ranked seventh in low income countries 
(LICs) (4%)[9].  
In the past, tobacco use was highest among those living in HICs but due to 
“targeted marketing, increased social acceptability, continued economic 
development, and population increases”[2] consumption has been increasing in 
LICs and MICs, and is expected to continue doing so. Between 1980 and 2012 
overall global smoking prevalence fell significantly, although due to population 
growth the absolute number of smokers increased[29]. With consumption now 
falling in HICs but increasing in many MICs and LICs, the global burden from 
tobacco is set to shift increasingly from higher to lower income countries. By 2030, 
the number of deaths directly attributable to tobacco could rise to more than eight 
million per year, with 80% occurring in LICs and MICs[24]. 
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Data presented in Figure 2[30] shows that between 1998 and 2014 (2013 and 2014 
data are forecast) the cigarette market size fell in Australasia, North America and 
Western Europe (from 1,253,000 million sticks to 811,000 million; 35% decrease) 
and Latin America (from 297,000 million to 233,000 million; 22% decrease), but 
increased in the Middle East and Africa (from 350,000 million to 417,000 million; 
19% increase), Eastern Europe (from 618,000 million to 661,000 million; 7% 
increase, although it peaked at 778,000 million in 2008 and has since been 
declining) and Asia Pacific (excluding China; from 1,077,000 million to 1,143,000 
million; 6% increase). China saw vast market growth. Between 1998 and 2014 sales 
increased from 1,591,000 million sticks to 2,609,000 million (64% increase). Yang et 
al[31] have shown that the direct and indirect economic costs of smoking 
attributable to those aged 35 years and older in China had risen by 154% and 376% 
respectively between 2000 and 2008, highlighting the significant economic burden 
that increasing smoking prevalence is having on China. TI targeting of new markets 
including those with limited regulation has significantly contributed to the growth in 
tobacco use seen in regions such as Asia Pacific[32, 33], Eastern Europe[34, 35], 
and Africa[36-38]. In 2009, almost 5.9 trillion cigarettes were consumed around the 
world which represents a 13% increase over ten years[2], and now 80% of the one 
billion smokers worldwide live in LICs and MICs[24]. For the companies involved, as 
Eriksen et al[2] report, the increase in cigarette consumption in LICs and MICs is 
enough to offset the consumption decrease in HICs.  
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Figure 2: Global cigarette market size, 1998-2014 
 
(Data source [30]) 
 
Although there are no international data on the tobacco market size in urban and 
rural communities, there are some data on smoking prevalence. For example, the 
World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Global Adult Tobacco Study (GATS) collects 
data on tobacco use in urban and rural communities in 14 countries (Bangladesh, 
Brazil, China, Egypt (split into two regions), India, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, 
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vietnam, and the Russian Federation)[39]. Of 
the 14 countries/regions where data were available (data for Uruguay were not 
available), smoking prevalence (current users aged 15+ of any smoked tobacco 
product) differed between the urban and rural areas surveyed for all countries, being 
higher in rural areas in nine of the 14 countries/regions surveyed[39] (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Current smokers (any smoked tobacco product) aged 15 years or older in urban and 





Bangladesh** 21.3 23.6 
Brazil* 16.6 20.4 
China*** 26.1 29.8 
Egypt** lower region 18.1 18.8 
upper region 20.6 19.9 






 29.4 32.0 
Poland** 27.8 31.9 
Russia** 40.2 35.9 
Thailand** 21.5 24.8 
Turkey* 33.0 27.2 
Ukraine*** 30.4 25.6 
Uruguay** - - 
Vietnam*** 23.3 24.0 
*Data from 2008; **Data from 2009; ***Data from 2010 
#
data from the middle urban quintile and middle rural quintile 
 (Data source [39]) 
 
A model of the tobacco epidemic has been proposed based on the way in which the 
epidemic developed in HICs, and describes four stages based on the pattern of 
tobacco use and subsequent deaths from smoking[40] (Figure 3). There is a 
significant delay between smoking and the onset of associated disease at the 
population-level. For example, deaths from lung cancer are not usually seen at the 
population-level until 20-30 years after smoking becomes widespread, and the 
death rate does not peak until 30-40 years after smoking prevalence reaches its 
highest level[40]. Lung cancer deaths were used as a proxy for the total smoking-
related mortality in Lopez et al’s 1994 model[40], and the four stages were detailed 
as follows. Countries at Stage 1 have little history of tobacco use, for example many 
of those in Sub-Saharan Africa. They have low smoking prevalence (less than 20% 
men and 5% women) with very few smoking-related deaths. Countries at Stage 2 
have a rapidly increasing smoking prevalence rate (between 20-65% men and 5-
40% women) with low but increasing smoking-related deaths; countries with 
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growing economies including China (and many other Asian countries) and some of 
those in Latin America are at Stage 2. Countries at Stage 3 have a fairly long history 
of tobacco use. They have declining male smoking prevalence (falling to around 
45%) but a fairly stable female smoking prevalence rate (around 40%), with 
increasing smoking-related deaths especially among men. Countries in eastern and 
southern Europe and some of those in Latin America are at Stage 3. Finally, 
countries at Stage 4 have a very long history of tobacco use and are the most 
developed. They have a declining smoking prevalence (45-30% men and 40-30% 
women) with substantial smoking-related deaths. However since the development of 
this model in 1994, many counties have moved to different stages and many 
developed countries now have a lower smoking prevalence. For example the United 
Kingdom (UK), Australia, and the USA all have around 20% prevalence[41], 
suggesting that perhaps a ‘Stage 5’ now needs to be added.   
 




Lopez et al[40] argue that their model clearly shows a 30-40 year lag between the 
rise in smoking prevalence and an associated rise in smoking-related mortality. This 
means that in countries where smoking prevalence is still increasing, smoking-
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related deaths are due to increase over the coming decades. Countries at earlier 
Stages can therefore learn from the experiences of those at later Stages, and have 
the opportunity to implement tobacco control policies nearer the beginning of their 
epidemics. However, one major limitation of Lopez et al’s model[40], as outlined in a 
recent update[43], is that it was only based on HIC data and was not intended to be 
used to predict the course of the epidemics in MICs and LICs; at the time there was 
little or no information available on smoking prevalence or associated deaths in 
MICs and LICs for which calculations could be based upon. It is also a generalised 
model, and the tobacco epidemic inevitably unfolds differently in individual countries 
due to differing levels of TI activity and the differing pace of tobacco control policy 
development. Many MICs and LICs have high male smoking prevalence and 
associated mortality, but very low rates amongst females. For example, the former 
Soviet Union’s (FSU) tobacco epidemic developed quite differently to how the model 
predicted, with relatively low female smoking prevalence and slower growth that 
expected given male rates[44]. Countries with this trajectory do not fit the model; in 
2004 Gilmore et al[44] placed FSU males between Stages 3 and 4 and females 
between Stages 1 and 2. A revised version of Lopez et al’s tobacco epidemic model 
in the 2012 update[43] develops the original model to take account of these larger 
male/female differences by developing two separate gender-specific models, and 
recommending that the smoking epidemic is always discussed completely 
separately for males and for females. 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the percentage of deaths attributable to tobacco at the 
country-level in 2004 amongst men and women respectively. Turkey had the 
highest percentage of deaths caused by tobacco amongst men (37.6%), and the 
Maldives had the highest percentage of deaths caused by tobacco amongst women 
(24.9%) closely followed by the USA (23.3%). Although the maps show that African 
and lower income countries tend to have a low percentage of deaths attributable to 
smoking, due to their earlier stage in the tobacco epidemic and the lag between 
smoking and the onset of diseases such as lung cancer, the epidemic in these 
countries, and its cost to life, has only just begun. The two maps also show that 
most countries have a lower percentage of smoking-attributable deaths amongst 
females than males. This, as Figure 3 showed, is because men usually start 
smoking before women, meaning that the onset of smoking-related disease and 
death tends to occur earlier in males. 














































































































































































































































The ethanol content of alcoholic drinks is typically measured in units. Globally the 
recommended level of ‘safe’ consumption varies, and is either communicated in 
units, number of drinks (the size of a ‘standard’ drink also varies globally) or grams 
of alcohol, and either as a daily or weekly limit[45, 46]. For example, in the UK it is 
recommended that men should not regularly exceed 3-4 units per day and women 
should not regularly exceed 2-3 units per day, where one unit of alcohol is 8g/10ml 
of ethanol[47] (Figure 6), whereas in the US it is recommended that men should not 
regularly exceed 1-2 drinks per day and women should not regularly exceed 1 drink 
per day, where one drink is “one 12 oz. beer, 4 oz. of wine, 1.5 oz. of 80-proof 
spirits, or 1 oz. of 100-proof spirits”[48]. This lack of global consensus, both in terms 
of the ‘safe’ consumption level and the terminology used, makes it difficult to 
compare results from different country-specific studies, and may also limit the 
amount of knowledge and skills that are shared internationally regarding the 
monitoring and regulation of alcohol consumption[46]. 
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Furtwaengler and De Visser’s 2013 study[46] of 57 country’s “definitions of standard 
drinks and intake guidelines” found firstly that many countries did not have any 
guidelines, and secondly that there was great variation among those that did. They 
found that daily consumption guidelines were more common than weekly, the 
maximum ‘safe’ limit was usually greater for men than women (although in many 
counties there was a different male/female ratio for maximum daily and maximum 
weekly consumption), and there was a lot of variation in what was considered a 
‘standard drink’. They also reported that there was little evidence of progress 
towards global guidelines, perhaps due to lack of consensus in the literature 
regarding the definitions of ‘responsible drinking’ and ‘binge drinking’, and what the 
threshold for ‘safe’ drinking should be[46]. 
For many years it has been believed that regular, low to moderate consumption of 
alcohol, especially red wine, may have health benefits[49-56], and this is the 
message promoted by the AI[57]. However there is no consensus in the literature 
regarding what constitutes ‘low’ or ‘moderate’ drinking, and the health benefits have 
now been disputed. The WHO in 1994 stated that “There is no minimum threshold 
below which alcohol can be consumed without any risk. Alcohol can be blamed for 
some of the world's most serious health problems. The less you drink, the 
better”[58], and more recently many studies have begun to question the assertion of 
health benefits of even minimal alcohol consumption[59-62]. It has been found, for 
example, that the risk of cancer increases from zero units of alcohol[63, 64]. 
The effects of higher levels of alcohol consumption are not disputed. Alcohol is 
addictive and not only causes acute and chronic health conditions, it also causes a 
large number of negative social consequences for the drinker, the people around 
them, and for society in general[65]. The health outcomes of excessive alcohol 
consumption, beyond the recommenced limits, can include brain damage, alcohol 
poisoning, increased blood pressure (a major risk factor for stroke and heart 
disease[66]), cancer (particularly breast cancer), and psychological problems[67]; 
see Figure 7. Alongside these medical conditions, drinking alcohol, especially in 
excessive amounts, also increases the prevalence of risky behaviours such as 
unsafe sex, behaviour which can lead to injury, and violence and crime[68-70]. 
Drinking alcohol has also been linked to an increased number of non-fatal 
accidents, road-traffic accidents, and death by drowning and fire[67]. Those who 
binge drink are also more likely to take illegal drugs[67], which have many additional 
physical and psychological impacts. Other social problems, that may or may not 
have a direct effect on the drinker themselves, can include damage to property or 
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the local environment, increased family tension and potential family breakdown, 
violence towards family or friends, the effect on partners causing them to become 
anxious or depressed, children’s behavioural problems or underperformance at 
school, and falling performance at work and potential unemployment[71].  
 




Globally harmful alcohol use is the third leading risk factor for premature deaths and 
disability[65], responsible for 5.9% of all deaths (an estimated 3.3 million deaths[73]) 
and 5.1% of all disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) in 2012[73]; and this is despite 
almost half (48%) of the world’s adult (aged 15+) population being lifetime 
abstainers from alcohol[73]. Alcohol use is one of the ten leading causes of death in 
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both HICs and MICs where it is responsible for 2% (ranked ninth) and 6% (ranked 
fifth) of all deaths respectively[9]. It is also the second largest cause of DALYs in 
HICs, responsible for 7%, and the leading cause of DALYs in MICs, responsible for 
8%[9]. Alcohol use does not feature in the top ten leading causes of death in LICs 
but it is the eighth leading cause of DALYs, responsible for 2%[9]. Figure 8 shows 
the percentage of deaths that were attributable to alcohol globally in 2004. As the 
map shows, the highest proportion of deaths attributable to alcohol was seen in 
Russia (10-14%).  
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Between 1999 and 2014 (2014 data are forecast) the alcoholic drink market size 
increased in every region except Australasia, North America and Western Europe 
where it fell slightly (from 79,000 million litres to 78,000 million; 2% decrease, 
having peaked at 83,000 million litres in 2007) (Figure 9). The Asia Pacific region 
saw the largest growth, but this is predominantly due to the very large increase seen 
in China (shown separately; the Chinese market increased 143%, from 27,000 
million litres to 64,000 million); the Asia Pacific region excluding China grew by 53% 
(from 20,000 million litres to 30,000 million). Sales in Latin America grew by 49% 
(from 25,000 million litres to 38,000 million) and sales in Eastern Europe grew by a 
similar amount (48%; from 20,000 million litres to 30,000 million; sales peaked in 
2007/8 at around 34,000 million litres). Sales in the Middle East and Africa 
increased by 90% (from 9,000 million litres to 17,000 million, although sales were 
almost level between 1999 and 2005 at between 9-10,000 million litres).  
Although there are no international data on the alcohol market size in urban and 
rural communities, there are some data on alcohol consumption levels in urban and 
rural communities in some smaller country- and community-level studies. For 
example, a US study using data from the 1992 National Longitudinal Alcohol 
Epidemiologic Study showed that 44.5% of individuals in central urban areas were 
current drinkers compared to 39.6% in rural areas, and 25.8% of individuals in 
central urban areas had consumed five or more drinks on a single day ever 
compared to 23.1% in rural areas[74]. A study in India of individuals from Delhi and 
surrounding rural communities found that the average daily consumption of alcohol 
by urban men was over five times the amount of rural men[75]. A study involving 
individuals in the capital city and four surrounding villages in Ghana found that men 
(statistically significant) and women in rural communities had a higher prevalence of 
‘current alcohol consumption’ than those in urban settings[76]. And a study of 
students in Germany found that 18.6% residing in large cities had never tried 
alcohol, compared to 16.5% in smaller urban districts and 10.7% in rural 
districts[77]. These examples of national-level studies do not provide consensus on 
urban and rural alcohol consumption, but they do all show large differences by 
community type.  
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Figure 9: Global alcohol market size, 1999-2014 
 
(Data source [78]) 
 
2.2 The Determinants of Health 
The ‘determinants of health’ are factors that have a significant influence on 
population- or individual-level health, including, for example, genetics, lifestyle 
choices, and the physical environment. The social determinants of health refer to 
how society, and the associated inequalities in society, affects health. The concept 
that health is influenced by society is not new; it has long been known that social 
and economic factors (for example poverty, social exclusion, unemployment or poor 
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status of an individual (Villerme in 1830 and Virchow in 1848 were some of the 
earliest physicians to make these inferences[79]). Individuals are strongly influenced 
by their local physical and social environments, including their perceptions of them, 
and it is therefore important to take into account these broader societal-level 
determinants of health, along with individual-level determinants, when developing 
policies[80]; it is important to focus on both the social determinants of health and the 
determinants of health, as they could be different[81]. 
In order to make sense of the plethora of social determinants that influence health 
and health outcomes, multiple models have been developed [including 82, 83-85]. 
The models aim to make explicit the linkages between different health determinants, 
and also help to identify “strategic entry points” where policymakers can intervene 
and attempt to make improvements[85].  
Arguably the most famous and widely used model was developed by Dahlgren and 
Whitehead in 1991 (Figure 10). This model consists of five categories of the 
determinants of health, each represented as a concentric ring surrounding the 
individual (encompassing age, sex, and genetic factors) at the centre. Closest to the 
individual are the ‘individual lifestyle factors’ which represent an individual’s lifestyle 
and health behaviours, such as whether they smoke or drink alcohol. Next are the 
‘social and community networks’, which influence personal health behaviours 
through social interactions, support, and peer pressure. Further away from the 
individual again are the ‘living and working conditions’ including factors such as 
education, the work environment, housing, and the ability to access necessary 
facilities and services. The outer ring is ‘general socio-economic, cultural and 
environmental conditions’ which includes societal factors such as the economic 
state of the country and community in which the individual lives and levels of 
unemployment. Each ring impacts each of the layers below it. The outer layer of the 
model, ‘general socio-economic, cultural and environmental conditions’, influences 
the standard of living within society, and can influence an individual’s selection of 
housing, employment, social interactions, and health behaviours. Those who are 
more disadvantaged, for example in terms of poor housing, exposure to stressful 
working conditions, or poor access to services, are more likely to exhibit unhealthy 
‘individual lifestyle factors’ such as smoking[85]. Some of the determinants in the 
‘Whitehead model’ are “amenable to change” whereas others are not[86]; 
determinants such as housing and access to services are able to be improved by 
national or local policy, whereas determinants such as genetic factors cannot be 
altered.  
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Whitehead has argued[87] that the model is useful for the following reasons: it 
highlights the range of influences on health, encouraging people to look beyond 
lifestyle factors and access to health services, it separates factors into those that 
are ‘fixed’ and those that could be changed through policy, and it emphasises the 
interrelationship between the individual factors - “one level cannot be understood in 
isolation from the others”. However, she also acknowledges that the model does not 
look at the determinants of health inequalities, and that it does not show specific 
pathways for change and therefore cannot be used to test hypotheses. 
 




The model is designed to explain that health is influenced by many factors, and their 
interactions, at multiple levels of causation[85]. However, these interrelationships 
are not made explicit – there are no directional arrows, for example, between the 
rings, instead each ring is bordered by a thick black line reducing the sense of 
interaction. The model does, however, clearly show the range of determinants at 
play, and is therefore helpful to those wanting to highlight these factors to others 
with limited prior knowledge of the determinants of health and their complex 
interactions; its strength is its simplicity. 








(consumer, e.g. smoker or 
drinker) 
Vector  
(corporation, e.g. tobacco 
or alcohol indsutry) 
2.2.1 Industrial Epidemics 
Despite authors such as Wiist[11] and Freudenberg[13, 88] having recommended 
that corporations should be recognised as a determinant of health for a number of 
years, to date none of the models of the determinants of health[including 82, 83-85] 
include the corporation as a determinant or risk factor. The ‘Industrial Epidemic’ 
theory begins to address this gap by focussing on industry and is therefore an 
important addition to fully understanding the many determinants that have an impact 
on health.  
In the late 1990s, after the release of millions of internal TI documents through 
litigation in the US (see sub-chapter 4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: 
Tobacco and Alcohol Marketing), the TI was exposed as the “underlying cause of 
the tobacco epidemic”[89]. The TI was first referred to as the ‘vector’ of the tobacco 
epidemic in 1999 by LeGresley[90] and this concept has since been developed, 
most notably by Jahiel and Babor[91, 92]. The concept of an ‘industrial epidemic’ 
adapts the traditional public health construct of infectious diseases and focuses on 
the ‘agent’ (the product, such as alcohol or tobacco), the ‘host’ (the consumer of the 
product), the ‘environment’ in which the host is exposed to the agent, and the 
‘vector’ (the corporation which makes, distributes or sells the product, such as the AI 
or TI; see Figure 11).  
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‘Industrial epidemics’ are epidemics of NCDs that have emerged from the 
commercialisation of products that have the potential to harm health, and are fuelled 
by what have been described as “disease-promoting corporations”[13]. The 
corporate vectors who produce these products use “societal methods” including 
marketing, peer-pressure and addiction to increase exposure of their agents to 
potential and existing hosts[92]. Additionally, and similarly to biological vectors 
(such as mosquitoes), corporations have developed ways to counter “adverse 
environmental conditions”; in order to mitigate the effect of policies or other activities 
that could hinder or reduce profitability, corporations use public relations and 
attempt to influence regulation[92]. The WHO has made similar inferences with 
regards to the TI:  
“tobacco use is unlike other threats to global health. Infectious 
diseases do not employ multinational public relations firms. There 
are no front groups to promote the spread of cholera. Mosquitoes 
have no lobbyists”[93]. 
At present most of the attempts to tackle the tobacco and alcohol epidemics focus 
on the host, i.e. there are many programmes in place aiming to encourage 
individuals to reduce the amount that they smoke or drink (and there is evidence 
that this is promoted by corporations such as the TI[94, 95] and AI[57, 96]). As the 
prevalence of diseases related to corporations is still increasing, Jahiel[92] argues 
that in order to effectively tackle the problem, the focus needs to shift from the host 
to the vector. Similarly Babor et al[97] argues that the AI is “an important but 
understudied part of the environment in which drinking patterns are learned and 
practised”, especially through the development of new products and of sophisticated 
marketing techniques. As will be addressed in the following chapter (Chapter 3) 
corporations are designed, and required by law, to maximise profits for their 
shareholders, and this, argues Jahiel[92], means corporations must leave the 
resulting social and health costs and outcomes for others (usually governments and 
other national agencies) to tackle and mitigate. 
Jahiel and Babor[91] argue that there are three main types of corporate-driven 
epidemics: 
 Generational epidemics: corporations need to replenish their population of 
users, so, as their current users get older and die, corporations target and 
compete for the younger markets. 
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 Targeted epidemics: corporations often identify particular groups that they 
wish to target for increased consumption or for the launch of new products, 
for example the creation of ‘alcopops’ aimed at young drinkers. 
 Transnational epidemics: corporations actively target foreign countries in 
order to expand their markets or to “develop new markets that are not yet 
saturated or subject to stringent regulations”. 
Corporations, unlike biological vectors, do however create products that are valued 
by society. The products produced by corporations are sought by individuals 
wanting to purchase or use their products, and policymakers must therefore weigh 
the product’s value to society and individuals against their potential harm to health 
when deciding on regulatory measures[92]. However, due to the importance of 
corporations in the modern political economy and the resources at their disposal, 
corporations have the ability to shape societal values, creating the initial demand 
and desire for their product in the first place and shaping broader perceptions of the 
value of their business and products, and to influence government thereby affecting 
the economic environment and influencing regulation[92]. Governments and 
policymakers must therefore be aware of the corporation’s primary goal: profit. 
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Chapter 3: Corporations and 
Corporate Marketing 
3.1 Corporations 
The definition of a company is “a commercial business”, and corporations are 
defined as “a large company or group of companies authorised to act as a single 
entity and recognised as such in law”[98]. Corporations now dominate the world’s 
economy[13]; as has been argued, corporations and their leaders have “displaced 
politics and politicians as...the new high priests and reigning oligarchs of our 
system”[99]. Corporations are today’s most dominant institutions; they “govern our 
lives. They determine what we eat, what we watch, what we wear, where we work, 
and what we do”[99]. 
As stated by UK law[100], one of the ‘general duties of directors’ is to “promote the 
success of the company” (see Box 1), and although ‘success’ is not defined within 
the Act, a second document entitled ‘Companies Act 2006: Duties of Company 
Directors: Ministerial Statements’ states that “[f]or a commercial company, success 
will usually mean long-term increase in value”[101]. Therefore corporations are 
required by UK law to increase the long-term value of the business; i.e. increase 
profits. 
In the US, Delaware’s General Corporation Law is the most influential due to the 
number of major companies incorporate under it, however the American Bar 
Association’s Model Business Corporation Act “governs more corporations, since 
most of the states have adopted it entirely or partially”[102] (the Model Business 
Corporation Act had, as of 2011, been adopted by 31 USA states[103]). The 
Act[104] states that: 
“In the case of a public corporation, the board’s oversight 
responsibilities include attention to: (1) business performance and 
plans; (2) major risks to which the corporation is or may be 
exposed....”  
and  
“(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the 
duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner 
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the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation”. 
Additionally, annotations in the Act state that “[i]n determining the corporation’s 
‘‘best interests’’ the director has wide discretion in deciding how to weigh near-term 





Corporations are therefore required, by law, to maximise profits for their 
shareholders. Tobacco and alcohol companies are legally required to sell as many 
tobacco and alcohol products as possible to maximise their profits, “regardless of 
the often harmful consequences it might cause to others”[99], and must therefore 
oppose effective regulation that could reduce sales. Corporations can only ever 
“function to serve its own interest regardless of the harm or benefits” as “any 
172 Duty to promote the success of the company 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards 
of business conduct, and  
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include 
purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the 
reference to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members were 
to achieving those purposes.  
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law 
requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of 
creditors of the company. 
 
Box 1: The UK Companies Act 2006 
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outcome other than profit for investors is immaterial”[11]. Corporations are therefore 
“compelled to cause harm when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs” and 
cost-benefit analysis is commonly a large part of corporate decision making[99]. 
One example of the corporate focus can be seen from a Philip Morris (PM; one of 
the world’s largest tobacco corporations) document from 1995[105]. The two quotes 
highlight the aggressive nature of corporations when attempting to influence policy 
in order to maximise their profitability: 
“Our goal is to help shape regulatory environments that 
enable our businesses to achieve their objectives in all of the 
locations where they do business”  
“Our overall approach to the issues is to fight aggressively, 
with all available resources, against any attempt, from any 
quarter, to diminish our ability to manufacture our products 
efficiently, and market them effectively” [105] 
Corporations have, very powerfully, been described as having a pathological nature, 
i.e. that they meet all of the criteria usually reserved for diagnosing psychopathic 
traits in humans[99]. Dr Robert Hare, an expert in psychopathy, was asked by 
Bakan[99] to apply his “diagnostic checklist of psychopathic traits” (being 
irresponsible, being manipulative, being grandiose, having a lack of empathy, 
having asocial tendencies, refusing to accept responsibility for their own actions, 
being unable to feel remorse, relating to others superficially) to the typical character 
of a corporation, and found that they matched closely[99]. Corporations have 
“dangerous self-obsessed personalities” and often try to mask this through activities 
such as corporate social responsibility (CSR))[99]; for example when a volcano 
erupted in Central Java in 2010, Philip Morris International (PMI), along with several 
other companies, sponsored a rescue camp where staff wore uniforms and drove 
vehicles bearing the PMI logo[106], and in 2010 in China, the China National 
Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) sponsored at least 69 elementary schools, and 
subsequently the children in these schools were exposed to pro-tobacco 
propaganda such as “Genius comes from hard work. Tobacco helps you to be 
successful”[107]. Although CSR activities (“actions by companies over and above 
their legal obligations towards society and the environment”[108]) often appear as 
being beneficial for society or the environment, its underlying aim is always to 
advance the interests of shareholders (i.e. increase profits); if CSR is genuine, 
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costing the company money, it is illegal[99] as corporations exist solely to maximise 
profits for their shareholders. 
Globalisation1 and international trade treaties such as the Global Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have made it easier for corporations to operate across 
national boundaries. Corporations are no longer tied to the country in which they 
began, and countries must now compete to provide the most “business-friendly 
policies” to entice corporations’ investment[99]. As the chairman of the Cato Institute 
(a prominent American think tank) argued “corporations have become sufficiently 
powerful to pose a threat to governments”; many are now worth more than the 
economies of some countries[99]. Corporations operate very differently in different 
regions and within individual countries. How they operate will depend on, for 
example, whether or not the product they are selling is new to the particular market, 
whether or not it is meeting an existing demand, the culture of the country (for 
example, in many Middle Eastern and Northern African countries consumption of 
alcohol is very low[110], predominantly for religious reasons), and the type of 
regulation the company/product is faced with. Companies are increasingly focussing 
on ‘pre-markets’, i.e. those not yet sufficiently developed to be classed as consumer 
markets[111] as they are seen as having large, untapped, potential profits and a 
lack of regulation. The production and marketing of products such as tobacco and 
alcohol is increasingly globalised, and due to a lack of regulation companies are 
able to use marketing practices in many developing countries that have been 
banned in most developed countries[32, 112, 113]. Globalisation has also given rise 
to greater middle and upper classes within countries with a low average gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita[111], meaning that more people have the 
disposable income to buy Western products. In many developing countries smoking, 
for example, is seen as a ‘Western’ habit, and is seen as desirable. Due to these 
variations and differences, it is important to study corporations across geographical 
space.  
Although industries producing products that have the potential to harm health have 
a negative impact by pushing these products (see sub-chapter 3.2 Corporate 
Marketing) and influencing policy (see sub-chapter 4.2 Policy Influence and 
Compliance), they may also have a positive impact by influencing other elements of 
                                                          
1
Definition of globalisation: through time-space compression “social, cultural, political, and 
economic processes now operate at a global scale”, meaning that “nation-states are no longer 
significant actors or meaningful economic units...consumer tastes and cultures are homogenized and 
satisfied through the provision of standardized global products created by global corporations with 
no allegiance to place or community”[109] 
Chapter 3: Corporations and Corporate Marketing 
49 
 
the determinants of health. Industry may positively influence “socio-economic, 
cultural and environmental conditions”[87] by, for example, creating jobs and by 
paying taxes to government. Industry can also positively affect an individual’s living 
and working conditions through offering employment (assuming the working 
conditions are favourable) allowing individuals to spend money on improving their 
living conditions. The TI and AI produce and market legal (in the majority of 
countries) products that are manufactured to a high standard, and that millions of 
people around the world want to use and consume (although research has shown, 
for example, that most smokers wish they had not started smoking and would now 
like to stop[114, 115]). Corporations, such as the TI and AI, are legitimately meeting 
their shareholder obligations (i.e. maximising profit), and do not aim to harm society. 
If a product is legal then companies are legally allowed to sell it. Companies do not, 
however, have any legal obligation to reduce harm either through product 
development, education, or by not fighting potentially stifling policies from coming 
into law. It is therefore important, argues Freudenberg and Galea[12], to identify 
policies that make it as easy as possible for corporations to choose health, and that 
this should be a priority of public health. 
3.1.1 The Tobacco Industry 
“Tobacco Industry revenue was $664 Billion in 2010, greater than 
the GDP of ALL but 18 nations”[116] 
After strong expansion into new markets in Latin America (1970s), Asia (1980s), 
and the FSU (1990s) and the acquisition of smaller, national companies[117], the 
present-day TI is dominated by just four global private tobacco companies. The ‘big 
four’ companies accounted for 40.2% of the global market in 2013, and the China 
National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), the world’s largest state-owned tobacco 
company[2], accounted for 43.2% of the 2013 global market (see Figure 12). The 
largest tobacco companies are as follows: 
 Philip Morris (PM) – brands include Marlboro, L&M, Virginia Slims 
 British American Tobacco (BAT) – brands include Lucky Strike, Pall Mall, 
Dunhill, Kent 
 Japan Tobacco International (JTI) – brands include Camel, Benson & 
Hedges, Winston, Silk Cut, Old Holborn (Roll Your Own; RYO) 
 Imperial Tobacco – brands include Drum (RYO), Golden Virginia (RYO), 
Lambert & Butler, Richmond 
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 China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) – controls production and 
sales on mainland China[118], and also produces brands for export to 
Southeast Asia[119]. Due to the size of the Chinese market (Chinese men 
smoke a third of the world’s cigarettes), in 2008 CNTC produced 2.1 trillion 
of the 5.9 trillion cigarettes made worldwide[2].  
 
Figure 12: Tobacco companies: global market share, 2013 
  
         (Source [120]) 
  
3.1.2 The Alcohol Industry 
Compared to the tobacco market, the alcohol market is not dominated as heavily by 
multinational corporations (MNCs), and so is more complex to analyse. The 
breakdown of alcohol companies’ market share in 2013 can be seen in Figure 13, 
and highlights the significant presence of smaller companies in the marketplace 
(‘Other’).  
The distribution of market share is heavily swayed by the dominance of beer in the 
market place; the global breakdown of alcoholic drinks consumption in 2011 can be 
seen in Figure 14. When looking at beer exclusively, the top five companies remain 
in the same order as seen in Figure 13: InBev (19.7%), SABMiller (9.6%), Heineken 
(9.2%), Carlsberg (6.2%), and China Resources Enterprise Co (6.2%). The top five 
companies selling high-strength premixers, spirits, and cider are completely 
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six companies make up less than 10% of the wine market (all market share data is 
from 2013[121]).  
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3.2 Corporate Marketing 
“The purpose of business is to create and keep customers, it has only two central 
functions – marketing and innovation”[Drucker in 123]. Marketing is “the action or 
business of promoting and selling products or services”[98] and it aims to attract 
and retain customers in order to make a profit. Marketing, and especially promotion, 
can change even the most well-informed consumer’s opinion and judgement about 
a product, and is able to “reinvent the familiar and make the unfamiliar 
trustworthy”[124]. As Chris Reiter, R.J.Reynolds Tobacco (RJR) Campaign Program 
Manager stated in 2003, “If you can market a product that kills people, you can sell 
anything”[2]. 
Corporate marketing is influenced by a number of factors in both the micro-
environment (factors that are controllable by the company, including product 
development, distribution, and the customer base) and the macro-environment 
(including social, technological, economic, and political/legal factors)[111]. The 
marketing mix[125] forms part of the micro-environment and is made up of five key 
variables known as the 5 P’s: product, price, promotion, place, and person. As 
companies control the marketing mix, the 5 P’s are explored below.  
As will be shown, the TI and AI market their products in similar ways which is 
perhaps because tobacco and alcohol are often consumed in conjunction, and 
because alcohol is sometimes used to promote tobacco products[126-128]. 
Although it is by no means exhaustive, this section provides a flavour of the TI and 
AI’s ‘5P’ marketing activities. 
3.2.1 The 5P’s: Product 
The product is the centre of the marketing mix and all other elements operate 
around it. It includes product development, and innovation can usually be 
considered an ongoing process[129].  
3.2.1.1 Tobacco 
Product innovation is key to the TI’s marketing strategy. In 2010, “BAT claimed that 
over 10% of sales came from product innovation, of which almost half were new 
products and variants that did not exist a year previously”[130]. 
An example of TI product innovation is the development of slimmer cigarettes. 
Brands include Vogue, Silk Cut Superslims, and Virginia Slims which are sold in 
“lipstick sized boxes” containing cigarettes half the width of regular cigarettes[131]. 
In Russia, there are over 100 brands of slim and superslim cigarettes on the market, 
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most of which are marketed towards women; for example, Vogue cigarettes are sold 
in bright, colourful packs, some of which have been designed by fashion 
designers[131] (Figure 15). Additionally, although many are aimed at women, 
studies have shown that they also appeal to children and young people. One study 
of 48 15 year-olds in Scotland showed that slimmer cigarettes were viewed more 
favourably than ‘traditional’ cigarettes across gender and socio-economic groups, 
and that these slimmer cigarettes were seen as being weaker tasting, less harmful, 
“cool”, and “cute”[132]. Another study by the same research group of 75 female 12-
24 year-olds in Scotland found that the participants thought that slimmer cigarettes 
looked nicer than ‘traditional’ cigarettes as they often had interesting designs on 
them (“I would smoke that because of the wee flowers, and it wouldn’t look 
disgusting in my ashtray” (young adult aged 18-24)), and were thought of as the 
‘most pleasant’ tasting and as weaker[133]. Some young adults (aged 18-24) 
described slimmer cigarettes as “petite”, “cute”, and “cool”, and more similar to 
“candy sticks” than ‘traditional’ cigarettes[133]. Additionally, children aged 12-14 
stated that slimmer cigarettes were more discrete (“You could hide them so your 
parents don’t find out”) and would be the choice for someone starting to smoke (“I 
think if you were like starting, that would be like the one you would go for cos it’s the 
smallest”)[133]. 
 




Another example of product innovation is the development of ‘capsule cigarettes’. 
Although these have been in the “margins of the industry” since 1985, new versions 
have recently been launched by all of the main companies[134]. Capsule cigarettes 
are the same size and shape as traditional cigarettes but contain a small capsule in 
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the filter which the consumer can press to release a different taste. For example, 
PM’s Marlboro Ice Blast gives a “cooling” menthol taste when the capsule is 
broken[135], and the JTI Silk Cut Superslims Choice combines both the superslim 
design and a capsule feature[136]. A study of 75 female 12-24 year-olds in Scotland 
found that capsule cigarettes were commonly described as “cool”, “funky”, and 
“high-tech”, and that the ‘click’ of the capsule was seen as a novelty and was 
desirable to children[133]. Additionally, it was thought that capsule cigarettes “would 
be less smelly than a standard cigarette, provide fresher breath, be gentler on the 
throat, and would make it less obvious that somebody had been smoking” (“They 
would make your breath fresh wouldn’t they at the end of your fag” (young adult 
aged 18-24), “Because you’re smoking a cigarette and then all of a sudden it’s like 
chewing gum” (child aged 15-17))[133]. 
3.2.1.2 Alcohol 
Alcohol companies are very good at repackaging and reblending their products to 
appeal to younger consumers. The creation of alcopops, colourful ‘shots’ 
administered via test-tubes, and drinks with daring names (for example HEMP – 
Highly Enjoyable Magic Potion)[137] are able to capture the youth market 
exceptionally well and help to make drinking alcohol appear exciting and fun.  
In the USA between 1970-1997 beer and wine were the drinks of choice for new 
drinkers, but from the late 1990s onwards this shifted towards spirits (and 
particularly ‘white’ spirits including vodka, rum, and tequila)[138]. These white spirits 
were able to be blended with fruit flavours and sugars, and were often carbonated, 
to create ready-to-drink (RTD) products that resembled soda or soft drinks[138, 
139]. These products were termed ‘alcopops’ by public health groups due to their 
appeal to young people[138]. Alcopops were able to be categorised as a ‘flavoured 
malt beverage’ as the production process started with beer; the beer base was 
highly filtered and replaced with flavouring that contained spirits in order to change 
the taste (until 2005, up to 99% of the alcohol in alcopops was from spirits)[138]. As 
production began with beer, alcopops were able to be classified as a beer instead of 
a spirit, meaning they were not subject to the same, stricter marketing restrictions 
that applied to spirits[138]. Alcopops commonly used the spirits’ brand name, for 
example Smirnoff Ice and Bacardi Breezer, aiming to push individuals towards 
consuming spirits as spirit companies “had been frustrated by the aging of their 
primary consumer base and the erosion of their market among younger drinkers, 
who prefer beer and other low alcohol products”[140]. Through extensive marketing, 
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particularly in mediums popular with young people, alcopops became hugely 
popular among children and young people during the early 2000s[138].  
Premixed drinks are a relatively new and growing trend, in part due to the global 
recession shifting sales towards off-trade consumption[141] (‘off-trade’ are sales for 
consumption ‘off’ the premise, for example those by supermarkets); 
“[m]anufacturers’ recent activity, focusing on launching a series of RTDs/high-
strength premix extensions to complement their key flagship spirits brands, can be 
viewed as a strategy to exploit this development”[141]. Examples of these new 
RTDs include: Southern Comfort Lemon & Lime (2009, UK) and Southern Comfort 
& Cola (2011, UK[142]), Jack Daniel’s & Cola (2009, UK[143]), Pimm’s Blackberry 
and Elderflower (2013, UK[144]); some spirit-based RTD cocktails have also been 
launched including: Sauza, Cruzan Cocktail Cubes including ‘Sauza Premium 
Original Margarita Cocktail Cube’, ‘Sauza Premium Strawberry Margarita Cocktail 
Cube’, and ‘Cruzan Premium Mojito Cocktail Cube’ (2009, USA[145]), J&B 
Manhattan (2010, Spain[146]), and Pampero Mojito (2010, Italy and Portugal[146]). 
In the UK ‘spirit beers’ have also recently been launched, including bourbon-
flavoured beer Dead Crow, tequila-flavoured beer Desperados, and rum-flavoured 
beers Cuvana and Cubanisto[147-150], showing that the trend for blended drinks 
has not yet ended. 
Similarly other products have also been combined to create new products. Along 
with alcopops and blends which combine different types of alcohol (as outlined 
above) there are many products that combine alcohol with foodstuffs, especially 
chocolate, ice-cream and other desserts[151], substances such as caffeine[152] 
(consumption of alcoholic energy drinks has been shown to be more harmful to 
health than drinking alcohol alone[153]), and even tobacco to give a “nicotine 
buzz”[154]. 
Another product, new on the US market in 2014, was ‘Palcohol’. Palcohol is 
powdered alcohol which, when water is added, turns into either vodka or rum, or a 
cosmopolitan, mojito, margarita or lemon drop cocktail[155]. Palcohol is not AI-
owned and was developed by an individual[156], but it helps to demonstrate the 
constant evolution in alcoholic beverages. 
3.2.2 The 5P’s: Price 
Price is an important part of the marketing mix as it determines what the company 
receives per unit for the product that is being marketed, and therefore the revenue 
that is generated[125]. There are two objectives with pricing: to maximise profits, 
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and to maintain or increase the product or company’s market share[157]. Price can 
also be used as a promotional tool, for example by using special offers and 
discounts[157] (this is discussed under sub-chapter 3.2.3 The 5P’s: Promotion). 
3.2.2.1 Tobacco 
The formula for ‘price elasticity of demand’ (percentage change in demand divided 
by percentage change in price) allows companies to calculate how much demand 
would be affected by changes in price[125]. This is a useful calculation for 
companies as it allows them to predict what would happen to sales if prices were 
increased or decreased. If demand is shown to be relatively unresponsive to price 
changes then it is said to be inelastic, but if it is responsive it is said to be 
elastic[125]. For cigarettes, an addictive product, the price elasticity of demand has 
been estimated to be between -0.3 to -0.5, which means that a 10% increase in 
price will reduce cigarette consumption by approximately 3%–5%[17]; estimates 
have been higher (up to 8%) in lower income countries[158]. Therefore although 
price increases will have an effect on consumption, cigarettes can be considered 
relatively price inelastic (the percentage reduction in consumption is smaller than 
the percentage price increase). 
In most countries, the pricing of tobacco products is complicated by taxes such as 
excise tax and sales/value added tax. Unlike sales/value added tax, excise tax is 
applied only to a narrow range of products, and at the production or importation 
stage rather than the sales/distribution stage[158]. It was traditionally used to raise 
government revenue, but more recently has been used as a tobacco control 
measure; tax/price increases have been identified as the most effective single 
tobacco control measure available (“over one hundred studies have examined the 
impact of tobacco taxes and prices on overall tobacco use...it is clear that a price 
increase will lead to a reduction in consumption”[158]) and help to offset the 
external costs of smoking[158]. For example, in September 2014, South Korea 
announced a proposal to almost double the cost of cigarettes through taxation in 
order to reduce its male smoking rate, which is one of the highest among developed 
countries at 41%[159]. Gilmore et al[160] found that cigarette prices were being 
increased in the UK (usually in March/April each year) over and above tax increases 
for all segments, except for the absolute cheapest brands where taxes were being 
absorbed. This, they argued, was in order to “reassure price-sensitive smokers and 
accentuate the price gap, but also to hide the price increases on the more 
expensive brands behind the excise increases”[160]. This ‘overshifting’ of taxes is 
central to retaining and maximising profit margins; higher tax increases the price 
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and reduces demand, meaning the after-tax mark up must rise for profits to 
increase[158, 160]. 
The price charged for a product must also reflect the level of disposable income 
potential consumers have access to. MNCs usually change the price of their 
products in different regions and countries according to the local economic situation, 
the tax system, and the market structure. For example, there is evidence that in new 
markets the TI initially sells cigarettes cheaply aiming to increase smoking 
prevalence and consumption levels regardless of profit, but that once prevalence 
and consumption levels are higher and regional economies are stronger, prices are 
increased and profits are reaped[130]. 2008-2011 data from GATS has also been 
used to compare cigarette prices and affordability across 15 countries (Bangladesh, 
Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Thailand, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Vietnam)[161]. This study found that cigarettes were 
most affordable in Russia, and also relatively affordable in Brazil, China and the 
Philippines, and that cigarettes had the highest mean price in Romania and were 
the cheapest in the Philippines[161].  
Cigarettes became more affordable (by almost 22%) in LICs and MICs between 
2000 and 2010, but became less affordable (by over 10%) in HICs[2] (Figure 16). 
Regionally, only in Europe have cigarettes become less affordable in the last 
decade (9% more expensive), whereas cigarettes in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region are almost 50% more affordable[2]. These differences are, at least in part, 
due to differences in taxation levels; excise taxes tend to be highest in HICs (in 
2008 63% of the price of the most sold cigarette brand was tax in HICs, compared 
to 54% in upper-middle income countries (UMICs), 45% in lower-middle income 
countries (LMICs), and 39% in LICs)[158].  
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A meta-analysis of 1,003 alcohol price elasticity of demand estimates found that the 
mean was -0.46 for beer, -0.69 for wine and -0.80 for spirits[162] meaning that a 
10% increase in price would reduce consumption of beer by approximately 5%, 
wine by approximately 7%, and spirits by 8%. Therefore although price increases 
reduce alcohol consumption, alcohol, like cigarettes, can be considered relatively 
price inelastic (the percentage reduction in consumption is smaller than the 
percentage price increase).  
Excise tax, as outlined above, is also applied to alcohol in most countries. Similarly 
to tobacco, excise tax is now used as an alcohol control measure; tax/price 
increases have been identified as one of the most effective (and cost-effective) 
alcohol control measures available (along with controls on alcohol availability and 
promotion)[163, 164]. Aside from reducing consumption, raising taxes also 
increases government revenue, although the amount raised tends to be much lower 
than the social costs attributable to alcohol consumption[163]. Similarly to tobacco, 
there is evidence that prices of alcoholic drinks are commonly increased over and 
above tax increases[165]; ‘overshifting’ of taxes allows alcohol companies to 
maximise profit margins. 
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Minimum unit pricing is one example of a price-related alcohol control measure. It 
assigns a minimum price to each unit of alcohol in an alcoholic drink, for example if 
the minimum unit price was 50p, a 10-unit bottle of wine would have to cost at least 
£5.00. Canada was the first country to introduce minimum alcohol pricing, and 
studies have shown that it has worked in tackling alcohol-related harm through 
reduced consumption[166, 167]. At the beginning of 2014, Moldova, Russia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, some US states, and eight of the ten Canadian provinces had 
a minimum price in place[168]. In the UK, minimum pricing is the focus of 
substantial policy debate[168]; in 2013 the plans for its introduction were shelved 
with many claiming that the government had “caved in to” AI opposition and 
lobbying[169, 170] and in 2014 plans for minimum pricing were replaced with a ban 
on ‘below cost’ (duty plus VAT) sales instead[171]. A ‘below-cost’ ban aims to stop 
supermarkets selling alcohol as a loss-leader, but critics have argued that only 1% 
of sales will be affected[172]. Scotland, however, has decided to go ahead with 
minimum pricing[173], but at the beginning of 2014[174] ministers were still fighting 
a court battle with the AI in order to pass the bill and the Scottish parliament is now 
awaiting a ruling from the European Court of Justice[175]. 
3.2.3 The 5P’s: Promotion 
The term ‘promotion’ describes the persuasive methods that are used to 
communicate information about a product such as its quality, main selling points, 
convenience, or availability to potential consumers. Promotion is what most people 
would think of when the term ‘marketing’ is used, but it is in fact just one element of 
the marketing mix. 
Promotional activity can take a number of different direct forms including advertising 
(paid forms of non-personal communication of products on television (TV), in print 
media, on billboards, cinema adverts, and on the radio), personal selling (oral 
communication with a potential customer), sales promotions (customer incentives), 
publicity (communicating product information in the media without having to pay for 
the time or space directly), direct marketing (directly distributing products, 
information, and promotional material to target consumers), sponsorship (company 
alignment with sports events, the arts, teams, tournaments, competitions, shows, or 
individual personalities), product placement (the deliberate placing of products 
within films or TV programmes), and Internet promotion (using electronic 
media)[123]. 




Information on TI promotional expenditure is not readily available for the vast 
majority of countries, so this section reports only on figures from the USA where 
reporting is mandatory[158], although there is also evidence that in new markets the 
TI quickly becomes one of the top national advertisers through intensive, heavy 
marketing[33, 35, 176]. As cigarette consumption has been declining since the early 
1980s, the TI has spent increasing amounts on advertising and promotion; since 
1981 expenditure has grown tenfold in the USA[17], and since the 1950s “cigarettes 
have been one of the most heavily marketed consumer products in the United 
States”[17]. The total spent in the US alone in 2008, $9,941 million, equates to more 
than “$34 being spent on tobacco marketing for every man, woman, and child in the 
US that year”[2]. Promotion, especially at this level, is very powerful, and is able to 
prey on people’s wants and desires, on people’s need to belong, and it is able to 
lure people into a particular lifestyle and identity[124]. Promotion aims to “persuade 
and/or maintain and reinforce specific behaviours among particular target 
audiences”[177], for example, in China BAT and PM tapped into the culture of gift-
giving and promoted the acceptability of giving cigarettes as a present[178].  
Tobacco advertising and promotion has been increasingly regulated in recent 
decades (see sub-chapter 4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: Tobacco and 
Alcohol Marketing). Due to this, in most developed countries the TI can no longer 
market using traditional media such as TV, radio, and print media, or use 
sponsorship or celebrity endorsements to promote their products; however there is 
evidence of the TI still using marketing practices banned in developed countries in 
some developing countries[32, 112, 113]. In the USA between 1970 and 2005, the 
types of marketing used by tobacco companies changed dramatically; measured 
media (TV, radio, newspapers, magazines, and billboards) expenditure decreased 
from 82% to almost none, whereas spending on promotional activities increased 
from 18% to almost 100%[17]. The USA’s Federal Trade Commission reports 
marketing expenditure of the five largest US cigarette manufacturers. In 2011 the 
data showed that $8.366 billion was spent on advertising and promotion in the USA, 
the majority of which (84%, $6.997 billion) was spent on price discounts paid to 
retailers in order to reduce prices for consumers, highlighting that this is now the 
main method of TI promotion in the West[179]. In 2011 the companies also reported 
spending over half a million dollars on newspaper advertising, the first time 
expenditure had been reported since 2008, $23 million on magazine advertising, $3 
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million on outdoor advertising including billboards and signs, and $77 million on 
point-of-sale (POS) advertising[179]. 
Although televised tobacco adverts are banned in many countries[2], studies have 
found that tobacco imagery is still common on television, although it cannot be 
assumed that it is all TI funded. For example, a study of 613 programmes on UK 
television completed in 2010 found that 73 programmes featured tobacco use, 18 
featured tobacco brand appearances and 204 featured tobacco paraphernalia, and 
there was a similar frequency before and after the 9pm UK watershed for 
programmes suitable for young people; in summary they found that a third of prime-
time TV programmes in the UK included tobacco content[180]. Another study in 
2004 of 120 programmes on New Zealand television found that 25% of these 
programmes had at least one scene (in total there were 152 scenes) which showed 
tobacco imagery[181]. Additionally, there have been similar studies with regards to 
tobacco imagery in films (although again it cannot be assumed it is all TI funded). 
For example, 497 films released between 1991 and 2001 (the top grossing 50 films 
in the US per year) were assessed for images of smoking and smoking-related 
paraphernalia[182]. This study found that 75% of films contained some smoking-
related images, but that rates had slightly declined over time (especially in youth-
orientated films; however rates went up in R-rated films (UK=15) and dramas). 
Another study of the top grossing 100 films each year released in the US between 
1996-2009 (1400 films) found that there were a total of 500 tobacco brand 
appearances within the 1400 films and that Marlboro and Camel were the most 
common brands[183]. In 1998, tobacco brand placements in films were banned in 
the US (as part of the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), see sub-chapter 4.1 
The Global Regulatory Environment: Tobacco and Alcohol Marketing) and it was 
found that after this, tobacco brand appearances dropped by 7% each year until 
2006 where there was little further decline[183]. In 2011, the five largest USA 
cigarette manufacturers reported no expenditure on product placement in films or 
TV shows, and that “neither they nor anyone working for them or on their behalf:  
sought, solicited, granted approval, or otherwise gave permission for the 
appearance of any cigarette product or cigarette brand imagery in any motion 
picture [or] television show”[179]. 
Having predominantly moved away from traditional media (especially in HICs), the 
TI now use new media such as the Internet, video games, and smartphones to 
market their products.  
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The advent of the Internet has had a profound effect on the way business is 
undertaken and how marketing is used and understood. There is now a “global 
virtual society linked by channels such as the Internet, text messaging, and 
interactive gaming”, and as communication has become globalised, the impact on 
public health has grown and intensified[17]. The Internet is now vital for marketing 
practices due to its global reach[123], extreme efficiency[129], and the fact it is 
largely unregulated[184]. Approximately 25% of the world’s population now has 
access to the Internet[184] and research by Pidd[2009, in 123] showed that across 
16 countries, on average, people spent 29% of their leisure time on the Internet. 
This is a huge amount of time when individuals can potentially be exposed to 
advertisements and company branding. Posting videos to the website YouTube is 
one method of reaching customers via the Internet. One study of tobacco-related 
videos on YouTube in 2010 found 163 videos, 71% of which were pro-tobacco, and 
only 4% anti-tobacco; one pro-tobacco video (focussing on Marlboro cigarettes) had 
been viewed over two million times[184].  
Video games are another important marketing arena. According to research 
undertaken by Nielsen in the US, males aged 18-34 years-old spend as much time 
playing video games as they do watching TV[17]. Haninger and Thompson[2004, in 
17] found that just six of the 396 video games they reviewed involved tobacco 
and/or alcohol products within game play, but that when tobacco and/or alcohol 
products were shown they were often strongly integrated. For example, in the game 
The Chronicles of Riddick: Escape from Butcher Bay “cigarettes are used as a 
reward, with each pack revealing some aspect of a new, related Riddick movie”, 
thereby making cigarettes seem ‘cool’ and desirable[17]. However, whilst more than 
$8 billion was spent on advertising tobacco products to young males in 2003, less 
than $15 million was spent on video game advertising[17], indicating that it is a 
relatively untapped advertising tool. 
Smartphones (including Apple’s iPhone and Google Android phones) have 
presented further opportunities for the TI to market their products through the 
advent of ‘apps’ which are small applications that a smartphone user can download 
onto their phone. Smartphones allow consumers to be “reached anytime, 
anywhere”, and smartphone users are growing exponentially globally[185]. A 2012 
search of the Apple App Store and Android Market (the two largest global app 
stores) identified 283 tobacco-related apps in English, 107 of which were pro-
smoking (42 in the Android Market and 65 in the Apple App Store)[185]. The pro-
smoking apps fitted into six categories: tobacco shop/brands, smoking simulation, 
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wallpaper, cigarette battery, pro-smoking advocacy, and cigarette rolling 
information. The most common categories were the former two – ‘tobacco 
shop/brands’ included information about where to purchase products and 
information about the brands, and ‘smoking simulation’ apps simulated smoking 
behaviour through the use of virtual cigarettes. The 42 Android apps alone were 
downloaded by a minimum of 6.2 million users and an average of 11.1 million 
users[185]. Again, although it cannot be assumed that the apps were TI funded or 
supported, research shows the high availability of pro-smoking apps to smartphone 
users. 
Research has found that music has also been used to promote tobacco products. 
One study, using internal TI documents, found that Brown & Williamson used music 
to promote their menthol brand Kool from 1975 onwards[186]. Music (initially 
through a ‘Kool Jazz’ concert and festival) was used to target African American men 
because, for example, “music provided an emotional hook for consumers to identify 
with the brand”. The subsequent ‘Kool Mixx’ campaign also involved taking “vans 
equipped with speakers blasting music” to inner-city neighbourhoods and 
distributing free samples, key chains, and lighters, alongside adverts in “ethnic” 
magazines and direct mailings[186]. The ‘Kool Mixx’ campaign was still running in 
2004; a competition for rappers was run, limited edition cigarette packs were 
released featuring artistic depictions of “hip-hop culture” and a ““Mixx Stick” radio 
[was] free with the purchase of a limited edition two-pack set”, and the ‘Kool Nu 
Jazz Festival’ was taken to four cities and featured modern and popular hip-hop and 
soul singers[186]. Celebrities were commonly used to promote tobacco products, 
but this is now banned in most developed countries. However, in 2010 in Indonesia 
a local tobacco company, Djarum, which makes the kretek (tobacco and cloves 
blend) cigarettes LA Lights, planned to sponsor a concert by the singer Kelly 
Clarkson. This caused outrage amongst fans and public health officials, and Djarum 
eventually pulled out[187]. Additionally, although it may not be intentional by the TI, 
when a celebrity gives an interview stating that they smoke, the journalist often 
reports the brand that they smoke to give their story credibility thereby providing the 
brand with publicity[188].  
The TI is also increasingly using more covert ways of reaching their target market, 
especially in the West. For example, after a cigarette advertising ban in Norway in 
1975 “Camel boots were introduced in that country, with advertisements that were 
virtually identical to earlier ads for Camel cigarettes”[17]. In 2010 The Observer 
newspaper[189] reported that tobacco companies (including Imperial, PM, and JTI) 
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have been using major UK music festivals to promote their products; tobacco 
advertising and sponsorship is banned in the UK, so specific tobacco companies or 
brands have signed exclusive deals with the privately-run festivals to, for example, 
be the only supplier. Promotional methods included using coloured light up kiosks to 
sell cigarettes at night, employing attractive staff wearing branded t-shirts and caps, 
selling ‘special edition’ boxes of cigarettes that also include additional extras such 
as ‘festival edition’ lighters or glow-sticks, and using customised camper vans to sell 
rolling tobacco[189]. Alongside these methods of promotion, tobacco companies are 
increasingly using social networking sites (such as Facebook and Twitter) to 
promote their products at events, for example employees will post photos of festival-
goers having a good time, with the tobacco company branding in full view thereby 
creating positive brand-association.  
Additionally, tobacco companies have begun to experiment with stealth marketing in 
order to create a ‘buzz’ around a product[17]. For example in Australia in 2002 the 
program of a youth-orientated music festival, ‘Big Day Out’, “contained a cryptic 
double-page advertisement for something called Discovery World Air (DWA). The 
advertisement, captioned ‘Length Matters’, featured a youth eating a hot dog and 
wearing a DWA cap and shirt”, and when people arrived at the DWA booth at the 
festival, they found glamorous assistants selling cigarettes for Rothmans[190]. PM’s 
recent “Be Marlboro” campaign also started as a stealth campaign, but then 
developed into a more traditional marketing campaign. ‘Be Marlboro’ was launched 
in Germany in 2011[191] (and has since been launched in around 50 countries 
worldwide[192]) and began with unbranded billboard adverts containing the word 
‘MAYBE’ with the letters ‘may’ crossed out leaving the word ‘be’ (see Figure 17). 
This ‘teaser’ advert soon developed into a branded campaign where two choices 
were given (for example “Left or Right”, “Sit or Stand”, “Yes or No”) followed by the 
slogan “Don’t be a maybe. Be Marlboro”[191]. Once this phase was established, the 
adverts were then replaced with real situations and associated photos to evoke 
emotional responses (for example, “Maybe never fell in love. Be Marlboro” 
(including a photo of a couple kissing), “Maybe will never be her own boss. Be 
Marlboro” (including a photo of a female mechanic sitting in a garage), and “A 
maybe never reached the top. Don’t be a Maybe. Be Marlboro” (including a photo of 
a woman smoking whilst standing at the top of a skyscraper))[191, 192]. In 
Germany the campaign was also supported by events such as ‘secret’ club nights, 
where those in receipt of tickets were told when and where to meet, and were then 
transported to a secret Marlboro-branded location where they were given drinks 
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vouchers and free Marlboro cigarette samples[191]. The ‘Be Marlboro’ campaign 
has been criticised for targeting youth[193] by exploiting “adolescents’ search for 
identity”[192], but PM have stated that the campaign was targeted at those aged 
between 18-24 years-old[191]. 
 
Figure 17: 'Be Marlboro' unbranded advert 
 
(Source [194] (image cropped)) 
 
The packaging of a product is another important part of promotion. Internal TI 
documents have shown that cigarette packaging is of critical importance “especially 
in the context of tighter restrictions on conventional avenues for tobacco 
marketing”[195]. When advertising restrictions are introduced the “pack itself 
remain[s] available for communication to customers and potential customers”[196] 
and unlike packaging for other products which may be immediately discarded, 
cigarette packaging is kept with the smoker until the pack is finished and is often 
“left on public display during use” thereby acting as an advertisement[195]. The TI 
“exploits all elements of packaging” from the outer film, the tear tape and pack 
inserts, to the physical structure of the pack[197]. For example, Imperial recently 
changed the packaging of their JPS hand rolling tobacco brand from landscape to 
portrait to “allow for easier merchandising and increased visibility of the price marks” 
and aimed to offer customers who also smoke JPS cigarettes “reassurance and 
consistency”[198], Imperial’s Lambert and Butler cigarettes began being sold in 
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‘Glide Tec’ packs in 2011 where users, from the front of the pack, are able to slide 
an inner part of the pack up to push the cigarettes out of the top of the pack[199, 
200], and PM’s Chesterfield and Marlboro Gold Original cigarettes were released in 
limited-edition ‘festival themed’ packs to tie-in with the UK’s 2014 summer festival 
season[201]. Figure 18 shows just a handful of the myriad colourful and enticing 
packs available in the UK in 2014. 
 
Figure 18: Cigarette packaging, UK, 2014 
 
(Source: images reproduced from www.tesco.com, May 2014) 
 
As Slade argued in 1997[196], “The adaptation of advertising to the pack itself in 
this manner is but another reason that a requirement for plain packaging is sound 
public policy”. Standardised ‘plain’ packaging has a “standardised shape, method of 
opening and background colour” with brand and product names in “a uniform style, 
colour and position”[197], along with large text and graphic pictorial health warnings 
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on both the front and back of the packs[202]. In December 2012, Australia became 
the first country to introduce plain packaging, and multiple countries including 
Ireland (which in 2014 became the first European country to attempt to pass plain 
packaging into law[203]), the UK, New Zealand, and Canada are considering 
following suit[202]. The TI have strongly contested the introduction of plain 
packaging through mass publicity and legal challenges arguing, amongst other 
things, that plain packaging ‘won’t work’, that it infringes their intellectual property 
rights and infringes international trade agreements, that it will lead to increases in 
smuggling, and that it will cause job losses in packaging and related industries[202, 
204]. Policymakers and those working in tobacco control commonly use the ‘scream 
test’ to determine the potential effectiveness of a policy proposal (“[w]hen the 
tobacco industry or its allies vehemently oppose a proposal, we know it will be 
effective”[205]) adding to evidence that plain packaging would be an effective 
tobacco control measure.  
Branding and brand-stretching (the practice of attaching a well-known brand to 
another product which is unrelated to the first) is another important part of 
promotion; having a brand identity is now a “dominant feature of contemporary 
marketing”[137]. Probably the most successful cigarette brand ever created was 
PM’s “Marlboro Man”[17]: In 1954, a cowboy was introduced as the Marlboro 
symbol and over the next few decades Marlboro cigarettes were rebranded from a 
product targeted at women to one branded as a symbol of adventure, 
independence, masculinity and freedom. Alongside the actual cigarettes, Marlboro 
developed a number of sideline products such as Marlboro Classic clothing 
(garments which were marketed as having strength and endurance), Marlboro 
Unlimited Gear (branded items including gas stoves, rucksacks, and outdoor 
watches, all “built for adventure”), and later, in the 1990s, competitions were 
launched for holidays to cattle ranches[17]. Since the 1970s, PM has spent over 
$100 million (2006 dollars) per year advertising Marlboro, and in 2006 Marlboro 
“was the 12th most highly valued brand worldwide, with an estimated $21.4 billion in 
brand equity”[17].  
Price can be used very successfully as a promotional tool. As outlined previously, in 
the USA in 2011, 84% of the $8.366 billion that was spent on advertising and 
promotion by the five largest US cigarette manufacturers, was spent on price 
discounts paid to retailers in order to reduce prices for consumers[179]. Given that 
smokers, especially young smokers or those from other vulnerable groups[17, 206, 
207], are very price sensitive it is a very effective marketing tool. Price promotions 
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can include ‘money off’ promotions, vouchers, free samples, multi-pack discounts, 
free additional cigarettes, and free promotional items[158]. A 1999 study of price-
based promotions in 3,464 tobacco-selling stores in 191 communities across the US 
before and after a ban on billboard advertising found that multi-pack discounts were 
observed in 23% stores before the ban and 27% after (which was a statistically 
significant increase), and money-off promotions were observed in 32% stores 
before the ban and 41% after (which was again significant)[208], indicating that 
price promotions are common and that the TI simply shifts marketing expenditure to 
non-banned media when other routes are restricted[208-210]. 
3.2.3.2 Alcohol 
As with TI marketing expenditure, the vast majority of countries do not require the AI 
to report their marketing expenditure so again only US data is reported. The USA’s 
Federal Trade Commission reported aggregate marketing expenditure of “14 major 
alcohol marketers” in the USA in 2011[211]. The data showed that $3.45 billion was 
spent on marketing in the USA, the majority of which was spent on POS (almost $1 
billion, 29%), national TV adverts ($780 million, 23%), and sport sponsorship ($400 
million, 12%); approximately a third of marketing expenditure was spent on 
traditional media (TV, radio, magazines and newspapers)[211]. Additionally, US 
data from 2002 showed that over two thirds of advertising expenditure was spent on 
beer, approximately a quarter on spirits, and the remainder on wine[212].  
Unlike tobacco, alcohol is not (generally) subjected to comprehensive restrictions on 
advertising and promotion. This means that the AI can still use ‘traditional’ media 
such as TV (and product placement within TV programmes), radio, print media, and 
billboards to promote their products.  
TV is an important outlet for AI marketing, and companies and brands often sponsor 
popular TV shows; “it remains the most overt means of marketing alcohol”[213]. In 
the US for example, between 2001 and 2005, there was a 34% increase in the 
number of alcohol advertisements on TV, and in these five years there were an 
estimated 1.4 million televised advertisements for alcohol[214]. A European study 
found that there were over 11,000 TV adverts between May and October 2010 in 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands (the most were aired in 
Germany, over 3,000, and least in the Netherlands, over 1,500)[215]. In each 
country, except Denmark, beer was the most advertised product on TV (in 
Denmark, spirits were the most advertised), and TV adverts were most common at 
the weekend and between the hours of 8pm-1am[215]. Alcohol is also often seen 
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within TV programmes. A study in 2004 of 144 episodes of 18 different top-rated, 
prime-time programmes in the US found that alcohol was present in every 
programme and in every episode of ten of the programmes[216]. It also found that 
wine was the most commonly shown alcoholic drink (as the sole alcohol type 40% 
of the time), followed by spirits (18%) and beer (11%), and in 31% instances 
multiple alcohol types were shown in the same scene[216].  
Alcohol is also commonly seen within films. For example, a study of the 15 highest 
grossing films in the UK between 1989 and 2008 (300 films in total) found that 86% 
films had at least one ‘alcohol appearance’[217]. Alcohol use was identified in 72% 
films, inferred alcohol use in 79% films, and branding occurred in 35% films 
(Budweiser beer was the most common brand to appear). 90% of the films that 
included alcohol branding were rated as suitable to be viewed by youth (but there 
was no alcohol branding in films rated U), and at least one alcohol appearance 
occurred in 52% U-rated films, 84% of PGs, 95% of 12/12As, 96% of 15s, and 
100% of 18s[217]. Another study, of the top grossing 100 films each year released 
in the US between 1996 and 2009 (1,400 films), found that there were a total of 
2,433 alcohol brand appearances (Miller and Budweiser beer were the two most 
common brands) and that in youth-rated films, the number of brand appearances 
significantly increased by 5.2 instances per year[183].  
In 2012 it was reported by “14 major alcohol marketers” in the US that just under 
$100 million was spent on advertising in newspapers and magazines[211]. 
Advertising in print media “represents a small proportion of the marketing spend for 
alcohol manufacturers, but is widely utilised by alcohol retailers”[213]. Between 
1997 and 2001 in the US there were over 9,000 adverts in 35 major magazines, 
82% were for spirits, 13% for beer, and the remainder for wine[218]. The annual 
number of adverts in these magazines was found to decrease overtime[218]. 
Similarly, between 2001 and 2004 in the US it was found that there were over 
13,000 adverts in national magazines[219]. Spirits were the most advertised form of 
alcohol in national magazines (almost three quarters of the adverts were for spirits) 
but the number of adverts decreased over time; in contrast the number of beer and 
wine adverts increased over time[219].  
The AI is increasingly using the types of media that are popular with young people 
as it needs to attract new consumers and establish brand loyalty[220]. The 
marketing of alcohol to young people involves linking the drinks “to youth lifestyle 
through music, fashion, use of animation and sports”[221]. For example, alcohol 
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companies promote their products on the radio through “DJ chat or [in the] lyrics of 
popular music”[137]. A study of 793 songs which US adolescents were most 
exposed to between 2005 and 2007 found that 21% ‘referred explicitly to alcohol’ 
and of these 24% contained reference to a specific alcohol brand[222]. These brand 
references were commonly associated with wealth (63%), sex (59%), luxury objects 
(51%), partying (49%), weapons (27%), and other drugs (44%)[222].  
AI sponsorship is also very common. “Sponsors can cash in on the prestige, fun or 
glamour of the event, accessing audiences when they are receptive during an 
enjoyable or exciting time”[137] which was echoed by Carling in their reference to 
music sponsorship: “Ultimately, the band are the heroes at the venue and Carling 
should use them to ‘piggy back’ and engage customers’ emotions”[220]. Sports 
sponsorship is particularly common, for example in 2012 it was reported by “14 
major alcohol marketers” in the US that they spent $400 million on sport 
sponsorship and $220 million on non-sport sponsorship[211]. Sports sponsorship 
includes, for example, naming rights of teams or competitions (Carling, for example, 
was the named sponsor of England’s football Carling Cup between 2003 and 
2012[220]), being the sole alcohol supplier at an event or for a particular team, 
merchandising, and placing billboards inside stadiums[137]. A study of the ten top 
clubs of the five most frequently played sports within Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands (50 clubs per country) were assessed for AI sponsorship 
in 2010[215]. In Bulgaria only 1/50 clubs was sponsored by the AI, 10/50 clubs were 
sponsored in Denmark, 23/50 in Italy, 24/50 in the Netherlands, and in Germany 
36/50 clubs were sponsored[215]. Sport sponsorship was shown to vary 
significantly by sport and by country, but appeared to be most prevalent in the more 
international sports/clubs (such as football and basketball).  
Festivals are also often sponsored by the AI, for example it was found that almost 
half of festivals in Sweden in 2012, whose visitors are predominantly under the age 
of 25, were sponsored by an alcohol brand or company[223]. Analysis of internal AI 
documents have found that Carling aims to be “the first choice for the festival virgin” 
in the UK by offering, for example, free branded tents (“Quick opportunity to get 
major brand presence on site”) and a free ‘Campsite Morning Delivery Service’ 
including “a cold can Carling and the daily newspaper – Great way to start the 
day!”[220]. Partnerships with bands are also common, for example in 2010 
Denmark’s Royal Unibrew partnered with Danish rock band ‘Kashmir’ launching a 
website-based competition where new bands could submit photos and a song with 
the hope of winning an opportunity to support ‘Kashmir’ on their 2010 tour[215]. 
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Similarly, the AI often uses celebrities to endorse their products, especially when 
appealing to younger segments of the market. Recent UK examples of celebrities 
endorsing alcohol products include Jean Claude Van Damme (actor) who in 2012  
began appearing in TV adverts for Coors Light beer (which has continued to date), 
Holly Valance (actor/singer) who appeared in adverts for the beer Fosters in 2011, 
and, more globally, Madonna (singer) partnered with Diageo’s Sminoff in 2011 and 
in one of her 2012 music videos Smirnoff is the only drink available behind a bar 
and there are multiple shots of Smirnoff bottles[224].  
As outlined in the tobacco section previously, the Internet has had a huge effect on 
the way companies operate and how they market their products. Most alcohol 
companies have their own websites, and usually ask users to verify their age before 
being able to access the website’s content, although this is almost always 
ascertained by simply ticking a box agreeing that the user is over the necessary age 
(this is also applicable to many TI websites). An Australian wine website 
(www.wickedwines.com.au) aimed at ‘younger wine lovers’ contained an “initial 
warning `This site contains wads of wickedness. If you’re  easily  offended  or  not  
in  the mood  for  some harmless  fun,  you’d  better  get  out  of  here  really 
quick’”[225], which could encourage young Internet users to continue onto the 
website with its use of exciting and enticing language. When, during a UK 
parliamentary inquiry (see sub-chapter 4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: 
Tobacco and Alcohol Marketing), it was pointed out that a child could easily enter 
these websites using a false date of birth or age, a WKD representative replied that 
there’s little they could do if a child makes a “wilful choice to lie”[220]. Alongside 
product information, AI company websites often contain games, competitions and 
downloads[213]. The website for Smirnoff Vodka, for example, contained a list of 
bars and upcoming events, competitions, video interviews with fashion designers 
and musicians, and interactive features[213]. ‘Advergames’ are online games 
integrated with company branding, and often appear on company websites[213]. 
Advergames typically feature significant branding and product placement (including 
brand names, logos, product images (such as images of bottles), characters, 
slogans, and colours associated with the brand) and commonly integrate brands 
into the game’s storyline; “the overall effect is to expose players to brand references 
for extended periods of time, and to do so in a way that is interactive and highly 
engaging”[213]. 
Aside from hosting their own websites and purely placing advertisements onto web 
pages, companies can use the Internet to organise promotional activities and 
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interactive events for consumers to get involved in. Social networking sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter are key platforms for this to take place. For example, the 
alcohol brand Southern Comfort announced in 2009 that its entire US marketing 
budget was to be spent online, with its main outlet being Facebook[226,  in 227]. 
Like many brands, Southern Comfort has its own Facebook page2 which includes 
photos of products, information about events, and asks Facebook users to comment 
on its statuses and updates. For example, when the Southern Comfort page was 
visited on 3rd April 2012 the latest post was “Who else had a great weekend? Prove 
it! Post some photos or share stories of you and your crew celebrating. (Bonus 
points if Southern Comfort is included in the pics or stories.)”, thereby encouraging 
users to post a photo or story that included Southern Comfort in a positive, fun light. 
Similarly, Diageo, which owns alcohol brands including Guinness, Smirnoff, and 
Baileys, announced a multimillion-dollar deal with Facebook in 2011. Diageo trained 
more than 950 of its staff in “Facebook boot camps” in order to effectively work with 
social media, and Facebook will provide Diageo with strategic consultancy to ensure 
that “the development of consumer participation programmes are social by 
design”[228]. Facebook has proved to be a very effective method of marketing for 
Diageo. Its brands saw a 20% increase in sales in the USA as a result of Facebook 
promotional activity, and in 2011 Smirnoff vodka was “the number one beverage 
alcohol brand on Facebook worldwide"[229].  
An Australian study of alcohol brands on Facebook highlights the main ways in 
which companies interact with potential and current consumers[230]. These 
included: associating drinking with specific times and places, asking consumers to 
interact, using mythology and popular culture to build a brand personality, offering 
consumption suggestions, using images, and running competitions. For example, AI 
Facebook posts are most common on a Friday, with brands posting messages 
‘anticipating the weekend’. One example outlined is that of “Bundaberg Rum’s 
‘Bundy R. Bear’ Facebook page which personifies the brand in the character of 
Bundy Bear”. An example given of a Friday post was an image of Bundy Bear’s arm 
wearing a Bundaberg Rum-branded watch which was captioned “118 minutes till 
Rum O’Clock. Hang in there team”; this post received 683 ‘likes’ and 53 
comments[230]. Many posts ask consumers a question, usually related to the 
product or to popular culture (this can be seen in the Southern Comfort example 
above). They also often ask consumers to “express sentiments about the brand”, for 
example Absolute posted the question “Which one do you prefer?” underneath a 
                                                          
2
 www.facebook.com/southerncomfort 
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photo of two of their cocktail brands (this post received 568 ‘likes’ and 191 
comments)[230]. Almost 60% of the content posted by brands in the study 
attempted to create a ‘personality’, i.e. creating characters, having ‘personable 
conversations’ about popular culture, shared sentiments and values, making jokes, 
and developing ‘myths or narratives about their history, founders and 
production’[230]. Jack Daniel’s, for example, has told stories about the history of 
their distillery and their founders (Figure 19), and Carlton Dry regularly uses humour 
and irony through the posting of ‘funny’ photos or Internet memes[230]. 
‘Consumption suggestions’ are often in the form of cocktail or food recipes[230]. For 
example, ‘strawberry and lime Rekorderlig cupcakes’ (Figure 20, left) and an 
‘unnamed’ Smirnoff cocktail (Figure 20, right). Facebook is also regularly used as, 
what Smirnoff term, a “competition medium”[220]. For example, a Smirnoff-
sponsored Facebook competition was used to find a new dancer for the singer 
Madonna’s new tour[224], and was again used by Smirnoff to give away free tickets 
to their ‘Electric Cabaret’ nightclub events[220]. Similar methods are used on other 
social networking sites and websites[213, 231]. 
 
Figure 19: A Jack Daniel's Facebook post 
 
(Source: [230]) 
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As content tends to be less formally regulated[230, 231], online marketing provides 
the AI with an arena for “creative freedom”, giving them access to young consumers 
who are “always looking for the new things to tell their mates about and share on 
their Facebook/Twitter”[220]. The AI therefore often aim for their messages to 
appear as though they are “from a trustworthy friend rather than a company”; as an 
internal document from Carling said “It should look like it’s come from your mate, but 
is in fact Carling branded”[220]. Additionally, much online alcohol-related ‘promotion’ 
is user-generated through individuals discussing and posting photos relating to 
drinking alcohol on social networking sites[138, 232, 233]. 
Marketing via mobile phones is also growing. Text message promotions are popular 
across the world, for example in Venezuela, Cervecería Regional put codes under 
beer bottle caps where drinkers could text a number to potentially win a prize 
(ranging from beer to a car), in Singapore, Asia Pacific Breweries invited potential 
consumers to “have a beer on us” via text message where customers were given a 
unique code that could be redeemed for a free drink in certain bars[137], and in the 
UK Sidekick (a flavoured vodka drink) ran a promotion called ‘Celebrate Your 
Sidekick’ where customers could text a code found underneath the bottle’s label in 
order to win prizes such as Apple iPods, iPhones and iPads for themselves and a 
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friend[234]. Additionally, with the introduction of smartphones (including Apple’s 
iPhone, and Google Android phones), ‘apps’ are now prolific. An example 
developed by Absolut Vodka entitled ‘Drinkspiration’ allows users to find cocktail 
recipes, create drinks based on what they say they have at hand, and share their 
own drink collections with friends on Facebook[235]. 
The packaging of a product is another important part of promotion. The colour, 
shape, and material of alcohol packaging can help to attract customers[215] and 
particular target markets. Alcopops, for example, are designed to be drunk directly 
from the bottle (‘brand-in-hand’) and allow consumers to “use the product’s brand 
values to communicate with their peers”[236]. Alcopops are often packaged in 
similar ways to soft drinks in bright and colourful packaging[139] (Figure 21). 
Innovative packaging is also often used to appeal to young drinkers, for example 
colourful shots packaged in test-tubes and drinks in sachets[137]. Some new 
premixed cocktails have begun to be packaged in ‘squeezable pouches’, which the 
consumer can freeze at home and then squeeze into a glass “as a no-mess way to 
enjoy fancy bar drinks at home”[237]. Many brands also sell products in limited 
edition packaging, for example Figure 22a which shows limited edition Absolut 
vodka packaging from Italy. The 2014 football World Cup saw many brands 
developing exclusive and limited edition packaging. For example, Budweiser was an 
official World Cup sponsor and used an image of the World Cup trophy on their 
promotional golden bottle (Figure 22b), and beers in Belgium, Spain and Croatia 
included pictures of members of their national football teams on their cans for fans 
to collect[238]. Also, in the Netherlands Heineken sold promotional cans which 
together spelt “Go Orange!” in Dutch (in reference to the Netherlands’ national 
football team colour). As one style of can was sold each week for three weeks, fans 
needed to buy the promotional cans for three consecutive weeks to complete the 
set (Figure 22c)[238]. 
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Figure 21: Alcopops on a UK supermarket shelf 
 
(Source: [239]) 
Figure 22: Limited edition alcohol packaging 
a)      b) c)  
(Source: a [215], b and c [238]) 
 
Price-based marketing is also a huge part of the AI’s marketing strategy, and the AI 
argue that it forms an important part of brand awareness and in helping new 
products to market[57]. Particular consumers, such as heavy drinkers and young 
people, are especially price sensitive[57] and therefore responsive to price 
promotions. In the UK, it has been noted that “the problems of price relate primarily 
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to supermarket sales” (although the AI argue that retailers set prices, not producers) 
and that between 1990 and 2008 alcohol has become more affordable as the price 
of alcohol rose by 85% whereas average incomes rose by 112%[57]. Cheap alcohol 
is a permanent feature in shops and supermarkets, and they almost continually 
aggressively advertise special offers and discounts such as two-for-one deals, half 
price offers, and bulk buy discounts[240]. Shops and supermarkets also sometimes 
sell alcohol at below-cost price to entice customers into the store[241]. The 
quadrennial football World Cup appears to be a time of “particular intensity” of 
below-cost selling; for example, during the 2006 football World Cup alcohol worth 
approximately £38.6 million was sold in supermarkets below-cost in the UK[241]. 
Overall, approximately 30-40% of alcohol sales in UK supermarkets are products 
that are part of a promotion[57]. Pubs and bars also routinely discount alcohol too, 
for example ‘happy hours’ where alcohol is cheaper between certain times, ‘ladies 
nights’ where women drink for free, promotions such as ‘drink all you can for a fiver’, 
and promotions that relate to a specific event such as a football match where drinks 
would be discounted until, for example, the first goal was scored[57, 242-244].  
Finally, there are two recent examples of AI promotions that are particularly 
noteworthy. First, in Ireland in 2009, Diageo, the owners of the beer Guinness, 
launched Arthur’s Day. Arthur’s Day aims to encourage people to ‘raise a pint’ to the 
founder, Arthur Guinness, at 17:59 to mark the year of the company’s 
establishment[245]. Each year Arthur’s Day occurs almost exactly six months after 
St Patrick’s Day (now a day which usually revolves around the consumption of 
alcohol) and always on a Thursday (typically a big drinking night for students)[245]. 
Since 2009 Arthur’s Day has grown, and in 2013 it involved over 1,000 paid 
musicians in pubs across Ireland, including headline acts such as the singer Tom 
Jones and the band Manic Street Preachers[246]. The Day is promoted in 55 
countries, and has also been pushed by Tourism Ireland as a ‘cultural 
initiative’[246]. Arthur’s Day has, however, been widely criticised[247], for example, 
the Irish minister of state with responsibility for alcohol and drugs labelled it “a 
pseudo-national holiday” created solely to market Diageo’s products[245]. Second, 
and possibly the most innovative marketing stunt yet was developed by Canadian-
based Molson who, in 2013, placed bright red fridges in multiple European cities 
and towns including London, Brussels, rural Belgium, and Dover[248]. In order to 
open the fridge, a Canadian passport had to be inserted into an electronic reader in 
the fridge’s door; Canadian’s would then be rewarded with free beer[248]. The 
marketing tagline was “Here’s to being proud of where you’re from”, and caused 
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crowds to gather and ‘toast all things Canadian’[248]. The marketing stunt was 
repeated in Sochi, Russia for the Winter Olympics in 2014[249]. 
3.2.4 The 5P’s: Place 
Place covers two distinct aspects: location (where the product is sold) and 
distribution (how the product gets to the sales location)[129]. The location and 
environment in which products are presented to customers is vital to their 
success[129, 157]. Within retail spaces, in-store displays and POS displays are the 
main way in which a company can encourage potential customers to choose their 
product over others.  
3.2.4.1 Tobacco 
The USA’s Federal Trade Commission reports marketing expenditure of the five 
largest US cigarette manufacturers, and showed that in 2011 $77 million was spent 
on POS marketing, and a total of $758 million on retailer and wholesaler 
promotional allowances (including allowances paid “in order to facilitate the sale or 
placement” of tobacco including the funding of shelving, merchandising, and 
incentive payments)[179]. In store marketing is clearly of huge importance to the TI. 
As RJR noted in 1978: 
“Simply stated, the point-of-purchase is where the action is – it’s 
the retail environment. It’s a specific location in a store, it’s product 
display, and it’s in-store advertising. Importantly, and perhaps not 
so obviously, the point-of-purchase is also in the mind of the 
prospective consumer”[250] 
On shelves within stores, tobacco products are often highlighted either by a bright 
backing or a shelf insert in order to accentuate the brand over those produced by a 
competitor. Tobacco companies have also been known to have their own 
independent stalls within existing stores selling tobacco in order for company reps to 
directly sell to customers. In one example, JTI set up a display stand within a small 
convenience store in London, UK, where, upon hearing a customer ask for 
cigarettes, the rep would offer the customer a similar JTI product with up to £1 off 
the recommended retail price[251]. 
Feighery et al[252] found that tobacco companies also offer retailers financial 
inducements such as discounts if sales targets are met. However the TI also exerts 
a great deal of control over the retail space including requiring retailers to place their 
products in certain locations and also place certain amounts of advertising in 
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particular spaces within the store. For example, an independent tobacco store 
manager said “Some reps require contracts; they have different volume levels. The 
contract asks for prime advertising location in the store, near the first register or a 
banner outside. The store would get a payment” and another said “They come in 
and say I want 45% of your space, if that is the market share they command in the 
area. They say, ‘I will provide the rack/bin and I will pay you 35 cents a pack for a 
year’....You have to maintain the right percentage of their product, put up 
signage”[252]. Another convenience store manager reported how tobacco 
companies compete with one another for prime placement, “The tobacco companies 
have the displays and they were trying to outbid each other...They are trying to get 
the space right behind the counter where the racks are.... They want the customer 
to see the cigarettes and the price right behind the cashiers”[252]. However, in 
countries such as England, Canada, Norway, Croatia, and Ireland tobacco products 
are banned from be displayed at the point of sale in all or certain types/sizes of 
shops[253, 254]. 
3.2.4.2 Alcohol 
The USA’s Federal Trade Commission reported aggregate marketing expenditure of 
“14 major alcohol marketers” in the US in 2011, and found that almost $1 billion was 
spent on POS marketing and $159 million was spent on promotional allowances for 
retailers[211]. 
Within stores, end-of-aisle promotions are common. For example, during the 2014 
football World Cup, in the Netherlands an end-of-aisle football stadium was created 
out of Heineken cans (in six-packs) and crates, and in Belgium collectable Jupiler 
beer glasses were placed at the end of food isles with the slogan “We are 
ready”[238]. Additionally, large displays of discounted alcohol are a common sight 
within supermarkets, “if you walk in [to a supermarket] now you will trip over a three-
for-two offer” at the very front of the store[57]. 
Alcohol companies are also investing heavily in POS promotion such as novel 
modes of delivery, using large screens to advertise their products in youth-
orientated bars, and sponsoring themed bars, pubs and concert venues[137]. For 
example, in Bangkok, outdoor music venues have been themed using the colours of 
different beer-brands[137]. Alcohol companies also pay for their brand to have a 
premium spot behind the bar, and will often use colourful backing or pedestals.  
Alcohol must also be sold in locations that appeal to the products’ target market, for 
example women have been found to prefer to buy alcohol in supermarkets rather 
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than specialist alcohol stores[255]. Also, the competition of alcoholic products (such 
as alcopops) with non-alcoholic products means the AI is continually looking for new 
outlets, “alcohol products need  to  be  as  accessible  to  the  target  groups  as  
soft  drinks  if  they  are  to compete  effectively”[255]. 
3.2.5 The 5P’s: Person 
There are a plethora of factors that affect individual’s interpretation of advertising, 
and there are two main arguments pertaining to this; ‘standardisation’ and 
‘adaptation’. Many argue that due to globalisation consumer demand and 
preferences have converged and, in many cases, how consumers have been taught 
to use and interact with specific products now carries few culturally specific 
references[256], meaning individuals around the world react and respond similarly 
to advertising; this is called ‘standardisation’[256-258]. Others argue that individuals 
in different countries interpret advertising messages differently to one another due 
to cultural, value and lifestyle, political, linguistic, economic (including stages of 
economic and market development), historical, religious, and socio-economic 
differences[256, 257]; this is called ‘adaptation’[256-258]. For example, prior to 
1990, advertising in Central and Eastern Europe was mostly used as an information 
tool, and had “negative connotations...as a tool for capitalist propaganda”[259]. This 
may mean that individuals in these countries interact with marketing differently to 
those in other countries, or that older individuals interact differently to younger 
individuals due to stronger memories of this previous use of marketing[259]. 
“Limited availability and cost of communication media”[257] undermines the 
suitability of ‘standardisation’ as access to different technologies around the world 
varies; for example TVs, the Internet, and mobile phones are commonplace in 
higher income countries but are still considered a luxury in many lower income 
countries[256]. These differences make truly global advertising campaigns hard for 
MNCs[256], and there has been “more country-specific adaptation than 
predicted”[258]. However, as globalisation is continually increasing and countries 
are becoming ever more connected (especially via the Internet and online media), 
transnational companies are able to increasingly harness the benefits that 
globalisation brings.  
While the benefits of globalisation are increasingly being utilised, companies have 
also realised that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to marketing does not always work 
and that marketing often needs to be tailored to particular target groups; targeted 
marketing is “now the essence of modern marketing”[177]. Targeted marketing is 
“based on the notion that if you speak to consumers in a way that resonated with 
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their attitudes, beliefs, values or behaviour, they will respond favourably to what you 
are marketing”, and research has indeed shown that consumers are more 
persuaded by targeted marketing than more general messages[177]. Between and 
within countries, populations are usually divided into segments representing 
different purchasing behaviours[177, 260]. In order to segment a population, people 
are categorised using “demographics (such as age, race/ethnicity, gender), 
consumer behaviour (for example light versus heavy product users), 
psychographics (including lifestyle, personality characteristics), [and] geographic 
location (for example neighbourhood, region)”[177]. Individuals are also likely to 
partake in similar activities to their peers, friends, and family. Network analysis has 
been used to explore the impact of people’s social networks on their health, and 
significant correlations have been found for many health behaviours/outcomes 
including smoking[261], alcohol consumption[262], and obesity[263]. After 
identifying groups of people who are expected to respond similarly, a corporation 
can then more effectively target their marketing towards them; either as country 
specific marketing, or multi-country marketing targeting a particular segment.  
3.2.5.1 Tobacco 
The TI uses targeted marketing in order to reach different segments of their 
potential market. Men and women are usually targeted separately. In the early 20th 
century, men represented 95% of the tobacco market in the US, and much of the 
advertising depicted male smokers as “strong, powerful, macho, rugged, and 
independent”[17]; this imagery is still used in many L/MICs. During the first world 
war, many women were employed in traditionally male occupations and started to 
dress differently (for example, wearing trousers) and partake in ‘male’ behaviours 
such as playing sport and smoking[264]. Smoking was used by women in order to 
challenge the “traditional ideas about female behaviour”, and in the US in the 
1920s/30s the TI seized the opportunity to shape social norms and “exploit ideas of 
liberation [and] power” to market cigarettes to women[264]. One aim of American 
Tobacco was to “challenge the taboo against women smoking in public” and so in 
1929 they hired women to smoke their ‘torches of freedom’ during a New York City 
march against inequality[264]. Equating smoking with gender equality and women’s 
rights still occurs in less-developed countries, where individuals aspire to Western 
values[131, 265]; women’s empowerment is correlated with women’s smoking 
prevalence[266]. Women have been the target of tobacco companies all over the 
world. For example after South Korean trade liberalisation in 1988 women were 
targeted with mild/light brands and ‘slim’ and ‘superslim’ cigarettes[267], after the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 women in FSU countries were targeted with 
milder, filtered brands resulting in large, rapid increases in female smoking 
prevalence[35, 268, 269], and in the US PM identified four categories of women, 
‘90s traditionalists’, ‘uptown girls’, ‘mavericks’ and ‘wallflowers’ and “approached 
marketing to each group differently”[270]. In part due to these techniques, the 
gender gap in most HICs has narrowed, but in most MICs and LICs female smoking 
rates still remain lower than male rates[266].  
Despite their insistence that they do not market to underage smokers, there is much 
evidence of the TI targeting youth; “the base of our business is the high school 
student”[271]. For example, analysis of internal TI documents found that in 
Argentina the TI studied the attitudes, lifestyles and aspirations of “young adults” in 
order to develop marketing campaigns, and that the identified “psychographic 
segments” were different to those in other countries therefore requiring tailored 
marketing[270], and additional analysis of internal TI documents found that in the 
US in the 1980s and 1990s, the TI attempted to “integrate smoking with nightlife, 
music, and sports” and used methods such as dance contests, cigarette sampling, 
and games with prizes ranging from cars to TI-branded items in order to reach the 
youthful segments of the market[272]. The youth market has been targeted through 
many mediums, even the televised ‘Flintstones’ cartoon between 1960 and 1966 
showed the main characters smoking Winston cigarettes[17]. A 2013 documentary 
by a French journalist, Paul Moreira, highlights that marketing practices banned in 
the developed world (such as offering free samples, celebrity endorsements, 
sponsorship of sporting and music events, and adding ‘juvenile’ flavourings to 
tobacco products) are still being used by the TI in developing countries to attract 
children and young people[113].  
The TI have also been known to specifically target disadvantaged areas with 
minority populations[17]. One example is Brown and Williamson’s use of music to 
target African American’s and inner-city neighbourhoods in America[186] outlined 
above (sub-chapter 3.2.3 The 5P’s: Promotion). Through analysis of six 
communities between 2000 and 2002 within Boston, USA, it was observed that 
there were significantly more TI adverts in lower socioeconomic communities 
compared to higher socioeconomic communities[273], and analysis of four 
“predominantly ethnic neighbourhoods” between 1993 and 1994 in Los Angeles, 
USA, found a significantly higher density of tobacco billboards in the African 
American, Hispanic and Asian neighbourhoods compared to the predominantly 
White community[274]. Analysis of internal TI documents has shown that in the US 
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the TI has specifically targeted inner-city African American communities (particularly 
with menthol cigarettes[275, 276]), and young, less educated, lower income, urban 
individuals[277], and additional analysis of internal documents has showed that the 
TI specifically targeted low socioeconomic status women in the US from the 1970s 
onwards with methods such as price discounts, distributing discount coupons with 
‘food stamps’, POS marketing, and developing new brands specifically for low 
income women[278]. 
3.2.5.2 Alcohol 
Women have been increasingly targeted by alcohol companies[215]. In the UK, 
women’s alcohol consumption is growing, and those aged between 18-25 years-old 
consume more alcohol than their counterparts in any other country[279]. Globally 
many alcohol products are being targeted towards women, including those 
traditionally drunk by men. For example in the Netherlands Heineken beer was sold 
in an “elegant” ‘slim can’ with the aim of increasing beer consumption among 
women[215] and separately Heineken beer was advertised in women’s magazines 
and a new rosé beer was developed[279], in the USA Amstel Light beer was 
introduced with adverts showing women partaking in traditionally male behaviours 
such as opening beer bottles with their teeth[279] and Jim Beam Bourbon launched 
‘fruitier, lighter’ products aimed at women such as a cognac infused with red 
wine[280], and in Italy Heineken beer was sold with free lip gloss and a bottle of 
wine was sold with free ‘Hello Kitty’ jewellery[215]. Alcohol is often advertised to 
women with reference to calories, for example Budweiser Select beer is marketed 
as “the lightest beer in the world” with only 55 calories and was advertised on the 
WeightWatchers website with the wording “Today’s lesson in lightness: 55 calories 
means you can be “good”...and still have a good time”, and ‘Bacardi and diet cola’ 
has been advertised as having “0 carbs, 0 sugar”[281]. In the US alcohol marketing 
also frequently refers to its ‘natural’ (vodka, beer, tequila), ‘organic’ (tequila) or 
‘antioxidant’ (beer) properties[281]. However, women are not just being targeted in 
the West. For example, in 2013 it was reported that the female segment of alcohol 
consumers in India was growing quickly as “many producers sponsor fashion shows 
and music festivals, while some have hired Bollywood stars for related promotions”, 
and the concept of women drinking alcohol is slowly becoming more socially 
acceptable[282]. 
Much alcohol marketing targets young drinkers, who are often segmented into 
‘starter’ drinkers and ‘established’ drinkers[236]. The AI has developed new 
products specifically aimed at youth (such as alcopops, see 3.2.3 The 5P’s: 
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Promotion above) and even opened new outlets such as themed pubs and 
clubs[236]. By studying alcohol adverts in 103 national magazines, and gathering 
age and sex readership data, research in the US has shown that underage youth 
are more exposed to advertising for beer, spirits, alcopops and low-alcohol products 
(including, for example, alcoholic lemonade) than those of legal age (21 years and 
older), and between 2001 and 2002 girls’ exposure to advertising of alcopops and 
low-alcohol products increased by 216% compared to just 46% for boys[283]. 
Internal AI documents have shown that Smirnoff and Carling have identified 
students as a key target market, and that the WKD ‘brand’ “should talk at the level 
of the target audience – young people” and “funny is the most important thing...not 
take itself too seriously, fresh, witty, a funny brand that doesn’t take itself too 
seriously”[220].  
Like the TI, the AI has been found to specifically target disadvantaged or minority 
populations. In a US study, it was found that there was more alcohol marketing in 
communities with high black and Hispanic populations, and there was significant 
alcohol marketing directed specifically towards black populations[284]. It has also 
been found that between 2008 and 2009 African American youth aged 12-20 years-
old were exposed to more alcohol advertising in magazines (32% more) and on TV 
(17% more), and more advertising for spirits on radio (32% more), than all youth 
aged 12-20[285]. This was explained by the authors as due to both higher media 
use by African Americans and by the existence of alcohol brands that appeared to 
be specifically targeted towards African Americans[285]. 
3.3 The Extent and Impact of Tobacco and Alcohol Industry 
Marketing 
TI and AI marketing are common globally. This is a concern given that both TI and 
AI marketing has been shown to negatively impact health through encouraging the 
consumption of tobacco and alcohol products, the evidence for which is outlined 
below. 
3.3.1 Tobacco Industry Marketing 
3.3.1.1 Extent 
It has been argued that understanding the extent to which, and how, tobacco is 
marketed is key to halting the tobacco epidemic[286]. There are a number of small 
studies which have examined levels of specific types of marketing in individual 
countries, for example the USA[208, 273, 287-290], Guatemala and Argentina[291], 
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and rural South Africa[292]. In addition there are three major international studies 
examining youth (WHO Global Youth Tobacco Study (GYTS)[293]) and adult (WHO 
GATS[39] and International Tobacco Control (ITC) Project[294]) exposure to 
marketing across multiple countries. However, to date, these data have 
predominantly been reported at individual country level on the studies’ websites[39, 
293, 294] or very briefly or without formal statistical comparison of between country 
differences[295-297]. Only in one study have the data been used to formally 
compare levels of marketing between countries: Li et al’s[298] study used ITC data 
collected between 2005 and 2006 to compare smokers’ exposure to marketing in 
Thailand, Australia and the USA to exposure in China. For example, it was reported 
that 29% adults reported exposure to in-store tobacco advertisements in China, 
compared to 85% in the USA, 33% in Australia, and 4% in Thailand (differences in 
exposure compared to China were significant (p<0.05) for each country), and 28% 
adults reported seeing sponsorship (sports and/or arts) in China, compared to 27% 
in the USA, 22% in Australia, and 4% in Thailand (differences in exposure 
compared to China were significant (p<0.05) for the USA and Thailand)[298]. 
Although reporting interesting figures, this study does not report marketing exposure 
at the community level, and does not control for media access or ownership, country 
income group, or community type. 
3.3.1.2 Impact  
Many studies have shown that TI marketing plays a significant role in smoking 
initiation amongst young people and in increasing smoking prevalence. The 
National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) 2008 19th monograph arguably provides the most 
in-depth summary of the evidence, and concludes that: 
“[t]he total weight of evidence – from multiple types of studies, 
conducted by investigators from different disciplines, and using 
data from many countries – demonstrates a causal relationship 
between tobacco advertising and promotion and increased 
tobacco use”[17] 
Multiple additional systematic reviews have also concluded that there is a strong 
relationship between TI marketing and different smoking-related outcomes. For 
example, a literature review of 29 studies and published in 2006[18] found that 
exposure to tobacco marketing increases the risk of initiation, that a dose-response 
relationship exists (i.e. increased exposure to tobacco advertising leads to a greater 
risk), and that the relationship is robust having been observed using many methods, 
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across multiple populations, with different types of marketing, and still exists after 
controlling for confounders. The authors concluded that there is “no explanation 
other than causality [that] can account for the evidence”. A cochrane systematic 
review published in 2008[19] included nine longitudinal studies that followed over 
12,000 adolescents (aged 18 or below) and found that exposure to TI marketing, in 
the form of advertising and promotions, is associated with future smoking initiation 
amongst adolescents (although two of the included studies found a relationship 
among girls but not boys). And a systematic review of 12 studies (ten of which 
focussed on young people under the age of 18) and published in 2009[20] found 
that a number of quantitative studies identified an association between POS 
marketing and increased smoking susceptibility, experimentation, and uptake 
among youth. One of the two adult studies included also showed that POS displays 
prompt impulse buying and urges to smoke, and undermined quit attempts. The 
authors state, however, that it is hard to estimate the effect of POS marketing alone 
as it may have been diluted by “noise” from other forms of marketing.  
The three systematic reviews outlined above[18-20] comprised 43 unique studies (7 
studies were included in more than one of the reviews); 26 studies were from the 
USA, five from England, four from Australia, two from Spain, one from Scotland, one 
from India, one from Norway, one from the Gambia, one from Japan, and one from 
Canada. Most of the 43 included studies focussed on marketing’s impact on youth; 
39 studied young people (aged 18 or younger), two studied those over the age of 
18, and two studied children and young people up to the age of 19. Additionally, 23 
of the included studies looked at the impact of adverts/advertising in general, 12 
focused on POS/in-store marketing, six assessed the impact of 
owning/liking/wanting promotional items, four looked at tobacco branding, two 
studied the impact of sport sponsorship, two looked at magazine/newspaper 
marketing, one focussed on TV marketing, and one studied billboard marketing 
(some studies looked at multiple marketing areas).  
There have also been many individual studies using primary data that have not 
been included in the three systematic reviews outlined above. Having completed a 
literature search, research on the impact of smoking or smoking-related imagery in 
films[2, 299-301], the impact of branding[302], and the impact of advertising and 
marketing in general[303, 304] has taken place in HICs including the USA[299-301], 
Iceland, Scotland, England, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Italy, and Hong 
Kong[2], and in MICs and LICs including China[302, 303], Brazil, India, Nigeria, 
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Pakistan, Russia[302], Mexico, Thailand[2], Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Sudan[304].  
Although a broad range of countries are represented in this brief review, there does 
appear to be a bias in the existing research towards HICs and especially the USA. 
The literature is consistent in confirming a significant relationship between TI 
marketing and smoking initiation and consumption. For this reason the WHO’s 
Director-General in 2000 described the tobacco epidemic as a “communicated 
disease - communicated through marketing”[305].  
3.3.2 Alcohol Industry Marketing 
3.3.2.1 Extent  
It has been argued that understanding the extent to which, and how, alcohol is 
marketed is key to mitigating the potentially harmful effects of alcohol use[137], yet 
very little is known about levels of marketing globally. The limited existing literature 
on levels of marketing is entirely focussed on communities within HICs and relies on 
observational data[244, 306-311]; no studies have used self-reported data (many 
collected self-reported advertising exposure as part of studies investigating 
precursors to alcohol use (see ‘Impact’ section below) but none used self-reported 
data to look explicitly at levels of marketing). No studies have comprehensively 
evaluated levels of marketing in multiple communities (urban and rural) or multiple 
countries simultaneously.  
The International Alcohol Control (IAC) Study began in 2011 as an international 
collaboration between New Zealand, England, Scotland, South Korea, and Thailand 
and has since been extended to also include Mongolia, Australia, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Peru, South Africa and Vietnam[312]. The IAC Study is based on the 
methods of the ITC Project[294], and aims to collect data on the alcohol 
environment (including alcohol availability, pricing and taxation, alcohol marketing, 
and drink driving interventions) and on individuals aged 16-65 in each country 
(including information on alcohol consumption, policy-relevant information such as 
the price paid, demographics, and attitudes to policy)[312, 313]. The results from 
the IAC Study have yet to be published, but they are expected to make a large 
contribution to the very sparse literature on alcohol marketing levels globally. 
3.3.2.2 Impact  
As with TI marketing which has been shown to have a significant impact on smoking 
initiation and smoking prevalence, AI marketing has been shown, through multiple 
studies, to play a significant role in drinking initiation and drinking prevalence.  
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There are three key systematic reviews that have been published examining 
different elements of AI marketing[21-23]. A systematic review published in 2008 
and focused on the UK[21] was comprised of three reviews, two of which are 
relevant to this thesis. The first review included 17 studies and concluded that “the 
effects of price changes on alcohol consumption are significant”, and although 
consistently negative there is large variation in the size of the relationship and 
effect. The second review involved 70 studies and found that there is consistent 
evidence that POS promotions, billboard advertising, advertising in print media, and 
advertising on broadcast media (TV, films, radio, music and music videos, the 
Internet) have an impact on drinking initiation and consumption levels, especially 
amongst youth, and owning alcohol-related merchandise was high among underage 
drinkers and binge drinkers. However, the authors conclude that due to the nature 
of many of the studies included, inferring causality for many of the advertising types 
was difficult. A review of seven cohort studies following more than 13,000 young 
people[22] (this study and all of the seven included studies were each included in 
the second review in[21]) published in 2009 demonstrated that there was a 
consistent association between alcohol advertising and drinking initiation, 
consumption and binge drinking in young people. This association was seen across 
a range of advertising types. However, the authors report that many of the studies 
failed to adequately account for some confounding factors, such as peer and family 
drinking behaviour. Another review published in 2009 included 13 longitudinal 
studies following more than 38,000 young people[23] (including all seven studies 
from[22] and 11 (including the seven from[22]) from[21]) and found that the included 
studies consistently (12 of the 13) showed that exposure to alcohol marketing is 
associated with drinking initiation and increased consumption amongst youth, and 
all controlled for confounders. A dose-relationship, where more exposure to alcohol 
advertising leads to a greater consumption of alcohol, was also found in multiple 
(seven) studies.  
The majority of research included within the three systematic reviews outlined 
above[21-23] is focussed on the USA and other HICs such as the UK and New 
Zealand, although limited research has also been completed in other countries 
including Japan, India, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Mexico and Estonia. 
Additionally, most of the studies have focussed on marketing’s impact on youth 
(aged 18 or younger), or have studied the impact on adults and young people. Many 
of the studies included in the three systematic reviews outlined above[21-23] were 
models (for example, econometric models). 
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There have been some additional studies which have not been included within the 
systematic reviews outlined above[21-23] which have found, for example, that 
adolescents in Australia who reported seeing alcohol adverts in magazines, in 
stores, in pubs/bars, or on promotional materials were significantly more likely to 
have initiated alcohol consumption than those who had not seen adverts but there 
were differences by age and sex[314], and that adolescents in Scotland who 
engaged with alcohol marketing at age 13 were 31% more likely to have started 
drinking, and 43% more likely to drink more, at age 15 than those who had not 
engaged with alcohol marketing[315]. An additional small cochrane review was 
published in 2014 and included one randomised controlled trial and three time-
series studies[316]. This review concluded that there was a general lack of high 
quality evidence regarding the effectiveness of alcohol advertising restrictions on 
alcohol consumption. 
In summary, the majority of the available literature consistently shows a significant 
relationship between alcohol marketing and drinking initiation and consumption 
levels. Similarly to the tobacco review, above, the literature appears to focus on 
HICs and especially the USA. 
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Chapter 4: Tobacco and Alcohol 
Marketing Regulations, and 
Industry Influence 
4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: Tobacco and 
Alcohol Marketing 
Due to the impact that tobacco and alcohol marketing has on smoking and drinking 
initiation and consumption, regulation pertaining to the marketing of these products 
has become a priority. Tobacco is much more heavily regulated around the world 
than alcohol; the main global policies are outlined below. 
4.1.1 Tobacco regulation 
While for many years countries allowed the TI to self-regulate its marketing 
practices, substantial evidence now shows that voluntary measures are 
ineffective[17]. It is also clear that partial advertising bans are ineffective because 
the TI “typically respond[s] to partial advertising bans in ways that undermine the 
ban’s effectiveness” and simply shifts its spending to ‘permitted’ media, which often 
includes ‘new media’, changes the target of its advertising, and uses its brand 
names on non-tobacco products[17]. Comprehensive bans are therefore needed as 
they have been shown to be effective[2, 17, 158, 317-319]. A complete ban on all 
tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship has been estimated to reduce 
consumption by around 7%, with some countries potentially seeing declines of up to 
16%[2], showing that restrictions on marketing have the potential to have a very 
large effect on population-level health.  
4.1.1.1 The Master Settlement Agreement 
The litigation in the US that led to the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) is well 
documented[see, for example, 320, 321-323]. In summary, in the 1950s 
epidemiological studies began linking smoking to, in particular, lung cancer, in the 
1960s a number of individuals in the US began suing the TI for smoking-related 
deaths, during the 1970s to 1990s anti-TI advocacy and awareness of TI practices 
such as marketing to children increased, and in the mid-1990s the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) declared nicotine as a drug and proposed regulating the 
sale and marketing of tobacco to youth[322]. Following this, 46 US states grouped 
together to sue the TI for the health care costs of tobacco-related morbidity and 
mortality. As this litigation could have almost bankrupted the TI, on the 20th June 
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1997 they agreed to enter a ‘global settlement’[320]. Many versions of this 
settlement were put forward to Congress, but eventually a compromise was reached 
in 1998 and the companies agreed to the ‘MSA’. The MSA included a payment to 
each State each year for future tobacco-related health care costs (saving the TI 
from paying past costs), which totalled approximately US$10 billion per year, 
adjusted for inflation, based on each company’s market share[320]. It also imposed 
certain restrictions on the marketing of tobacco products to the youth market, and 
provided funds to launch a national non-smoking campaign. Importantly for research 
into TI conduct, millions of pages of internal TI documents were released as part of 
the state litigation. There are now over 13 million documents available online in the 
Legacy Tobacco Documents Library3, hosted by the University of California, San 
Francisco. These documents have allowed researchers to create a clear picture of 
how the TI operates, the tactics it uses, the ways it attempts to stop, diminish, or 
circumvent legislation, and its opinions on all areas of its business, its customers, 
and policy.  
4.1.1.2 The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
The information gained from the MSA fed into the development of the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)[324]; the WHO using its treaty 
making powers for the first time. It was adopted by the World Health Assembly 
(WHA) in May 2003, entered into force in February 2005, and has “since become 
one of the most rapidly and widely embraced treaties in United Nations 
history”[325]. As of November 2014 the FCTC had 179 Parties[326] out of 193 UN 
Member States[327], and covered over 87% of the world’s population[328]. Notably 
two populous and important tobacco markets have yet to ratify the FCTC; the USA 
and Indonesia[326]. 
The FCTC is a legally binding evidence-based treaty, and Parties must meet their 
obligations by implementing the approaches it specifies[325, 329]. The FCTC 
“represents a milestone for the promotion of public health” and “reaffirms the right of 
all people to the highest standard of health”[325]. The FCTC covers all aspects of 
tobacco control from ‘Article 8: Protection from exposure to tobacco smoke’, to 
‘Article 13: Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship’[324].  
Given the importance of industry marketing in driving tobacco use[17-20] and 
evidence that complete bans on marketing are an effective means of reducing 
tobacco use[2, 17, 158, 317-319], multiple FCTC Articles make recommendations 
                                                          
3
 http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu 
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regarding the marketing of tobacco products (Box 2[324]). Most notable is Article 13 
which recommends a “comprehensive ban of all tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship” including, at a minimum, TV, radio and print media marketing, 
promotional incentives, and sponsorship of events[324].  
The FCTC also made unprecedented reference to the role that the TI has played 
and will continue to play in the smoking epidemic[330]. The WHO Committee of 
Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents stated that “the tobacco industry has 
operated for years with the express intention of subverting the role of governments 
and of WHO in implementing public health policies to combat the tobacco 
epidemic”[330], explicitly highlighting the underhand nature of the TI, and the need 
for such stringent controls. Given the overwhelming evidence of the TI’s efforts to 
influence policy, Article 5.3 states:  
In setting and implementing their public health policies with respect 
to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from 
commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in 
accordance with national law.  ([330], emphasis added)  
The ‘Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3’[330] outline four ‘Guiding 

















Article 6: Price and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco 
“implementing tax policies and, where appropriate, price policies, on tobacco products 
so as to contribute to the health objectives aimed at reducing tobacco consumption” 
Articles 11: Packaging and labelling of tobacco products 
“tobacco product packaging and labelling do not promote a tobacco product by any 
means that are false, misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous 
impression about its characteristics, health effects, hazards or emissions, including 
any term, descriptor, trademark, figurative or any other sign...” 
Article 13: Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
“Each Party shall...undertake a comprehensive ban of all tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship” 
At a minimum...each Party shall:  
 “prohibit all forms of tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship that 
promote a tobacco product by any means that are false, misleading or 
deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression about its characteristics, 
health effects, hazards or emissions” 
 “restrict the use of direct or indirect incentives that encourage the purchase of 
tobacco products by the public” 
 “undertake a comprehensive ban ... tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship on radio, television, print media and, as appropriate, other media, 
such as the internet, within a period of five years” 
 “prohibit... tobacco sponsorship of international events, activities and/or 
participants therein” 
Article 16: Sales to and by minors 
“...prohibiting the manufacture and sale of sweets, snacks, toys or any other objects in 
the form of tobacco products which appeal to minors” 
“Each Party shall prohibit or promote the prohibition of the distribution of free tobacco 
products to the public and especially minors” 
“Each Party shall endeavour to prohibit the sale of cigarettes individually or in small 
packets which increase the affordability of such products to minors” 
 
Box 2: Selected marketing-related elements of the FCTC 






4.1.1.3 National Policy  
Many individual countries have implemented their own regulations with regards to 
tobacco marketing, either in line with or in addition to the FCTC. The bans that were 
in place in 2010 on direct (including TV, radio, magazine, e-mail, coupons, brand 
loyalty programs) and indirect (including brand stretching, event sponsorship, 
product placement on TV and films) advertising are shown in Figure 23. In 2010, 
over 60% of countries had some form of restriction on tobacco marketing in 
place[2]. The majority of European countries had a ban on tobacco advertising on 
national TV, radio, and in print media. Using the definitions above, only a handful of 
countries had a ban on all forms of direct and indirect advertising; these were 
Principle 1: There is a fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the 
tobacco industry’s interests and public health policy interests.  
The tobacco industry produces and promotes a product that has been proven 
scientifically to be addictive, to cause disease and death and to give rise to a variety 
of social ills, including increased poverty. Therefore, Parties should protect the 
formulation and implementation of public health policies for tobacco control from the 
tobacco industry to the greatest extent possible. 
Principle 2: Parties, when dealing with the tobacco industry or those working to 
further its interests, should be accountable and transparent.  
Parties should ensure that any interaction with the tobacco industry on matters related 
to tobacco control or public health is accountable and transparent.  
Principle 3: Parties should require the tobacco industry and those working to 
further its interests to operate and act in a manner that is accountable and 
transparent.  
The tobacco industry should be required to provide Parties with information for 
effective implementation of these guidelines.  
Principle 4: Because their products are lethal, the tobacco industry should not be 
granted incentives to establish or run their businesses.   
Any preferential treatment of the tobacco industry would be in conflict with tobacco 
control policy. 
 
Box 3: FCTC Article 5.3 'Guiding Principles' 
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Panama, Colombia, Norway, Montenegro, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Kenya, Eritrea, 
Djibouti, Madagascar, Syria, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Kuwait[2]. Worryingly, however, in 2010 there were still a 
large number of countries with no advertising bans (defined as either having no ban 
at all or a ban that does not cover national TV, radio, and print media advertising), 
including the USA, Mexico, Argentina, Nigeria, Angola, Somalia, Russia, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, and Austria[2].  
At the European level, a Tobacco Control Score was developed by Joossens and 
Raw[331] to measure and quantify the level of tobacco control measures present in 
individual European countries, and is now updated every few years. Each country is 
scored on a number of measures including the price of cigarettes, bans on smoking 
in public places, advertising bans, and health warnings on packs. A total score out 
of 100 is calculated, and countries are then ranked against one another. As Figure 
24 shows, in 2013 only ten countries scored 50 (half) or more of the points available 
indicating that most European countries are failing to effectively protect individuals 
from tobacco marketing and/or tobacco smoke. Although assigning a score to 
tobacco control efforts is somewhat subjective and subject to criticism, it does 
provide an important and interesting overview of what countries are doing well and 
where they may need to make improvements. 
In 2013 it was reported by the WHO that more than a third of the world’s population 
(2.3 billion people) were “covered by at least one effective tobacco control 
measure”[332], highlighting that although much progress has been made globally 
there is still much more to achieve. 
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Figure 24: Tobacco Control Scale, 2013 
(Source [253]) 
 
4.1.2 Alcohol regulation 
The FCTC recommendations and guidelines demonstrate the world’s prevailing 
opinion on TI conduct, and the realisation that the TI’s influence must be curbed; 
much of which has been supported by the internal documents released by the MSA. 
There has been no litigation resulting in the release of internal AI documents on this 
scale meaning that relatively little is known about AI conduct.  
In the UK, in 2009, there was a parliamentary inquiry into alcohol. The Health Select 
Committee obtained a large number of internal marketing documents from alcohol 
producers and their communications agencies to allow them to examine “not just 
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what advertisers are saying, but why they are saying it”[333]. The Committee 
selected four alcohol producers (Beverage Brands, Diageo, Halewood International, 
and Molson Coors Brewing Company) and their respective communications 
agencies, and each were asked to supply the committee with documents relating to 
specific brands (WKD, Smirnoff vodka, Lambrini and Sidekick shots, and Carling 
respectively). The documents supplied included client-agency contact reports, client 
briefs, creative briefs, media briefs, media schedules, advertising budgets, and 
market research reports[333]. This was the first time internal AI documents were 
available for analysis and although not on the same scale as the MSA, they do 
provide some insight into the AI’s marketing activities and practices. 
Research has shown there is little to suggest that ‘Big Tobacco’ and ‘Big Booze’ 
operate differently[334]. The TI and AI are closely associated and have “at times not 
only been under the same ownership, but have learned from each other, and have 
sung from the same songbook”[335]. The TI and AI have often shared employees, 
for example a former chief financial officer of SABMiller joined Imperial in 2011[336]. 
Moodie et al[337] have commented on the corporate overlap of the TI and AI in 
more detail:  
“The similarities between strategies used by the tobacco [and] 
alcohol....corporations are unsurprising in view of the ﬂow of people, 
funds, and activities across these industries, which also have 
histories of joint ownership—eg, Philip Morris owned ... Miller 
Brewing; Altria is a lead shareholder in tobacco .... companies that 
have shared directorships; SAB Miller Board includes at least ﬁve 
past or present tobacco company executives and board members; 
and the Diageo Executive Director, responsible for public affairs, 
spent 17 years in a similar role at Philip Morris. Additionally, tobacco 
and ... drink corporations use the same public relations firms to 
lobby worldwide and to design stakeholder marketing campaigns 
such as Pernod Ricard’s drink Responsib’All Day”[337]. 
Despite these similarities, and the large proportion of the global burden of disease 
that alcohol is responsible for[9], there is currently no FCTC-equivalent for alcohol. 
There have been calls from a number of bodies for a comparable treaty, for 
example a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control (FCAC)[338-340], including 
from the 2006 WHO Expert Committee on Problems Related to Alcohol 
Consumption which recommended that the WHO implement “legally binding 
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agreements between countries, to support the implementation of alcohol policies 
and programmes”[341]. However, arguably the political will to implement such 
strong policies is not in place[328]. 
Tobacco products are harmful, no matter how much is consumed, but the same 
cannot be said regarding alcohol; many studies[49-56] have shown a protective 
effect for certain diseases when individuals consume low to moderate amounts of 
alcohol. These studies (although since refuted[58-64]), combined with that fact that 
alcohol is intrinsically entwined into many cultures and societies and has been used 
for much longer than tobacco in HICs[14, 338], makes it much harder to develop an 
international alcohol control strategy. Although most countries aim for abstinence 
from tobacco, very few will have this aim for alcohol use instead focussing on 
controlling alcohol use by reducing “frequency of intoxication and overall volume 
consumed”[338].  
4.1.2.1 WHO Global Strategy 
In 2008 the WHO began drafting a strategy in order to try and reduce the harmful 
use of alcohol globally. Finally in May 2010 all (then) 193 Member States of the 
WHO reached consensus for the first time, resulting in the WHA adopting the 
‘Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol’[65]. However, unlike the 
FCTC, it only provides guidelines and “urges” WHO Member States to adopt and 
implement the recommended policies[65]. Lien and DeLand[328] termed this a 
“‘soft’ international agreement on alcohol”.  
The Global Strategy provides countries with a range of policy options and measures 
that could be used to tackle harmful alcohol use. Some of these are similar to those 
recommended in the FCTC such as implementing age restrictions, using taxation to 
raise prices, adding health warning labels to products, and reducing marketing and 
promotion[328]. However, compared to the FCTC, the Global Strategy makes a 
much smaller number of recommendations regarding marketing; these can be seen 
in Box 4[65]. Recently, there have been further calls for the greater regulation of 
alcohol marketing[342-344] given the effectiveness of marketing restrictions in 
tackling harmful drinking behaviour[14, 163, 164, 221, 319, 345]. 
 
 







The Global Strategy also encourages Member States to give “appropriate priority to 
the promotion and protection of population health”[65], but does not make reference 
to the continued influence of the AI. Despite the role that the AI and its corporate 
marketing plays in drinking initiation and consumption, and its legal responsibilities 
to maximise profits for shareholders, the WHO’s approach to the AI is one of 
partnership and cooperation[10]. One of the main challenges noted, regarding the 
“balancing of different interests”, is that: 
“Production, distribution, marketing and sales of alcohol create 
employment and generate considerable income for economic 
operators and tax revenue for governments at different levels. 
Public health measures to reduce harmful use of alcohol are 
sometimes judged to be in conflict with other goals like free 
markets and consumer choice and can be seen as harming 
economic interests and reducing government revenues. Policy-
makers face the challenge of giving an appropriate priority to the 
promotion and protection of population health while taking into 
account other goals, obligations, including international legal 
obligations, and interests. It should be noted in this respect that 
international trade agreements generally recognize the right of 
countries to take measures to protect human health, provided that 
these are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions 
Area 5: Availability of alcohol 
 For this area policy options and interventions include: 
o Regulating  the number and location of on-premise and off-premise 
alcohol outlets 
Area 6: Marketing of alcoholic beverages 
 For this area policy options and interventions include: 
o Regulating the content and the volume of marketing 
o Regulating direct or indirect marketing in certain or all media 
o Regulating sponsorship activities that promote alcoholic beverages 
o Restricting or banning promotions in connection with activities targeting 
young people 
 
Box 4: Marketing-related elements of the Global Strategy 
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to trade. In this regard, national, regional and international efforts 
should take into account the impact of harmful use of alcohol” 
([65], emphasis added) 
And the Global Strategy requests Member States to: 
 “encourage mobilization and active and appropriate engagement 
of all concerned social and economic groups, including scientific, 
professional, nongovernmental and voluntary bodies, the private 
sector, civil society and industry associations, in reducing harmful 
use of alcohol” 
([65], emphasis added) 
 
4.1.2.2 National Policy 
As is clear from the Global Strategy, the AI is still seen as a valid contributor to the 
development of alcohol policy, and unlike the FCTC there is no mention of 
protecting alcohol policy from the AI. National alcohol policy ranges from legal 
regulations, to voluntary codes (self-regulation or non-statutory regulations), and 
some countries use a combination of the two (co-regulation)[221].  
It is common to place a restriction on the time or place that alcohol marketing can 
occur, for example restrictions on marketing near or in the view of schools, or on TV 
or radio before the watershed. For example Italy has a self-regulatory code that 
states that alcohol advertising on TV between the hours of 4pm and 7pm and within 
programmes targeted at children should be avoided[221]. It is also common to 
restrict the placement of alcohol marketing in media that particularly appeals to 
youth, as van den Broeck and de Bruijn[221] state, “in many self regulation codes a 
25% or 30% threshold of exposed adolescents is used as a benchmark. If more 
than 25% or 30% of the audience is expected to be under aged, alcohol marketing 
may not be placed”.  
As well as regulating the placement and duration of alcohol marketing, many 
countries also regulate the content of marketing material and advertisements. 
Content restrictions are used to protect viewers and potential consumers against 
adverts that are misleading or suggestive[221]. Most countries ban advertisements 
that specifically target those below legal drinking age, although often this is 
subjective. The first European Union (EU)-level alcohol issue that was “processed 
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as a public health issue” were ‘alcopops’[346]. Alcopops arrived onto the UK alcohol 
market in 1995 and were quickly found in other European markets. Alcopops were 
clearly aimed at youth, and this “resulted in demands for action at the European 
level”[346]. The European Parliament called upon the European Commission to 
introduce guidelines for the marketing and selling of alcopops and to look at ways of 
taxing alcopops at the same rate as spirits[346]. During this discussion attention 
shifted from a focus on alcopops to alcohol consumption by youth in general; in 
2001 the European Council created Council Recommendations (2001/458/EC) 
regarding the marketing of alcohol to young people. It recommended that Member 
States should ensure that alcoholic products were not designed for or promoted to 
young people, paying particular attention to, among other things, the use of 
characters/motifs, use of young people in campaigns, and the implication of social 
or sexual success[347]. However, despite almost all Member States adopting these 
recommendations, they are not legally binding, and are often open to 
interpretation[221]. There is currently only one binding regulation related to alcohol 
at the European level, the 2010 Audio Visual Media Services Directive (AVMSD; 
2010/13/EU), which prohibits televised alcohol advertising being specifically aimed 
at youth, depicting youth consuming alcohol, or suggesting that alcohol 
consumption will lead to social or sexual success[221].  
The AI increasingly seeks innovative ways to market their products. With increasing 
regulation, policymakers must be aware of the potential move to unregulated forms 
of marketing as has been seen with tobacco[221]. Partial bans on advertising will 
therefore not work, as the AI will find ways around it and market heavily on non-
banned media. For example, Norway has restrictions on the use of alcohol logos on 
the kits of visiting sports teams, however the AI quickly worked to circumvent this 
ban; for example, “Carlsberg had players wear uniforms with the word ‘Probably’ 
taken from its well known slogan ‘Probably the best beer in the world’”[137].  
France’s alcohol policy, Loi Evin (1991), was “one of the most comprehensive 
attempts to restrict advertising of alcohol” by a single country[137]. The law only 
allowed advertisers to refer to the product’s features, did not allow references to 
lifestyle, and did not allow people (especially if drinking) or a drinking atmosphere to 
be depicted in advertisements[137]. One of the most contentious issues from Loi 
Evin was that French TV broadcasters were not permitted to show alcohol branding 
on athletes clothing or in sports arenas (both of which are very popular among 
advertisers), meaning that many foreign sporting events could not be televised in 
France[137]. Some of the restrictions have now been relaxed due to legal 
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challenges, for example advertising on billboards is now permitted and multinational 
sporting competitions are now exempt from the law[137]. 
In 2004 the WHO published the Global Status Report on Alcohol Policy, which 
provided an overview of alcohol policy around the world. In 2002 questionnaires 
were sent to a total of 175 countries, and 118 countries responded[348]. The survey 
found that the bans in place varied significantly between drink type within the 118 
countries (note in particular the difference between bans for beer and spirits) (Figure 
25). For example, Poland banned all advertising for wine and spirits, but advertising 
for beer was allowed on TV, radio, in the cinema, outdoors, in magazines and 
newspapers, and by sponsorship due to its lower alcohol content, but it was not 
allowed on TV, radio, or in cinemas between 6am and 8pm, except for sponsor 
messages[221]. Between approximately 13-16% of countries (depending on media 
and drink) relied on voluntary agreements, and a further 28-57% of countries had no 
restrictions on advertising at all (Figure 25). The WHO[348] report also showed that 
only 24% of countries surveyed had a full or partial ban on beer brands being used 
as sponsorship at youth events or sports events, compared to 61% with no ban at 
all on sponsorship at youth events and 68% at sports events.  
 




Additionally an Alcohol Policy Score was developed by Brand et al in 2007[349] to 
measure and compare the level of alcohol control policies in the (then) 30 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Each 
country was scored on five measures (alcohol availability, drinking context, price, 
advertising, and drink-driving) which were weighted according to their known 
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effectiveness as an alcohol control policy. A total score out of 100 was calculated. 
As Figure 26 shows, only ten countries scored 50 (half) or more of the points 
available. The low scores amongst all OECD countries (the median score was 42.4) 
indicates a general lack of alcohol control policies and that countries are failing to 
effectively protect individuals from alcohol availability, marketing, and harm. As with 
the tobacco control score[331], assigning a score to alcohol control is somewhat 
subjective and subject to criticism, but it does provide an important and interesting 
overview of what countries are doing well and where they may need to make 
improvements. 
 
Figure 26: Alcohol Policy Scores for 30 OECD countries, 2007 
 
(Source [349]) 
4.2 Policy Influence and Compliance 
Due to their legal duty to maximise profits for their shareholders (see sub-chapter 
3.1 Corporations), corporations have a vested interest in any policies that have the 
potential to affect their day-to-day operations, sales, and ultimately their profits. 
Corporations must therefore oppose policy, or attempt to influence it in order to 
make the business environment as favourable as possible; “corporations seek to 
dominate the information and decision-making environment to pursue their 
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interests”[350]. Corporations tend to resist any form of regulation, especially strong 
binding forms, and will generally push for self-regulation, but when this is not an 
option they tend to push for “weak federal or state action that preempts (sic) strong 
measures at lower levels”[351].  
Understanding the tactics and arguments used by corporations, and especially 
those by “disease-promoting corporations”[13], when attempting to influence policy 
is therefore vital. The size and wealth of many corporations gives them significant 
power to influence policy decisions around the world, for example the size of the AI 
“allows considerable resources to be devoted, directly or indirectly, to promoting the 
policy interests of the industry”[97]. By contrast, policymakers tend to have far fewer 
funds and resources than large corporations, and because of this policymakers 
need to be armed with as much knowledge as possible about how industries 
operate in order to counter their efforts as effectively as possible. 
4.2.1 Tactics 
Most information relating to corporate tactics focuses on the TI due to the wealth of 
information gained from the release of internal TI documents during the MSA (see 
sub-chapter 4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: Tobacco and Alcohol 
Marketing). From the study of these internal TI documents it has been found that 
tobacco companies employ many tactics when attempting to influence policy, and 
“the documents show that the tobacco industry has been engaged in deceiving 
policy makers and the public for decades”[352].  
The term ‘tactic’ in this thesis should be understood as: a method by which a 
corporation attempts to exert influence on, for example, policy decisions (either 
through influencing policymakers directly, or by influencing the meaning or 
understanding of the policy in question). Below is a list of TI tactics combined and 
adapted from Bero[352], Saloojee and Dagli[353], and the WHO[354]: 
 Intelligence gathering / monitoring 
 Public relations 
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 Lobbying 
 Create controversy 
 Consultancy programmes 
 Forming alliances 
 Intimidation 






 Bribery / gift giving 
 Rubbish evidence/health groups/advocates 
 Support alternative measures to divert attention 
 Using third parties and front groups 
 Political funding / campaign contributions 
 International treaties / International instruments 
 Philanthropy 
 Controlling information released 
 Joint manufacturing agreements / joint ventures 
 Pushing for voluntary regulatory agreements 
 Funding research / manipulating research outputs 
 Youth smoking prevention and retailer education programmes 
 Pre-emption 
Due to the size of the TI and its vast wealth[355] it can easily implement the above 
tactics and intimidate those who dare to oppose them; “unlike parasites, tobacco 
use does not mutate by itself. Rather, it requires tobacco companies to actively 
devise strategies and oppose public health measures that save lives”[356]. The TI is 
very active in using, or threatening to use, the judicial system to intimidate those 
who criticise them or try to impose regulation; the TI has tried to ‘divide and 
conquer’ those working against them, such as researchers, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), governments and the media[355], and they are willing to try 
and discredit and undermine those undertaking research to try to stop them 
producing unfavourable results. For example PM, in 1982, proposed “attacking 
researchers themselves, where vulnerable”[355], and in 1995 at a PM Board of 
Directors meeting it was said that: “our goal is to help shape regulatory 
environments that enable our business to achieve their objectives in all locations 
where we do business... [and we will] fight aggressively”[354]. 
There have been multiple attempts to list and categorise corporate tactics. Hillman 
and Hitt’s paper[357] is the most widely cited attempt to analytically categorise the 
tactics used by corporations attempting to influence policy. Their system of 
classification, based on resource dependence and market exchange theory, 
assumes that corporate political activity represents one side of an exchange 
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relationship in which corporations offer policymakers support and information in 
return for influencing policy. They identify three ‘long-term’ political strategies which 
each contain multiple ‘short-term’ tactics: information strategy (providing 
policymakers with specific information on the costs and benefits of proposed 
regulations and on their policy preferences through, for example, direct and indirect 
lobbying, commissioning research, and supplying position papers or technical 
reports), financial incentive strategy (offering financial inducements to policymakers, 
for example financial support as contributions to a political decision maker or a 
political party, paid travel expenses, or offering employment), and constituency-
building strategy (influencing policy by gaining the support of individual voters 
through, for example, the mobilisation of employees, customers, suppliers, and 
public relations activities)[357]. Wiist[16] categorises corporate tactics used to 
influence health policy into five “somewhat overlapping” categories, which may be 
used separately or in combination: political tactics (including lobbying), finance 
tactics (including influencing universities, business associations, government 
subsidies), PR and advertising tactics (including using spokespeople, funding 
professional organisations, publishing ‘news’, arguing that research is ‘junk science’, 
CSR, front groups, advertising), product and service tactics (including product 
modification, changing the company’s physical location, targeting vulnerable 
populations, manipulating science), and legal tactics (including limited liability, 
‘taking on’ opponents, avoiding taxes, legal trials, influencing trade agreements, 
using the First Amendment in the USA, using unregulated activity, pre-emption). 
And Farnsworth and Holden’s[358] work splits corporate influence of policy into 
three different groups: political engagement (lobbying, funding think tanks and 
research units, networks of business leaders and politicians), institutional 
participation (business representatives that sit on boards of government agencies, 
advisory committees, quangos, hospitals etc), and provision (of services or products 
to consumers or customers). These three examples of attempts to categories 
corporate tactics highlight the lack of consensus and lack of a systematic approach.  
Within the last 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
corporate lobbyists and public-relations professionals[359]. Lobbying, argues Miller 
and Mooney[359], has become a central method of communication for corporations, 
along with philanthropy and CSR. They state that lobbying is “the attempt by 
organised interests to influence policy and the decision making of governmental or 
other similar institutions”, and that it occurs within the political process without any 
“formal democratic mechanisms”[359]. In most Western nations, notably in the UK 
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and USA, lobbying has become an important part of the policy process, and 
lobbying occurs at every level of governance[350]. Lobbyists work to secure 
“favourable assumptions” by giving incentives such as free travel and hospitality, 
advisory positions, and board memberships to policymakers (also known as the 
‘revolving door[350, 351])[350]. For example, tobacco companies were identified as 
some of the most common providers of corporate hospitality to UK MPs in 2014 (for 
example Imperial gave three MPs VIP tickets to the Wimbledon tennis final[360]) 
and also in 2014 there was concern that the new chief executive of the UK’s civil 
service also held a position with SABMiller[361, 362]. Miller and Dinan[2009, in 359] 
argue that as business tends to be much more active than other actors, lobbyists 
overwhelmingly work on behalf of business, and predominantly Big Business 
(meaning that decision makers are being influenced disproportionately by the ideals 
of Big Business). For example, interviews conducted with the AI in 2010 showed 
that AI representatives felt they had good access to UK Government officials and 
civil servants (which was more frequent than contact with ministers): “You can pick 
up the phone to them, you can talk to them, it’s not a problem of access. It’s just a 
case of ... you have something to say, you have something to contribute, they’ll 
listen”[363]. Based on these interviews, Hawkins and Holden[363] argue that the AI 
“are involved at every stage of the policy process and are seen by government as 
key stakeholders who must be consulted – and where possible accommodated – in 
policy debates” in the UK and that “they owe this position both to the ubiquity of their 
contacts with political actors and to the extensive resources at their disposal both as 
individual organisations and through the trade bodies they fund. The extent of their 
resources means that they are able to participate in all available forums and can 
supply concrete policy solutions to governments [at] a time when departmental 
budgets and resources are being squeezed”. 
Corporations fund a complex network of lobby groups, front groups, trade 
associations, parliamentary groups, research institutes and think tanks[350, 364] in 
order to influence and direct policy decisions. Many of these organisations may 
appear as independent, but instead are “vehicles for corporate influence”[350]. A 
study by Cain, Loewenstein and Moore[2005, in 351] found that people only 
discount the information they hear to a small extent from a source who discloses its 
conflict of interest. However, a source with a conflict of interest usually feels 
compelled to put their point across more strongly and this combination therefore 
makes the source more, rather than less, credible.  
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Miller and Harkins[350] demonstrate that corporations work to ‘capture’ the following 
sectors: (a) science, (b) civil society, (c) the media, and (d) policy [adapted from 
350]. 
(a) Lobbyists regularly attempt to capture scientific expertise, to act as credible 
spokespeople or expert witnesses for the industry’s cause. If the science 
cannot be ‘captured’ then an industry, through its lobbyists and front groups, 
will aim to create uncertainty in order to slow down or stop policy 
implementation and regulation. This worked especially well for the TI, where 
the health effects of tobacco were confused and debated for approximately 
thirty years before they were widely accepted by the public and policymakers 
– similar tactics are now being used by the AI.  
There is a long history of corporations attempting to influence science. The 
TI (and, more recently, the AI) often pay prominent scientists to conduct 
studies in their favour and to act as advisors on their behalf to counter 
damaging scientific evidence[351]. Its aim is to confuse the public and 
policymakers, and to delay government action[351].  
(b) Civil society is made up of charities, NGOs, trade unions and business 
associations. It is important for corporations to appear to have these types of 
organisations ‘on board’, as they are thought to represent the general public, 
i.e. voters. The setting up or funding of fake citizen groups (‘astroturf’ 
organisations) is a key strategy by corporations as they appear to be 
genuine organisations set up by ordinary citizens. It has recently been 
claimed that the AI is adopting tactics ‘pioneered’ by the TI through the 
funding of charities in order to gain political influence[365]. Alcohol 
companies, over the past 25 years, have been found to set up more than 30 
‘social aspect’ organisations (SAOs) around the world (including in the 
emerging markets of Asia and Africa) in order to promote their policy 
objectives[97]. These SAOs tend to exist in order to “promote a set of key 
messages that support ineffective policies for reducing harm”[97]. Think 
tanks are also often thought to be independent, but in reality there are often 
heavily funded by an interested industry. Using techniques like these, 
corporations are able to “populate the information environment” with an array 
of seemingly independent reports and studies that are in line with corporate 
interests[350].  
(c) The media is used by corporations to connect with the general public and 
influence popular opinion. The media can work to promote corporate 
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interests but, conversely, can also help to publicise popular concerns. 
Corporations use front groups and public relations specialists to portray their 
messages and viewpoints, keeping themselves hidden thereby making the 
messages appear as independent. The “blurring of the line between 
journalism and lobbying is central to the contemporary use of the traditional 
media”[350].  
Influencing the media is a key tactic of many corporations, and especially of 
the TI. For example as Sweda and Daynard[355] report, in May 1995 PM 
sponsored a trip to New York and Washington DC for ten Asian journalists. 
Tobacco companies also attempt to publish articles in prestigious journals, 
such as The Lancet[366], to make their views heard, and appear credible 
and of equal weighting to counter articles.  
(d) Policy capture is the ultimate aim of the other ‘captures’. Corporations aim to 
pursue their interests via interactions with policymakers, either directly or 
indirectly through organisations such as trade associations (trade 
associations work on behalf of an industry, and usually claim to represent all 
levels of the industry from manufacturing to selling). 
Both the TI and AI focus strongly on individual responsibility, and emphasise the 
role of education in solving any problems associated with their products. In order to 
promote this they regularly enter partnerships with government or push for self-
regulatory measures as discussed in the following two sub-chapters. 
4.2.1.1 Partnership working 
Partnership working is common in the modern policymaking process, and so it is 
important for policymakers to be completely aware of the objectives of any potential 
corporate partners before they start working together[367]. Partnership working 
breaks down the usual barriers between corporations and government. For the 
corporation involved, a partnership with government or an NGO offers them 
credibility and ties their brands to the “positive emotions attributed to their partnered 
organisation”[368], and for governments or NGOs, corporations can be seen as a 
valuable resource of expertise and insider knowledge about their products, 
marketing, and consumers[3]. 
The health sector must have an understanding of the objectives of potential 
partners[367], as despite the potential benefits, partnerships with other sectors, 
such as the TI and AI, have often been found to favour the partner, and have drawn 
much criticism. Many critics of government-industry partnerships believe that they 
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tend to erode the necessary governmental control over business activity[11], and is 
usually more beneficial to the corporation involved than the policymaker, making 
“the pursuit of social objectives harder”[350]. Daube[335] argues that “‘Cooperation’ 
is code for voluntary self-regulation that does nothing to prevent them promoting 
their products exactly as they wish”. For example, the UK Government’s ‘Alcohol 
Harm Reduction Strategy’ in 2004 and the subsequent White Paper on Public 
Health in 2005 included the AI as a “key partner in tackling alcohol problems”[3]. 
Many were concerned about the prominence given to the AI, and many had doubts 
about the AI’s ability to work in effective partnership with government and their 
ability to develop effective self-regulation[3]. After government officials discussed 
the ‘Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy’ with the AI, the document changed 
considerably; a new document entitled ‘Social Responsibility Standards for the 
Production and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks in the UK’ was produced[3] and despite it 
setting out important key standards and principles, it did not include “new 
mechanisms for monitoring, implementation and accreditation”, and it “failed to 
address some of the acknowledged weaknesses of self-regulation in this field, such 
as fragmentation, duplication, gaps and inconsistencies between existing codes 
covering different sectors and aspects of the industry”[3]. In this case, by involving 
the AI, compromises had to be reached which may not have always been in public 
health’s best interest. As argued by Wiist[369]: 
“The goal and values of public health and the goal of the 
corporation are fundamentally different: protecting and promoting 
the health of the public versus making a profit to return to 
investors, i.e. create ‘shareholder value’. ‘Partners’ cannot have 
fundamentally conflicting goals” 
The International Centre for Alcohol Policy (ICAP) is an AI funded centre with the 
aim of promoting “an industry-favourable alcohol ideology”[370]. ICAPs partnership 
with public health, argues McCreanor et al[370], is part of its “ideological agenda to 
influence how alcohol is perceived and the climate in which alcohol policy decisions 
are made”, with a particular focus on the policy of developing countries which the AI 
are attempting to enter and influence. ICAP managed to recruit a former key alcohol 
policy advisor with the WHO to become president, which opened doors to many 
health professionals and added credibility[370]. One of ICAP’s main strategies has 
been to publish reports and findings in order to create an established knowledge 
base on which to base policy, and this has been done through a series of 
Chapter 4: Tobacco and Alcohol Marketing Regulations, and Industry Influence 
112 
 
conferences and collaborations[370]. ICAP attempts to focus policy on the individual 
and their personal choices (as has also been seen by the TI), rather than the social 
and environmental factors that public health professionals argue play a major part in 
the decision to drink alcohol to excess. McCreanor et al[370] argue that partnering 
with public health bodies brings the following benefits to ICAP: respectability, 
credibility, and the legitimisation of ICAP in policy arenas. But in response to 
McCreanor et al’s article, the AI have stated that they understand they “have an 
important role in promoting responsible drinking” and state that it is because of this 
that they, as an industry, have adopted a self-regulatory code of marketing 
practice[371]. 
A study by Bakke and Endal[372] looked at alcohol policy in four African countries 
(Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda and Botswana). All four of the draft national alcohol 
policy documents were found to contain the same core policy measures, 
emphasised “the role of alcohol in society and the legitimacy of industry participation 
in the development and implementation of national alcohol policies”, and included a 
heavy reliance on self-regulation and education campaigns. Where document 
properties were available, the policy documents showed that the ‘author’ was 
mramsay from the ‘company’ SABMiller Africa Asia (therefore, the authors assume, 
Mitch Ramsay, Policy and Issues Manager, SABMiller Africa) indicating significant 
AI involvement. Civil society, NGOs, and representatives from government agencies 
were invited to attend workshops and policy consultations relating to the drafting of 
the policies, however these workshops were facilitated by a SABMiller 
representative and a representative of the South Australian Department of Health 
who, significantly, was also an ICAP consultant. In summary, Bakke and Endal[372] 
found that by allowing the AI to be heavily involved in writing alcohol policy, national 
policies become homogenised (each country’s policy document was “virtually the 
same in wording, structure, even page formatting”), and recommendations for action 
focussed less on what is known to create the best health and social outcomes, and 
more on industry preferences (i.e. self regulatory measures). Bakke and Endal’s 
paper[372] does not assess what changes have resulted from these policy 
documents, or if the polices have had a positive or negative impact, so it is not 
possible to comment on the overall suitability of this approach in developing nations 
if they lack the capacity to develop policy any other way. 
In Sweden the Independent Alcohol Cooperation was launched in 1997 as a 
partnership between government, the National Institute for Public Health, alcohol 
companies and business related to the AI[373]. However, this partnership example 
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has drawn a lot of criticism as all activities of the committee must be agreed by 
consensus, which means that government bodies are unable to undertake activities 
that the AI does not agree with, whereas the AI can continue to lobby for a more 
relaxed alcohol policy in Sweden[373]. Similarly, Munro[374] looked at a partnership 
between Alcohol Education Australia and the AI. It was found that the partnership 
was more beneficial to the AI and that it was difficult maintaining a strong public 
health stance when in partnership with a corporation. These examples show how 
important it is, when involving any industry in policy making, to set strict rules at the 
beginning of the process, and to be extremely careful not to agree to terms that may 
result in the public health body becoming less effective. 
The WHO has been recommending intersectoral work for over 25 years, and the 
importance of it has been emphasized[367], but this has changed in relation to the 
TI since the FCTC. For example, the WHO’s Director-General said in a speech in 
2012: 
“In some countries, the tobacco industry is pushing for joint government-
industry committees to vet or screen all policy and legislative matters 
pertaining to tobacco control. Don’t fall into this trap. Doing so is just like 
appointing a committee of foxes to look after your chickens” [375] 
Working in partnerships can sometimes provide some benefits as the industry 
involved is an expert in their field and are able to reach the public in a way that 
government agencies cannot. However, as has been outlined, partnership working 
draws much criticism. When entering a partnership, it is important that bodies 
“operate within a clear framework”[3]. Many believe that a corporate entity would 
only join in partnership with government or an NGO if it brought them benefits (after 
all, as outlined in sub-chapter 3.1 Corporations, corporations are required by law to 
maximise profits for their shareholders), and therefore they are unable to put health 
first and unable to agree to any measures that may damage their business interests 
(through loss of credibility, respectability, or profit). For example, as Babor et al[97] 
states with regards to partnership with the AI, “[e]xperience suggests that working in 
partnership with the alcohol industry is likely to lead to ineffective or compromised 
policy and is best avoided by governments, the scientific community and NGOs”. 
Article 5.3 of the FCTC (see sub-chapter 4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: 
Tobacco and Alcohol Marketing) requires all Parties to protect policymaking from 
the “vested interests of the tobacco industry”[330], thereby putting stop to 
partnerships with the TI. However, there are concerns that many governments are 
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still engaging with the TI[376], and, for example, as outlined above, tobacco 
companies were identified as some of the most common providers of corporate 
hospitality to UK MPs in 2014[360]. Daube[335] believes that “[t]hose who argue for 
any form of partnerships or associations with alcohol [or] tobacco...companies have 
learned nothing from the history of the past 60 years”. Although the involvement of 
industries within the policy-setting process can help secure cooperation, the fact 
that the industries involved must act on behalf of its shareholders and not public 
health, means that partnerships alone are unable to significantly improve a 
population’s health.  
4.2.1.2 Self-regulation 
The political-economy theory of self- or voluntary-regulation shows that 
“corporations strategically self-regulate by setting standards to pre-empt strong and 
effective regulation through political action. To avoid government regulation, 
corporations move faster than governments to self-regulate”[377]. Voluntary 
regulation is more lenient than statutory regulation and allows the corporations 
involved to continue operating as they were previously, with perhaps very minor 
changes. The main benefits and disadvantages of self-regulation can be seen in 
Box 5. Voluntary regulation is often pushed for by the TI and AI alike, each claiming 
that they “deserve the public’s and government’s trust”[351]. 
Baggott[3] interviewed representatives from the AI, voluntary sector, government, 
public sector, and academics in order to understand different stakeholder 
perspectives on the AI being considered a ‘key partner’ in UK alcohol policy. 
Baggott found that AI respondents believed that self-regulation “imposes less of a 
burden than direct regulation” and enabled the industry to respond quicker to any 
problems that are highlighted to them, whereas those who opposed industry self-
regulation argued that voluntary codes “lack consistency and overall coherence”. 
Regarding the Portman Group (set up in 1989 by the UK’s main alcohol producers 
to operate the AI’s main self-regulatory scheme and fund educational initiatives to 
promote responsible drinking), AI interviewees argued that it worked well to 
discourage bad practice amongst producers and that it was very independent, but 
those working outside of the AI believed it to be a “powerful public relations body 
and lobbyist for the industry” lacking independence and inevitability reflecting the 
views of its funders. Overall, Baggott concluded that “[m]ore could be done to 
establish effective co-regulation, with tougher statutory backing”. Co-regulation, 
where regulatory rules are developed and enforced by a combination of government 
policymakers and industry representatives, is often used when efforts to enforce 
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binding, restrictive regulation have failed[137]. For example, televised alcohol 
advertising in the UK is co-regulated by Ofcom (government) and the Advertising 
Standards Agency (industry body)[137, 221] and this means that when the voluntary 
element of the agreement fails, there is a binding ‘legal backstop’ to support the 




Similarly to the AI, the TI often attempts to implement voluntary codes of regulation. 
One key example of this is Project Cerberus, under which the TI attempted to 
mitigate the effect of the FCTC by targeting more “sympathetic countries”[377]. 
BAT, PM and JTI collaborated under ‘Project Cerberus’ to promote a voluntary 
Pros: 
 Self-regulation harnesses the ‘inside’ knowledge and expertise of those who 
are being regulated. 
 It is based on consensus and is likely to lead to higher compliance. 
 The spirit as well as the letter of regulation is more likely to be upheld. 
 It is less costly to Government and may be less costly to those being 
regulated. 
 It is more flexible and therefore more able to respond quickly to new and 
changing circumstances. 
Cons: 
 Self-regulation tends to be complacent and rules may be unenforced or 
under-enforced. 
 It lacks legitimacy and attracts suspicion that self-regulatory bodies are 
concerned primarily with protecting their members’ interests. 
 Few real sanctions can be applied, as self-regulatory bodies have limited 
powers to ensure compliance. 
 Self-regulatory bodies cannot control the activities of non-members (unless 
there is an externally enforced system of compulsory membership or 
licensing). 
 Self-regulatory bodies often have conflicts of interest. For example, the 
exclusion of a member may lead to loss of revenue. Self-regulatory bodies 
that also have a representative role (such as trade associations, for example) 
experience internal tensions that undermine their regulatory role.  
 Self-regulation is not as publicly accountable as state regulation. 
 Self-regulation can be costly, placing a considerable burden on the industry 
(or profession) and also on Government, particularly where there is a ‘co-
regulation’ element. 
(Source: reproduced from[3]) 
Box 5: The pros and cons of self-regulation 
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alternative to the FCTC, the 2001 International Tobacco Products Marketing 
Standards (ITPMS). The ITPMS was to be audited by an independent body, set up 
by the TI, to increase credibility of the voluntary agreement. The TI agreed that the 
audit body should be “completely independent” and that “funding... should be as 
arms-length as possible”[377]. Although the ITPMS did not stop the FCTC, it did, in 
some countries, slow down FCTC ratification, confuse policymakers and 
governments, and slow down the implementation of effective tobacco control 
programmes[377]. The ITPMS conveyed a public message that the TI could 
regulate itself. However, the WHO cautioned countries against adopting the ITPMS, 
and stated “We have seen no evidence that tobacco companies are capable of self 
regulation” and “We know what works and what doesn’t. Voluntary codes have 
proved to be a failure”[377]. Generally, TI self-regulatory codes are weak and 
undermine real tobacco control attempts. Mamudu et al[377] argue that Project 
Cerberus demonstrated that “public health professionals and policy makers cannot 
trust or work with the tobacco industry”.  
With regards to the AI, Babor et al[97] have argued that voluntary codes do not 
adequately address exposure to, or the content of, marketing messages, despite 
industry claims that they adhere to their codes on responsible marketing. van den 
Broeck and de Bruijn[221] argue that self regulation has been insufficient in many 
countries including Australia, the UK, the USA and the Netherlands. They state that 
voluntary codes are “often ambiguous and open to interpretation”, and because of 
this they argue that it is important to have an independent adjudication system that 
is able to give companies penalties and sanctions if the codes are broken. Non-
industry respondents in Baggott’s[3] study (outlined above) argued that no real 
punishments exist for breaking voluntary codes, and that without sanctions the 
“codes lacked weight especially in a competitive business environment”.  
Although self-regulation is often the cheaper option for governments, and harnesses 
the expertise and knowledge of the corporation(s) involved, it is generally seen to be 
much weaker than binding regulation. A review by Baggott [1989; in 137] showed 
that self regulation “tends towards under-regulation and under enforcement”, and 
another showed that voluntary regulation works best when the threat of binding 
regulation is at its greatest [Babor et al in 137]. Any form of regulation, whether it is 
enforced or voluntary, works against the interest of the industry involved and it is 
therefore unsurprising that voluntary regulation, where corporations are in charge, is 
often unsatisfactory[183, 333, 378, 379] from a public health point of view. 




Through using the above tactics, corporations make a number of repeated 
arguments when opposing regulation. The term ‘argument’ in this thesis should be 
understood as: the reasons given by a corporation as to why they oppose one idea 
or support another (such as a particular policy). 
The TI and AI often attempts to frame the debate about tobacco and alcohol 
regulation in terms of individual liberty and personal responsibility as opposed to 
health; they often state that it is the right of an adult to decide whether or not they 
smoke or drink, and that they have the right to make a mature and personal 
choice[350, 355, 380]. The TI argues that it is responsible, and is honest about the 
dangers of smoking and would not encourage youth to smoke. However, an internal 
document from RJR in 1973 demonstrates otherwise: 
“At the outset it should be said that we are presently, and I believe 
unfairly, constrained from directly promoting cigarettes to the youth 
market...if our Company is to survive and prosper, over the long 
term, we must get our share of the youth market...Thus we need 
new brands designed to be particularly attractive to the young 
smoker, while ideally at the same time being appealing to all 
smokers”[381].  
The argument of ‘personal responsibility’ has been used by unhealthy industries as 
a way of sheltering from criticism, litigation and additional legislation[351]. This 
strategy shifts responsibility from those who make the products, to those who use 
them[351]; from the ‘vector’ to the ‘host’ (Figure 11). The AI, for example, argues 
that as most people drink responsibly, it is unfair to penalise all drinkers with higher 
taxes or more stringent regulation because of the actions of a few[57, 380]. 
However, as Bond et al[382] states the AI “relies on risky alcohol consumption by 
consumers to ensure maximum profits”. Other arguments used by both industries 
include, for example, that regulation equates to a ‘nanny state’, studies criticising 
the industries are ‘junk science’, and self-regulation is sufficient[351]. In the past, 
the TI argued that smoking did not harm health, only ‘excess’ smoking[351], and this 
same argument is now being used by the AI who argue that moderate drinking does 
not harm health[57].  
The AI, similarly to the TI, regularly argues that they do not encourage underage 
consumption of their products as it would be irresponsible and detrimental to their 
business[57]. However, as cited in a paper by Stanley and Daube[383], an AI 
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insider recently admitted that they “deliberately target young people with tastes that 
appeal to the ‘younger palate’”. Caffeine is often added to alcoholic drinks to ensure 
that young drinkers can stay alert and therefore keep drinking for longer, a practice 
that Stanley and Daube[383] label as “horrifyingly irresponsible”. Bond et al[382] 
found, through looking at internal PM documents from when it owned MBC (see 
following section), that it believed that alcohol marketing did not cause harmful 
consumption of alcohol and that advertising bans would therefore not stop alcohol 
from being consumed[384]. The AI, through ICAP, has also argued that they have 
“a legitimate and positive role to play in developing alcohol policies in emerging 
markets”[370] and should therefore not be excluded from the policymaking process. 
4.2.3 Similarities in TI and AI corporate political activity 
Due to co-ownership of tobacco and alcohol corporations, there is some third-party 
access to information on the AI through the internal TI documents released as part 
of the MSA (see sub-chapter 4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: Tobacco and 
Alcohol Marketing). Bond et al[334] have looked closely at the relationship between 
the TI and AI by undertaking a systematic search of these TI documents. Much of 
Bond et al’s study relates to PM and Miller Brewing Company (MBC), as PM bought 
MBC in 1970. The documents analysed by Bond et al point to a number of 
similarities between the practices of the TI and AI, especially in terms of “preventing 
and delaying public health measures”. The industries worked closely together, 
sharing arguments and tactics and forming similar allies. The study found that both 
industries faced similar objections from public health bodies, similar international 
scrutiny about their business practices, and similar threats (for example potential tax 
increases and regulation regarding their advertising, labelling, supply chains and 
selling practices). As the then Vice-President of PM stated regarding their 
manufacturing of tobacco and beer, “the fact that so many people enjoy our 
products is both the foundation of our success and the source of our problems” as 
many people find the products “morally suspect”[334]. Another senior PM employee 
stated: 
 “People (and politicians) need causes, and in a world which is 
generally more peaceful and affluent than ever before, there’s a 
shortage of big causes. That’s why we hear so much about really 
rather little causes: smoking, drinking, dietary hazards...”[334] 
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Throughout the documents there is concern about alcohol beginning to appear on 
the public health agenda; in 1998 a PM document claimed that those who targeted 
‘Big Tobacco’ were now targeting ‘Big Booze’[382].  
Bond et al[334] also found that both the TI and AI try to defend their right of 
commercial free speech, especially in the US where free speech is covered by the 
First Amendment in the Constitution. Regarding tax increases, both the TI and AI 
were found to believe that it is unfair to impose product-specific excise taxes as they 
are regressive and affect people on lower incomes disproportionally. MBC also 
argued that placing higher taxes on alcohol is unfair on those who drink responsibly 
(further details about the TI’s attempted influence of tax policy can be found in a 
recent systematic review[385]). Both industries were also found to argue that 
“advertising affects brand performance, not consumption or abuse” (or underage 
drinking[382]) and that marketing restrictions therefore do not achieve what they are 
set out to do. Both PM and MBC claimed that they did not encourage those 
underage to smoke or drink as they are “adult customs”, however this is 
contradicted by the launch of alcopops and flavoured cigarettes which have been 
shown to appeal to youth. A document from RJR, also analysed by Bond et al, 
acknowledged that in the long term, the company must tailor its products to the 
youth market to allow the company to prosper. 
Although the work by Bond et al[334] provides a valuable insight into the 
collaborations between, and similarities of, the TI and AI, it is only based on those 
with co-ownership. Only TI documents were searched for information about the AI. 
This means that only those alcohol companies who had dealt directly with tobacco 
companies, or who were owned by them would be identified, and the results would, 
unsurprisingly, indicate that the two industries collaborated. It would be interesting 
to find out if knowledge has been shared between independent companies in the TI 
and AI. Despite this limitation, PM’s involvement with MBC has provided a gateway 
to documents from the AI, and related industry groups[382].  
The tactics and arguments used by the TI and AI are usually used in an attempt to 
distract and intimidate those working to promote tobacco/alcohol control, and to 
delay or stop policy or regulation that might have a detrimental impact on their 
business. As Sweda and Daynard[355] note, the use of tactics by the TI is not to 
‘win’ as they know that they are fighting a losing battle, especially in more 
developed countries. 
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4.2.4 Regulatory Compliance 
As outlined above, due to the TI and AI’s legal duty to maximise profits for their 
shareholders, corporations have a vested interest in any policies that have the 
potential to affect their operations, sales, or profits and will attempt to influence their 
development and introduction. Once regulations are implemented, corporations will 
often then attempt to circumvent them through non-compliance[386]. 
4.2.4.1 TI compliance 
Despite the importance of marketing legislation, there is very little literature on the 
extent to which it is complied with. Within tobacco control, the compliance literature 
focuses largely on retail sales of tobacco products to underage youth, which is 
outside the remit of this thesis. There are a few small studies which examine 
compliance with a specific marketing regulation in a specific setting, for example in-
store and POS advertising in California, USA[287], Ohio, USA[387], Ontario, 
Canada[388], New Zealand[389], and Melbourne, Australia[390, 391], health 
warnings on magazine adverts in the USA[392], graphic health warning labels on 
cigarette packs in New Zealand[393], health warnings and product descriptors (such 
as ‘light’) on cigarette packs in eight FSU countries[394], and outdoor advertising in 
Louisiana and Los Angeles County, USA[395]. Of these, only one[394] assessed 
compliance with FCTC measures. 
The geographical bias in this literature (nine of the ten articles focussed on either 
North America or Australasia) indicates that there is a large gap in the 
understanding of TI compliance with tobacco marketing policies across the world, 
especially in MICs and LICs. Additionally six of the ten articles looked at compliance 
with store-based regulations (including POS advertising and in-store adverts) and 
two focussed on pack-based regulations (for example, health warnings and product 
descriptors), indicating that there is little or no literature exploring compliance with 
other common marketing types, for example, the sale of single cigarettes, TV 
advertising, or print media advertising. 
More general information about possible regulatory breaches is also reported by 
NGOs such as Action on Smoking and Health (ASH)[396-398] and by news 
websites[399, 400]. The WHO also attempts to monitor FCTC implementation 
through the submission of (now biennial) country implementation reports[401] 
(which countries must submit under Article 21[324]). The successful implementation 
of the evidence-based policies of the FCTC is central to halting the spread of the 
tobacco epidemic. However, implementation of some of the Articles has found to 
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have been slow reflecting both the lack of capacity in many countries to implement 
effective policies[402] and insidious influence by the industry[402-407]. In 2012 
Article 13 (the main Article focussing on TI marketing) had the fifth worst average 
full implementation rate (44%) due mostly to trouble implementing cross-border and 
Internet advertising bans[402]. This figure measures the proportion of Parties with 
relevant FCTC legislation in place, but it does not show whether or not the 
legislation is being enforced or complied with.  
4.2.4.2 AI compliance 
Despite the importance of alcohol marketing legislation, there is very little literature 
on compliance; much of the compliance literature focuses on retail sales of alcohol 
to underage youth which is outside the remit of this thesis. There are a few small 
studies which look at compliance with a particular regulation in a specific setting, for 
example the content of alcohol adverts during televised sport in the USA[408], the 
frequency and content of alcohol adverts in magazines targeted at young people in 
Australia[409], and outdoor advertising in Louisiana and Los Angeles County, 
USA[395]. One example of the AI circumventing marketing bans comes from 
Norway which when the inclusion of alcohol logos on visiting sports teams was 
banned, Carlsberg logos were replaced with the word ‘Probably’ taken from its very 
well known slogan ‘Probably the best beer in the world’[137]. 
Additionally some NGOs report on regulatory problems, for example the European 
Centre for Monitoring Alcohol Marketing (EUCAM) regularly reports on self-
regulatory failures[410, 411] and non-compliance and circumvention of formal 
legislation[412-414], and the Dutch Institute for Alcohol Policy (STAP) produced a 
report in 2007 assessing compliance with alcohol marketing regulations (both formal 
and voluntary) in a range of European countries[415]. The STAP report found that 
there was an overall lack of literature regarding alcohol marketing regulations and 
levels of adherence to these regulations[415]. The geographical bias in this 
literature (all but one of the studies focussed on Europe, Australia or the USA) 
indicates that there is a large gap in the understanding of AI compliance with alcohol 
marketing policies across the world, especially in MICs and LICs.  
Advertising restrictions are often open to interpretation, which can sometimes be 
considered as non-compliance. In the UK, alcohol adverts must not suggest that 
drinking alcohol will lead to social success, which is a fairly ambiguous requirement. 
For example, a 2006 Carling advert showed a flock of birds performing ‘aerial 
aerobatics’ to create the word ‘Belong’ in the style of Carling’s logo (Figure 27) and 
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received complaints arguing that it breached advertising codes[220]. The advert 
took viewers through the three stages of ‘belonging’ as outlined in an internal 
Carling document uncovered during the UK parliamentary inquiry (see sub-chapter 
4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: Tobacco and Alcohol Marketing): first it 
showed “the moment when an individual joins a group”, then showed viewers “the 
joy of belonging” as the birds fly and perform together, and finally “the power of 
belonging” as the birds are, together, able to create the word ‘Belong’[220]. 
Hastings[220] argues that “in the light of these documents the ASA’s [regulatory 
body] conclusion that “the ad did not imply alcohol contributed to the popularity of an 
individual or the success of a social event” becomes completely implausible”. 
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Chapter 5: The Tobacco Industry’s 
Attempted Influence of Marketing 
Regulations: A Systematic Review 
5.1 Background 
The public availability of internal TI documents resulting from state-level litigation 
and the signing of the MSA in the US has formed the basis of an extensive body of 
work on TI political activity (see [416] for overview). These studies have greatly 
expanded understanding of the scope of TI political activity, but they tend to be 
event or case-study based. While the focused nature of these studies provides 
potentially valuable detail of the political strategies used by large tobacco 
companies, they do not draw out the broader trends and patterns of TI political 
activity, and with over 850 publications now based on these documents[417] it is 
increasingly difficult for public health advocates and policymakers to learn from the 
research findings. Only two studies have reviewed elements of this literature 
systematically[4, 418], and none have attempted to systematically categorise TI 
political activity in a way that could then be applied to other areas of public health 
involving corporations.  
This chapter therefore aims to both systematically review the existing literature on 
methods used by the TI to influence regulation aimed at restricting the marketing of 
tobacco products, and to develop taxonomies for categorising the tactics and 
arguments used. By providing a summary of industry activity in this area, this review 
is likely to be a valuable resource for enhancing the ability of public health 
advocates and policymakers to understand, predict, and potentially counter tactics 
the TI might use to exert influence on policy and the types of arguments it is most 
likely to make when it does. This is particularly important given that multiple Articles 
of the WHO’s FCTC make recommendations regarding the marketing of tobacco 
products, for example Article 13 recommends a “comprehensive ban on advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship”[324]. The FCTC covers over 87% of the world’s 
population[328], but despite the vast majority of states becoming Party to the FCTC 
many have yet to implement its recommendations[401] with the tactics of the TI 
identified as a hindrance to the development and implementation of legislation[403]. 
Existing research shows that despite TI claims that marketing is only used for brand 
switching and capturing market share, there is a significant link between TI 
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marketing and smoking initiation among young people and increased smoking 
prevalence[17-20]. This underpins the continuing importance of understanding the 
strategies used by the TI to shape policies aimed at regulating the marketing of 
tobacco products which kill half of their long-term users[24, 25].  
5.2 Methods 
This review aimed to identify all articles that examined TI attempts to influence 
marketing regulation from 1990 to 2013. As shown in sub-chapter 3.2 Corporate 
Marketing, marketing encompasses five key variables: product, promotion, price, 
place, and person[157], and each of these are included within the systematic 
review. However as a systematic review of TI influence on tobacco tax had already 
been completed[4], price in the form of tax was excluded from the review. 
The databases Web of Knowledge (which includes Web of Science, BIOSIS 
Previews, and MEDLINE), Business Source Premier, and Embase were searched 
using this search string:  
 (corporat* OR industr* OR compan* OR busines* OR firm*) AND 
(tobacco OR smok* OR cigarette*) AND (marketing OR advertis* 
OR sponsor*) AND (regulat* OR policy OR legislat*) 
The search engine Google was used to identify grey literature, the UCSF Tobacco 
Documents ‘Marketing and Advertising’ Bibliography[419] was searched for 
additional academic articles, the series of UCSF US State tobacco reports[420] 
were assessed, and two prominent academic TI experts were selected (based on 
agreement with one of my PhD supervisors, Professor Anna Gilmore) and contacted 
via e-mail to identify any additional papers (see Table 2). Primary data were 
excluded from the review as assessing the 13 million internal TI documents 
released as part of the MSA was not feasible due to time constraints. All searches 
were conducted between April and July 2011, and were updated in March 2013. 
Searches were limited to articles from 1990 to 2013 and those written in English. 
The search protocol was developed in conjunction with a qualified librarian. 
Initial study inclusion/exclusion criteria were discussed extensively between myself 
and two of my PhD supervisors (Professor Anna Gilmore and Dr Gary Fooks), 
piloted and re-piloted. The final inclusion/exclusion criteria used in this review can 
be seen in Box 6. In total 1,754 articles were identified, of which 1,326 were 
excluded based on their title and abstract alone. 418 articles were downloaded for 
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full analysis (ten articles could not be located despite efforts to contact the authors). 
370 articles were excluded for not meeting the inclusion criteria or due to overlap. 
The remaining 48 articles met all of the inclusion criteria.  
 
Table 2: Literature searches completed for the tobacco industry systematic review 





Web of Knowledge (which included 
Web of Science, BIOSIS Previews 
and MEDLINE) 
Full string in ‘Topic’ 672 
Business Source Premier 
 
Full string in ‘Topic’, except 
‘(tobacco OR smok* OR cigarette*)’ 
in ‘Title’ (searching with it in ‘topic’ 
returned far too many hits) 
231 
EMBASE Full string in ‘Topic’ 227 
UCSF Tobacco Documents 




Search string could not be applied 
so all studies published on this site 
were initially considered based on 
their title 
99 
UCSF reports on state tobacco 
policymaking 
(www.tobacco.ucsf.edu/states) 
Search string could not be applied 
so all studies published on this site 
were initially considered based on 
their title 
45 
Contacting experts E-mail 417** 
Search engine ‘Google’ Full string 63 
 Total 1,754 
*the searches were undertaken in the order listed within the table, and duplicate articles 
identified in preceding searches were not counted 
**this large number was due to one of the experts who was contacted sending a full list of 
their publications, most of which were not related to TI marketing 
 
 
Data extraction (see Appendix 1) was undertaken by myself, and a random sample 
of 24 (50%) of the included articles were second-reviewed by two of my PhD 
supervisors (Professor Anna Gilmore and Dr Gary Fooks) to check that all the 
inclusion criteria were met and to agree final tactic and argument categorisation. All 
differences were discussed between the three of us. Disagreements related only to 
categorisation, more often in relation to the categorisation of arguments than tactics. 
Where disagreement occurred, all evidence falling under that particular category 
was re-reviewed by all three of us until agreement had been reached. Narrative 
synthesis was undertaken to combine the evidence from the articles. 




To be included in this review, studies and individual tactics and arguments had to fulfil 
the following criteria: 
 Studies must be written in English. 
 Studies must cover the period from 1990-2013. In papers that cover both 
before and after 1990, only those tactics/arguments relating to post-1990 will 
be recorded and included within this review.  
 Studies must look at TI efforts to influence new regulatory measures regarding 
marketing regulation/policy (information regarding how the industry attempts 
to circumvent existing regulation will not be included within the review). 
 The tactics/arguments covered must be related to one or more of the 
following: product (for example, packaging, new products/flavours, branding), 
price* (for example, price promotions, minimum pricing), promotion 
(advertising including billboards, point-of-sale, sponsorship), place (for 
example, vending machines, restrictions on advertising near schools) or 
person (for example, restrictions on advertising or selling to youth). 
 Each individual claim made regarding TI tactics/arguments used to influence 
marketing regulation must be directly supported by verifiable evidence. 
 Tactics/arguments identified must be directly implemented by the TI or by a 
group where substantial evidence suggests that they act on the TI’s behalf. 
 Tactics/arguments which are noted within the included articles are assumed to 
have been carried through, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
Tactics/arguments which are shown to only have been planned, and not used, 
will not be recorded. 
 Only tactics/arguments directly related to marketing regulation will be 
recorded. For example, health warning labels are included as they influence 
the means of packaging as a marketing tool, but they are excluded if the study 
only looks at, for example, the wording of the warning, as this does not affect 
marketing. 
 Only tactics/arguments that are clearly detailed in the paper(s) are coded. 
 
*Price in the form of tax has been excluded as a separate review on tax-related 
lobbying has already been completed (see [4]) and this would therefore overlap. Price 
in terms of price-based promotions have been included. 
 
Box 6: Tobacco industry systematic review - inclusion and exclusion criteria 




This review splits TI political activity into ‘strategies’ which include individual ‘tactics’ 
(the methods by which a corporation attempts to exert influence) and ‘frames’ which 
include individual ‘arguments’ (the reasons given by a corporation as to why they 
oppose one idea or support another).  
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) paper[357] was used as the basis for the initial 
categorisation of TI strategies/tactics as it is the most widely cited attempt to 
analytically categorise the tactics used by corporations attempting to influence 
policy (outlined in sub-chapter 4.2 Policy Influence and Compliance). While they 
claim their list is a “comprehensive taxonomy of specific political strategies”[357], it 
preceded the TI document literature which, given the uniqueness of the resource, is 
arguably the richest literature available on corporate political activity. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, therefore, additional strategies and tactics that were not included 
within their categorisation were identified. 
Hillman and Hitt’s[357] categorisation did not consider the frames or arguments 
used by industry, and so a second taxonomy was developed to take account of 
these. Frames offer a way of “packaging” an issue[421], they provide a “summary 
message for a defined topic area”[422] and may contain several arguments that 
share a common perspective[421, 422]; in other words, frames are the “meta-
message”[423]. Many articles, within tobacco[421, 422, 424-429] and other 
areas[430-433], have shown that how an argument or issue is framed is important 
for its success and how it is perceived. It was therefore deemed important for the 
reviews to categorise both the arguments used, and the broader frames in which 
they fit. There is no consensus within the literature regarding the naming of frames. 
The list of strategies/tactics and frames/arguments were developed via ‘a priori 
coding’[434], the former adapted from Hillman and Hitt[357] and the latter based on 
the limited existing literature on TI frames[425, 427]. Additional categories were 
added via ‘emergent coding’[434] following review of the papers included and after 
extensive discussions between myself and two of my PhD supervisors (Professor 
Anna Gilmore and Dr Gary Fooks). This was an iterative process and the 
taxonomies were only finalised after all of the papers had been reviewed. 
5.2.2 Categorisation 
The tactics and arguments used by the TI were categorised using the taxonomies 
outlined above. The number of times each was used was counted. If a tactic or 
argument was referred to more than once (in one or multiple articles) regarding the 
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same policy then it was only counted once, however if it was referred to more than 
once about different policies then this was counted separately. While the tactics and 
arguments counted will be influenced by both the focus of the included articles (and 
any bias therein) and the framework of categorisation, counting was deemed the 
best way of obtaining an indication of which tactics and arguments are relied upon 
most heavily by the TI. 
The geography of where each tactic and argument was used was also identified. If 
the article included was transnational, wherever possible the geography of where 
the individual tactics and arguments were used was listed. For example, the article 
by ASH[435] is a transnational study but the tactic ‘indirect lobbying’ was used in the 
UK (Europe).  
Data was extracted into a custom-made form (see Table 3). As only individual 
statements were considered from each article, using a critical appraisal form to 
assess the quality of the overall article was not deemed necessary.  
 
Table 3: Data extraction form 
Full reference  
First reviewer  Second reviewer  
Check list for inclusion 
Does the study relate to tobacco industry 
arguments/tactics used to influence 
marketing regulation (price (not tax), product, 
promotion, place, person)? 
Yes  No (exclude from 
review) 
 
Is the article in English? Yes  No (exclude from 
review) 
 
Is the study concerned with activities which 
take place from 1990 onwards? (If only 
concerned with pre-1990, exclude; if 
concerned with before and after 1990, 
include and note claims from 1990 onwards). 
Yes, study is 
concerned with 
post-1990 (state 
which period it 
focuses on). 






Is verifiable evidence used to support any 
claims made about tobacco industry 
arguments/tactics used to influence 
marketing regulation? (Only note claims that 
are supported with verifiable evidence) 




What country/region does the article focus 
on? 
 
Which companies are studied?  
What methodology and type of data is used?  
Which policy is industry attempting to 
influence?  
 
What tactics does industry use?  
Which arguments does industry make?  
 





In total 48 articles that mentioned arguments and tactics used by the TI when 
attempting to influence marketing regulation were included within this review. Over 
half (56%) of the articles focussed on activity in North America, Europe or 
Australasia, 17% focussed on Asia (Table 4). Only one article focussed on activity in 
Africa, but one ‘transnational’ study[436] also made references to TI arguments 
used when countering regulations proposed in Africa. 
 






Africa 1 (2%) Africa [437] 
Asia 8 (17%) Philippines [438]; Malaysia [439]; Japan [440]; 
Cambodia [33]; Lebanon [441]; China [442]; Uzbekistan
1
 
[443]; Middle East [444] 
Australasia 3 (6%) Australia [445] [446]; New Zealand [447] 
Europe 5 (10%) Switzerland [448]; Hungary [449]; Czech Republic [450]; 
European Union [451] [452] 
North America 19 (40%) USA [453] [382] [454] [455] [456] [457] [458] [459] [460] 
[461] [462] [463] [464] [465] [466] [467] [468] [469] [470]  
South America 4 (8%) Argentina [471]; Uruguay [472]; Latin America [94] [473] 




Different official bodies class Uzbekistan as either a Central Asian or European country. In 
this review it is counted as Asian, as per the UN[478] 
 
 
5.3.2 Tactics and Arguments 
The TI uses a number of recurring tactics (Table 5) and arguments (Table 6) when 
attempting to influence marketing regulation. A table of the underlying data, 
including all of the tactics and arguments used, can be found in Appendix 1. 
5.3.2.1 TI tactics used to influence marketing regulation  
This review identified 18 separate tactics (Table 5) falling under six main strategies: 
‘Information’ (providing or manipulating evidence), ‘Constituency building’ (forming 
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alliances with other sectors, organisations, or the public to give the impression of 
larger support for the industry’s position), ‘Policy substitution’ (proposing or 
supporting alternative policies), ‘Legal’ (using the legal system), ‘Constituency 
fragmentation, and destabilization’ (weakening opponents), and ‘Financial incentive’ 
(offering direct or indirect monetary incentives). 
The strategies ‘Constituency fragmentation’ and ‘Financial incentive’ were identified 
least frequently and each only in a single geographic region (North America and 
Europe respectively). The other strategies were widely used, although two individual 
tactics were only documented in single jurisdictions: pre-emption (Legal strategy) 
was only seen in the USA, although used in multiple states; and the preparation of 
position papers/technical reports (Information strategy) was only seen in the EU. A 
further Information tactic, establishing collaboration with or working alongside 
policymakers, was only identified in Europe but within two jurisdictions. 
 
















Africa – 1 
[437]  
Asia – 3 
[443] [441] [444] 
Australasia – 2 
[446] [436] 
Europe – 7 
[435] [435] [452] [451] 
[451] [449] [450] 
N.America – 6 
[462] [468] [460] [467] 
[436] [477] 
S.America – 3 
[473] [94] [471] 
Transnational – 1 
[406]  
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, 




Europe – 5 
[435] [435] [452] [451] 
[450] 
N.America – 5 
[455] [465] [468] [458] 
[436]  







Commissioning, writing (or 







Australasia – 2 
[445] [446] 
Europe – 2 
[451] [449] 
N.America – 3 
[468] [435] [436]  
Preparing position papers, 
technical reports or data on 




Europe – 2 
[452] [451] 
Establishing industry/policymaker 
collaboration (e.g. via working group, 
technical group, advisory group) / work 












Form alliances with and 
mobilise other industry 




Asia – 1 
[444] 
Australasia – 1 
[446] 
Europe – 5 
[435] [451] [451] [450] 
[449] 
N.America – 6 
[465] [457] [468] [460] 
[463] [436] 
S.America – 2 
[473] [94] 






Europe – 3 
[448] [452] [451] 
N.America – 4 
[468] [436] [477] [95]  







Australasia – 1 
[446] 
Europe – 3 
[452] [451] [451] 
N.America – 2 
[457] [458] 






Europe – 2 
[451] [449] 





 Collaboration between 
companies / development 







Asia – 1 
[439]  
Australasia – 2 
[445] [446] 
Europe – 3 
[435] [452] [449] 
N.America – 2 
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[435] [436]  
S.America – 2 
[473] [94] 







Develop/promote (new or existing) 
voluntary code / self-regulation 
18 
 
Asia – 7 
[439] [443] [440] [33] 
[441] [442] [444] 
Australasia – 1 
[445] 
Europe – 5 
[435] [448] [451] [450] 
[449] 
N.America – 2 
[453] [459] 
S.America – 2 
[473] [94] 
Transnational – 1 
[406]  






Asia – 1 
[444] 
Australasia – 1 
[446] 
Europe – 1 
[451]  
N.America – 2 
[468] [461] 
S.America – 2 
[473] [471] 
Transnational – 1 
[95]  
Develop/promote non-regulatory initiative 
(generally seen to be ineffective/less 
effective, e.g. education programmes) 
6 
 
Africa – 1 
[437]  
Asia – 1 
[444] 
N.America – 1  
[95]  
S.America – 2 
[94] [471]  







N.America – 6 
[453] [466] [467] [460] 
[461] [463] 
Using litigation / threat of legal action 
9 
 
Africa – 2 
[436] [436] 
Asia – 1 
[438]   
Australasia – 1 
[446] 
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Europe – 2 
[452] [475] 
N.America – 3 






Preventing the emergence of, neutralising 
and/or discrediting potential opponents 
(individuals, organisations or coalitions)  
2 
 





Providing current or offering future 
employment to those in influential role 
1 
 
Europe – 1 
[451] 




Europe – 1 
[450] 
1
Including research/publications intended to undermine or misrepresent existing evidence 
2
Creation of group for specific purpose of working against proposed policy 
3
Routine use of a trade association was not counted, industry collaboration had to be 
‘active’ 
4
Includes efforts to prevent the implementation of ‘anticipated’ policies 
5
In some cases, industry uses legislators to promote their alternative policies 
 
 
A variety of Information strategies were identified and widely used. These include 
direct[94, 406, 435-437, 441, 443, 444, 446, 449-452, 460, 462, 467, 468, 471, 473, 
477] and indirect[435, 436, 450-452, 455, 458, 465, 468] lobbying of policymakers, 
attempting to shape the evidence via commissioning research[435, 436, 445, 446, 
449, 451, 468] or preparing technical reports[451, 452], and efforts to establish 
collaboration with policymakers[449, 452]. When lobbying directly the TI often 
identifies and targets specific politicians, hoping that they will act on their behalf in 
policy discussions; this was seen in the UK[435, 451], Uzbekistan[443], 
Australia[446], the EU[452], and the USA where there was evidence that legislators 
have lobbied on the industry’s behalf[455, 465]. There was also evidence that the TI 
lobby domestic political actors to represent their interests in other countries; for 
example in 1992 when plain packaging was proposed in Australia, the TI 
“approached the vice-consul (commercial) of the British Consul General in Sydney” 
in order to ask for assistance from the UK government in dealing with the Australian 
government[436].  
The use of indirect lobbying, where the TI’s interests are often hidden behind front 
groups or allies from other industry sectors or trade organisations, was frequent. 
Evidence from only Europe and North America may reflect the loss of TI credibility 
in these regions and hence its need to use third parties, or it may simply reflect the 
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research base. Examples illustrate the range of contexts in which this tactic was 
used. When opposing the UK’s Tobacco Advertising Bill in 2000, for example, the TI 
“encouraged a range of other organisations” to lobby the government on their 
behalf, these included the British Brands Group, the Association of Convenience 
Stores, and the Advertising Association[435], the TI again involved similar front 
groups when plain packaging was discussed in the UK in 2008[435]. When the use 
of new health warnings was proposed in Australia in 1991, the TI, through a 
lobbyist, gained the support of third parties such as the Business Council of 
Australia, the Confederation of Australian Industry, the media, unions, advertising 
organisations, and growers and suppliers[446]. And when the European Community 
(EC) sought to end all tobacco advertising in member states in the 1990s, “PM 
sought to preserve Denmark’s opposition to the ban though the creation of the 
Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression” which was “managed at arm’s 
length” and recruited more than 50 prominent Danes including a leading lawyer, a 
leading Danish writer and philosopher, and a well-known architect[451]. 
Attempts to shape the evidence base were also identified as a key element of the 
TI’s information strategy[435, 436, 445, 446, 449, 451, 452, 468]. For example, in 
order to counter the EC directive banning tobacco advertising and sponsorship, the 
TI commissioned two “separate but complementary projects” through the Adam 
Smith Institute in London which were to argue against the ban in the “context of a 
host of proposals which progressively restrict personal freedom”[451]. When plain 
packaging was suggested in Canada, the TI developed a common strategy and 
created the ‘Plain Packs Bible’ as a “resource for ... the industry and allied groups 
who need to put the industry’s case in public” and something that would be 
“accessible for civil servants and politicians”[435]. 
External Constituency Building was often linked to indirect lobbying because the TI 
both creates front groups or astroturf organisations to lobby on its behalf[449, 451, 
457], or forms alliances with and mobilises existing organisations[94, 435, 436, 444, 
446, 449-452, 457, 458, 460, 463, 465, 468, 473]. For example, PM was able to 
cultivate and create allies to support the TI by contributing financially to women’s 
organisations in the USA; when a bill further restricting television advertising was 
proposed, American Women in Radio and Television wrote letters to Congress 
opposing the ban “out of gratitude” for PM’s support[458].  
Internal Constituency Building (collaboration among manufacturers) was also 
common and cut across different policies and jurisdictions[94, 406, 435, 436, 439, 
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445, 446, 449, 452, 473]. This review suggests it occurs when the TI is facing a 
major regulatory threat, for example it was reported in TI attempts to combat the 
introduction of plain packaging in Canada[435], the FCTC globally[406], and the 
European Tobacco Products Directive (TPD)[452]. 
The use of policy substitution also appears to be a key strategy used to prevent the 
implementation of marketing regulations, and has been documented globally. Most 
frequently the TI proposes the implementation of voluntary regulation in place of 
formal legislation[33, 94, 406, 435, 439-445, 448-451, 453, 459, 473]. This tactic is 
designed to reduce political pressure to formally regulate (which is attractive to 
policymakers, mostly due to cost), and to pre-empt political action. For example, 
when faced with a ban on all direct and indirect advertising in Malaysia, the TI 
created a voluntary code entitled ‘Code for the Marketing of Cigarettes’[439], and 
similarly in Australia PMI developed their own marketing code of practice specifically 
intended to be used “in lobbying, to gain a public relations advantage by promoting 
PMI as responsible towards youth”[445]. Voluntary regulation has also been 
proposed by the TI, and in some cases implemented, in the USA[453, 459], 
Japan[440], Cambodia[33], Lebanon[441], China[442], Hungary[449], Czech 
Republic[450], UAE[444], and Switzerland[448], and has also been suggested when 
the risk of regulatory intervention is transnational[94, 406, 451, 473].  
Similarly, the TI often develops or promotes non-regulatory initiatives, such as youth 
education programmes, in order to avoid more formal legislation and appear socially 
responsible[94, 95, 406, 437, 444, 471]. For example, when opposing FCTC 
restrictions on marketing, the TI saw youth access schemes as a way to “make a 
significant gesture that would divert attention from the FCTC, moderate the WHO’s 
moves toward the FCTC, and bring the tobacco companies together against the 
FCTC”[406]. Much research shows TI-funded educational campaigns are 
ineffective[95, 479], and often counterproductive[479, 480].  
The third policy substitution tactic identified is the development or promotion of an 
alternative regulatory policy to the one being proposed that is less effective and 
more favourable to their business interests[95, 444, 446, 451, 461, 468, 471, 473]. 
For example, in Australia, when new health warnings were proposed in 1991, the TI 
decided that their best chance of minimising their effect was to support the adoption 
of the (weaker) European health warnings then being used, rather than those 
suggested by the Australian Ministerial Council on Drugs Strategy, as the European 
warnings were at the bottom of the pack and comparatively small[446]. And, when 
Chapter 5: The Tobacco Industry’s Attempted Influence of Marketing Regulations 
137 
 
the EC proposed a ban on tobacco advertising, the TI in Germany worked with the 
German government to “introduce a weak proposal designed to replace the 
proposed, stronger EC advertising ban”[451]. It was drafted by TI officials and was 
meant to be submitted to the EC through German representatives without 
acknowledging its true origin[451].  
Using or threatening legal action against a proposed regulation was commonly used 
and seen globally[436, 438, 446, 452, 454, 457, 469, 475], for example it was used 
multiple times when packaging regulations were proposed[436, 438, 469, 475]. It is 
typically used once other tactics have failed, and reinforces industry arguments 
about the high costs of regulation and the immediate fiscal advantage of policies 
(notably self-regulation) promoted by the industry. The TI was also seen attempting 
to use legal action to suppress an individual opposition organisation[446]. The 
second legal tactic, pre-emption, was only documented in the US but occurred in 
multiple states. It was found to have been used when the TI was arguing against 
youth access restrictions[453, 460, 461, 467], and in some cases more specifically 
against vending machines restrictions[463, 466]. 
5.3.2.1 TI arguments used to influence marketing regulation  
This review identified 17 separate arguments (Table 6), which were grouped into 
four main frames: ‘Negative Unintended Consequences’ (direct and indirect 
compliance costs (monetary and other)), ‘Legal’ (illegality of the policy (the implicit 
cost for government)), ‘Regulatory Redundancy’ (policy is unnecessary), and 
‘Insufficient Evidence’ (policy is not based on sound evidence).  The ‘Negative 
Unintended Consequences’ and ‘Legal’ frames were the most commonly used. 
While all of the frames were seen across a wide range of geographic areas, again 
highlighting the cross-national nature of TI political activity, three arguments within 
these frames were only used in one jurisdiction: “Regulation will cause an increase 
in illicit trade” was only identified as having been used in the USA[435, 436]; the 
argument that ‘the regulation is discriminatory’ was only identified as having been 
used once in Europe[452]; and the argument that ‘the health impacts of smoking 
remain unproven’ was only identified in Uzbekistan[443].  
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Table 6: Arguments used by the tobacco industry when attempting to influence marketing 
regulation 
Frame  
(number of times identified) 
Argument 





































The cost of compliance 
for manufacturers will be 
high / the time required for 




Australasia – 2 
[446] [447] 
Europe – 2 
[452] [475] 
N.America – 1 
[462]  
Transnational – 1 
[474]  
Regulation will result in 




Asia – 1 
[443] 
Europe – 1 
[452]  
N.America – 1 
[436] 
The regulation is 
discriminatory / regulation 





Europe – 1 
[452] 
Public Revenue 
Regulation will cause 
economic/financial 
problems (for city, state, 
country or economic area 
(e.g. European Union)) 
7 
  
Asia – 2 
[443] [444] 
Europe – 2 
[452] [449] 
N.America – 3 
[462] [464] [435] 
Associated 
industries 
Regulation will result in 
financial or job losses 
(among retailers and 
other associated 




Australasia – 1 
[447] 
Europe – 1 
[452] 




Regulation will have 




Australasia – 1 
[446]  
N.America – 2 
[435] [436] 





Regulation will cause an 
increase in illicit trade 
2 
  
N.America – 2 
[435] [436] 





Regulation could have 
other negative unintended 
consequences (e.g. cause 
confusion amongst 
customers, set a 





Africa – 1 
[436] 
Australasia – 1 
[447]  
N.America – 2 
[468] [435] 














Africa – 2 
[436] [436]  
Asia – 3 
[435] [436] [436] 
Australasia – 3 
[446] [436] [436] 
Europe – 5 
[435] [435] [452] 
[436] [436] 
N.America – 4 
[435] [382] [436] 
[436] 
S.America – 1 
[472]  
Transnational – 2 
[476] [436] 
Regulation is more 
extensive than necessary 




Australasia – 1 
[446]  
Europe – 1 
[452] 
N.America – 1 
[436] 
Transnational – 1 
[476]  
Body doesn’t have the 
power to regulate / it’s 
beyond their jurisdiction 
4 
  
Europe – 2 
[452] [451] 
N.America – 2 
[454] [436] 
Regulation will cause an 




Australasia – 1 
[436] 




Industry adheres to own 
self-regulation codes / 




Asia – 1 
[443] 
Australasia – 1 
[445]  
N.America – 2 
[456] [95] 
Transnational – 1 
[406] 
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Industry only markets to 
those of legal age / is 
actively opposed to 
minors using product 
4 
  
Asia – 1 
[442] 
N.America – 2 
[455] [456] 
Transnational – 1 
[406]  
Existing regulation is 
satisfactory/existing 
regulation is satisfactory, 




Europe – 1 
[452]  
N.America – 3 




evidence that the 
proposed policy will work / 
marketing doesn’t cause 
or change behaviour (it’s 
only used for brand 
selection and capturing 
market share), so 




Asia – 2 
[443] [442] 
Australasia – 4 
[445] [446] [447] 
[474] 
Europe – 1 
[452]  
N.America – 2 
[435] [456]  
Transnational – 1 
[476]  





Asia – 1 
[443] 
1




A large number of arguments focused on the negative unintended consequences of 
legislation. These included claims of economic losses to tobacco manufacturers 
(including compliance costs, job losses, and lost competitiveness)[436, 443, 446, 
447, 452, 462, 474, 475], associated industries[447, 452, 463, 464], and the public 
revenue[435, 443, 444, 449, 452, 462, 464]. Such arguments sometimes involve 
exaggerated claims, for example it was claimed that a ban on advertising in 
Uzbekistan would lead to “the immediate demise of the domestic cigarette 
industry”[443]. There are a wide variety of other arguments in this frame, including 
the claim that the proposed regulation will have negative public health 
consequences[435, 436, 446, 476]. For example the TI argued that plain packaging 
in Canada would “make cigarettes cheaper and more available to youth”[436] and 
new warning labels in Australia would lead to “warning overload” causing 
consumers to “ignore warning labels entirely”[446].  
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Arguments questioning the legality of policies to curb TI marketing (legal frame) are 
very common and aim to shift the focus of the debate away from public health and 
consumer protection, aiming instead to highlight the potential administrative costs of 
new policies. The argument that a proposed policy violates the TI’s legal rights has 
been widely used to fight a variety of public health policies including the regulation 
of packaging (health warnings and plain packaging)[435, 436, 446, 472, 476], 
product descriptors (such as ‘light’ or ‘mild’)[435, 436], and advertising bans[382, 
436]. Such arguments frequently claim that public health measures are incompatible 
with trade law. For example FCTC proposals to remove product descriptors were 
met with TI arguments that the words were part of a trademark and therefore the 
proposed regulation would violate Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) and the Paris Convention[436], and in Uruguay PM alleged that 
plain packaging regulations would violate a Switzerland-Uruguay bilateral 
investment treaty[472]. Such arguments are made despite growing evidence that 
they are misplaced (see below). 
Other arguments falling within the legal frame involve exaggerated and emotive 
claims such that regulation is “extreme”, “disproportionate” (PM on plain 
packaging[476]), or “excessive” (the TI on pack health warnings in Canada[436]), or 
a demonstration of the “nanny state” (as per Australia’s approach to health 
warnings[446]). These claims relate to broader libertarian arguments about the 
appropriate level of state intervention and regulation, and aim to increase the 
political risks for policymakers. In Europe, the TI has argued that the EU’s powers 
do not extend to public health regulations, and the issue is instead one for individual 
Member States[451, 452], and similarly in North America the TI has argued that 
regulation is “beyond federal jurisdiction”[436] and that “the Constitution prohibits 
any one state from regulating avenues of national commerce”[454]. Although the 
argument that the proposed regulation will lead to an increase in compensation 
claims was only identified twice[436], the threat of the cost of litigation underlies all 
of these legal arguments. 
Arguments that the regulation is unnecessary (regulatory redundancy frame) were 
also frequently used. These claims took a variety of forms including that the TI is 
opposed to youth smoking and does not market to youth[406, 442, 455, 456], and 
that they can be trusted to comply with voluntary regulations and that existing 
voluntary initiatives work[95, 406, 443, 445, 456]. In some instances the TI 
suggested that existing regulation was sufficient or simply needed better 
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enforcement[452, 455, 456, 470]. In all cases the overarching message was that 
further regulation was unnecessary. 
Questioning the strength of evidence[435, 442, 443, 445-447, 452, 456, 474, 476] 
(insufficient evidence frame) that supports public health policies is a common 
technique that has been used, for example, to oppose the introduction of plain 
packaging (in New Zealand[474], Canada[435], and transnationally[476]) and raise 
doubts about the impact of TI advertising on consumer behaviour[443, 445, 456]. 
This argument, along with others, is used to increase scepticism about the likely 
benefits of regulation and reinforce other arguments the TI makes.  
There are major doubts over the accuracy of almost all of the arguments identified 
in this taxonomy. For example, arguing that plain packaging violates trademarks 
under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules ignores the distinction made between 
registration and use under TRIPS and the Paris Convention[481]. There is no 
provision within WTO rules that requires “WTO Members to grant the owner of a 
registered trademark, an affirmative right to actually ‘use’ that mark”[481]. Moreover, 
members are granted “significant flexibility in enacting public health measures” 
when it’s necessary to protect “human, animal or plant life or health”[481]. While the 
US First Amendment provides extensive protection to freedom of speech, it has 
been argued that “protecting the public health may necessitate stringent limits on 
commercial expression”[482] therefore allowing some speech to be restricted for the 
good of the public’s health. In Europe and North America where the TI have argued 
that the regulation falls outside of EU or federal jurisdiction is also false, and its 
attempts to overturn regulation on this basis have failed[452]. Additionally, arguing 
that there is no evidence that regulating marketing works has also been found to be 
false. Much research has found a significant link between advertising and smoking 
behaviour[17-20].  
5.4 Discussion 
This systematic review suggests that the TI uses a relatively narrow range of 
strategies/tactics and frames/arguments when attempting to influence marketing 
regulation, albeit a wider range than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate 
political activity. This review also suggests that TI political activity is not 
geographically specific, with strategies/tactics and frames/arguments being used 
across a wide variety of jurisdictions indicating that they are transferable. 
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Consequently the taxonomies developed within this chapter are likely to be helpful 
in understanding TI political activity internationally.  
Taxonomies 
Hillman and Hitt’s[357] framework, on which the categorisation of tactics in this 
review was initially based, considerably under-represents the range of tactics that 
the TI uses when attempting to influence policy. This may reflect both the 
unprecedented number of regulatory risks facing this particular industry and that 
their categorisation was developed prior to the release of internal TI documents. 
Additionally, Hillman and Hitt’s[357] taxonomy was based on exchange theory which 
assumes that corporate political activity represents one side of an exchange 
relationship in which corporations offer policymakers support and information in 
return for influencing policy. While the relevance of this approach is now arguably 
more limited with the advent of the FCTC’s Article 5.3 (which aims to protect public 
health policies from the “vested interests of the tobacco industry”[330]), this will not 
necessarily reduce the TI’s ability to influence policy but simply require them to do 
so less directly and openly. The frequency with which the TI relies on third parties 
highlights the weakness of exchange theory-based models of corporate political 
activity. This review also identified tactics/strategies that sit outside of exchange 
theory (some are explicitly negative, such as constituency fragmentation and the 
threat of litigation, and some are implicitly negative, such as ineffective forms of self-
regulation) which challenges the assumption that corporate political activity is 
designed to produce outcomes that are mutually beneficial to corporations and 
policymakers, and shows that the information and arguments the TI uses are highly 
misleading; findings which suggest Hillman and Hitt’s[357] model may be both 
limited and naïve.  
Although it appears that the TI uses a number of discrete arguments within a narrow 
range of frames, many of them fall within a larger ‘cost-benefit’ meta-frame which 
promotes the economic and social costs of proposed public health policies and 
underplays their benefits. TI activity is designed to promote these ideas in a diverse 
range of ways in order to ensure that the message reaches key policymakers and 
appears to come from a number of different sources. This approach is highly 
relevant to current policymaking which embeds stakeholder consultation and impact 
assessments within the process of policy formation; it has previously been shown 
that the TI successfully lobbied for the introduction of impact assessments in Europe 
(impact assessments using a cost-benefit approach in which the impacts of policies 
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are monetised) because it felt that this system would work to its advantage and 
make it harder for public health policies to be implemented[483]. This is also 
supported by the related literature[484] which shows how impact assessment, 
notably cost-benefit analysis, can work to assist corporate interests. Arguments 
such as ‘the cost of compliance will be high’, ‘the regulation is more extensive than 
necessary’ and those under the ‘negative unintended consequences’ frame are 
used to increase scepticism about the likely benefits of regulation, and highlight the 
potential future costs for industry, retailers, and the public through the wasting of 
public funds on unnecessary policy formation, discussion and implementation. This 
is also observed through the omission of a ‘health’ frame[485]; this review found no 
evidence of the TI making reference to the dangers of smoking, although it did find 
an example of the TI refuting the relationship between smoking and disease as late 
as 1994 in Uzbekistan[443]. This singular use perhaps indicates that the TI 
sometimes uses arguments on the basis of their potential to influence, rather than 
on their validity. 
Finally it is noted that there is some overlap in the tactics and arguments used by 
the TI. For example, there is both a legal strategy and a legal frame, the policy 
substitution strategy overlaps with the regulatory redundancy frame (especially, for 
example, the tactic ‘develop/promote voluntary code/self-regulation’ and argument 
‘industry adheres to own self-regulation’), and many of the arguments within the 
negative unintended consequences frame are linked to constituency building efforts. 
Additionally, the strategy ‘external constituency building’ is often linked to the tactic 
‘indirect lobbying’ (all but one[455] of the articles documenting indirect lobbying also 
document external constituency building). This highlights how the tactics and 
arguments used by the TI reinforce one another. 
Strengths and limitations 
This review has a number of limitations. First, although a broad search strategy and 
search string was used when initially identifying articles it is still possible that some 
relevant articles may have been missed and therefore not included within the 
review. To minimise this, a librarian was consulted, online research repositories 
were searched, and experts in the field were contacted to identify additional articles. 
Second, the coding of arguments and tactics within the articles is often subjective. 
To mitigate this, myself and two of my PhD supervisors (Professor Anna Gilmore 
and Dr Gary Fooks) reviewed and re-reviewed the coding at various points during 
the systematic review process and, at the end, collectively reviewed 50% of the 
Chapter 5: The Tobacco Industry’s Attempted Influence of Marketing Regulations 
145 
 
included articles, plus all of those in categories where coding concerns had been 
identified. Third, the identification of tactics and arguments, and the jurisdictions in 
which they are used, is dependent on the available literature, its quality, and any 
publication bias. This in turn may depend on limitations in the availability and nature 
of the TI documents on which much of the literature is based. These issues have a 
number of implications, for example many of the articles included did not focus 
primarily on TI attempts to influence marketing regulations and only made brief 
references to TI tactics or arguments, with little context or background. This 
limitation was overcome by requiring each tactic and argument to be supported by 
verifiable evidence. Information regarding the success or failure of a particular policy 
proposal was not always recoded, making it impossible to reliably determine which 
tactics or arguments were most successful in defeating marketing-related 
regulations. Additionally, it is highly likely that some of the tactics and arguments 
were used more frequently by the TI than identified within the literature. For 
example, financial incentives are likely to be used more frequently and broadly than 
the two occasions identified in Europe[450, 451], it is known that the TI frequently 
attempts to discredit their opponents (see for example[486-489]) however this tactic 
was only found to have been used twice within the included literature[458, 468], and 
similarly, arguments that marketing regulations will increase illicit tobacco are more 
commonly used, and in more jurisdictions, than this review would suggest[202, 490, 
491]. The limited appearance of some arguments, such as tobacco not having been 
proven to cause disease (which was only identified as having been used by the TI in 
Uzbekistan in 1994[443]), may reflect the fact that only tactics and arguments from 
1990 onwards were included. In addition, it is noted that despite a growing literature 
showing how the TI influences trade agreements and then uses them to argue 
against the feasibility of regulations[492, 493], the use of trade agreements to pre-
empt marketing policy is not identified as a tactic (although the use of trade 
agreements as an argument under the ‘legal’ frame is identified). This is perhaps 
due to the focus of the search being on the TI’s influence of marketing regulations 
which may, therefore, have missed articles examining industry influence on trade 
agreements that were in turn used to influence marketing regulations. Due to 
concerns regarding bias in the literature, the counting element of this review should 
be used as a guideline only to provide some insight into the most frequently used 
tactics and arguments.  
The main strength of this review is its systematic approach and its attempt to 
rigorously categorise industry strategies/tactics and frames/arguments; it is the first 
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attempt to do so. A key strength is the geographic diversity of the literature 
reviewed. Although over half of the included articles (26 articles, 56%) focussed on 
North America, Europe or Australasia (perhaps in large part due to grants provided 
by the USA’s NCI for research on TI documents in the early 2000s), a significant 
proportion did not, and the geographic base was far more diverse than some 
previous reviews of industry activity[4]. This review provides sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the tactics and arguments used to influence policymakers in HICs are 
also used in LICs. The data is, however, unable to offer any guidance on which 
arguments and tactics are most likely to be used in different jurisdictions. While 
some tactics and arguments were seen only in one or a few jurisdictions, this 
sometimes appears to reflect limitations in the underlying literature (see above), or 
specific jurisdictional issues for example the use of pre-emption in US states. While 
care needs to be taken in assuming that tactics and arguments used in one 
jurisdiction will be used elsewhere, this review suggests that the findings will be 
broadly applicable across different geographies; this might reflect the tendency for 
TI political activity to be centrally coordinated, underlining the importance of 
collaboration between public health advocates internationally. It is, however, also 
important to note that some arguments are likely to be more effective in certain 
circumstances, for example legal arguments may be more successful where 
government legal expertise is undeveloped and the costs of litigation proportional to 
government revenue are high[492].  
Implications for policy, practice, and research 
This systematic review has identified common tactics and arguments that the TI 
uses to prevent the implementation of regulation, and has shown that they are 
repeatedly used across different jurisdictions. Policymakers need to be aware of 
these in order to understand how the TI may try to manipulate the regulatory 
environment in their own interests, and public health advocates can use this 
information to prepare effective counter strategies.  
Models of corporate political activity based on internal TI documents represent a 
potentially valuable analytical tool with which to examine opposition to public health 
policies and identify low visibility activity (such as activity undertaken by third 
parties). Further work is now needed to examine whether the taxonomies for TI 
tactics and arguments developed in this chapter can be applied to other industries 
and policy areas. Further research is also required to examine the interconnections 
between strategies/tactics, frames/arguments and different intended audiences. 
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Finally, due to limitations in the included literature, it is also recommend that future 
research on corporate influence should, where at all possible, include contextual 
information, ensure all claims are supported by reliable and verifiable evidence, and 
that the success or failure of individual tactics and arguments are recorded.  




Chapter 6: The Alcohol Industry’s 
Attempted Influence of Marketing 
Regulations: A Systematic Review 
6.1 Background 
The understanding of how large corporations seek to shape health policy has been 
considerably advanced by the analysis of millions of internal TI documents released 
following litigation in the USA[352, 494, 495]. With this unique resource, systematic 
reviews[4, 418] which provide detailed overviews of how the TI seeks to influence 
policy have begun to be published. With a relative lack of high quality documentary 
data, research on AI political activity is considerably less established and 
awareness of the AI’s political activity is less developed[363, 496]. This may 
account for differences in how public institutions, such as the WHO, engage with the 
TI and AI. While Article 5.3 of the FCTC requires all Parties to protect health policies 
from the “vested interests of the tobacco industry”[330] and guidelines for this article 
identify the need to actively monitor and expose TI conduct[497], the WHO’s 
approach to the AI is one of partnership and cooperation[65]. This position has 
persisted despite appeals from the public health community[498] and research 
suggesting that ‘Big Tobacco’ and ‘Big Booze’ operate in similar ways[334], 
although recently the WHO has highlighted the importance of protecting the 
development of all health policies from “commercial or vested interests”[499].   
As shown in Part 1, it is important to understand how corporations, especially those 
producing products that have the potential to damage health, attempt to influence 
regulation. As argued in relation to the AI, “for politicians and health experts it is 
important that they reveal to the public the subversive messaging of the alcohol 
industry and do not fall prey to the industry’s half-truths—or worse—out right 
lies”[500]. This chapter aims to systematically review the tactics and arguments the 
AI uses when attempting to influence public policy relating to alcohol marketing, and 
to develop taxonomies for tactic and argument categorisation. This focus is chosen 
for two reasons. First AI marketing is known to significantly influence drinking 
initiation and prevalence[21-23] and restrictions on alcohol marketing are a key 
element of alcohol control[14, 163, 164, 221, 319, 345]. Second, it deliberately 
builds upon the first review’s findings (Chapter 5) by further developing the 
taxonomies of arguments and tactics, and applying them to a second industry. 
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Using the same method of classification makes the two industries easily comparable 
and highlights how the new taxonomies can be applied to different industries. This 
review should therefore enhance the ability of public health advocates and 
policymakers to understand, predict, and potentially counter the ways in which the 
AI may try to exert influence on policy and the types of arguments it is most likely to 
make when it does.  
6.2 Methods 
This review aimed to identify all articles (based on either primary or secondary data) 
that examined AI attempts to influence marketing regulation from 1990 to 2013. The 
AI comprises large MNCs and tiny specialist brewers, and both on- and off-trade 
businesses (sales for consumption ‘on’ the premises and ‘off’ the premise, 
respectively). In this review tactics and arguments used by any alcohol producer or 
group representing these producers are included. As before, all five elements of the 
marketing mix (product, promotion, price, place, and person[157]) are included, but 
as price in the form of tax was excluded from the TI systematic review because a 
systematic review of TI influence on tobacco tax had already been completed[4], for 
comparative purposes it was also excluded from this review. 
The databases Web of Knowledge (which includes Web of Science, BIOSIS 
Previews, and MEDLINE), Business Source Premier, and Embase were searched 
using this search string: 
(corporat* OR industr* OR compan* OR busines* OR firm*) AND 
(alcohol OR drink) AND (marketing OR advertis* OR sponsor*) AND 
(regulat* OR policy OR legislat*) 
The search engine Google was used to identify grey literature and five prominent 
academic alcohol control experts were selected (based on agreement with one of 
my PhD supervisors, Professor Anna Gilmore) and contacted via e-mail to identify 
any additional articles (see Table 7). All searches were conducted between April 
and July 2011, and were updated in March 2013. Searches were limited to articles 
from 1990 to 2013 and those written in English. The search protocol was developed 
in conjunction with a qualified librarian.  
Initial study inclusion/exclusion criteria were piloted and were discussed extensively 
between myself and two of my PhD supervisors (Professor Anna Gilmore and Dr 
Gary Fooks). The final inclusion/exclusion criteria used in this review can be seen in 
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Box 7. In total 917 articles were identified, of which 670 were excluded based on 
their title and abstract alone. 239 articles were downloaded for full analysis (8 
articles could not be located despite efforts to contact the authors). 222 articles 
were excluded for not meeting the inclusion criteria. The remaining 17 articles met 
all of the criteria and were included within the review.  
 
Table 7: Literature searches completed for the alcohol industry systematic review 





Web of Knowledge (which 
included Web of Science, 
BIOSIS Previews and 
MEDLINE) 
Full string in ‘Topic’ 424 
Business Source Premier 
 
Full string in ‘Topic’, except ‘(alcohol OR 
drink)’ in ‘Title’ (searching with it in ‘topic’ 
returned far too many hits) 
297 
EMBASE Full string in ‘Topic’ 144 
Contacting experts E-mail 16 
Search engine ‘Google’ Full string 36 
 Total 917 
*the searches were undertaken in the order listed within the table, and duplicate articles 
identified in preceding searches were not counted 
 
 
Data extraction (see Appendix 2) was undertaken by myself, and 100% of the 
included articles were second-reviewed by one of two of my PhD supervisors 
(Professor Anna Gilmore or Dr Gary Fooks) to check that all of the inclusion criteria 
were met and to agree tactic and argument categorisation (the higher percentage 
was due to the overall lower quality data and broader review criteria). Any 
differences were discussed between all three of us. Disagreements related only to 
categorisation, more often in relation to the categorisation of arguments than tactics. 
Where disagreement occurred, all evidence falling under that particular category 
was re-reviewed by all three of us until agreement had been reached. Narrative 
synthesis was undertaken to combine the evidence from the articles. 
 





To be included in this review, studies and individual arguments/tactics had to fulfil the 
following criteria: 
 Studies must be written in English. 
 Studies must cover the period from 1990-2013. In papers that cover both 
before and after 1990, only those tactics/arguments relating to post-1990 will 
be recorded and included within this review.  
 Studies must look at AI efforts to influence a) policy debates concerning 
marketing regulations generally, or b) new specific marketing policies, or c) 
broader alcohol policy within which marketing is included (information 
regarding how the industry attempts to circumvent existing regulation will not 
be included within the review). 
 The tactics/arguments covered must be related to one or more of the 
following: product (for example, packaging, new products/flavours, branding), 
price* (for example, price promotions, minimum pricing), promotion 
(advertising including billboards, point-of-sale, sponsorship), place (for 
example, restrictions on advertising near schools) or person (for example, 
restrictions on advertising or selling to youth). 
 Each individual claim made regarding AI tactics/arguments used to influence 
marketing regulation must be directly supported by verifiable evidence (either 
a clear citation that could be verified by the authors or a direct quote from an 
AI official or industry affiliated body). 
 Tactics/arguments identified must be directly implemented by the AI or by a 
group where substantiated evidence suggests that they act on the AI’s behalf. 
 Tactics/arguments which are noted within the included articles are assumed to 
have been carried through, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
Tactics/arguments which are shown to only have been planned, and not used, 
will not be recorded. 
 Only tactics/arguments directly related to marketing regulation will be 
recorded. For example, health warning labels are included as they influence 
the means of packaging as a marketing tool, but they are excluded if the study 
only looks at, for example, the wording of the warning, as this does not affect 
marketing. 
 Only tactics/arguments that are clearly detailed in the paper(s) are coded. 
 
*Price in the form of tax has been excluded because tax-related lobbying was 
excluded from the systematic review of TI political activity and it was the aim to make 
the TI and AI reviews comparable. Price in terms of price-based promotions have 
been included. 
 
Box 7: Alcohol industry systematic review - inclusion and exclusion criteria 




Unlike the TI review which was based solely on secondary data, this review is 
based on both primary and secondary data. Primary data came predominantly from 
a UK parliamentary inquiry into alcohol where four producers and their 
communications agencies were asked to provide documents relating to five brands 
and were questioned by MPs from the Health Select Committee (see sub-chapter 
4.1 The Global Regulatory Environment: Tobacco and Alcohol Marketing); many 
additional companies, trade groups and SAOs also provided written evidence[57, 
220, 333]. Additionally, due to a lack of evidence on specific regulatory proposals, 
the present review was expanded to look at AI influence on marketing policy 
debates along with their influence on specific marketing regulations as per the TI 
review.  
6.2.1 Taxonomies and Categorisation 
AI political activity was divided into ‘strategies’/‘tactics’ (the methods by which a 
corporation attempts to exert influence) and ‘frames’/‘arguments’ (the reasons given 
by a corporation as to why they oppose one idea or support another). Taxonomies 
developed in the first systematic review of TI political activity (Chapter 5), which had 
partly been based on Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) paper[357], were used as an initial 
framework to code AI political activity. Coding categories (strategies/tactics and 
frames/arguments) were amended and developed via ‘emergent coding’[35]. This 
was an iterative process and the taxonomies were only finalised after all the papers 
had been reviewed as described above.  
The geographical distribution of where tactics and arguments were used was also 
recorded. If the article included was transnational, the geography of where the 
individual tactics and arguments were used was listed. For example, the article by 
Casswell and Thamarangsi[338] is a transnational study, but the ‘free market 
economy’ argument was used in France. 
Data was extracted into a custom-made form (see Table 8). As only individual 
statements were considered from each article, using a critical appraisal form to 
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Table 8: Data extraction form 
Full reference  
First reviewer  Second reviewer  
Check list for inclusion 
Does the study relate to alcohol industry 
arguments/tactics used to influence 
marketing regulation (price (not tax), product, 
promotion, place, person)? 
Yes  No (exclude from 
review) 
 
Is the article in English? Yes  No (exclude from 
review) 
 
Is the study concerned with activities which 
take place from 1990 onwards? (If only 
concerned with pre-1990, exclude; if 
concerned with before and after 1990, 
include and note claims from 1990 onwards). 
Yes, study is 
concerned with 
post-1990 (state 
which period it 
focuses on). 






Is verifiable evidence used to support any 
claims made about alcohol industry 
arguments/tactics used to influence 
marketing regulation? (Only note claims that 
are supported with verifiable evidence) 




What country/region does the article focus 
on? 
 
Which companies are studied?  
What methodology and type of data is used?  
Which policy is industry attempting to 
influence?  
 
What tactics does industry use?  
Which arguments does industry make?  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Geography 
In total 17 articles met the inclusion criteria. A quarter (24%) of the articles focussed 
on Europe, and a further quarter (24%) were transnational (Table 9). No articles 
focussed on AI conduct in South America. 
 






Africa 2 (12%) Sub-Saharan Africa [372]; South Africa [501] 
Asia 1 (6%) Thailand [502] 
Australasia 3 (18%) Australia [503] [504] [505] 
Europe 4 (24%) UK [57] [236]; Netherlands [243]; Ireland [506] 
North America 3 (18%) USA  [138] [507]; Canada and USA [508] 
Transnational 4 (24%) Transnational [338] [382] [96]; OECD [509] 
Total 17  
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6.3.2 Tactics and Arguments 
The AI uses a number of recurring tactics (Table 10) and arguments (Table 11) 
when attempting to influence marketing regulation. A table of the underlying data, 
including all of the tactics and arguments used, can be found in Appendix 2. 
6.3.2.1 AI tactics used to influence marketing regulation  
This review identified 20 separate tactics falling under five main strategies (Table 
10): ‘Information’ (providing or manipulating evidence), ‘Constituency building’ 
(forming alliances with other sectors, organisations, or the public to give the 
impression of larger support for the industry’s position), ‘Policy substitution, 
development and implementation’ (proposing, supporting or helping to implement 
alternative policies), ‘Legal’ (using the legal system), and ‘Financial incentive or 
threat’ (offering direct or indirect monetary incentives or threatening financial 
withdrawal). 
Of all the tactics that were used more than once (17 out of the 20 tactics), all but 
four (indirect lobbying, establishing industry/government collaboration, omission of 
evidence, and developing regulation from scratch and planning implementation) 
were used in multiple geographical locations therefore highlighting the transnational 
nature of AI political activity. 
 
















Africa – 4 
[372] [372] [372] 
[372] 
Asia – 1  
[502] 
Europe – 1 
[506] 
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, including front 
groups, to lobby on the industry’s behalf) 
4 
 
Africa – 4 
[372] [372] [372] 
[372] 
Establishing industry/government collaboration (e.g. 
via working group, technical group, advisory group) 
/ work alongside policymakers providing technical 
4 
 
Africa – 4 
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support/advice / policy development or 
implementation 























































Commissioning, writing (or ghost 






Asia – 1  
[502] 
Europe – 1 
[57] 
Transnational – 1 
[96] 
Preparing position papers, 
technical reports or data on 




Asia – 1  
[502] 
Europe – 1 
[506] 
Transnational – 1 
[96] 




Europe – 2 
[57] [57] 
Transnational – 1 
[96] 
Omission of evidence 
4 
 
Africa – 4 
[372] [372] [372] 
[372] 
Removing troubling phrases 
1 
 
Transnational – 1 
[96]  
Contesting nature of the evidence 
4 
 
Europe – 3 
[57] [57] [57] 








Forming alliances with and 





Asia – 1  
[502] 
N.America – 1 
[138] 
Transnational – 2 
[382] [501] 
Media advocacy (press 
releases, publicity campaigns, 
public hearings, interviews) 
2 
 
Asia – 1  
[502] 
Europe – 1 
[506] 
Forming alliances with or 






Asia – 1  
[502] 
N.America – 1 
[138] 
Creation of front 3 






Asia – 2 
[502] [502] 






companies / development of 






Asia – 1  
[502] 
Europe – 2 
[57] [236] 
Transnational – 2 
[382] [96] 






regulatory initiative (generally 
seen to be ineffective/less 




Africa – 4 
[372] [372] [372] 
[372] 
Europe – 3 
[57] [57] [57] 
N.America – 2 
[508] [138] 
Transnational – 1 
[96] 
Developing/promoting (new or 




Africa – 4 
[372] [372] [372] 
[372] 
Asia – 1  
[502] 
Australasia – 1 
[505] 
Europe – 6 
[506] [57] [57] [57] 
[236] [243] 
N.America – 1 
[138] 
Transnational – 1 
[338] 
Developing regulation from 




Africa – 4 








Asia – 1  
[502] 
Europe – 1 
[338] 
Shaping international law 
1 
 
Transnational – 1 
[338] 
Financial incentive or threat 
(1) 
Threatening financial withdrawal 
1 
 
Asia – 1  
[502] 




Including research/publications intended to undermine or misrepresent existing evidence 
2
Routine use of a trade association was not counted, industry collaboration must have been 
more ‘active’ 
3
Includes efforts to prevent the implementation of anticipated policies 
 
 
A variety of Information strategies were used across multiple jurisdictions. These 
include direct[372, 502, 506] and indirect[372] lobbying of policymakers and 
establishing collaborative working arrangements with policymakers[372], and a 
variety of efforts aimed at shaping and manipulating the evidence base. The latter 
included commissioning, writing or disseminating research/publications[57, 96, 502] 
or more technical reports[96, 502, 506], the selective citation[57, 96] and omission 
of evidence[372], contesting the evidence used to support policy[57, 96], and the 
efforts to remove “troubling” phrases such as ‘‘alcohol and other drugs’’ from the 
official lexicon[96]. The AI-funded ICAP has played a key part in such efforts by 
commissioning and publishing a large number of books, monographs, briefing 
papers, in-depth reviews of alcohol policy issues, journal articles, and policy guides 
on all manner of alcohol-related issues[96] thereby populating the evidence base 
with non-peer reviewed information which, amongst other things, tends to highlight 
the health benefits of alcohol[57, 96] and omit evidence of its negative health and 
social effects[372].  
External Constituency Building was often linked to indirect lobbying. The AI creates 
front groups, astroturf organisations, or SAOs (such as ICAP[96], the Portman 
Group[236], The DrinkAware Trust[57], and the Federation on Alcohol Concern of 
Thailand (FACT) established during the formation of an advertising ban in 
2006[502]) to lobby on its behalf[138, 502]. It also forms alliances with other industry 
sectors or trade organisations[138, 382, 502], and civil society organisations, 
consumers, or employees[138, 502] in order to oppose public health 
measures[382]. In Thailand the AI worked with groups such as the Thai Retail 
Association, the Hotel Association, the Restaurant Association, the Tourism 
Association, and the Marketing Association of Thailand[502], and in the USA it 
reached out to the Federal Trade Commission[138] and built partnerships with 
government departments, NGOs, universities, researchers, and physicians[138]. 
The AI also uses media advocacy, such as press launches[506] and seminars[502], 
to shape the news and public agenda. 
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Policy substitution, used to prevent the discussion or implementation of formal 
marketing regulations, appears to be a key strategy and has been documented 
globally[57, 96, 138, 236, 243, 338, 372, 502, 505, 506, 508]. This strategy involves 
filling regulatory gaps with weak alternatives to evidence-based public health 
measures. In some lower income countries, a lack of government capacity to 
develop policy can offer industries the opportunity to become involved in developing 
policies. For example, in Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda and Botswana SABMiller Africa 
was given responsibility for drafting national alcohol policy documents[372]. These 
policy documents focussed on self-regulatory measures, education campaigns, and 
gave responsibility for its implementation to a National Alcohol Council on which AI 
representatives served[372]. The promotion of self-regulatory measures is designed 
to reduce political pressure for and to pre-empt formal regulation and was identified 
in numerous jurisdictions. For example, evidence was found of voluntary codes 
being developed and promoted by individual companies[57, 138] and by industry 
groups in the UK[57, 236], Ireland[506], the Netherlands[243], and globally[338]. 
Similarly, another technique involves the promotion of non-regulatory initiatives such 
as education programmes[57, 96, 138, 372, 508] sometimes delivered through 
stand-alone websites (for example, SABMiller’s www.TalkingAlcohol.com[57]) or 
through more developed CSR initiatives (for example, Diageo’s Responsible 
Drinking Fund, which claims to have led or supported over 130 prevention 
programs, focusing on “education, public awareness, and responsible retail 
practices” in over 40 countries in 2009, including development of the DrinkIQ 
website[138]). 
Using or threatening legal action against a proposed regulation was only 
documented in Thailand[502] and France[338] but there is also evidence of the AI 
attempting to shape international law (specifically the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services with a view to reducing restrictions on alcohol distribution and 
advertising[338]). One example of the AI threatening financial withdrawal was also 
documented; in Thailand the AI threatened to withdraw their sponsorship of sporting 
events in retaliation for an advertising ban[502]. 
6.3.2.2 AI arguments used to inf luence marketing regulation  
This review identified 20 separate arguments grouped into five main frames (Table 
11): ‘Regulatory Redundancy’ (asserting that proposed policies are unnecessary), 
‘Legal’ (questioning the legality of policies (the implicit cost for government)), 
‘Negative Unintended Consequences’ (direct and indirect compliance costs 
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associated with proposed policies), ‘Complex Policy Area’ (policies, and the issues 
surrounding them, are presented as highly complicated), and ‘Insufficient Evidence’ 
(questioning the strength of evidence supporting policies). 
Of all the arguments that were used more than once (16 out of the 20 arguments), 
all but one (complicated/beyond Industry’s control) were used in multiple 
geographical locations therefore again highlighting the cross-national nature of AI 
political activity. 
 
Table 11: Arguments used by the alcohol industry when attempting to influence marketing 
regulation 
Frame 
(number of times identified) 
Argument 





Industry adheres to own self-
regulation codes / self-
regulation is working well or 




Africa – 1  
[501] 
Asia – 1  
[502] 
Australasia – 3 
[503] [504] [505] 
Europe – 5 
[57] [57] [57] [57] 
[57] 
Transnational – 1 
[509] 
Industry only markets to 
those of legal age / is actively 




Australasia – 1 
[504] 
Europe – 1 
[57] 
N.America – 2 
[382] [138] 
Existing regulation is 
satisfactory/Existing 
regulation is satisfactory, but 
requires better enforcement 
5 
 
Asia – 1  
[502] 
Australasia – 1 
[503] 
Europe – 3 
[506] [57] [57] 
Industry is responsible 
6 
 
Australasia – 3 
[503] [503] [504] 
Europe – 2 
[57] [57] 
N.America – 1 
[382] 
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Individuals should consume 





Africa – 1 
[372]  
Australasia – 1 
[504] 
Europe – 2 
[57] [57] 
N.America – 1 
[382] 
Transnational – 2 
[96] [96]  
Industry has positive impact 
7 
 
Africa – 2 
[372] [372]  
Australasia – 2 
[503] [504] 
Europe – 1 
[57]  




Infringes legal rights of 
company (trademarks, 
intellectual property, 
constitutionally protected free 





Asia – 1  
[502] 
Europe – 1 
[57] 
N.America – 1 
[382] 
Regulation is more extensive 




Europe – 3 
[57] [57] [57] 
Transnational – 1 
[96] 








































The cost of compliance for 
manufacturers will be high / 
the time required for 




N.America – 1 
[508] 
Regulation will result in 




Asia – 1  
[502] 
The regulation is 
discriminatory / regulation will 
not affect all 
producers/customers equally  
4 
 
Australasia – 1 
[504] 
Europe – 3 
[57] [57] [57] 
Public Revenue 
Regulation will cause 
economic/financial problems 
(for city, state, country or 




Australasia – 1 
[504] 





Regulation will result in 
financial or job losses 
(among retailers and other 
associated industries, e.g. 
printing, advertising, leisure) 
2 
 
Asia – 1  
[502] 




Regulation will have negative 
public health consequences 
4 
 
Australasia – 1 
[503] 
Europe – 2 
[57] [57] 









Europe – 2 
[57] [57] 
Transnational – 1 
[96] 






Europe – 2 
[57] [57] 
Collaboration with Industry 
would be beneficial 
7 
 
Africa – 4 
[372] [372] [372] 
[372] 
Australasia – 1 
[503] 
Europe – 2 
[506] [57] 
Characterising policymakers 
and public health actors as 
authoritarian/denigrating 




Asia – 2 
[502] [502] 




There’s insufficient evidence 
that the proposed policy will 
work / marketing doesn’t 
cause or change behaviour 
(it’s only used for brand 
selection and capturing 
market share), so regulation 
will have no effect 
8 
 
Asia – 1  
[502] 
Australasia – 1 
[504] 
Europe – 3 
[506] [57] [57] 
N.America – 1 
[508] 




The argument that population-level health measures are unnecessary (regulatory 
redundancy frame) is made through a wide range of mutually reinforcing arguments 
which rest on industry claims of its own responsibility, its ability to market alcohol 
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responsibly, and its distinction between responsible and irresponsible consumption. 
This frame included arguments that the AI is responsible[57, 382, 503, 504] (for 
example that industry always encourages “responsible consumption”[503] and it 
recognises “that responsible drinking is important both to our business interests and 
to society’s interests”[57]), that self-regulatory codes are “sufficient”[501], 
“robust”[503], “effective”[502, 503], “extraordinarily successful”[505], “faster”[57], 
and “better”[502] allowing the AI to deal quickly with, and rectify, any complaints or 
regulatory breeches[57, 504] and close regulatory “gaps”[57], and that, in any case, 
the industry only markets to those of legal drinking age[57, 138, 382, 504]. Further, 
the AI appears to overstate the parallels between voluntary and statutory regulation 
for example by emphasising the independence of their (industry-funded) monitoring 
and adjudication groups[57].  
 
This is similar to arguments surrounding personal responsibility and responsible 
drinking. The AI frequently attempts to shift the blame for alcohol misuse to the 
consumer and away from their products and marketing[96], arguing that there 
should be an individual-level focus on education and the promotion of responsible 
consumption[57, 96, 372] (and even that AI marketing itself has this aim[382]) and 
that their SAOs such as the DrinkAware Trust and the Portman Group provide 
information and education so that consumers can make “informed judgements” 
about how they use alcohol[57], thereby framing the problem of alcohol misuse as 
an issue of self control and unlawful behaviour; “misuse is caused by certain 
drinkers who clearly misuse alcohol and by some under 18s who are clearly 
breaking the law. This therefore is not a problem about problem drinks but about 
problem drinkers”[57]. This focus on a small number of alcohol misusers provides 
the AI with a frame that has the potential to invalidate the current focus of health 
policy; the AI argues that population-level approaches, such as taxation or 
restrictions on advertising, penalises moderate drinkers because of a “few people” 
who consume alcohol in an irresponsible way and that these approaches do not 
tackle alcohol misuse effectively[57, 96, 504]. This supports AI claims that “existing 
regulation is satisfactory”[57, 503] or that it simply “requires better enforcement”[57, 
502, 506], framing the issue as one that can be dealt with through ‘law and order’ 
solutions; “the panoply of powers available to the police and local authorities should 
be used much more effectively both against individuals who misuse alcohol and 
those who wilfully seek to break the law in obtaining alcohol underage, as well as 
against those retailers who sell alcohol irresponsibly”[57]. 
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Additionally the AI argues that the industry, its marketing, and alcohol itself, has a 
positive impact and should therefore not be regulated further. In Lesotho the AI 
argued that when alcohol is used in moderation it has a “positive role to play in 
socialisation” and that the industry is a “major contributor to the economy”[372], in 
Milwaukee, USA, MBC argued that a product (beer) that forms a significant part of 
the local history should not be ‘demonised’[507], in Australia the AI argued that 
“responsible advertising can have a positive cultural impact”[503] and highlighted 
the importance of the AI to communities as “funders of events”[504], and in the UK 
the wine company Constellation argued that marketing could be used “to promote a 
more responsible approach to alcohol consumption”[57] (a very similar statement 
was also made in the USA by PM when they owned MBC[382]).  
 
Whilst actual legal threats are rarely reported in the literature (see above), 
arguments questioning the legality of policies to curb AI marketing are more 
common. These arguments aim to shift the focus of the debate away from public 
health and consumer protection, with the AI contesting advertising regulations and 
minimum pricing proposals under international trade agreements (UK[57] and 
Thailand[502]), national constitutions (USA[382]), and international law (UK[57]). 
The argument that regulations are disproportionate and more extensive than 
necessary also aims to highlight the responsible nature of the AI. In relation to 
health warnings in the UK it was stated that it is not “necessarily appropriate to have 
a health warning on a drink of alcohol. Alcohol is not like cigarettes; it is capable of 
being misused but when drunk in moderation it is perfectly compatible with a healthy 
lifestyle”[57]. This argument has also been used regarding minimum pricing[57], 
dealing with alcohol misuse[57], and raising the legal drinking age[96]. 
 
The AI often argues that regulation would have negative unintended consequences 
for manufacturers[57, 502, 504, 508], associated industries[502, 504], the public 
revenue[504], and public health[57, 382, 503]. For example, in both Australia[503] 
and the UK[57], it was argued that advertising restrictions would make it impossible 
to introduce new, lower-strength products to the marketplace thereby stopping 
industry developing and selling healthier products, and in the USA, the Beer 
Institute argued that mandated health warnings on alcohol products could 
“undermine the credibility of other government campaigns to provide information 
about serious risks which are not commonly known”[382]. The AI commonly avoids 
citing evidence to support such claims, therefore suggesting that the aim may 
simply be to exaggerate the risks associated with public health measures. 
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The AI also emphasises the complications involved in addressing problems 
associated with alcohol consumption with a view to highlighting the value of 
industry-government co-operation[57, 372, 503, 506]; it has “a unique capacity to 
access those responsible for promoting and selling alcohol as well as to those who 
consume their products”[372] and “partnership working can deliver a more 
responsible drinking culture”[57]. Although the AI argue to be involved in 
policymaking, they also argue that some issues relevant to alcohol-related harms 
are beyond the AI’s control (for example individual retailers’ price promotions[57] 
that may be deemed irresponsible). Similarly the AI regularly characterises 
policymakers and public health actors as authoritarian (“the health lobby's approach 
is to ban everything, and if it cannot be banned, regulate it severely”[503]) with the 
Thai government being labelled a ‘dictatorship’ because of an advertising ban[502], 
and the Australian government being described as a “’nanny state’ needlessly 
interfering with people’s choices”[504].  
 
Questioning the strength of evidence favourable to public health policies is another 
common technique that has been used to oppose advertising bans 
transnationally[382], in Thailand[502], Australia[504], Ireland[506] and in the UK[57], 
minimum pricing in the UK[57], and health warning labels in the USA[508]. Amongst 
other things, the AI makes broad claims for which there is no peer-reviewed 
evidence (“The effect of pricing, advertising and availability are insignificant next to 
the effect of cultural stereotyping, peer influence and role modelling”[57]) or claims 
which are almost impossible to test (“In much of continental Europe, the price of 
alcohol is far cheaper than in the UK but there are not the same problems; societal 
tolerance (or intolerance) of those who drink irresponsibly or illegally appears to be 
a greater determinant of the extent to which a country will experience alcohol harm 
than the price of alcohol”[57]). These arguments are used to reinforce the other 
arguments made by the AI.  
6.4 Discussion 
This systematic review illustrates the varied nature of AI political activity used in 
attempts to influence marketing regulation or marketing-related policy debates. The 
review also highlights similarities to TI political activity, and these are discussed in 
the following chapter (Chapter 7). 
Like the first review (Chapter 5) it was found that Hillman and Hitt’s[357] taxonomy 
of corporate tactics, which is the most widely cited attempt to analytically categorise 
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the tactics used by corporations and on which the categorisation of tactics in this 
review was initially based, considerably under-represents the range of tactics used 
by corporations when attempting to influence policy or policy debates. Again 
tactics/strategies were identified, such as the promotion of self-regulatory codes and 
the threat of litigation, that challenge Hillman and Hitt’s[357] assumption that 
corporate political activity represents one side of an exchange relationship in which 
corporations offer policymakers support and information in return for influencing 
policy and is, therefore, designed to produce outcomes that are mutually beneficial 
to corporations and policymakers. 
The existing literature challenges the accuracy of almost all AI arguments identified 
in this review. For example, despite the AI’s argument that self-regulatory codes 
negate the need for formal regulation and that industry collaboration would be 
beneficial for policymakers, self-regulation and partnership working have been 
shown to be ineffective[14, 221, 333]. Arguing that there is insufficient evidence 
supporting the need to curb AI marketing and that marketing does not change 
behaviour is also false as much research has found a significant link between AI 
marketing and drinking initiation and drinking prevalence[21-23]. Similarly, arguing 
that the AI does not market to children is misleading as research shows that AI 
marketing often targets and appeals to youth and those below legal drinking age[14, 
140, 236, 283]. 
Consistent with the TI review findings (Chapter 5), many of the individual arguments 
fall within a larger ‘cost-benefit’ meta-frame which promotes the economic and 
social costs of proposed public health policies and underplays their benefits. 
Arguments claiming that regulation is more extensive than necessary and likely to 
produce negative unintended consequences are used to increase uncertainty about 
the likely benefits of regulation, and highlight the potential future costs for the 
industry, retailers, and the public revenue. This is also observed through the 
omission of a ‘health’ frame[485]; this review found little evidence of the AI making 
reference to the dangers of drinking alcohol (only in terms of references to ‘problem 
drinkers’), although multiple examples of the AI highlighting the potential health 
benefits of alcohol consumption were identified[57, 96]. This review also found that 
many of the arguments were supported by CSR activities. CSR tends to be used 
strategically and preventatively by an industry, or individual company, and therefore 
usually precedes formal regulation; many CSR activities are built into self-regulatory 
codes which enable the promotion of corporate arguments. This focus on CSR is 
perhaps due to the fact that, although the TI and AI face similar regulatory threats, 
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the AI is at a much earlier policy stage and still able to use CSR activities globally to 
boost their credibility and form relationships (CSR partnerships are likely to create 
further opportunities for co-operation[510]) ahead of regulation. 
Strengths and limitations 
This review has a number of limitations. First, although a broad search strategy and 
search string was used when initially identifying articles it is still possible that some 
relevant articles may have been missed. To minimise this, a librarian was consulted, 
online research repositories were searched, and experts in the field were contacted 
to identify additional articles. Second, interpretive coding of arguments and tactics is 
ultimately subjective. To mitigate this, I along with two of my PhD supervisors 
(Professor Anna Gilmore and Dr Gary Fooks) reviewed and re-reviewed the coding 
at various points during the systematic review process and all of the included 
articles were second-reviewed to ensure consistency. Third, the identification of 
tactics and arguments, and the jurisdictions in which they are used, is dependent on 
the available literature, its quality, and any publication bias. As such, it is possible 
that some tactics and arguments are used more frequently than the literature 
identified would suggest (especially lower visibility tactics such as threatening 
financial withdrawal or threatening legal action which generally take place in 
private). Closely related to this is the fact that the review focuses only on marketing 
policy and the AI may use a more diverse set of tactics and arguments in its political 
activity in other areas. For these reasons the number of articles listed next to each 
tactic and argument (the ‘count’) should be used only as a guideline to provide 
some insight into the tactics and arguments used by the AI. Finally, due to the often 
sparse information in the papers identified, it was impossible to reliably determine 
which tactics or arguments were most persuasive or successful in defeating 
marketing-related regulations.  
The main strength of this review is its systematic approach, which provides a 
comprehensive and geographically diverse overview of AI tactics and arguments. Its 
attempt to rigorously categorise industry strategies/tactics and frames/arguments is, 
along with the review presented in Chapter 5, the first attempt to do so. Whilst care 
needs to be taken in assuming that tactics and arguments used in one jurisdiction 
will be used elsewhere, this review suggest that the findings will be broadly 
applicable across different jurisdictions.  
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Implications for policy, practice, and research 
This systematic review has identified strategies/tactics and frames/arguments used 
by the AI to shape policy debates and prevent the implementation of restrictions on 
alcohol marketing. Policymakers need to be aware of these in order to understand 
how the AI may try to influence the policy-making process, and public health actors 
can use this information to prepare effective counter strategies. By demonstrating 
some of the conflicts between AI political activity and public health, this review 
raises important concerns about the value of AI-government co-operation to public 
health. 
This review has further developed the taxonomies for classifying corporate political 
activity outlined in the first review (Chapter 5), and has shown the political and 
scholarly value of applying them to other industries. Future work could now apply 
the taxonomies to additional policy areas or industries. Again it is recommended 
that future research on corporate influence should, where at all possible, include 
contextual information, ensure all claims are supported within the paper by empirical 
evidence, and that the success or failure of individual tactics and arguments are 
recorded. 
 




Chapter 7: Taxonomies and 
Industry Parallels 
7.1 Taxonomies of Political Activity 
As Chapter 4 outlined there have been multiple attempts to list and categorise 
corporate tactics, and limited work has also attempted to explore corporate 
arguments. Until now, systematic reviews of the arguments and tactics used by the 
TI and AI when attempting to influence marketing regulations had not been 
completed, nor had taxonomies of corporate tactics and arguments been 
developed. The taxonomies developed are also ready to be applied to other policy 
areas or industries.  
Systematic reviews are important in providing up-to-date summaries of current 
findings in a particular field[511]. They allow interested parties to quickly gain an 
objective overview of the evidence available for a given topic and highlight areas 
where further research is needed[512]; systematic reviews are “generally 
considered higher-caliber evidence” than individual studies in decision making for 
health policy[513]. Simply listing tactics or arguments makes it difficult to understand 
patterns in industry activity. Systematic reviews of the literature are able to bring 
activity together into conceptually coherent categories, therefore providing public 
health advocates and policymakers with a better understanding of the range of 
tactics and arguments used by industry to influence policy. 
The two systematic reviews presented in Chapters 5 and 6 split TI and AI political 
activity into ‘strategies’ which include individual ‘tactics’ (the methods by which a 
corporation attempts to exert influence), and ‘frames’ which include individual 
‘arguments’ (the reasons given by a corporation as to why they oppose one idea or 
support another). A separate taxonomy was developed for strategies/tactics and 
frames/arguments. 
The final taxonomies can be seen below; the taxonomy of strategies/tactics in Table 
12 followed by an explanation of the strategies, and the taxonomy of 
frames/arguments in Table 13 followed by an explanation of the frames. The TI 
review was completed first, meaning that the taxonomies were initially based on the 
papers included in this review. The coding categories were further amended and 
developed via ‘emergent coding’[434] during review of the papers included in the 




second (AI) review. The taxonomies below list all of the categories identified in both 
the TI and AI reviews. Not all of the tactics and arguments were used by the TI or 
AI, so some of the categories seen below were missing from the tables included 
within the reviews themselves. The categories in the TI review may also have been 
worded slightly differently than will be seen below, as categories were further 
developed and adapted in the AI review and it is this final wording that is used in 
Table 12 and Table 13.  
 
Table 12: Taxonomy of industry strategies/tactics 
Strategy Tactic 
Information 
Direct lobbying (meetings and correspondence with 
legislators/policymakers)  
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, including front groups, to lobby 
on the industry’s behalf) 
Establishing industry/government collaboration (e.g. via working 
group, technical group, advisory group) / work alongside 
policymakers providing technical support/advice / policy development 
or implementation 
Evidence 
Adding to the 
evidence base or 
shaping its 
understanding 
Commissioning, writing (or ghost 




Preparing position papers, 
technical reports or data on 
impacts (including economic 
impact studies) 
Selective citation of industry-
favourable evidence  
Omission of evidence 
Removing troubling phrases 
Contesting nature of the evidence 
Constituency 
building 
External constituency building 
Forming alliances with and 
mobilising other industry 
sectors/business/trade 
organisations 
Media advocacy (press releases, 
publicity campaigns, public 
hearings, interviews) 
Forming alliances with or 
mobilising unions/civil society 
organizations/ 
consumers/employees/the public 









Internal constituency building 
Collaboration between 
companies / development of pan-








Developing/promoting (new or 
existing) voluntary code / self-
regulation 
Developing/promoting non-
regulatory initiative (generally 
seen to be ineffective/less 






Developing regulation from 
scratch and planning 
implementation 
Legal 
Using litigation / threatening legal 
action 
Pre-emption 
Shaping international law 
Constituency fragmentation and destabilization 
Preventing the emergence of, 
neutralising and/or discrediting 
potential opponents (individuals, 
organisations or coalitions)  
Financial incentive or threat 
Providing current or offering 
future employment to those in 
influential role 
Gifts, entertainment or other 
direct financial inducement 
Threatening financial withdrawal 
1
Including research/publications intended to undermine or misrepresent existing evidence 
2
Creation of group for specific purpose of working against proposed policy 
3
Routine use of a trade association was not counted, industry collaboration must have been 
more ‘active’ 
4
Includes efforts to prevent the implementation of anticipated policies 
5
In some cases, industry uses legislators to promote alternative policies on their behalf 
 
 
Information strategy: Policymakers face considerable problems in producing 
information which is relevant to the economic and health consequences of policies. 
Industry tends to have information advantages relative to policymakers partly 
because they have access to internal, policy-relevant information relating, for 
example, to employment figures or to the nature of product ingredients and their 
health impacts. Industry takes advantage of these differences by supplying 
policymakers with information about the likelihood of a proposed policy having 
negative impacts. Exchange theory assumes that corporations offer policymakers 
support and information in return for influencing policy[357]. In practice, however, 




policymakers often lack the information necessary to assess the accuracy of 
industry supplied data and their inferences. This, and their legal duty to maximise 
profits for their shareholders and therefore shape policy to their advantage, gives 
companies incentives to misrepresent policy-relevant information.  
 
Constituency Building strategy: Constituency Building involves gaining the 
support of other sectors, organisations, or individuals in order to give the impression 
of a larger support-base for the industry’s position and policy preferences[514], and 
often involves financial or other incentives. Constituency building is a key political 
strategy of both public health and corporate actors, and can also reinforce other 
political practices such as lobbying as officials seek to gain and maintain constituent 
support[357]. Industry uses constituency building in three key ways: forming 
alliances with other organisations (such as trade associations, unions, or 
organisations representing other industry sectors), mobilising the public (through 
publicity campaigns, increasingly through digital media, and press releases), and via 
false alliances built through industry-created front groups and astroturf 
organisations.  
 
Policy Substitution, Development and Implementation strategy: Policy 
substitutions are commonly offered by industries, where alternative policies are 
developed as a substitute for proposed policies. Policy substitution is attractive to 
policymakers as it reduces the costs associated with developing and implementing 
policies, whilst still appearing to meet (often publicised) objectives, but unattractive 
due to industry alternatives usually being less effective at, in the case of the TI and 
AI, promoting public health. Voluntary codes represent the most common policy 
substitute, but industries also offer to develop alternative statutory (or other more 
formal) policies, particularly where policymaking capacity is weak (for example, in 
lower income countries). Policy substitution is sometimes used by industry as policy 
prevention when a non-favourable policy is anticipated.  
 
Legal strategy: Industry is likely to use or threaten legal action when proposed 
policies are imminent and other, less confrontational approaches have failed. 
Litigation (and threats of litigation) works by highlighting and reinforcing industry 
arguments relating to the perceived and actual costs (financial and time) associated 
with implementing regulation, and highlighting the immediate advantages of 
voluntary codes and self-regulation. International trade and investment 
agreements[492] also represent an important way of challenging public health 




measures. Shaping such agreements represent an important and strategic way of 
remotely shaping health policy[492]. 
 
Constituency Fragmentation and Destabilization strategy: As well as building 
supportive constituencies (Constituency Building), industries also work to weaken 
and discredit opposing constituencies or prevent them from emerging in the first 
place. The aim is to intimidate opponents, hoping to stop or reduce opposition to 
industry actions, or make opponents appear extreme or disreputable. 
 
Financial Incentive or Threat strategy: Industry seeks to influence policymaking 
through a range of financial incentives and threats. Incentives range from campaign 
finance and other political donations, to more ‘hidden’ practices such as offers of 
employment to policymakers, gifts, and the provision of entertainment. Financial 
threats recognise the dependence of governments on business. Such threats can 
involve capital flight (companies moving business overseas or withdrawing from, for 




Table 13: Taxonomy of industry frames/arguments 
Frame Argument 
Regulatory Redundancy 
Industry adheres to own self-regulation codes / 
self-regulation is working well or is better than 
formal regulation 
Industry only markets to those of legal age / is 
actively opposed to minors using product 
Existing regulation is satisfactory/Existing 
regulation is satisfactory, but requires better 
enforcement 
Industry is responsible 
Individuals should consume product 
responsibly / individual-level approach needed 
Industry has positive impact 
Legal 
Infringes legal rights of company (trademarks, 
intellectual property, constitutionally protected 
free speech (e.g. US First Amendment), 
international trade agreements) 
Regulation is more extensive than necessary / 
regulation is disproportionate 




Body doesn’t have the power to regulate / it’s 
beyond their jurisdiction 
Regulation will cause an increase in 
compensation claims 































The cost of compliance for manufacturers will 
be high / the time required for implementation 
has been underestimated 
Regulation will result in financial or job losses 
(among manufacturers) 
The regulation is discriminatory / regulation will 
not affect all producers/customers equally  
Public Revenue 
Regulation will cause economic/financial 
problems (for city, state, country or economic 
area (e.g. European Union)) 
Associated 
industries 
Regulation will result in financial or job losses 
(among retailers and other associated 
industries, e.g. printing, advertising, leisure) 
Public Health 





Regulation will cause an increase in illicit trade 
Other 
Regulation could have other negative 
unintended consequences  
Complex Policy Area 
Complicated/beyond Industry’s control 
Collaboration with Industry would be beneficial 
Characterising policymakers and public health 
actors as authoritarian/denigrating 
policymakers and public health actors 
Insufficient Evidence 
There’s insufficient evidence that the proposed 
policy will work / marketing doesn’t cause or 
change behaviour (it’s only used for brand 
selection and capturing market share), so 
regulation will have no effect 
The health impacts of consumption remain 
unproven 
1




Regulatory Redundancy frame: Industry uses a number of arguments which seek 
to emphasise that proposed policies are unnecessary, and likely to waste public 
funds. These points are made through, for example, industry claims that it is 
capable of self-regulation, that existing regulation is satisfactory (and simply in need 
of better enforcement), and that industry is responsible and doesn’t need to be 
formally regulated. 
 




Legal frame: Legal arguments highlight the illegality of proposed policies. They 
generally aim to shift the focus of the debate away from public health and consumer 
protection, and instead highlight the potential administrative costs of developing and 
introducing new policies. 
 
Negative Unintended Consequences frame: Industry uses a wide range of 
arguments to highlight the potential negative effects of regulation. These ‘negative 
unintended consequences’ include economic impacts (such as financial or job 
losses for manufacturers, losses to the public revenue, and losses to associated 
industries such as the hospitality and advertising industries), public health impacts 
(where the risk of regulation causing harm to health through, for example, increased 
consumption, is highlighted), and a wide range of other impacts (including setting a 
precedent for other types of products and causing confusion amongst customers). 
The argument that proposed regulations will increase illicit trade feeds into many of 
the ‘negative consequences’ arguments, as increases in illicit trade can have both 
economic and public health impacts (by making the product cheaper and more 
available). 
 
Complex Policy Area frame: The argument of complexity is primarily used to cast 
doubt on academic research and highlight the difficulties involved in addressing 
multi-faceted public health problems with relatively focused policies. These claims 
are designed to support alternative policies such as voluntary codes which are 
usually much more flexible than statutory regulation and therefore able to reflect and 
react to the complexity of public health issues.  
 
Insufficient Evidence frame: Industry uses a number of arguments aimed at 
questioning the strength of the evidence base behind proposed health policies. 
Such arguments aim to increase scepticism of the likely benefits of proposed 
policies and support arguments from other frames, which emphasise the costs and 
underplay the benefits of public health policies. 
7.2 Parallels in Tobacco and Alcohol Industry Political 
Activity 
In line with recent recommendations that “investigations of the strategies of alcohol 
industry actors may benefit from comparisons with other industries, and particularly 




with the tobacco industry”[515], this sub-chapter compares AI and TI political 
activity. 
The two systematic reviews presented in Chapters 5 and 6 mark the first attempts to 
systematically review the tactics and arguments used by the TI and AI when 
attempting to influence marketing regulations, and the first attempts to develop 
taxonomies of TI and AI corporate political activity. They show that the TI and AI use 
a similar narrow range of consistent, and non-geographically specific, tactics and 
arguments. 13 common tactics used by both the AI and TI when attempting to 
influence marketing regulation were identified, in addition to five tactics used only by 
the TI and seven unique to the AI. Similarly, 13 common arguments used by both 
industries were also identified, along with four arguments unique to the TI, and 
seven (three of which formed the new frame ‘complex policy area’) which had only 
been used by the AI. These are outlined below. 
7.2.1 Tactics 
The TI review identified 18 separate tactics falling under six main strategies 
(‘Information’, ‘Constituency building’, ‘Policy substitution’, ‘Legal’, ‘Constituency 
fragmentation, and destabilization’, and ‘Financial incentive’) and the AI review 
identified 20 separate tactics falling under five main strategies (‘Information’, 
‘Constituency building’, ‘Policy substitution’, ‘Legal’, and ‘Financial incentive’); there 
was no evidence of the AI using the ‘Constituency fragmentation, and 
destabilization’ strategy. Although there were 13 common tactics, there was no 
evidence of the AI developing alternative regulatory policies, using legal pre-
emption, preventing the emergence of or discrediting potential opponents, offering 
employment, or offering gifts or other direct financial inducement (Table 14). 
However, a number of new tactics were identified by the AI review that had not been 
identified of having been used by the TI: ‘Selective citation of industry-favourable 
evidence’, ‘Omission of evidence’, ‘Removing troubling phrases’ and ‘Contesting the 
evidence base’ (Information), ‘Threatening financial withdrawal’ (Financial incentive 
or threat), ‘Shaping international law’ (Legal), and ‘Developing regulation from 
scratch and planning implementation’ (Policy substitution, development and 
implementation).  
The four most frequently used tactics by the TI were direct lobbying, 
developing/promoting voluntary codes, internal constituency building (collaboration 
between companies), and forming alliances with other industry sectors, and three of 




these (the former three) were also in the top four most commonly used AI tactics (in 
addition to developing/promoting non-regulatory initiatives).  
 






Direct lobbying (meetings and correspondence with 
legislators/policymakers)  
√ √ 
Indirect lobbying (using third parties, including front groups, to 
lobby on the industry’s behalf) 
√ √ 
Establishing industry/government collaboration (e.g. via working 
group, technical group, advisory group) / work alongside 
policymakers providing technical support/advice / policy 
development or implementation 
√ √ 
Evidence  
Adding to the 
evidence base 
or shaping its 
understanding 
Commissioning, writing (or 
ghost writing), or disseminating 
research/publications 
√ √ 
Preparing position papers, 
technical reports or data on 
impacts (including economic 
impact studies) 
√ √ 
Selective citation of industry-
favourable evidence  
 
√ 
Omission of evidence  √ 
Removing troubling phrases  √ 





Forming alliances with and 




Media advocacy (press 
releases, publicity campaigns, 
public hearings, interviews) 
√ √ 
Forming alliances with or 















 Collaboration between 
companies / development of 
pan-industry group or industry 
trade association 
√ √ 
Policy substitution, development and 
implementation 
Developing/promoting (new or 




regulatory initiative (generally 
seen to be ineffective/less 




alternative regulatory policy 
√ 
 
Developing regulation from 





Using litigation / threatening 
legal action 
√ √ 
Pre-emption √  
Shaping international law  √ 
Constituency fragmentation and 
destabilization 
Preventing the emergence of, 
neutralising and/or discrediting 
potential opponents (individuals, 
organisations or coalitions)  
√ 
 
Financial incentive or threat 
Providing current or offering 




Gifts, entertainment or other 
direct financial inducement 
√ 
 
Threatening financial withdrawal  √ 
 
One key difference between the industries was the AI’s greater use of CSR 
activities. CSR is used strategically as part of efforts to prevent or delay formal 
regulation, and the greater use of CSR by the AI is therefore likely due to it being at 




an earlier policy stage than the TI, allowing the AI to use CSR activities globally to 
boost their credibility and form relationships to prevent regulation. While the TI has 
used CSR heavily in the past[510, 516-518], more recently it has mostly been 
refrained from doing so by the FCTC. The WHO’s Director-General referred to the 
TI’s move away from CSR in a speech in 2012: 
“we have an enemy, a ruthless and devious enemy... The enemy, 
the tobacco industry, has changed its face and its tactics. The wolf 
is no longer in sheep’s clothing, and its teeth are bared. Tactics 
aimed at undermining anti-tobacco campaigns, and subverting the 
Framework Convention, are no longer covert or cloaked by an 
image of corporate social responsibility. They are out in the open 
and they are extremely aggressive”[375] 
7.2.2 Arguments 
The TI review identified 17 separate arguments grouped into four main frames 
(‘Negative unintended consequences’, ‘Legal’, ‘Regulatory redundancy’, and 
‘Insufficient evidence’) and the AI review identified 20 separate arguments grouped 
into five main frames (‘Negative unintended consequences’, ‘Legal’, ‘Regulatory 
redundancy’, ‘Insufficient evidence’, and ‘Complex policy area’); a new frame, 
‘Complex policy area’, was identified in the AI review. Although there were 13 
common arguments, there was no evidence of the AI using the arguments that 
regulation will cause an increase in illicit trade, cause an increase in compensation 
claims, that the body doesn’t have the power to regulate, or that the health impacts 
of consumption remain unproven (Table 15). However, a number of new arguments 
were identified by the AI review that had not been used by the TI: ‘Interferes with a 
free market economy’ (Legal), ‘Industry is responsible’ (although the similar 
arguments such as adhering to self-regulation and not marketing to minors were 
identified in the TI review), ‘Individuals should consume product 
responsibly/individual-level approach needed’ and ‘Industry has positive impact’ 
(Regulatory redundancy), and all arguments under the new frame ‘Complex Policy 
Area’. 
The four most frequently used arguments by the TI were that the regulation 
infringers the legal rights of the company, there’s insufficient evidence, it will cause 
economic/financial problems, and the cost of compliance will be high, but only one 
of these (insufficient evidence) featured in the top four most used arguments by the 
AI as there was greater use of arguments relating to responsibility.  










Industry adheres to own self-regulation 
codes / self-regulation is working well or 
is better than formal regulation 
√ √ 
Industry only markets to those of legal 
age / is actively opposed to minors using 
product 
√ √ 
Existing regulation is satisfactory/Existing 
regulation is satisfactory, but requires 
better enforcement 
√ √ 
Industry is responsible  √
1
 
Individuals should consume product 




Industry has positive impact  √ 
Legal 
Infringes legal rights of company 
(trademarks, intellectual property, 
constitutionally protected free speech 
(e.g. US First Amendment), international 
trade agreements) 
√ √ 
Regulation is more extensive than 
necessary / regulation is disproportionate 
√ √ 
Body doesn’t have the power to regulate / 
it’s beyond their jurisdiction 
√ 
 



































The cost of compliance for manufacturers 
will be high / the time required for 
implementation has been underestimated 
√ √ 
Regulation will result in financial or job 
losses (among manufacturers) 
√ √ 
The regulation is discriminatory / 
regulation will not affect all 
producers/customers equally  
√ √ 






Regulation will cause economic/financial 
problems (for city, state, country or 




Regulation will result in financial or job 
losses (among retailers and other 













Regulation could have other negative 
unintended consequences  
√ √ 
Complex Policy Area 
Complicated/beyond Industry’s control  √ 




Characterising policymakers and public 
health actors as authoritarian/denigrating 




There’s insufficient evidence that the 
proposed policy will work / marketing 
doesn’t cause or change behaviour (it’s 
only used for brand selection and 
capturing market share), so regulation 
will have no effect 
√ √ 





similar arguments such as adhering to self-regulation and not marketing to minors were 
identified in the TI review 
 
It was also found that both the TI and AI use arguments that are inaccurate, false or 
misleading. For example, both industries make arguments that regulating marketing 
is unnecessary or ‘won’t work’ despite there being substantial evidence that TI and 
AI marketing is significantly linked to smoking and drinking behaviour[17, 18, 21-23, 
315, 519-523]. Both reviews also found that many of the individual arguments fell 
within a larger ‘cost-benefit’ meta-frame, promoting the economic and social costs of 
proposed public health policies and underplaying their benefits. Both industries used 
arguments claiming that regulation is more extensive than necessary and likely to 
produce negative unintended consequences, which are used to increase uncertainty 




about the likely benefits of regulation and highlight the potential future costs for the 
industry, retailers, and the public revenue.  
7.2.3 Discussion 
By confirming substantial commonalities between AI and TI political activity, the 
systematic reviews support previous research suggesting that ‘Big Tobacco’ and 
‘Big Booze’ may operate in similar ways[334]. While some differences were also 
observed, this may be due to a number of factors. First, raising concerns about 
compensation or debating which body has the power to regulate (as identified in the 
TI review), for example, are arguments likely to be made in the face of impending 
regulation by companies which no longer have inside influence over policy 
discussions. These differences in political activity reflect the existence of greater TI 
regulation and alcohol policy being comparatively less advanced. Second, 
differences in framing may reflect variations in how different industries make similar 
points. For example, while the AI may not directly contest the health impacts of 
alcohol consumption, questions about the degree of harm caused by alcohol 
consumption are implicit in arguments surrounding individual responsibility and the 
health benefits of alcohol consumption. Third, differences may reflect bias in the 
literature and disparities in data access; because of the availability of internal TI 
documents, information on lower visibility political activity, such as the threatening of 
legal action, is more available on the TI. Finally, differences may reflect the broader 
inclusion criteria used for the AI review (i.e. covering policy debates concerning 
marketing regulations generally rather than just new specific marketing policies) and 
the inclusion of both primary and secondary evidence in the AI review. 
Limitations of the systematic reviews 
Although systematic reviews are seen as forming some of the highest calibre 
evidence available to policymakers[5, 511, 513], publication bias and the literature 
available to include within reviews can potentially have a large effect on the findings. 
This was a problem for both of the reviews presented within this thesis. Many of the 
articles included that were based on secondary-data did not focus primarily on 
attempts to influence marketing regulations and only made brief references to 
industry tactics or arguments, with little context or background. This meant that the 
success or failure of individual tactics and arguments could not be assessed. 
Additionally, it is highly likely that some of the tactics and arguments were used 
more frequently than identified within the literature and that by just focusing on how 
the TI and AI attempt to influence marketing policy, political activity that may have 




been used in relation to other policy areas may have also been missed. For 
example, with regards to the TI, it is known that the TI frequently attempts to 
discredit their opponents[486-489] however this tactic was only found to have been 
used twice within the TI review, arguments that marketing regulations will increase 
illicit tobacco[202, 490, 491] are more commonly used and in more jurisdictions than 
the TI review would suggest, and despite not being identified in the TI review at all 
there is evidence of the TI attempting to shape the evidence base[524-527], 
influence international regulations[492, 493], and focussing on individual 
responsibility[528]. With regards to the AI review, due to the relative lack of high 
quality documentary data, it is possible that some tactics and arguments were not 
counted at all or were used more frequently than the literature identified would 
suggest. This would particularly apply to lower visibility tactics such as threatening 
financial withdrawal or threatening legal action which generally take place in private. 
Although the findings from the systematic reviews provide policymakers with the first 
systematic and comprehensive list of tactics and arguments used by the TI and AI 
when they attempt to influence marketing regulations, the counting element within 
the reviews should be used with caution; due to concerns regarding bias in the 
literature the ‘counts’ can only be used to provide limited insight into the most 
frequently used tactics and arguments. 
Systematic reviews must also have boundaries, i.e. they cannot possibly include all 
literature and relate to findings that cover all of time. It was decided that only tactics 
and arguments used by the TI and AI since 1990 would be included within the two 
systematic reviews, thereby allowing over two decades (1990-2013) of political 
activity to be included and assessed. However, using this cut-off point inevitably 
means that some tactics and arguments were likely to have been missed and either 
not included within the taxonomies at all, or fewer examples counted. This is 
potentially a greater problem for the TI review as much of the information regarding 
TI political activity has been gained from the release of internal TI documents as 
part of the MSA in 1998, and much information therefore relates to prior 1990. 
Additionally, the systematic reviews only focussed on TI and AI political activity in 
relation to marketing policy. It is likely that reviews of other policy areas would have 
produced different results, and may have found that the TI and AI use a more 
diverse set of tactics and arguments in its political activity in other policy areas. This 
is, as discussed in Part 4, a potential area for further research. 
In relation to the taxonomies, deciding on strategies and frames and individual tactic 
and argument categories was difficult and resulted in many detailed discussions 




between myself and two of my PhD supervisors. Although this process took time, 
categories were only finalised once all of the related evidence had been re-reviewed 
and agreement had been reached. However, despite the care that was taken, 
category names and groupings and the coding of arguments and tactics are 
ultimately subjective. Although different groups of researchers may have done this 
differently, it is unlikely that the underlying and main conclusions would have been 
substantially different. 
Finally, across the two systematic reviews, over half of the 65 included articles 
focussed on Europe, North America or Australasia, highlighting a large bias towards 
research in these higher income countries which have the longest history of tobacco 
use (Figure 3) and where alcohol use is greatest (Figure 9). Although three articles 
focussed on Africa (one tobacco, two alcohol), four on South America (all tobacco) 
and nine on Asia (eight tobacco, one alcohol), much more research is needed into 
the TI and AI’s political activity in emerging and developing economies globally, and 
especially in countries where governments are less accountable or transparent and 
corruption is high, thereby potentially allowing industry to have a larger impact. 
Despite the geographical bias, the two reviews presented in this thesis demonstrate 
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Chapter 8: The EPOCH Study 
8.1 The EPOCH Study 
It is now understood that the environment is an important determinant of health (see 
sub-chapter 2.2 The Determinants of Health), in part because it plays a large role in 
influencing a population’s health-related behaviours. As outlined by Chow et al[529] 
there are a number of instruments that have been developed to measure the 
environmental factors that have an influence on health-related behaviours, including 
those by Brownson et al[530], Day et al[531], and Joossens and Raw[331], however 
until now these instruments have “focused on a single health behaviour such as 
smoking, physical activity or diet and on one aspect of the environment”[529]. 
Additionally, most of the instruments have only been used in, and developed for, 
individual geographical settings[529]. In order to effectively compare environmental 
factors in a number of different settings, a new model to measure multiple-aspects 
of the environment was required.  
The Environmental Profile of a Community’s Health (EPOCH) tool was developed to 
meet this need. EPOCH is a component of the Prospective Urban Rural 
Epidemiology (PURE) study, a large (over 150,000 individuals[532]) cohort study 
examining the relationship between lifestyle factors and cardiovascular disease in 
adults aged 35-70 years[533]. The PURE study collects data including participants’ 
medical history, lifestyle behaviours (including physical activity, diet, and health 
behaviours), and body measurements, and also takes blood samples and runs an 
electrocardiogram[533]. EPOCH collects information on environmental factors that 
may influence health in the PURE communities.  
The EPOCH study is split into two parts: EPOCH 1 and EPOCH 2. 
 EPOCH 1 is an objective environmental audit of the communities. There are 
six parts to the data collection: 1) noting information on essential 
infrastructure and services, 2) a pre-defined 1km walk within a community in 
which trained investigators systematically record physical aspects of the 
environment (for example the number of adverts), 3) assessment of a 
tobacco outlet, 4) assessment of a grocery store, 5) assessment of a 
restaurant, and 6) availability and cost of certain medications[534]. Each 
community audit (one per community) is completed during daylight working 
hours. The pre-defined 1km walk is mapped beforehand, and must occur 
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• EPOCH 1 Community 
• EPOCH 2 Household 
• EPOCH 2 
• PURE 
Individual 
within the area which local residents would consider the main commercial 
district of the community[534]. 
 EPOCH 2 is an interviewer-administered questionnaire. It finds out about the 
following three subjects: “what participants observe in their community; their 
awareness of local laws, regulations, and health programs; and their 
opinions about behaviors and laws”[529]. The EPOCH 2 survey is split into 
four sections: 1) the tobacco environment, 2) the nutrition and physical 
activity environment, 3) the social environment, and 4) individual’s home and 
work environment[534]. The questionnaire was designed to be completed 
either via a face-to-face interview or over the telephone[534]. As the same 
people are interviewed in EPOCH 2 as those included within the PURE 
study, the information collected through EPOCH can be linked to biological 
measures, such as BMI, and information about health behaviours. 
It was expected that those conducting the community assessments and interviews 
within each community were trained researchers with knowledge of health-related 
research, were familiar with the assessment areas, and spoke the main language of 
the community[534]. 
The EPOCH study, combined with data from the PURE study, means that multiple 
levels of the environment that have the potential to influence health can be studied; 
the community as a whole (through the community environmental audit in EPOCH 
1), the household level (through the questionnaire administered in EPOCH 2), and 
the individual level (through the questionnaire in EPOCH 2 and biological and 








Figure 28: EPOCH/PURE levels 
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National level data (i.e. national policy and economic indicators) were not collected 
in EPOCH or PURE, so the relevant and necessary information for the analysis 
presented in this thesis was self-collected (data collection is discussed within the 
methods sections of the following chapters). 
8.2 Country, Community, and Individual Sampling Methods 
17 countries were initially included in EPOCH (see Figure 29), and this number is 
being continually increased. For practical reasons, proportionate sampling of the 
whole world was not aimed for[535], instead the investigators aimed to find a 
balance between involving countries with substantial heterogeneity in their social 
and economic circumstances and policies, and their ability to provide at least ten 
years of follow-up data[533, 535]. There was also an intentional focus on MICs and 
LICs[533] as data on chronic diseases are lacking[536]. The study countries cover 
all four income groups in the World Bank 2006 classification[533, 536]:  
 High income countries (HIC): Canada, Sweden, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) 
 Upper-middle income countries (UMIC): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, 
Poland, South Africa, and Turkey 
 Lower-middle income countries (LMIC): China, Colombia, and Iran 



























Within each country, multiple urban and rural communities were selected for 
assessment. This was completed using a stratified sample with the aim of including 
a broad and diverse range of communities[536]. The number of communities 
sampled within each country varied in order to ensure substantial 
heterogeneity[533]. The number of communities surveyed ranged from three in the 
UAE and Zimbabwe to 88 in India and 101 in China, the additional community 
surveys in these countries were to reflect their population size and diversity in 
policies, socioeconomic status, culture, and physical environment[533, 535]. 
It was acknowledged that the notion of a ‘community’ differs widely by country, and 
so broad guidelines were devised for EPOCH community selection. EPOCH 
communities had to be within a pre-specified geographic area, must have been 
viewed by local residents as a community, must have contained residents with 
common characteristics, and must have contained residential and commercial 
zoned areas[534]. A whole city or town was not usually considered a community, 
instead individual communities from distinct areas of the city/town were 
selected[535]. Communities were not expected to be larger than a diameter of five 
Figure 29: EPOCH/PURE study countries 
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kilometers (it was noted that rural communities may have larger areas and fewer 
residents than urban communities); community boundaries were drawn by postcode 
or by town/village boundary, depending on the country[534]. Rural communities 
tended to be defined by village boundaries, and had to be located at least 50km 
away from an urban centre[535]. Both rural and urban communities were included 
as it was expected that they have distinct characteristics in terms of their social and 
physical environment[533], which may have different effects on health behaviours 
and outcomes.  
Communities also had to have a stable population, or be unlikely to substantially 
change over the study period[533]. Individuals were selected to be broadly 
representative of all individuals aged 35-70 within a selected community. The 
recruitment method varied by country, for example in rural India announcements 
about the study were made by a community leader and then followed up by door-to-
door visits by researchers, whereas in Canada information about the study was sent 
by post and then followed up by a phone call[533, 535]. At least three attempts were 
made to contact eligible individuals. Households were eligible if at least one 
member was aged 35-70 years and if the eligible individuals intended to continue 
living at that address for at least the following four years[533, 535]. EPOCH uses a 
subsample of the individuals selected for PURE[533]. 
8.3 The Final Sample 
The research presented in this thesis (Chapters 9-12) is some of the first to analyse 
the EPOCH data. Chapters 9-12 will, in turn, examine the tobacco marketing 
environment between and within countries, assess levels of TI compliance with 
marketing regulations, examine the alcohol marketing environment between and 
within countries, and assess levels of AI compliance with marketing regulations. 
The EPOCH data used in this thesis were obtained from the Population Health 
Research Institute (PHRI), part of McMaster University and Hamilton Health 
Sciences in Canada, during a two week visit in June/July 2013; I played no role in 
the design of the study or in the primary data collection. The data used are from the 
first phase of data collection; the data for EPOCH 1 was predominantly collected 
during 2010 and EPOCH 2 predominantly between November 2009 and July 2012. 
The EPOCH study will be repeated and will ultimately become a longitudinal study 
allowing for comparisons and analysis of risk factors over time.  
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The Bangladesh data were not available in time for this work, so as Table 16 shows, 
the final sample comprised 16 countries; three HICs, seven UMICs, three LMICs, 
and three LICs. 462 communities were included, of which 235 were urban 
communities and 227 were rural. 11,842 individuals aged (predominantly) 35-70 
years who both lived in the communities surveyed for EPOCH 1 and answered the 
EPOCH 2 questionnaire (5,809 resided in urban communities and 6,033 in rural 
communities) were also included. 
 
Table 16: The EPOCH sample 
 Number of communities Number of participants 
Country Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
All countries 462 235 227 11,842 5,809 6,033 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada 46 31 15 1,145 807 338 
Sweden 23 20 3 580 496 84 
UAE 3 1 2 89 26 63 
All HIC 72 52 20 1,814 1,329 485 
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina 20 6 14 544 171 373 
Brazil 14 7 7 387 202 185 
Chile 5 2 3 127 51 76 
Malaysia 33 18 15 1,168 591 577 
Poland 4 1 3 89 26 63 
South Africa 6 3 3 194 99 95 
Turkey 38 25 13 1,207 795 412 
All UMIC 120 62 58 3,716 1,935 1,781 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China 101 39 62 3,131 1,224 1,907 
Colombia 54 31 23 278 151 127 
Iran 20 11 9 593 321 272 
All LMIC 175 81 94 4,002 1,696 2,306 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
India 88 37 51 2,118 766 1,352 
Pakistan 4 2 2 111 57 54 
Zimbabwe 3 1 2 81 26 55 
All LIC 95 40 55 2,310 849 1,461 
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8.3.1 The EPOCH countries 
In order to provide some context, a brief summary of each of the included 16 
countries has been produced. This summary includes data on population size, GDP 
per capita, and a brief overview of each country’s national tobacco and alcohol 
markets. Data has been combined from multiple sources, and is the first time a 
summary of the tobacco and alcohol markets has been produced for the EPOCH 
countries. 
As well as being outlined in the text below, Figure 30 and Figure 31 graphically 
show the national male and female smoking prevalence and the percentage of 
individuals who did not report drinking alcohol in the previous 12 months for each of 
the 16 included countries. 
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8.3.1.1 High Income Countries 
Canada 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 34.0 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 46,212 
Tobacco: Canada is one of the world’s leading nations in tobacco control, 
and ratified the FCTC in 2004[541]. In 1994 the minimum legal smoking age 
was raised from 16 to 18 years[541]. The percentage of smokers in Canada 
is in decline[541], and in 2010 the adult male daily smoking prevalence was 
15.1% and female prevalence was 12.1%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in Canada, 18.8% of men and 25.8% of women reported 
not drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, beer was 
the most commonly consumed alcohol type (53%), followed by spirits (27%) 
and wine (20%), and the average per capita alcohol consumption between 
2003-2005 was 9.8 litres of alcohol[538]. The minimum legal age for alcohol 
consumption is determined by individual provinces in Canada; in Quebec it is 
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Population (million, 2010[539]): 9.4 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 49,360 
Tobacco: Sweden signed the FCTC in 2003 and ratified it in 2005[537]. 
Although sales of tobacco products are in decline, sales of snus (an oral 
smokeless tobacco) are still rising[541]. The minimum legal smoking age has 
been 18 years since 1997[541]. The adult male daily smoking prevalence in 
Sweden in 2010 was 12.0% (the lowest of all EPOCH countries), and female 
prevalence was 13.0%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in Sweden, 12.0% of men and 22.7% of women (the lowest 
of all EPOCH countries) reported not drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 
months[538]. In 2005, wine was the most commonly consumed alcohol type 
(44%), followed by beer (39%), and the average per capita alcohol 
consumption between 2003-2005 was 10.3 litres of alcohol[538]. Retail sales 
of alcohol over 3.5% ABV are only allowed through a government monopoly 
Systembolaget, and there is a strictly enforced minimum legal age for 
purchasing alcohol of 20 years-old[542]. Alcohol products of less than 3.5% 
ABV are sold in grocery stores, and the minimum legal age to purchase this 
type of alcohol is 18 years, although non/low alcohol beer has no age 
limit[542].  
United Arab Emirates 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 7.5 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 34,049 
Tobacco: The UAE signed the FCTC in 2004 and ratified it in 2005[537]. 
However, “as in most countries in the Middle East, ambivalence within the 
government system leads to contradictory policies” with local Emirate laws 
operating alongside national legislation, and enforcement is often poor[541]. 
The national minimum legal smoking age is 18 years, but this is expected to 
rise to 20 years by 2015[541]. The adult male daily smoking prevalence in 
the UAE in 2010 was 17.6%, and female prevalence was 1.4%[537]. 
Alcohol: The UAE is an Islamic country and alcohol use is banned for all 
Muslims[543]. Sale of alcohol to non-Muslims aged 21 years or older is, 
however, allowed but under strict guidelines; in order for non-Muslims to 
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purchase alcohol they must show an Emirate-issued licence (the licence is 
only valid in the Emirate that it was issued in)[543]. In 2003 in the UAE, 
91.0% of men and 97.0% of women reported not drinking any alcohol in the 
previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, beer was the most commonly consumed 
alcohol type (92%), and the average per capita alcohol consumption 
between 2003-2005 was just 0.54 litres of alcohol[538]. 
8.3.1.2 Upper-Middle Income Countries 
Argentina 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 40.4 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 9,133 
Tobacco: Argentina is one of the largest tobacco producing countries in the 
world[541]. It signed the FCTC in 2003, but is yet to ratify it[537]. As of 2012, 
the minimum legal smoking age is 18 years[541]. Adult male daily smoking 
prevalence (of cigarettes only) in Argentina in 2010 was 25.1%, and female 
prevalence was 17.6%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in Argentina, 6.3% of men (the lowest of all EPOCH 
countries) and 27.7% of women reported not drinking any alcohol in the 
previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, wine was the most commonly consumed 
alcohol type (59%), followed by beer (32%), and the average per capita 
alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was 10.0 litres of alcohol[538]. The 
minimum legal age for alcohol consumption is 18[542]. 
Brazil 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 194.9 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 10,978 
Tobacco: In 2011, Brazil was the second largest producer and the leading 
exporter of tobacco leaf in the world, and is a major producer of finished 
cigarettes[541]. Despite this, it “is internationally known for its commitment to 
health” and “has one of the world’s most stringent anti-smoking control 
programmes”; it was the second country to sign the FCTC (in 2003), and 
ratified it in 2005[537, 541]. The minimum legal smoking age is 18 
years[541]. The adult male daily smoking prevalence in Brazil in 2010 was 
18.9%, and female prevalence was 11.5%[537].  
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Alcohol: In 2003 in Brazil, 41.8% of men and 58.7% of women reported not 
drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, beer was the 
most commonly consumed alcohol type (54%), followed by spirits (40%), 
and the average per capita alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was 
9.2 litres of alcohol[538]. The minimum legal age for alcohol consumption is 
18, but age-verification is known to be lax[542]. 
Chile 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 17.1 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 12,671 
Tobacco: Chile signed the FCTC in 2003 and ratified it in 2005[537]. In 
2006/7 the minimum legal smoking age was raised from 16 to 18 years[541]. 
The adult male daily smoking prevalence (cigarettes only) in Chile in 2010 
was 33.7%, and female prevalence was 26.0% (the highest of all EPOCH 
countries)[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in Chile, 24.7% of men and 39.8% of women reported not 
drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, wine, spirits 
and beer were consumed in almost equal quantities (38%, 32% and 30% 
respectively), and the average per capita alcohol consumption between 
2003-2005 was 8.6 litres of alcohol[538]. The minimum legal age for alcohol 
consumption is 18, but enforcement of this is lax[542]. 
Malaysia 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 28.4 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 8,729 
Tobacco: Malaysia signed the FCTC in 2003 and ratified it in 2005[537]. The 
minimum legal smoking age is 18 years[544]. The adult male current 
smoking prevalence in Malaysia in 2010 was 46.4% (the highest of all 
EPOCH countries), and female prevalence was just 1.6%[537]. 
Alcohol: Although Malaysia is a predominantly Muslim county, only 60% of 
the population practiced Islam in 2012 meaning there is still a large market 
for alcohol sales[542]. In 2003 in Malaysia, 95.5% of men and 99.2% of 
women reported not drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 
2005, beer was the most commonly consumed alcohol type (79%), followed 
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by spirits (17%), and the average per capita alcohol consumption between 
2003-2005 was just 0.8 litres of alcohol[538]. The minimum legal age for 
alcohol consumption for non-Muslims is 18[542]. 
Poland 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 38.3 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 12,302 
Tobacco: Poland signed the FCTC in 2004 and ratified it in 2006[537]. The 
minimum legal smoking age is 18 years[541]. The adult male daily smoking 
prevalence in Poland in 2010 was 33.5%, and female prevalence was 
21.0%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003, 16.4% of men and 34.3% of women reported not drinking 
any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, beer was the most 
commonly consumed alcohol type (56%), followed by spirits (31%), and the 
average per capita alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was 13.3 litres 
of alcohol[538]. The minimum legal age for alcohol consumption is 18[542]. 
South Africa 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 50.1 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 7,266 
Tobacco: South Africa signed the FCTC in 2003 and ratified it in 2005[537]. 
In 2009 the minimum legal smoking age was raised from 16 to 18 
years[545]. The adult male daily smoking prevalence in South Africa in 2010 
was 31.7%, and female prevalence was 9.0%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in South Africa, 60.5% of men and 84.6% of women 
reported not drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, 
beer was the most commonly consumed alcohol type (56%), followed by 
wine (17%) and spirits (16%), and the average per capita alcohol 
consumption between 2003-2005 was 9.5 litres of alcohol[538]. The 
minimum legal age for alcohol consumption is 18[542]. 
Turkey 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 72.8 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 10,135 
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Tobacco: Turkey signed and ratified the FCTC in 2004[537]. The minimum 
legal smoking age is 18 years, but a 2003 survey reported that the average 
age at which children started to smoke was 11 years-old[541]. The adult 
male daily smoking prevalence in Turkey in 2010 was 43.8%, and female 
prevalence was 11.6%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in Turkey, 83.6% of men and 97.1% of women reported not 
drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, beer was the 
most commonly consumed alcohol type (60%), followed by spirits (35%), 
and the average per capita alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was 
3.4 litres of alcohol[538]. The minimum legal age for alcohol consumption is 
18, but age-verification is lax[542]. 
8.3.1.3 Lower-Middle Income Countries 
China 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 1,341.3 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 4,448 
Tobacco: China is the largest producer of tobacco leaf in the world and is a 
significant producer of finished cigarettes[541]. The CNTC is the world’s 
largest state-owned tobacco company[2] and accounted for 43.2% of the 
2013 global tobacco market[120]. Due to the size of the Chinese market 
(Chinese men smoke a third of the world’s cigarettes), in 2008 CNTC 
produced 2.1 trillion of the 5.9 trillion cigarettes made worldwide[2]. China 
signed the FCTC in 2003 and ratified it in 2005[537]. The minimum legal 
smoking age is 18 years, but in China cigarettes are often offered to friends 
and family as gifts and to show hospitality thereby creating a smoking-
tolerant environment leading to a higher chance to minors smoking[541, 
546]. The adult male daily smoking prevalence in China in 2010 was 45.4%, 
whereas female prevalence was just 2.0%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in China, 27.4% of men and 61.9% of women reported not 
drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, spirits were the 
most commonly consumed alcohol type (57%), followed by beer (34%), and 
the average per capita alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was 5.9 
litres of alcohol[538]. There is no minimum legal age for alcohol 
consumption, but alcohol producers are only allowed to sell to those over 18 
years-old[542]. 




Population (million, 2010[539]): 46.3 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 6,180 
Tobacco: Colombia ratified the FCTC in 2008[537], and is viewed as being 
“at the forefront of strong tobacco control measures among its Latin 
American peers”[541]. In 2009 the minimum legal smoking age was raised to 
18 years (prior to this, a 1986 law only banned the sale of cigarettes to 
children under 14 years-old)[541]. The adult male current smoking 
prevalence (cigarettes only) in Colombia in 2010 was 23.8%, and female 
prevalence was 11.1%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003, 13.7% of men and 24.7% of women reported not drinking 
any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, beer was the most 
commonly consumed alcohol type (64%), followed by spirits (34%), and the 
average per capita alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was 6.2 litres of 
alcohol[538]. The minimum legal age for alcohol consumption is 18[542]. 
Iran 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 74.0 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 5,675 
Tobacco: The Iranian tobacco market is controlled by the Iranian Tobacco 
Co, a state-owned tobacco company[541]. Iran signed the FCTC in 2003 
and ratified it in 2005[537]. The minimum legal smoking age is 18 years, but 
this restriction is often flouted[541]. In 2010 the adult male daily smoking 
prevalence in Iran was 20.4%, and female prevalence was just 1.0%[537]. 
Alcohol: Since 1979, when an Islamic government came to power, alcohol 
has been banned in Iran as Islamic law forbids the consumption, 
manufacture and sale of alcohol[542]. Non-alcoholic beer is subsequently a 
“highly developed and well-established” product in Iran, and there is a large 
‘black market’ for alcoholic drinks[542]. The average per capita alcohol 
consumption between 2003-2005 was 1.02 litres of alcohol[538]. 
8.3.1.4 Low Income Countries 
India 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 1,224.6 
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GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 1,419 
Tobacco: India signed the FCTC in 2003 and ratified it in 2004[537]. India 
has some of the toughest tobacco control policies globally, but they “are 
difficult to enforce due to the country’s huge population and the overall lax 
enforcement culture”[541]; tobacco sales were still increasing in 2010[541]. 
Since 2003 the minimum legal smoking age has been 18 years[541]. The 
adult male daily smoking prevalence in India in 2010 was 18.3%, and female 
prevalence was just 2.4%[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in India, 80.0% of men and 97.0% of women reported not 
drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, spirits were the 
most commonly consumed alcohol type (88%), and the average per capita 
alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was 2.6 litres of alcohol[538]. The 
minimum legal age for alcohol consumption is determined by individual 
states in India; the minimum age ranges from 18 years-old to 25 years-
old[542]. 
Pakistan 
Population (million, 2010[539]): 173.6 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 1,019 
Tobacco: Pakistan signed and ratified the FCTC in 2004[537] however it 
suffers from weak implementation of tobacco control measures due to lack of 
unity between government and law enforcement bodies, and widespread 
corruption[544]. The minimum legal smoking age is 18 years[544]. The adult 
male daily smoking prevalence in Pakistan in 2010 was 27.3%, and female 
prevalence was 4.4%[537]. 
Alcohol: In Pakistan it is illegal for Muslims (who form 97% of the population) 
to consume alcohol, but non-Muslims over the age of 21 may buy and 
consume alcohol[542]. In 2003, 99.7% of men and 100.0% of women (both 
the highest of all EPOCH countries) reported not drinking any alcohol in the 
previous 12 months (and were lifetime abstainers)[538]. The average per 
capita alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was just 0.06 litres of 
alcohol, and what was consumed was mostly alternative forms of alcohol 
such as fermented beverages made from maize, millet, rice, or cider, fruit 
wine, and fortified wine[538]. 




Population (million, 2010[539]): 12.6 
GDP per capita (US$, 2010[540]): 568 
Tobacco: Zimbabwe has not signed the FCTC[537], and is the only country 
in this study not to have done so. Zimbabwe is a major grower of tobacco (in 
2008 it was grown on over 0.25% of agricultural land[2]) and relies 
substantially on tobacco for export earnings[547, 548]. The adult male 
current smoking prevalence (cigarettes only) in Zimbabwe in 2010 was 
21.3%, and female prevalence was only 0.4% (the lowest of all EPOCH 
countries)[537]. 
Alcohol: In 2003 in Zimbabwe, 74.0% of men and 96.8% of women reported 
not drinking any alcohol in the previous 12 months[538]. In 2005, ‘other’ 
alcoholic beverages (including fermented beverages made from maize,
 millet, rice, or cider, fruit wine, and fortified wine) were the most commonly 
consumed alcohol type (68%), followed by beer (25%), and the average per 
capita alcohol consumption between 2003-2005 was 5.1 litres of 
alcohol[538]. 
8.4 EPOCH Strengths and Limitations 
The strengths and limitations of the analysis presented in the subsequent chapters 
will be dealt with in each discussion. There are, however, a number of strengths and 
limitations relating to the EPOCH study and data more broadly, which apply to each 
of the following pieces of analysis; those outlined below will therefore not be 
outlined again. 
Limitations 
First, although diverse[549], the 16 countries included in the analysis are not 
necessarily representative of LICs, MICs, and HICs generally, nor is the selection of 
communities within each country necessarily representative of all communities[533]. 
This means that the results cannot reliably be extrapolated to all communities within 
a country, or to other countries in any of the income groups. Second, the sample 
size (both the number of communities and number of individuals) varies by country, 
and more uncertainty would be expected in an estimate for a country in which only a 
few communities are sampled. Third, although the EPOCH methods have been 
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shown to be reliable[529], there are limits to how well a 1km walk (in EPOCH 1) can 
represent an entire community. It was impossible to walk around whole 
communities, so selecting a 1km route was deemed to be the most systematic way 
of comparing multiple communities. Forth, individuals surveyed in EPOCH 2 were 
only asked whether or not they saw certain types of marketing in the last six 
months, not how often they saw it meaning that EPOCH offers a limited indication of 
total marketing exposure. Linked to this, individual exposure to marketing was solely 
based on self-reported, retrospective data meaning there could be substantial recall 
bias. There is no reason to suspect that this recall bias would be different for 
different marketing types, so it is likely that all of the data would have been affected 
equally. Also linked to this, little explanatory information was given within the 
questionnaires (although further details were included within the EPOCH 
manual[534]) regarding what was meant by each form of marketing, meaning that 
there was the potential for measurement error. For example, the percentage of 
individuals who reported exposure to radio marketing may be higher than the reality 
as some individuals may have counted hearing a product discussed by a radio DJ 
or within the lyrics of a song (as shown in sub-chapter 3.2.3 The 5P’s: Promotion) 
as marketing exposure, whereas the measure was meant to only capture industry 
radio advertisements. Although these errors may have affected the self-reported 
data, there is no way of telling if this is the case or which measures are captured 
most accurately. Fifth, only individuals aged 35-70 years were included in EPOCH 
meaning there are no data collected on youth exposure to marketing. As most 
individuals who smoke or drink begin smoking or drinking in adolescence[25, 550-
552], this is a significant limitation. Sixth, EPOCH data were collected between 2009 
and 2012 and some of the included countries have since taken further steps to 
strengthen their marketing regulations meaning that marketing levels may have now 
have fallen within these countries. Finally, EPOCH is currently cross-sectional, and 
although there are plans to repeat the study every 5-6 years the data are not yet 
longitudinal. This means that the current analysis, presented in this thesis, can only 
provide a snapshot of the environment.  
Additionally, although the methods used in the EPOCH study have been shown to 
be reliable[529], and the diversity[549] of the countries included is one of the major 
strengths of EPOCH, undertaking research within such different countries and 
communities has many potential problems. First, defining what constitutes an 
‘urban’ and ‘rural’ community within each country is not simple, as international 
definitions are not standardised. For example, in Canada postcodes were used to 
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define communities, whereas in rural India village boundaries (which were often 
more subjective) were used. This means that urban communities and rural 
communities may not be directly comparable between countries. Second, equivalent 
and comparable data collection measures had to be defined for each country[529]. 
For example the definition of a tobacco store varied by country; in one country a 
tobacco store may have been a large supermarket and in another it may have been 
a stand-alone market stall[529]. As only one tobacco store was selected per 
community, this could mean that measures derived from the store assessment 
(such as whether or not it sold single cigarettes or had POS advertising) are not an 
accurate reflection of tobacco stores within a country or community, or are not 
directly comparable across countries. Third, although researchers were trained and 
a detailed manual was produced[534], it is quite possible that outlets and adverts 
counted during EPOCH 1 may have been recorded slightly differently by different 
researchers or by those within different countries. In the EPOCH pilot, measuring 
the numbers of adverts was shown to be one of the most unreliable EPOCH 1 
measures[529]; the training and EPOCH manual was subsequently improved to 
address this. Forth, creating a standardised questionnaire to use with individuals in 
such a wide range of countries is difficult as questions must be easy to understand 
and interviewers must be able to clearly explain, without biasing the results, what is 
meant when queries arise. Cultural differences are inevitable, but the EPOCH 
manual was developed to try and minimise any confusion that could arise. It is not 
possible to know whether problems did occur during data collection, or on what 
scale, but it is reassuring to know that the EPOCH methods have been assessed 
and found to be reliable[529]. 
Strengths 
First, EPOCH is the first study to systematically collect data on the level and nature 
of marketing at both the country and community level. Second, it is the first large-
scale study to collect both observed community data and self-reported data from 
individuals. Third, the 16 countries included in the analysis in this thesis are very 
diverse, both in terms of economics and culture. Finally, the reliability of EPOCH as 
a tool for measuring environmental determinants of health has been assessed and 
confirmed[529], meaning researchers can be as certain as possible that the 
methods used during data collection provide an accurate representation of the 
communities and countries included.  
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Chapter 9: The Tobacco Marketing 
Environment 
9.1 Background 
As sub-chapter 2.1 Prevalence of Tobacco and Alcohol Use, and Tobacco and 
Alcohol’s Impact on Health outlined, globally tobacco is a leading cause of morbidity 
and mortality, responsible for an estimated 18% of deaths in HICs, 11% in MICs, 
and 4% in LICs[9]. However, with smoking prevalence falling in HICs but still 
increasing in many MICs and LICs, the global burden from tobacco is set to rise 
substantially and shift increasingly from higher to lower income countries. By 2030 
tobacco use is predicted to cause over eight million deaths per year, 80% of which 
will occur in MICs and LICs[24].  
The TI has been described as the ‘vector’ of this global tobacco epidemic[91, 404], 
with marketing underpinning the TI’s ability to spread the epidemic[17-20]. The 
WHO’s FCTC made unprecedented reference to the role that the TI has played and 
will continue to play in the smoking epidemic[330], and given the importance of 
marketing in driving tobacco use[17-20] and evidence that complete bans on 
marketing are an effective means of reducing tobacco use[2, 17, 158, 317-319], 
multiple FCTC Articles make recommendations regarding the marketing of tobacco 
products[324]. Most notable is Article 13 which recommends a “comprehensive ban 
of all tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship” including, at a minimum, 
television, radio and print media marketing, promotional incentives, and sponsorship 
of events[324]. The successful implementation of this Article and the other 
evidence-based policies of the FCTC are central to halting the spread of the 
tobacco epidemic. Yet while 179 countries[326], covering over 87% of the world’s 
population[328], have become Party to the FCTC since it came into force in 2005, 
implementation of some of the Articles has been slow reflecting both the lack of 
capacity in many countries to implement effective policies[402] and insidious 
influence by the industry[402-407]. 
As sub-chapter 3.3 The Extent and Impact of Tobacco and Alcohol Industry 
Marketing showed, there is limited literature on the extent of TI marketing globally 
despite there being three major international studies examining youth[293] and 
adult[39, 294] exposure to marketing across a large number of countries. Ten of the 
countries in the present study are unique to EPOCH and not examined by either of 
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the other two adult studies (WHO GATS[39] and the ITC Project[294]; Table 17). In 
addition EPOCH is the only large-scale study that collects data on observed 
marketing levels; GATS and the ITC Project rely solely on self-reported data by 
individuals. EPOCH is therefore unique in collecting observed community data on, 
for example, tobacco outlet density, community advertising, and the sale of single 
cigarettes. Although GATS, the ITC Project and EPOCH each collect self-reported 
data on marketing seen by individuals, EPOCH covers a consistently broader range 
of marketing types in each country. Data from GATS and the ITC Project have not 
been used to systematically assess levels of tobacco marketing between and within 
countries, and they are not designed to study levels of marketing sub-nationally.  
 
Table 17: Comparison of countries included in international adult studies of tobacco marketing 
exposure 
EPOCH country ITC GATS 
HICs Canada x  
Sweden   
UAE   
UMICs Argentina   
Brazil x x 
Chile   
Malaysia   
Poland  x 
South Africa   
Turkey  x 
LMICs China x x 
Colombia   
Iran   
LICs India x x 
Pakistan   
Zimbabwe   
 
 
This chapter aims to provide a broad assessment of the global tobacco marketing 
environment by examining 16 countries, all but two of which have ratified the FCTC 
(Argentina has signed but not ratified, and Zimbabwe is yet to join). Due to the large 
differences in tobacco sales and consumption between HICs, MICs and LICs, and 
Chapter 9: The Tobacco Marketing Environment 
205 
 
urban and rural communities (as Chapter 2 showed), all analysis will focus on 
country income group and urban/rural comparisons. Specifically this chapter aims to 
determine the extent and nature of tobacco marketing (through both observed and 
self-reported measures) in order to assess levels of marketing and whether these 
differ between countries, country income groups, and urban and rural communities. 
The hypotheses are that marketing levels will be lowest in higher income countries 
given their current stage of the tobacco epidemic and their more established 
tobacco control policies[553], and that more marketing will be seen in urban 
communities compared to rural communities given their higher population densities 
(and therefore potential for higher return) and easier access[554]. This chapter 
addresses the current gaps in the literature and in doing so will be important in 
identifying countries or community types with particularly high levels of certain types 
of marketing.  
9.2 Methodology 
9.2.1 Data source 
Data from the EPOCH study were used for this analysis (see Chapter 8 for study 
description). 
9.2.2 Measures of marketing 
EPOCH records both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ marketing. Push marketing aims to increase 
product availability[555, 556] and was measured in EPOCH 1 by the number of 
tobacco outlets (counted during the 1km walk) and whether or not a selected store 
sold single cigarettes (one store selling tobacco was selected according to a strict 
protocol and visited during the 1km walk). Pull marketing encourages customers to 
seek out a product through advertising and promotion[555, 556] and was measured 
using both observation via EPOCH 1 (the number of tobacco adverts counted 
during the 1km walk and whether or not the selected store visited during the 1km 
walk had POS tobacco advertising) and self-report via EPOCH 2 (whether or not 
individuals recalled seeing tobacco advertising on different types of media in the 
past six months). All but one of the marketing measures examined are specifically 
covered by FCTC Articles[324] or their guidelines for implementation[557]; tobacco 
outlet density is not currently addressed by the FCTC but is included in this analysis 
as it has been shown to play an important role in adult and youth smoking 
prevalence consumption[558-561]. More information can be found in Appendix 3. 
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9.2.3 Community-level analysis (EPOCH 1) 
Averages of the number of tobacco outlets and adverts per community and the 
percentage of communities where the selected store did sell single cigarettes or 
have POS advertising were calculated for each country and country income group 
(each split by urban and rural communities). The data were then tabulated and 
graphed. 
To examine differences in the number of observed tobacco outlets and tobacco 
adverts between urban and rural communities and country income groups negative 
binomial multilevel regression models were used; statistical tests showed that the 
outcome data were highly overdispersed (large variance), hence negative binomial 
regression models rather than Poisson regression models were used. The number 
of outlets or adverts was the outcome variable, with categorical explanatory 
variables for country income group (4 categories: HIC, UMIC, LMIC and LIC) and 
community type (2 categories: rural and urban), and a random effect for country. 
Incidence rate ratios (IRR) were obtained by exponentiating the regression 
coefficient and these are presented along with corresponding confidence intervals 
(CI) and p-values (95% significance). As data on single cigarettes and POS 
advertising were based on only one tobacco-selling store per community, and it is 
not possible to know whether the selected store was representative of all stores 
within the community, these outcome variables were not subject to regression 
analysis. 
9.2.4 Individual-level analysis (EPOCH 2) 
To examine differences in self-reported marketing levels between urban and rural 
communities and across country income groups 13 binary (yes/no) outcome 
variables were considered. These included whether or not individuals reported 
seeing tobacco marketing on 11 different mediums: posters, signage, TV, radio, 
print media, cinema, sponsorship, on other products, Internet, free samples, and 
vouchers. The first six and last five marketing types were then also combined into 
‘traditional marketing’ and ‘non-traditional marketing’ variables respectively, and the 
percentage of individuals who saw 0 and 1 or more of these traditional or non-
traditional marketing types were tabulated and graphed. 
A logistic multilevel regression model was applied to each of the 13 binary outcome 
measures and included categorical explanatory variables for country income group 
(4 categories: HIC, UMIC, LMIC and LIC) and community type (2 categories: rural 
and urban), and random effects for country and community. Each model was 
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adjusted for potential confounders – sex, age, education, smoking status, having 
close friends who smoke, access to the Internet, TV ownership and radio ownership 
– to assess whether the differences between communities and country income 
groups were explained by these covariates (see Appendix 4). Based on existing 
literature[17, 35, 113, 131, 186, 261, 264, 265, 267-270, 272-278, 562-565], all of 
these factors were deemed potentially important in explaining differences in 
individuals’ exposure to tobacco marketing. Odds ratios (OR) are presented along 
with corresponding CIs and p-values (95% significance). 
All of the models were fitted in R 3.0.2, using the glmmadmb and glmer functions 
from the glmmADMB and lme4 packages. 
9.3 Results 
The full EPOCH sample (as outlined in Chapter 8) was used. This comprises 462 
communities in 16 countries, of which 235 were urban communities and 227 rural 
(Table 18). 11,842 individuals (who resided in the observed communities and were 
interviewed) were included; 5,809 in urban communities and 6,033 in rural 
communities. The number of communities surveyed in each country ranged from 
just three in the UAE and Zimbabwe to 88 in India and 101 in China; the large 
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Table 18: The EPOCH sample used in the tobacco marketing environment analysis 
 Number of communities Number of participants 
Country Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
All countries 462 235 227 11,842 5,809 6,033 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada 46 31 15 1,145 807 338 
Sweden 23 20 3 580 496 84 
UAE 3 1 2 89 26 63 
All HIC 72 52 20 1,814 1,329 485 
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina 20 6 14 544 171 373 
Brazil 14 7 7 387 202 185 
Chile 5 2 3 127 51 76 
Malaysia 33 18 15 1,168 591 577 
Poland 4 1 3 89 26 63 
South Africa 6 3 3 194 99 95 
Turkey 38 25 13 1,207 795 412 
All UMIC 120 62 58 3,716 1,935 1,781 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China 101 39 62 3,131 1,224 1,907 
Colombia 54 31 23 278 151 127 
Iran 20 11 9 593 321 272 
All LMIC 175 81 94 4,002 1,696 2,306 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
India 88 37 51 2,118 766 1,352 
Pakistan 4 2 2 111 57 54 
Zimbabwe 3 1 2 81 26 55 
All LIC 95 40 55 2,310 849 1,461 
 
9.3.1 Observed marketing: push 
Tobacco outlets 
There are marked differences in outlet type and density between countries and 
country income group (Table 19, Figure 32a). The total number of outlets selling 
tobacco (vendors/street stands and general stores) increased with declining country 
income; 1.7 on average per community in HICs, 3.4 in UMICs, and over 5 in LMICs 
and LICs. This trend was caused largely by the greater number of vendors/street 
stands in lower income countries as they were non-existent in HICs, rare in UMICs 
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(0.2 on average per community) and LMICs (0.7 per community), but common in 
LICs (almost 2 on average per community). The density of general stores did not 
follow this same pattern; there were 1.7 on average per community in HICs, 3.2 in 
UMICs, 4.6 in LMICs, and 3.4 in LICs. 
Across all countries combined, vendors/street stands were more common in urban 
(0.9 on average per community) than rural (0.5) communities, as were general 
stores selling tobacco (3.7 on average per urban community, 3.3 per rural 
community), although urban/rural differences varied somewhat by country income 
group (Table 19, Figure 32a). 
A multilevel negative binomial regression model controlling for community type and 
country income group showed that compared to HICs, the number of outlets in 
UMICs was not significantly different (p>0.05) but there were over 2.5 times more 
outlets per community in LICs (IRR=2.58 (CI=1.23-5.17), p=0.019) and LMICs 
(IRR=2.52 (CI=1.17-5.67), p=0.012), and across all countries there were, on 
average, 27% fewer outlets selling tobacco in rural than urban communities 
(IRR=0.73 (CI=0.63-0.85), p<0.001; Table 20).  
Sale of single cigarettes 
While the sale of single cigarettes was not observed in eight of the 16 study 
countries, overall their sale increased with declining country income; in HICs fewer 
than 3% sold single cigarettes compared with 10.8% in UMICs, almost 40% in 
LMICs, and 64.2% in LICs (Table 19, Figure 32b). Urban/rural differences in the 
sale of single cigarettes varied by country income group, but in both LMICs and 
LICs sales of single cigarettes was more common in urban than rural communities. 
9.3.2 Observed marketing: pull 
Community adverts  
Tobacco adverts were much more common in LICs than all other country income 
groups; almost no adverts were seen in communities in HICs, compared to around 1 
on average per community in UMICs and LMICs, and almost 3 in LICs (Table 19, 
Figure 32c). Across all country income groups adverts were more common in urban 
(1.7 per community) than rural communities (0.9).  
A multilevel negative binomial regression model controlling for community type and 
country income group showed that compared to HICs, the number of adverts in 
UMIC and LMICs was not significantly different (p>0.05) but 81 times more tobacco 
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adverts were observed per community in LICs (IRR=80.98 (CI=4.15-1578.42), 
p=0.004), and across all countries there were, on average, 60% fewer adverts in 
rural than urban communities (IRR=0.40 (CI=0.26-0.60), p<0.001; Table 20). 
POS advertising 
The percentage of selected tobacco stores with POS advertising did not differ 
clearly by country income group; 18.1% in HICs had POS advertising, compared to 
40.0% in UMICs, 21.1% in LMICs, and 44.2% in LICs (Table 19, Figure 32d). 
Across all countries POS advertising in the selected tobacco stores was more 
common in urban (40.9%) than rural (19.3%) communities.  
 






















































































































































All (462) 4.2 0.7 3.5 31.5 1.3 30.4 
Urban (235) 4.6 0.9 3.7 31.5 1.7 40.9 
Rural  (227) 3.8 0.5 3.3 31.4 0.9 19.3 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada Urban  (31) 1.5 0 1.5 0 0.0 9.7 
Rural  (15) 1.1 0 1.1 0 0 0 
Sweden Urban  (20) 2.1 0 2.1 0 0.8 50.0 
Rural  (3) 1.0 0 1.0 0 0 0 
UAE Urban  (1) 6.0 0 6.0 100.0 0 0 
Rural  (2) 4.5 0 4.5 50.0 0 0 
All HIC All  (72) 1.7 0 1.7 2.8 0.2 18.1 
Urban  (52) 1.8 0 1.8 1.9 0.3 25.0 
Rural  (20) 1.5 0 1.5 5.0 0 0.0 
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UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina Urban  (6) 2.0 0 2.0 33.3 0.5 16.7 
Rural  (14) 0.8 0 0.8 21.4 0.5 7.1 
Brazil Urban  (7) 1.0 0.3 0.7 0 10.4 100.0 
Rural  (7) 2.0 0 2.0 0 6.0 100.0 
Chile Urban  (2) 3.0 1.0 2.0 0 0.5 50.0 
Rural  (3) 1.3 0.3 1.0 66.7 1.0 100.0 
Malaysia Urban  (18) 5.8 0.2 5.6 0 0.1 50.0 
Rural  (15) 7.2 0.7 6.5 26.7 0.1 46.7 
Poland Urban  (1) 8.0 0 8.0 0 0 0 
Rural  (3) 1.3 0 1.3 0 0 0 
South 
Africa 
Urban  (3) 3.3 1.0 2.3 33.3 0 33.3 
Rural  (3) 1.3 0 1.3 33.3 0 33.3 
Turkey Urban  (25) 4.0 0 4.0 0 0.1 36.0 
Rural  (13) 1.2 0 1.2 0 0.1 7.7 
All UMIC All  (120) 3.4 0.2 3.2 10.8 1.1 40.0 
Urban  (62) 4.0 0.2 3.8 4.8 1.3 45.2 
Rural  (58) 2.8 0.2 2.6 17.2 0.9 34.5 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China Urban  (39) 6.7 0.4 6.3 0 0.5 20.5 
Rural  (62) 3.0 0.0 2.9 0 0.0 0 
Colombia Urban  (31) 7.7 2.4 5.3 100.0 3.3 54.8 
Rural  (23) 7.3 1.2 6.2 100.0 2.1 43.5 
Iran Urban  (11) 3.0 0 3.0 63.6 0 0 
Rural  (9) 3.9 0 3.9 88.9 0.1 11.1 
All LMIC All  (175) 5.3 0.7 4.6 39.7 1.0 21.1 
Urban  (81) 6.6 1.1 5.5 46.9 1.5 30.9 
Rural  (94) 4.1 0.3 3.8 33.3 0.6 12.2 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
India Urban  (37) 5.4 2.8 2.6 86.5 4.5 75.7 
Rural  (51) 5.2 1.3 3.9 56.9 1.3 17.7 
Pakistan Urban  (2) 4.0 0 4.0 0 3.0 50.0 
Rural (2) 3.0 0 3.0 0 8.0 50.0 
Zimbabwe Urban  (1) 1.0 0 1.0 0 0 100.0 
Rural (2) 7.5 4.0 3.5 0 8.5 100.0 
All LIC All  (95) 5.2 1.9 3.4 64.2 2.8 44.2 
Urban  (40) 5.3 2.6 2.7 80.0 4.3 75.0 
Rural  (55) 5.2 1.4 3.9 52.7 1.8 21.8 
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Figure 32: Differences in observed tobacco marketing exposure between country income 
groups and urban and rural communities 
A  
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Observed marketing: A) Average number of outlets 
selling cigarettes/tobacco (vendors/street stands, 
general stores, and combined); B) Percentage of 
selected tobacco stores selling single cigarettes; C) 
Average number of cigarette/tobacco adverts; D) 
Percentage of selected tobacco stores with POS 
advertising. Each graph presents data by country 
income group and community type (all communities, 
and split into urban and rural). 
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Table 20: Negative binomial multilevel regression models showing incidence rate ratios for the 
observed levels of push and pull tobacco marketing 
Push marketing: 
Average number of 
tobacco outlets 
(vendors/street 
stands  and  general 
stores) 
Pull marketing: 




 (95% CI) IRR
a
 (95% CI) 
Community 
type 
Urban 1 1 




HIC 1 1 
UMIC 1.29 (0.67-2.49) 3.96 (0.30-52.88) 
LMIC 2.52 (1.23-5.17)* 4.68 (0.26-85.00) 
LIC 2.58 (1.17-5.67)* 80.98 (4.15-1578.42)* 
a
IRRs were obtained by exponentiating the regression coefficient. 
Models control for community type and country income group, with a 
random effect for country. 95% CIs also shown 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 
 
9.3.3 Self-reported marketing: pull 
Traditional marketing 
Across country income groups, individuals in HICs were least likely to report 
exposure to all forms of traditional marketing (except print media), although 
differences between other income groups varied by the type of marketing (Table 21, 
Figure 33a-f, Figure 33l). TV marketing was the most common form of traditional 
marketing seen (29.6% individuals reported seeing TV marketing in the previous six 
months) followed by posters (19.8%), print media (16.5%), signage (16.4%), radio 
(12.4%), and cinema marketing (4.8%). All forms of traditional marketing (except 
TV) and exposure to at least one form were less common in rural than urban 
communities. 
Multilevel logistic regression models controlling for potential confounders including 
TV and radio ownership showed that compared to HICs, the odds of individuals in 
LICs reporting exposure to at least one form of traditional marketing in the last six 
months were almost 10 times higher (OR=9.77 (CI=1.24-76.77), p=0.030); UMICs 
and LMICs compared to HICs were not significantly different (p>0.05; Table 22a). 
Specifically, in LICs the odds of exposure were significantly higher for radio (46 
times higher; OR=46.05 (CI=1.29-1642.57), p=0.036), signage (11 times higher; 
OR=11.02 (CI=1.07-113.60), p=0.044), TV (9 times higher; OR=9.42 (CI=1.21-
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73.20), p=0.032) and cinema (3 times higher; OR=3.08 (CI=1.46-6.49), p=0.003) 
marketing (Table 22a). The odds of poster and print media exposure were not 
significantly different between HICs and LICs (p>0.05), nor were differences 
between HICs and UMICs or LMICs for any form of traditional marketing.  
These same logistic regression models also showed that compared to urban 
residents, the odds of individuals in rural communities reporting exposure to at least 
one form of marketing were significantly lower (28% lower; OR=0.72 (CI=0.53-0.98), 
p=0.036) as were four of the six traditional marketing types measured – poster (59% 
lower; OR=0.41 (CI=0.28-0.59), p<0.001), signage (66% lower; OR=0.34 (CI=0.24-
0.48), p<0.001), print media (46% lower; OR=0.54 (CI=0.39-0.75), p<0.001), and 
cinema (51% lower; OR=0.49 (CI=0.30-0.78), p=0.003; Table 22a). The odds of TV 
and radio marketing exposure between urban and rural communities were not 
significant (p>0.05). 
Non-traditional marketing 
Non-traditional marketing was considerably less frequently observed than traditional 
marketing. Tobacco marketing on other products (such as umbrellas) was the most 
common form of non-traditional marketing (12.4% individuals reported seeing 
marketing on other products), followed by sponsorship (9.0%), Internet marketing 
(7.9%), and free samples and vouchers (both 4.2%; Table 21, Figure 33g-k). 
Differences were not marked between country income groups, but both overall 
exposure to non-traditional marketing (Figure 33m) and exposure to each form of 
non-traditional marketing  was more common in urban than rural communities. 
Multilevel logistic regression models showed that once potential confounders were 
controlled for none of the country income group comparisons to HIC were significant 
for any of the non-traditional forms of marketing (p>0.05; Table 22b). However, 
compared to urban residents, the odds of individuals in rural communities reporting 
exposure to all forms of non-traditional marketing in the last six months were 
significantly lower. The odds of exposure to one or more forms were 62% lower 
(OR=0.38 (CI=0.25-0.59), p<0.001), exposure to sponsorship 65% lower (OR=0.35 
(CI=0.22-0.56), p<0.001), marketing on other products 68% lower (OR=0.32 
(CI=0.20-0.54), p<0.001), Internet marketing 55% lower (even after controlling for 
Internet access; OR=0.45 (CI=0.26-0.78), p=0.005), free samples 63% lower 
(OR=0.37 (CI=0.21-0.66), p<0.001) and vouchers 72% lower (OR=0.28 (CI=0.16-
0.51), p<0.001; Table 22b). 
  
 
Table 21: Percentage of individuals who reported seeing each type of tobacco marketing within the previous six months 
 








































































































































Country and community type 
(number of individuals) 
All 
countries 
All (11,842) 19.8 16.4 29.6 12.4 16.5 4.8 42.4 9.0 12.4 7.9 4.2 4.2 18.1 
Urban (5,809) 23.0 20.1 28.0 13.2 21.3 6.1 43.8 12.3 16.4 10.9 5.1 5.4 24.0 
Rural (6,033) 16.7 12.8 31.2 11.7 11.9 3.6 41.1 5.8 8.6 5.1 3.3 3.0 12.4 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada Urban (807) 7.3 8.3 8.4 2.1 20.1 2.2 30.2 13.4 6.7 4.8 0.5 0.9 20.5 
Rural (338) 8.0 6.8 8.6 2.7 18.3 3.6 28.1 10.4 4.4 4.1 0 0.9 16.3 
Sweden Urban (496) 13.3 19.8 9.8 0.8 39.4 3.9 47.9 8.9 25.4 16.5 0.8 1.4 36.8 
Rural (84) 2.4 7.1 7.1 0.0 42.9 2.4 47.6 6.0 17.9 10.7 3.6 0 26.2 
UAE Urban (26) 7.7 7.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 7.7 7.7 3.9 3.9 7.7 0 0 7.7 
Rural (63) 7.9 1.6 6.4 1.6 6.4 0.0 14.3 0.0 1.6 1.6 0 0 1.6 
All HIC All (1,814) 8.9 10.8 8.6 1.8 25.4 2.9 34.6 10.7 11.7 8.1 0.6 0.9 23.6 
Urban (1,329) 9.6 12.5 8.8 1.7 26.9 3.0 36.4 11.5 13.7 9.2 0.6 1.1 26.3 
Rural (485) 7.0 6.2 8.0 2.1 21.0 2.9 29.7 8.3 6.4 5.0 0.6 0.6 16.1 
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina Urban (171) 9.4 9.4 21.1 0.0 8.8 0 28.7 2.3 0.6 0.6 0 0 3.5 
  
 
Rural (373) 1.6 1.9 23.1 0.5 6.4 0 27.6 1.6 0.0 0.5 0 0 2.1 
Brazil Urban (202) 7.4 4.0 18.3 4.0 11.4 1.5 27.7 3.0 1.0 3.5 0.5 0.5 6.4 
Rural (185) 17.3 0.5 18.4 1.1 2.7 0.0 34.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
Chile Urban (51) 68.6 35.3 100.0 72.6 47.1 0 100.0 3.9 76.5 17.7 0 0 76.5 
Rural (76) 4.0 1.3 15.8 5.3 4.0 0 18.4 0.0 2.6 0.0 0 0 2.6 
Malaysia Urban (591) 44.0 32.8 45.9 37.7 42.5 11.3 50.8 32.3 32.3 38.9 13.5 17.1 44.3 
Rural (577) 35.0 28.3 37.4 30.0 31.4 7.1 39.3 21.3 25.3 27.9 12.5 11.4 30.9 
Poland Urban (26) 23.1 19.2 15.4 3.9 23.1 3.9 46.2 7.7 11.5 15.4 15.4 7.7 42.3 
Rural (63) 15.9 14.3 11.1 1.6 12.7 1.6 36.5 1.6 7.9 4.8 1.6 0 12.7 
South Africa Urban (99) 49.0 44.9 55.1 45.9 54.1 21.4 81.6 30.3 29.3 17.2 30.3 34.3 50.5 
Rural (95) 40.0 34.7 35.8 48.4 30.5 3.2 68.4 16.8 17.9 5.3 17.0 10.5 26.3 
Turkey Urban (795) 15.6 16.0 21.4 5.7 11.2 1.5 31.7 5.4 10.9 2.6 0.8 0.5 13.8 
Rural (412) 7.3 9.7 20.6 4.6 7.5 1.5 27.4 3.4 9.5 2.7 0.7 0 13.6 
All UMIC All (3,716) 22.2 17.9 29.5 16.3 20.0 4.2 37.9 11.8 15.1 12.7 5.7 5.9 20.7 
Urban (1,935) 26.1 21.3 32.2 18.6 23.8 5.4 41.4 14.4 18.2 14.9 6.3 7.3 25.4 
Rural (1,781) 18.0 14.3 26.6 13.9 15.8 2.9 34.2 9.0 11.7 10.2 5.2 4.3 15.6 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China Urban (1,224) 27.0 18.3 43.3 18.5 18.4 8.4 52.3 11.6 21.6 15.4 6.7 6.0 30.5 
Rural (1,907) 12.4 7.1 44.0 14.0 8.4 2.8 50.0 2.3 9.0 4.4 1.9 1.8 13.8 
Colombia Urban (151) 58.9 44.4 58.3 45.0 35.1 6.0 76.2 38.4 39.7 7.3 35.1 35.8 42.4 
Rural (127) 75.6 62.2 70.1 56.7 43.3 7.1 85.0 52.0 52.8 13.4 48.8 50.4 55.1 
Iran Urban (321) 5.3 15.6 3.4 0.0 2.8 6.9 23.7 0.9 2.1 0.3 0 0.3 3.7 
Rural (272) 0.4 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.5 4.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 0 0.4 
  
 
All LMIC All (4,002) 19.2 14.1 38.9 15.9 12.6 5.0 47.5 7.9 14.3 7.6 5.8 5.7 19.6 
Urban (1,696) 25.8 20.1 37.1 17.4 16.9 7.9 49.0 12.0 19.5 11.8 7.9 7.6 26.5 
Rural (2,306) 14.4 9.6 40.3 14.8 9.4 2.8 46.5 4.8 10.4 4.4 4.2 4.3 14.5 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
India Urban (766) 27.6 24.4 26.2 7.4 12.3 8.2 46.1 6.1 7.4 0.4 2.5 2.9 8.1 
Rural (1,352) 18.8 14.0 29.3 3.9 5.6 6.1 41.5 1.0 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 2.1 
Pakistan Urban (57) 57.9 77.2 63.2 45.6 40.4 15.8 87.7 33.3 24.6 28.1 15.8 8.8 40.4 
Rural (54) 42.6 64.8 48.2 18.5 18.5 1.9 77.8 5.6 1.9 0.0 3.7 1.9 9.3 
Zimbabwe Urban (26) 84.6 57.7 84.6 23.1 50.0 11.5 96.2 50.0 65.4 0.0 7.7 3.9 69.2 
Rural (55) 70.9 78.2 30.9 78.2 56.4 3.6 96.4 36.4 38.2 1.8 3.6 0 49.1 
All LIC All (2,310) 25.2 22.2 30.2 8.4 10.7 7.0 46.9 5.0 5.5 0.9 1.6 1.3 7.1 
Urban (849) 31.3 29.0 30.5 10.5 15.3 8.8 50.4 9.3 10.4 2.2 3.5 3.3 12.1 
Rural (1,461) 21.6 18.3 30.1 7.3 8.0 5.9 44.9 2.5 2.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 4.2 
a 
Posters (for example billboards, pasted on walls, visible on the sides of taxis, buses etc); 
b 
Permanently sponsored signage on shops or other buildings; 
c 
Print media such as newspapers/magazines; 
d 
Sponsorship of sporting, music, other events; 
e 
On products such as umbrellas, ashtrays, shopping bags, 
clothing, or any other products; 
f 
Promotional vouchers that allow discounts 
 
 




Figure 33: Differences in self-reported tobacco marketing exposure between country income 
groups and urban and rural communities 
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Self-reported marketing: Percentage of individuals reporting A) seeing poster marketing; B) seeing signage marketing; C) 
seeing TV marketing; D) hearing radio marketing; E) seeing print media marketing; F) seeing cinema marketing; G) 
seeing sponsorship; H) seeing marketing on other products; I) seeing Internet marketing; J) seeing free samples; K) seeing 
vouchers; L) seeing 1+ types of traditional marketing; M) seeing 1+ types of non-traditional marketing in previous six 




Table 22: Logistic multilevel regression models showing odds ratios for the percentage of individuals who reported seeing each type of tobacco marketing within 
the previous six months  
a: traditional forms of marketing 
 Posters Signage TV Radio Print media Cinema 1+ traditional 
OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) 
Community 
type 
Urban 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

















HIC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 












































b: non-traditional forms of marketing 




 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) OR
a
 (95% CI) 
Community 
type 
Urban 1 1 1 1 1 1 





















































Models control for community type, country income group, sex, age, education, smoking status, friends who smoke, Internet access, TV 
ownership, radio ownership, with a random effect for country and community. 95% CIs also shown 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 




Overall self-reported exposure 
In total, 45% of individuals across all countries and communities reported exposure 
to at least 1 type of tobacco marketing over the previous six months (range 4-
100%), and 10% reported exposure to at least 5 types (range 0-56%; Table 23). In 
Sweden, where tobacco control measures (including advertising bans) are rated 
highly[253], 58% of individuals in urban communities reported seeing at least one 
type of tobacco marketing and almost 7% reported seeing at least 5 types, and in 
urban Chile, Malaysia and South Africa, and urban and rural Colombia and 
Zimbabwe, over 40% of individuals reported seeing five or more types of tobacco 
marketing in the last six months.  
 
Table 23: Percentage of individuals who reported seeing 0 and 1+ (split into 1-4 and 5+) types of 










types Country and community (n) 
All countries All (462) 54.76 45.24 35.22 10.01 
Urban (235) 52.05 47.95 34.89 13.06 
Rural (227) 57.38 42.62 35.55 7.08 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada Urban (31) 61.71 38.29 36.31 1.98 
Rural (15) 64.79 35.21 33.43 1.78 
Sweden Urban (20) 41.82 58.18 51.52 6.67 
Rural (3) 44.05 55.95 53.57 2.38 
UAE Urban (1) 92.31 7.69 3.85 3.85 
Rural (2) 85.71 14.29 14.29 0.00 
All HIC All (72) 57.31 42.69 39.49 3.20 
Urban (52) 54.89 45.11 41.34 3.77 
Rural (20) 63.92 36.08 34.43 1.65 
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina Urban (6) 69.59       30.41 29.82        0.58 
Rural (14) 72.12       27.88 27.88        0.00 
Brazil Urban (7) 70.30      29.7 28.71        0.99 
Rural (7) 65.41       34.59 34.59 0.00 
Chile Urban (2) 0.00 100.00 56.86       43.14 
Rural (3) 80.26       19.74 19.74        0.00 




Malaysia Urban (18) 46.53       53.47 13.03       40.44 
Rural (15) 59.62       40.38 10.75       29.64 
Poland Urban (1) 42.31       57.69 50.00        7.69 
Rural (3) 58.73       41.27 39.68        1.59 
South Africa Urban (3) 17.17       82.83 40.40       42.42 
Rural (3) 31.58       68.42 45.26       23.16 
Turkey Urban (25) 63.27       36.73 31.32        5.41 
Rural (13) 67.23       32.77 29.13        3.64 
All UMIC All (120) 59.36       40.64 25.57       15.07 
Urban (62) 55.14       44.86 26.72       18.14 
Rural (58) 63.95       36.05 24.31       11.73 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China Urban (39) 43.61       56.39 39.51       16.89 
Rural (62) 48.63       51.37 46.99        4.38 
Colombia Urban (31) 22.52       77.48 37.09       40.40 
Rural (23) 14.96       85.04 29.13       55.91 
Iran Urban (11) 75.08       24.92 24.92 0.00 
Rural (9) 95.96        4.04 3.68        0.37 
All LMIC All (175) 50.39       49.61 39.02       10.59 
Urban (81) 47.70       52.3 36.52       15.78 
Rural (94) 52.38       47.62 40.86        6.76 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
India Urban (37) 53.52       46.48 39.03        7.44 
Rural (51) 58.43       41.57 39.79        1.78 
Pakistan Urban (2) 12.28       87.72 52.63       35.09 
Rural (2) 22.22       77.78 66.67       11.11 
Zimbabwe Urban (1) 3.85       96.15 46.15       50.00 
Rural (2) 3.64       96.36 52.73       43.64 
All LIC All (95) 52.90       47.1 40.87        6.23 
Urban (40) 49.23       50.77 40.16       10.60 
Rural (55) 55.03       44.97 41.27        3.70 
 
9.4 Discussion 
This study makes a number of important findings in relation to tobacco marketing. 
First it identifies high levels of ongoing exposure to tobacco marketing despite 14 of 
the 16 countries in this study having ratified the FCTC (12 of them in 2004/5) 




thereby being required to implement comprehensive marketing bans: 10% of all 
individuals reported seeing five or more types of tobacco marketing in the last six 
months and 45% recalled seeing at least one form of tobacco marketing. Second, it 
identifies significantly higher levels of marketing in lower than higher income 
countries, which supports evidence of the TI specifically targeting L/MICs[418, 566]; 
these countries are also at an earlier stage of the tobacco epidemic[40, 42] (Figure 
3). Once potential confounders were controlled for, marked and highly significant 
differences in marketing remained. Third, for 12 of 15 measures, marketing 
exposure was significantly lower in rural than urban communities ranging from 27% 
(observed outlets) to 71% lower (self-reported vouchers). 
The increasing rates of smoking in a number of EPOCH countries in contrast to 
falling global smoking prevalence[29] makes these findings particularly alarming. 
For example, recent increases in youth smoking have been observed in Brazil, 
Poland, Turkey and  India[567]. High levels of marketing may reflect failure to enact 
regulation and/or enforce compliance[407]; even in countries with highly-regarded 
tobacco control measures such as Sweden[253], Canada[568] and Brazil[569], 
individuals reported significant exposure to tobacco marketing which suggests that 
the TI may still be finding ways to  market its products. For example, although no 
adverts were observed in Canada, around 7.5% of individuals reported seeing 
posters and signage in the previous six months. The greater exposure to traditional 
marketing in LICs compared to HICs (10 times more) and similar levels of exposure 
to non-traditional marketing across all country income groups suggests that 
regulation has been more successful in controlling traditional marketing in HICs, 
resulting in the TI increasingly having to move to using newer, less regulated forms. 
The greater amount of urban marketing is consistent with evidence that the TI 
focuses its marketing and distribution on areas with the greatest potential impact, 
i.e. areas with higher density populations[570, 571], and on cost-effective, 
accessible areas (rural communities can present different challenges than urban 
ones[554]). 
There are some limitations to EPOCH which were outlined in Chapter 8. One of the 
limitations relates to the representativeness of the included studies;  linked to this it 
is noted that in two of the three LMICs included (China and Iran), the main tobacco 
company is state-owned[2]. Countries with state-owned monopolies traditionally do 
not market their products as heavily (as the lack of competition renders it less 
necessary[34]) and these findings (Table 19 and Table 21) suggest the marketing 




environment may be a little different in these countries especially in terms of self-
reported marketing in Iran where, compared to other LMICs (and LICs and some 
UMICs), exposure to most forms of marketing was lower. However, the results 
appear to be consistent with data from the WHO’s GATS which, despite no formal 
analysis having been completed, shows higher self-reported marketing exposure in 
lower income countries (with the exception of Russia) and in urban 
communities[39]. Another limitation related to sample size; linked to this it is noted 
that the number of countries per country income group, and the small number of 
communities surveyed in two of the three LICs, may explain the wide CIs seen in 
some significant LIC to HIC comparisons. Additionally, as only one tobacco-selling 
store was visited per community during the environmental audit and it is not 
possible to know whether the selected store was representative of all stores within 
the community; the statistical analysis therefore did not include the sale of single 
cigarettes or the existence of POS advertising. Finally, it is possible that the 
existence of sub-national marketing regulation may explain some of the differences 
in marketing levels seen between urban and rural communities. The WHO provides 
information on whether or not a country has sub-national tobacco marketing laws 
(six of the included 16 countries did)[537] but does not detail what the sub-national 
law applies to, for example TV or print-media marketing; because of this it was 
impossible to include it as a potential confounder in the models, or stratify the 
analysis accordingly. 
There are also strengths to EPOCH (outlined in Chapter 8), and also to this 
particular study.  First, the present study is the first to compare the levels of multiple 
types of observed and self-reported tobacco marketing across such a wide range of 
countries. And second, although differences in self-reported exposure to marketing 
will reflect access to certain types of media, Internet access, TV and radio 
ownership were controlled for in the individual-level models. 
Implications for policy 
This study has shown that despite the FCTC having been ratified by all but two of 
the included countries, tobacco marketing remains ubiquitous. Given overwhelming 
evidence of the importance of TI marketing[17-20] these findings highlight the 
urgent need for countries to implement and enforce comprehensive controls on 
tobacco marketing. Exposure to marketing in countries with comprehensive 
marketing regulation suggests that regulation needs to be actively enforced. 
Chapter 10: Tobacco Marketing Regulation and Levels of Tobacco Industry Compliance 
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Chapter 10: Tobacco Marketing 
Regulation and Levels of Tobacco 
Industry Compliance 
10.1 Background 
All but two EPOCH countries have ratified the FCTC, and those that have are 
legally required to implement comprehensive tobacco marketing regulations. Yet 
Chapter 9 showed that tobacco marketing is ubiquitous, even within countries which 
have ratified the FCTC. The high levels of marketing observed and self-reported 
within countries that should have regulation in place is likely to be due to two 
interconnected reasons – government failure to enforce regulation and/or TI failure 
to comply. While it would be ideal if the TI simply complied with regulation and 
governments did not have to spend limited resources on monitoring and 
enforcement, existing evidence shows that in many countries the TI actively 
circumvents marketing regulation, especially in new markets or where policy is 
poorly enforced[35, 176, 193, 438, 449, 572]. 
Despite sometimes slow or poor implementation, the FCTC is “without question the 
most powerful tool the international community has to reduce the global NCD 
burden”[328] yet its impact and that of other marketing regulation relies on TI 
compliance. Despite the importance of marketing regulation, there is very little 
literature on the extent to which it is complied with (as was shown in sub-chapter 4.2 
Policy Influence and Compliance), although the WHO does provide a country-level 
compliance score based on expert rankings (outlined in 10.4 Discussion).  
This chapter therefore aims to assess the presence of marketing regulation within 
the EPOCH countries, examine the extent of compliance with regulation, and 
identify factors which are associated with good compliance. It is hypothesised that 
the number of pieces of marketing regulation that a country has in place will 
increase with the length of time since FCTC ratification. All but two of the EPOCH 
countries which have ratified the FCTC did so in 2004/5 giving them plenty of time 
to implement regulation by 2010 (when the majority of EPOCH data were collected) 
and within the five years for implementation that the FCTC allows:  
“undertake a comprehensive ban or, in the case of a Party that is not in 
a position to undertake a comprehensive ban due to its constitution or 




constitutional principles, restrict tobacco advertising, promotion and 
sponsorship on radio, television, print media and, as appropriate, other 
media, such as the internet, within a period of five years”[324] (emphasis 
added) 
It is also hypothesised that compliance will be poorer in lower income countries 
primarily due to their lower budgets for monitoring and enforcement, and that higher 
country income, greater expenditure on health and tobacco control, and good 
governance (such as low levels of corruption and good government stability), in 
particular, will be significant factors in good compliance. It is difficult to hypothesise 
whether compliance will be better in urban or rural communities because, on the 
one hand it might be expected that compliance will be poorer in rural than urban 
communities given access difficulties[554] potentially making enforcement harder 
and relatively less cost effective, but on the other hand it might be expected that 
compliance will be poorer in urban communities where TI marketing is greatest (as 
shown in Chapter 9). 
This work will be important in identifying countries that need to implement further 
marketing controls, and countries or community types with poor levels of 
compliance with existing marketing regulations. This analysis will help policymakers 
effectively focus resources to better ensure compliance. 
10.2 Methodology 
10.2.1 Data sources 
The same sample size as Chapter 9 was used (see Table 18).  
Regulation 
Data on the extent and nature of marketing regulation relating to the data collected 
in EPOCH was obtained from the WHO[537]. Regulatory data regarding the sale of 
single cigarettes were not available from the WHO[537] and so were gathered from 
individual country regulatory documents which were predominantly available on the 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids’ Tobacco Control Laws website[573]. Where 
documents were missing, or where the regulation was not clear, national tobacco 
control experts were contacted. Regulatory data were obtained for the year 2010 
(the year the majority of EPOCH data were collected). 
 




Marketing and compliance 
Data covering 12 forms of marketing were obtained from EPOCH: observed outdoor 
advertising, POS advertising, and the sale of single cigarettes (EPOCH 1), and self-
reported advertising on posters, TV, radio, print media, sponsorship, other products 
with tobacco branding, Internet, free samples, and vouchers (EPOCH 2). Although 
additional marketing types were included in Chapter 9, only these 12 forms of 
marketing were used in this analysis as they relate to regulation that the TI could 
choose to either adhere to or ignore; outlet density was not assessed as it cannot 
be assumed that industry has control over this, whereas the sale of single cigarettes 
was included as, although retailers play a significant role in whether or not they are 
sold, it is also an important TI promotional method particularly in LICs[574-576]. 
Additionally, signage and cinema marketing are not assessed because no data on 
regulation were available from the WHO[537] for these forms of marketing. The 
measures of marketing are the same as those used in Chapter 9 and so will not be 
outlined in detail again here (see Appendix 3).  
These 12 measures of marketing were then linked to national regulation. 
Information on national regulation in ten marketing areas was required as regulation 
on ‘billboard/outdoor advertising’ was compared to both observed outdoor 
advertising and self-reported exposure to poster marketing, and regulation on 
‘national and international TV and radio advertising’ was compared to both self-
reported exposure to TV marketing and self-reported exposure to radio marketing.  
National regulation was used in this chapter, but as EPOCH collected data at the 
community level compliance in both urban and rural communities will be examined. 
Explanatory variables 
Data on eight explanatory variables – GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, 
government effectiveness, government stability, government expenditure on health, 
budget for tobacco control, and tobacco production – were collated from the World 
Bank[540, 577], the UN[578, 579], and the WHO[537]. More information can be 
found in Appendix 5. 
10.2.2 Analysis 
Presence of regulation 
First the presence of regulation was examined by country, country income group, 
and by the year in which each country ratified the FCTC. The amount of marketing 




regulation in place by a country’s FCTC ratification date is potentially interesting as 
it has been hypothesised that longer FCTC ratification would equate to a country 
having a greater number of marketing regulations. 
Compliance scores 
Where a country did have a specific piece of regulation in place, compliance with 
that regulation was assessed using data on the levels of marketing obtained via 
EPOCH (presented in Table 19 and Table 21). Compliance was categorised into 
either ‘good’ or ‘poor’ compliance, the exact definition of which varied by measure: 
 For the average number of observed adverts: 
o Good compliance: <1 advert observed 
o Poor compliance: 1+ adverts observed 
 
 For all other data (presented as percentages):  
o Good compliance: <10% of selected tobacco stores had POS 
advertising or sold single cigarettes / <10% of individuals reported 
seeing marketing (posters, TV, radio, print media, sponsorship, other 
products with tobacco branding, Internet, free samples, and 
vouchers) 
o Poor compliance: 10%+ of selected tobacco stores had POS 
advertising or sold single cigarettes / 10%+ of individuals reported 
seeing marketing (posters, TV, radio, print media, sponsorship, other 
products with tobacco branding, Internet, free samples, and 
vouchers) 
Compliance scores were calculated for urban and rural communities within each 
country (i.e. each country was assigned two scores).  
An overall good compliance score (OGCS) was also calculated as an indicator of 
country-level compliance as follows: 
 Number of marketing types subject to regulation – 12 marketing types were 
included in the analysis (see 10.2.1 Data sources). For each marketing type 
subject to regulation, a country was categorised as having either good or 
poor compliance for both urban and rural communities. 




 Urban good compliance score (UGCS) – this reflects the proportion of 
marketing types subject to regulation that had good compliance within urban 
communities. 
 Rural good compliance score (RGCS) – this reflects the proportion of 
marketing types subject to regulation that had good compliance within rural 
communities. 
 Overall good compliance score (OGCS) – this is the UGCS and RGCS 
combined into one average measure. If all urban and rural communities had 
good compliance for all marketing types subject to regulation, then a country 
would have a score of 100%. 
Example  
The compliance scores for Brazil were calculated as follows: 
 Seven marketing types were subject to regulation in Brazil.  
 UGCS: across urban communities, six of the seven marketing types subject 
to regulation were given a good compliance score. Therefore, the proportion 
of marketing types subject to regulation that had good compliance (the 
UGCS) was 86%. 
 RGCS: across rural communities, five of the seven marketing types subject 
to regulation were given a good compliance score. Therefore, the proportion 
of marketing types subject to regulation that had good compliance (the 
RGCS) was 71%. 
 OGCS: combining the UGCS and RGCS gives Brazil an overall good 
compliance score (OGCS) of 79%. 
Results and the determinants of compliance 
For each specific marketing measure, graphs were produced to show the average 
amount of marketing observed or self-reported within each urban and rural 
community (as presented in Table 19 and Table 21) with countries split into those 
with regulation and those without. Within the ‘ban’ section on each graph, a line is 
included to show the threshold between good and poor compliance (i.e. above the 
line is poor compliance). These graphs are used to examine levels of compliance for 
each marketing measure. 
Also for each specific marketing measure, the average amount of observed and 
self-reported marketing was calculated for countries with a ban in place, those with 




a partial ban, and those with no ban in order to provide an overall comparison of 
marketing levels and to give an indication of whether or not specific marketing bans 
are sufficiently complied with to make them effective. This was calculated by 
averaging the EPOCH data collected in all countries and communities in each of 
these three categories (i.e. not averaging the means presented in Table 19 and 
Table 21).  
The OGCS was then used to examine overall levels of compliance with marketing 
regulation by country and country income group. Pearson’s correlations were also 
run between the OGCS (continuous) and the following country-level explanatory 
variables: GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, government stability, government 
effectiveness, government expenditure on health, tobacco control budget per million 
population, and production of tobacco (all continuous variables; see Appendix 5). 
These correlations were used to provide an idea of the relationship between overall 
compliance and a range of explanatory variables. Correlations were calculated in 
StataMP 12[580], and the correlation coefficients are presented along with 
corresponding p-values (95% significance).  
10.3 Results 
10.3.1 Presence of regulation 
The number of relevant marketing regulations in place in each country ranged from 
zero in Zimbabwe to ten in Colombia, out of a possible ten (Figure 34, Table 24). 
The two countries which had not ratified the FCTC – Argentina and Zimbabwe – had 
the fewest pieces of marketing regulations in place of all EPOCH countries 
(Zimbabwe had zero, Argentina had one). China and Pakistan were the only 
additional countries which had fewer than half of the ten marketing regulations in 
place (China had two, and Pakistan had four). In two EPOCH countries, China and 
Iran, the main tobacco company is state-owned[2] and countries with state-owned 
monopolies traditionally do not market their products as heavily[34], however this 
does not appear to have influenced the number of marketing regulations in place; 
China only had two pieces of regulation, whereas Iran had eight. The total number 
of marketing regulations a country had in place in 2010 did not follow a trend by 
country income group, although ‘HIC’ is the only group where all countries had over 
half of the ten pieces of regulation in place, and the average number of marketing 
regulations in place is much lower in LICs (4.0) than all other country income groups 
(LMICs 6.7, UMICs 6.4, HICs 6.3). 




Bans on sponsored events and the free distribution of tobacco were the most 
common marketing regulations, and were both in place in 13 countries (only 
Argentina, China and Zimbabwe did not have a ban on either), billboard/outdoor 
advertising was banned in 12 countries (again Argentina, China and Zimbabwe did 
not have a ban in place, and nor did Pakistan), as was the sale of single cigarettes 
(the UAE, China, India, and Zimbabwe did not have a ban in place; this was the only 
form of marketing that was banned in Argentina) (Table 24). The least common 
marketing ban was on POS marketing; only five countries (the UAE, Malaysia, 
Turkey, Colombia, and Iran) had a ban in place. Both national and international TV 
and radio advertising, and local and international newspaper and magazine 
advertising were banned in seven countries, but many other countries had a partial 
ban (six countries had a ban on national TV and radio advertising but not 
international TV and radio, and six countries had a ban on local newspaper and 
magazine advertising but not international newspapers and magazines). 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































High income countries 




  X    6 
Sweden   X  X
##
  X    7 




   X   6 
Average number of bans in HICs 6.3 
Upper-middle income countries 
Argentina*
,
**  X X X X X X X X X 1 




     X 6 
Chile   X X
#
       8 
Malaysia        X   9 
Poland   X  X
##
  X    7 




   X   6 
Turkey**       X   X 8 
Average number of bans in UMICs 6.4 
Lower-middle income countries 
China** X X X   X X X X X 2 
Colombia           10 
Iran    X
#
    X   8 
Average number of bans in LMICs 6.7 
Low income countries 
India** X  X        8 
Pakistan  X X X X  X X   4 
Zimbabwe* X X X X X X X X X X 0 
Average number of bans in LICs 4.0 
*country had not ratified the FCTC 
**country also had sub-national laws/regulations in place, but the WHO does not detail what 
these are regarding[537] 
#
country had a ban on national TV and radio advertising, but not international
 
##
country had a ban on local newspapers and magazines advertising, but not international 
 
 
Argentina and Zimbabwe have not ratified the FCTC and, as expected, these two 
countries had the fewest number of marketing bans in place of all EPOCH countries 
(Table 25).  




The countries which ratified the FCTC the earliest (in 2004) had a mixed number of 
bans in place, ranging from just four in Pakistan to eight in India and Turkey. 
Countries that ratified in 2005 also had a large range of marketing bans in place, 
ranging from just two in China (the lowest of all EPOCH countries that had ratified 
the FCTC) to nine in Malaysia. Colombia ratified the FCTC in 2008, the latest of all 
EPOCH countries, but was the only country to have all ten bans in place.  
 
Table 25: Number of tobacco marketing bans by FCTC ratification date 
Country 
Number of full marketing 
bans (maximum of 10), 
2010 











South Africa 6 
Sweden 7 
UAE 6 
Ratified FCTC in 2006 
Poland 7 
Ratified FCTC in 2008 
Colombia 10 





10.3.2 Levels of regulatory compliance 
10.3.2.1 Level of compliance with observed marketing 
Sale of single cigarettes 
All but four EPOCH countries banned the sale of single cigarettes (Table 24). 
Overall, compliance was poor (although fewer selected tobacco stores sold single 
cigarettes in countries with a ban than those without); on average 31% of selected 
tobacco stores sold single cigarettes in communities within countries with a ban on 
the sale of single cigarettes, as did 33% in communities within countries without a 
ban in place. 




Poor compliance was found in both urban and rural communities in two of the seven 
UMICs with a ban (Argentina and South Africa) and both LMICs with a ban 
(Colombia and Iran) (Figure 35a). The level of poor compliance ranged from a third 
of selected tobacco stores selling single cigarettes in urban Argentina and urban 
and rural South Africa, to 100% in urban and rural Colombia. All six countries with 
good compliance in both urban and rural communities had perfect compliance (i.e. 
0% of the selected tobacco stores sold single cigarettes). Chile and Malaysia were 
the only countries to have mixed compliance; both had good (perfect) compliance in 
urban communities, but poor compliance in rural communities.  
Tobacco adverts  
All but four EPOCH countries had a ban on billboard and outdoor advertising (Table 
24). Overall, compliance was poor; on average there were 1.6 tobacco adverts in 
communities within countries with a ban on billboard and outdoor marketing, 
compared to 0.6 in communities within countries without a ban in place.  
Poor compliance was found in both urban and rural communities in one of six 
UMICs with a ban (Brazil), one of two LMICs with a ban (Colombia) and the only LIC 
with a ban (India) (Figure 35b). Brazil had the worst compliance of all countries; 
10.4 adverts were observed on average in urban communities and 6.0 in rural 
communities. Few differences were observed between urban and rural areas with 
Chile the only country to have mixed compliance; good compliance in urban 
communities (0.5 adverts) and (just) poor compliance in rural communities (1.0 
advert).  
POS advertising 
Only five of the 16 EPOCH countries banned POS advertising in 2010 (Table 24). 
Overall, compliance was poor; on average 37% of selected tobacco stores had POS 
advertising in communities within countries with a ban on POS advertising, 
compared to 27% in communities within countries without a ban in place. 
Poor compliance was seen in one of two UMICs with a ban (Malaysia) and one of 
two LMICs with a ban (Colombia); despite having bans in place over 40% of the 
selected tobacco stores in urban and rural Malaysia and Colombia had POS 
advertising (Figure 35c). Turkey and Iran had mixed compliance; urban Turkey had 
poor compliance and rural Turkey had good compliance, whereas the reverse was 
true for Iran.  




Figure 35: Compliance with observed tobacco marketing  
a) Percentage of selected tobacco stores selling single cigarettes, split into countries with and without 
a ban on the sale of single cigarettes 
 
b) Average number of tobacco adverts, split into countries with and without a ban on billboard and 
outdoor tobacco advertising 
 
c) Percentage of selected tobacco stores with POS advertising, split into countries with and without a 
ban on POS tobacco advertising 
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10.3.2.2 Level of compliance with self-reported traditional marketing 
Posters 
All but four countries banned tobacco billboard and outdoor advertising (Table 24). 
Overall, compliance was poor; on average 21% of individuals reported exposure to 
tobacco poster marketing in communities within countries with a ban on billboard 
and outdoor marketing, compared to 18% in communities within countries without a 
ban in place.   
Poor compliance was found in both urban and rural communities in three of the six 
UMICs with a ban (Malaysia, Poland, and South Africa), one of the two LMICs with 
a ban (Colombia), and the only LIC with a ban (India) (Figure 36a). The level of poor 
compliance within these communities ranged from 16% of individuals in rural Poland 
reporting exposure to tobacco poster marketing in the last six months, to more than 
75% in rural Colombia. Sweden, Brazil, Chile and Turkey had mixed compliance; 
urban communities in Sweden, Chile and Turkey had poor compliance, as did rural 
Brazil. 
TV 
Only seven of the 16 EPOCH countries had a national and international TV and 
radio tobacco advertising ban in place in 2010 (Table 24). Overall, compliance was 
poor; on average 34% of individuals reported exposure to tobacco TV marketing in 
communities within countries with a ban on both national and international TV and 
radio marketing (of all marketing measures, this is the highest average percentage 
in countries with a ban), compared to 13% in communities within countries with a 
ban on just national TV and radio marketing, and compared to 30% in communities 
within countries without a ban in place. 
Of the seven countries with a ban, only Sweden (HIC) had good compliance (9.8% 
individuals in urban communities and 7.1% in rural communities saw tobacco TV 
advertising in the last six months) (Figure 36b). The poorest compliance was seen 
in Colombia; 58.3% of individuals in urban communities and 70.1% in rural 
communities reported seeing TV advertising.  
Of the six countries with a ban on national, but not international, TV and radio 
advertising compliance was mixed. Poor compliance was found in urban and rural 
communities in all three UMICs with a partial ban (Brazil, Chile, and South Africa), 
whereas good compliance was found in both HICs (Canada and the UAE) and the 
one LIC with a partial ban (Iran). Urban Chile had the worst compliance; 100% 




individuals reported exposure to TV marketing, but this could have been exposure 
to marketing on international TV which was not banned. 
Radio 
Only seven of the 16 EPOCH countries had a national and international, TV and 
radio tobacco advertising ban in place in 2010 (Table 24). Overall, compliance was 
poor; on average 14% of individuals reported exposure to tobacco radio marketing 
in communities within countries with a ban on both national and international TV and 
radio marketing, compared to 7% in communities within countries with a ban on just 
national TV and radio marketing, and compared to 12% in communities within 
countries without a ban in place. 
Poor compliance was found in urban and rural communities in one of three UMICs 
with a ban (Malaysia) and both LMICs with a ban (China and Colombia); the poorest 
level of compliance was seen in Colombia where 45.0% of individuals in urban 
communities and 56.7% of individuals in rural communities reported hearing 
tobacco radio advertising in the last six months (Figure 36c).  
Of the six countries with a ban on national, but not international, TV and radio 
advertising compliance was mixed. Of countries with a partial ban, poor compliance 
was found in urban and rural communities in one of three UMICs (South Africa). 
Few differences were identified between urban and rural areas; only Chile had 
mixed compliance (poor in urban communities, good in rural). Poorest compliance 
was identified in urban Chile (72.6% individuals reported exposure to radio 
marketing), but this could have been exposure to marketing on international radio 
which was not banned. 
Print media 
Seven of the 16 countries had a local and national newspaper and magazine 
tobacco advertising ban in place in 2010 (Table 24). Overall, compliance was again 
poor (although exposure was lowest within countries with a full ban in place); on 
average 15% of individuals reported exposure to tobacco print media marketing in 
communities within countries with a ban on both local and national newspaper and 
magazine marketing, compared to 24% in communities within countries with a ban 
on just local newspaper and magazine marketing, and compared to 16% in 
communities within countries without a ban in place. 




Poor compliance in both urban and rural communities was found in one of three 
UMICs with a ban (Malaysia) and one of three LMICs with a ban (Colombia); over 
30% individuals within each community group reported exposure to tobacco print 
media marketing (Figure 36d). Compliance was mixed in two of three UMICs (Chile 
and Turkey), one of three LMICs (China), and the one LIC with a ban (India); all had 
poor compliance in urban communities and good compliance in rural.  
Of the six countries with a ban on local, but not national, newspaper and magazine 
advertising compliance was generally poor. Compliance was poor in both urban and 
rural communities in two of three HICs with a partial ban (Canada and Sweden), 
and two of three UMICs with a partial ban (Poland and South Africa). Compliance 
was mixed in Brazil (UMIC); poor in urban communities and good in rural.  
 
Figure 36: Compliance with self-reported traditional tobacco marketing 
a) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing poster tobacco marketing within the previous six 
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b) Percentage of individuals who reported exposure to TV tobacco marketing within the previous six 
months, split into countries with a ban on national and international TV and radio tobacco advertising, 
with a ban on national TV and radio tobacco advertising only, and without a ban 
  
c) Percentage of individuals who reported exposure to radio tobacco marketing within the previous six 
months, split into countries with a ban on national and international TV and radio tobacco advertising, 
with a ban on national TV and radio tobacco advertising only, and without a ban 
 
d) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing print media tobacco marketing within the previous six 
months, split into countries with a ban on local and international newspaper and magazine tobacco 
advertising, with a ban on local newspaper and magazine tobacco advertising only, and without a ban 
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10.3.2.3 Level of compliance with self-reported non-traditional marketing 
Sponsorship 
All but three countries banned tobacco sponsorship at events (Table 24). Overall, 
compliance was just poor; on average 10% individuals reported exposure to 
tobacco sponsorship in communities within countries with a ban on event 
sponsorship, compared to 6% in communities within countries without a ban in 
place. 
Poor compliance was found in both urban and rural communities in one of three 
HICs with a ban (Canada), two of six UMICs (Malaysia and South Africa), and one 
of two LMICs with a ban (Colombia); the poorest compliance was seen in Colombia 
where 38.4% individuals in urban communities reported seeing TI sponsorship, as 
did 52.0% of those in rural communities (Figure 37a). Few differences were 
identified between urban and rural areas with only Pakistan showing mixed 
compliance; urban communities had poor compliance (33.3% individuals reported 
seeing sponsorship) and rural communities had good compliance (5.6%).  
Other products 
Eight countries banned non-tobacco products from having tobacco branding (Table 
24). Overall, compliance was poor; on average 13% of individuals reported 
exposure to tobacco marketing on other products in communities within countries 
with a ban on non-tobacco products being identified with tobacco branding, 
compared to 12% in communities within countries without a ban in place. 
Poor compliance was found in both urban and rural communities in two of four 
UMICs with a ban (Malaysia and South Africa), and one of two LMICs with a ban 
(Colombia); poorest compliance was seen in Colombia where 39.7% individuals in 
urban communities and 52.8% individuals in rural communities reported exposure in 
the last six months (Figure 37b). Few differences were identified between urban and 
rural areas with only Chile (UMIC) showing mixed compliance; very poor 
compliance in urban communities (76.5% individuals reported seeing tobacco 
branding on non-tobacco products) but good compliance in rural communities.  
Internet 
Half of the 16 EPOCH countries had a ban on tobacco Internet advertising in place 
in 2010 (Table 24). Overall, compliance was good; on average 4% of individuals 
reported exposure to tobacco Internet marketing in communities within countries 
with a ban on Internet marketing (of all marketing measures, this is the lowest 




average percentage in countries with a ban), compared to 12% in communities 
within countries without a ban in place. 
Poor compliance was only found in both urban and rural communities in Sweden 
(HIC); 16.5% individuals reported exposure to Internet marketing in the last six 
months as did 10.7% in rural communities (Figure 37c). Mixed compliance was 
found in two of four UMICs with a ban (Chile and Poland) and the one LMIC with a 
ban (Colombia); Chile and Poland had poor compliance in urban communities, 
whereas Colombia had poor compliance in rural communities.  
Free samples 
All but three EPOCH countries banned the free distribution of tobacco (Table 24). 
Overall, compliance was good; on average 5% of individuals reported exposure to 
free tobacco samples in communities within countries with a ban on the free 
distribution of tobacco, compared to 3% in communities within countries without a 
ban in place. 
Poor compliance was found in urban and rural communities in two of six UMICs with 
a ban (Malaysia and South Africa) and one of two LMICs with a ban (Colombia) 
(Figure 37d). Free samples were highly prevalent in Colombia; 35.1% of people in 
urban communities and 48.8% of those in rural communities reported seeing free 
samples in the last six months. Only Poland (UMIC) and Pakistan (LIC) had mixed 
compliance, and both had poor compliance in urban communities. 
Vouchers 
11 EPOCH countries banned promotional discounts (Table 24). Overall, compliance 
was good; on average 6% of individuals reported exposure to tobacco vouchers in 
communities within countries with a ban on promotional tobacco discounts, 
compared to 2% in communities within countries without a ban in place. 
Poor compliance was found in both urban and rural communities in two of four 
UMICs with a ban (Malaysia and South Africa) and one of two LMICs with a ban 
(Colombia); Colombia had particularly poor compliance, 35.8% and 50.4% 
individuals in urban and rural communities respectively reported seeing vouchers in 
the last six months (Figure 37e).  
 




Figure 37: Compliance with self-reported non-traditional tobacco marketing 
a) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing tobacco sponsorship within the previous six months, 
split into countries with and without a ban on tobacco sponsored events 
 
b) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing tobacco marketing on other products within the 
previous six months, split into countries with and without a ban on non-tobacco products being 
identified with tobacco branding 
 
c) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing tobacco advertising on the Internet within the 
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d) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing free tobacco samples within the previous six months, 
split into countries with and without a ban on free distribution of tobacco 
 
e) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing tobacco vouchers within the previous six months, 
split into countries with and without a ban on promotional tobacco discounts 
 (the red line represents the poor/good compliance threshold; above the line = poor compliance) 
 
10.3.3 Overall compliance and determinants 
This analysis has found that compliance levels with existing bans was mixed, both 
by country, country income group, and by marketing type/ban. Table 26 provides a 
summary of overall compliance.  
Comparing country income groups, both the urban (UGCS) and rural (RGCS) good 
compliance scores were highest in HICs (HIC: UGCS 87%, RGCS 91%; UMIC: 
UGCS 46%, RGCS 56%; LMIC: UGCS 38%, RGCS 33%; and LIC: UGCS 57%, 
RGCS 79%) showing that urban and rural communities in HICs had the best 
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RGCS was higher than the UGCS; i.e. compliance was generally better in rural 
communities than urban communities. 
The overall good compliance score (OGCS) is also clearly higher in HICs. HICs had 
an OGCS of 89%; only self-reported exposure to sponsorship (urban and rural 
communities) in Canada and self-reported exposure to posters (urban) and Internet 
(urban and rural) in Sweden had poor compliance. An OGCS of 51% was seen in 
UMICs, 35% in LMICs, and 68% in LICs. At the country-level, all three HICs and 
one LMIC (Iran) had very high (over 80%) OGCSs; the UAE had an OGCS of 100%, 
Canada 86%, and Sweden and Iran both had an OGCS of 83%. This is in 
comparison to Argentina and Colombia which had OGCSs of 0% and 4% 
respectively, and South Africa (14%), Malaysia (14%) and China (17%) which also 
had very low OGCSs. 
 





















HIC Canada 7 6 86% 6 86% 86% 
Sweden 9 7 78% 8 89% 83% 
UAE 7 7 100% 7 100% 100% 
HIC total 23/36 
(63.9%) 
20 87% 21 91% 89% 
UMIC Argentina 1 0 0% 0 0% 0% 
Brazil 7 6 86% 5 71% 79% 
Chile 9 5 56% 7 78% 67% 
Malaysia 11 2 18% 1 9% 14% 
Poland 9 5 56% 7 78% 67% 
South 
Africa 
7 1 14% 1 14% 14% 





25 46% 30 56% 51% 
LMIC China 3 0 0% 1 33% 17% 
Colombia 12 1 8% 0 0% 4% 
Iran 9 8 89% 7 78% 83% 
LMIC total 24/36 
(66.7%) 
9 38% 8 33% 35% 
LIC India 10 6 60% 7 70% 65% 
Pakistan 4 2 50% 4 100% 75% 
Zimbabwe 0 - - - - - 
LIC total 14/36 
(38.9%) 
8 57% 11 79% 68% 
*these regulations are applied to both urban and rural communities 




Each country’s OGCS (from Table 26) was then correlated with a range of potential 
determinants. All of the Pearson correlation coefficients were statistically significant 
(p<0.001), but all were weak to moderate correlations (Table 27). The weakest 
correlation was with HDI rank (-0.2291) and the strongest with GDP per capita 
(0.5007). The correlations show that an increasing OGCS was correlated with an 
increasing GDP per capita, decreasing HDI ranking (i.e. worse level of 
development), increasing percentile rank of corruption (i.e. less corrupt), 
government stability (i.e. more stable) and government effectiveness (i.e. more 
effective), increasing government expenditure on health as percentage of GDP, 
increasing tobacco control budget per million population (although this correlation 
excluded Colombia, Malaysia and the UAE as no budgetary data were available for 
these countries, see Appendix 5), and deceasing tobacco production. 
 
Table 27: Pearson correlation coefficients between the overall good compliance score for 




GDP per capita 0.5007 <0.001 
HDI rank -0.2291 <0.001 
Corruption 0.4460 <0.001 
Government stability 0.3146 <0.001 
Government effectiveness 0.3667 <0.001 
Government expenditure on health 0.3138 <0.001 
Tobacco control budget per million population 0.4676 <0.001 
Tobacco production -0.3994 <0.001 
 
10.4 Discussion 
The FCTC appears to have had a positive impact on the extent of marketing 
regulation, as the two countries which had not ratified the FCTC had the fewest 
marketing regulations in place. However, the number of marketing regulations that a 
country had in place did not appear to increase with the number of years since 
FCTC ratification. Most notable was Colombia which ratified the FCTC in 2008, the 
latest of all EPOCH countries, and which was the only country to have all ten pieces 
of marketing regulation in place. This suggests that perhaps countries which ratified 
the FCTC earlier did so because they already had some regulation in place, 
whereas countries leaving ratification until later may have implemented marketing 
regulations in line with the FCTC in one go prior to ratification; it is, for example, 
noteworthy that Colombia’s regulation was very poorly complied with (Colombia had 
an OGCS of just 4%). Similarly, the extent of marketing regulation did not appear to 




be linked with country income group; all three HICs had over half of the bans in 
place (six or seven out of 10; average of 6.3), compared to between one and nine in 
UMICs (average of 6.4), two and ten in LMICs (average of 6.7), and zero and eight 
in LICs (average of 4.0).  
The analysis also found that compliance with marketing regulation was mixed and 
varied by country, country income group, community type, and by marketing 
type/ban. Overall, only for five of the 12 tobacco marketing types assessed – 
observed sale of single cigarettes and self-reported exposure to TV, radio, print 
media, and Internet marketing – were lower levels of marketing seen within 
countries with a full or partial ban compared to those without a ban. This suggests 
that either some specific tobacco marketing restrictions are harder to enforce or 
deliberately not complied with, or perhaps that regulation has recently been 
introduced in countries with particularly high rates of specific types of marketing and 
enforcement is still being refined.  
The analysis presented in this chapter has also identified some potentially important 
variables in understanding which factors determine good regulatory compliance – 
GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, government stability, government 
effectiveness, government expenditure on health, tobacco control budget per million 
population, and tobacco production. The correlations were as expected, i.e. that the 
OGCS increased with greater wealth, better governance, greater spending on 
health and tobacco control, and less reliance on tobacco production, apart from HDI 
rank which showed that an increasing OGCS was associated with a worse level of 
development (however the correlation coefficient was very weak; -0.2). 
Comparison of the OGCS with the WHO compliance score 
Although the measures are not directly comparable, and have been calculated very 
differently, these compliance findings can be assessed in the context of an existing 
measure of compliance; the WHO[537] calculate a compliance score for direct and 
indirect marketing bans for all countries where data are available. Table 28 shows 
these WHO compliance scores for the EPOCH countries, an average of these 
scores (calculated as part of this work), and each country’s OGCS (Table 26) 
calculated using the EPOCH data.  
14 of the 16 EPOCH countries have a WHO compliance score (there is no score 
given to Argentina or Zimbabwe). The average WHO compliance score is similar to 
the OGCS for ten of the 14 countries: two HICs (Canada and Sweden), four UMICs 




(Brazil, Chile, Poland and Turkey), two LMICs (China and Iran), and both LICs 
(India and Pakistan, although there is no WHO compliance score for direct 
marketing for Pakistan). However the WHO scores are significantly different to the 
EPOCH OGCSs for the remaining four countries: the UAE’s OGCS showed perfect 
compliance, which is much better than the average WHO score of 60% suggests, 
whereas Malaysia and South Africa’s OGCSs of 14% and Colombia’s OGCS of 4% 
are much worse than the average WHO scores of 85%, 70% and 55%, respectively, 
suggest. 
 
Table 28: EPOCH compliance with tobacco marketing regulations compared to WHO scores 
 WHO compliance score for 
advertising/promotion/sponsorship 
bans, 2010* 
 EPOCH – overall 
good compliance 
score (OGCS) 
Direct** Indirect*** Average**** 
HIC Canada 10 10 10 (100%) 86% 
Sweden 10 8 9 (90%)  83% 
UAE 7 5 6 (60%)  100% 
UMIC Argentina - - -  0% 
Brazil 9 4 6.5 (65%)  79% 
Chile 10 6 8 (80%)  67% 
Malaysia 8 9 8.5 (85%)  14% 
Poland 7 7 7 (70%)  67% 
South Africa 7 7 7 (70%)  14% 
Turkey 8 10 9 (90%)  75% 
LMIC China 5 0 2.5 (25%)  17% 
Colombia 6 5 5.5 (55%)  4% 
Iran 10 10 10 (100%)  83% 
LIC India 6 6 6 (60%)  65% 
Pakistan - 8 8 (80%)  75% 
Zimbabwe - - -  - 
*WHO compliance score calculation - “Compliance with national and comprehensive...advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship bans (covering both direct and indirect marketing) was assessed by up to 
five national experts [comprising a senior tobacco control government official, the head of a tobacco 
control NGO, a health professional specialising in tobacco control, a member of a public health 
university department, and/or a member of the Tobacco Free Initiative within a WHO country office], 
who assessed the compliance...as “minimal”, “moderate” or “high”.” “The experts performed their 
assessments independently. Summary scores were calculated by WHO from the five individual 
assessments by assigning two points for highly enforced policies, one point for moderately enforced 
policies and no points for minimally enforced policies, with a potential minimum of 0 and maximum of 
10 points in total from these five experts. The compliance assessment was obtained for legislation that 
had been adopted by 30 June 2010.”[581] 
 
**including national TV and radio, international TV and radio, local magazines and newspapers, 
billboards and outdoor advertising, point of sale, Internet, other direct bans; ***including free 
distribution, promotional discounts, non-tobacco goods and services identified with tobacco brand 
names, brand name of non-tobacco products used for tobacco product, appearance of tobacco brands 
in TV and/or films (product placement), appearance of tobacco products in TV and/or films, sponsored 








Possible reasons for the differences identified include different calculation methods, 
the range of marketing measures that the scores are based on (the WHO 
compliance score is based on a slightly larger range of measures than the OGCS, 
although the OGCS includes the sale of single cigarettes which the WHO measure 
does not), and the data on which the scores are based upon (the WHO data and 
calculation is outlined underneath Table 28 and is based upon expert opinion, and 
the OGCS is derived from aggregate (combined UGCS and RGCS) observed and 
self-reported data and a definition of good and poor compliance that was defined for 
this study).  
Strengths and limitations 
Alongside EPOCH’s strengths and limitations outlined in Chapter 8, this particular 
analysis has some additional limitations. First, the information on marketing 
regulation gained from the WHO[537] and regulatory documents[573] does not 
necessarily correlate with the data collected by EPOCH. For example, the 
sponsorship ban only relates to event sponsorship but EPOCH asked individuals 
whether they recalled seeing sponsorship of sporting, music or other events, and 
the WHO data[537] combines TV and radio bans into one, whereas some countries 
may have had a ban on one and not the other. This could, in some cases, have 
resulted in ‘good’ or ‘poor’ compliance being incorrectly assigned.  
Second, this analysis assumes that all marketing observed or self-reported was 
marketing paid for by the TI. Much Internet marketing, for example, is user-driven 
(see sub-chapter 3.2.3 The 5P’s: Promotion) and may not have originated directly 
from the TI but may have been recorded by EPOCH. Compliance could therefore 
have been categorised as poor, but TI Internet marketing may have actually been 
minimal or non-existent.  
Third, differences in compliance between countries were not unexpected, but such 
large differences in compliance between marketing types/bans within the same 
country were; it would have been expected that if there was good compliance for 
one marketing type, good compliance would be seen for other marketing types. This 
could be due to measurement errors in the EPOCH data collection (as outlined in 
Chapter 8); where compliance is scored as ‘poor’ enforcement may be good but 
exposure may still be reported, for example, the percentage of individuals who 
reported exposure to radio marketing may be higher than the reality as some 
individuals may have counted hearing a product discussed by a radio DJ or within 
the lyrics of a song (as shown in sub-chapter 3.2.3 The 5P’s: Promotion) as 




marketing exposure, whereas this measure is only meant to capture TI radio 
advertisements. Although these errors may have affected the reported data and the 
subsequent compliance categorisation, there is no way of telling if this is the case or 
which marketing types are captured most accurately.  
Forth, the calculation of each country’s OGCS was a result of combining the UGCS 
and RGCS (which were based on the average exposure in all urban communities 
and the average exposure in all rural communities, as reported in Table 19 and 
Table 21). This may have produced different results if scores had instead been 
calculated across all communities within a country, and not split across urban and 
rural communities. However, an overall score combining the urban and rural scores 
was chosen for consistency with the results presented in the earlier part of this 
chapter and Chapter 9, as these separated data into urban and rural communities. 
Related to this, and as mentioned in Chapter 8, some countries surveyed very few 
communities meaning that results from just one of these communities could have 
significantly affected the results shown and therefore the compliance score 
assigned.  
Finally, the boundaries between good and poor compliance, as outlined in the 
methods, were defined for this study and therefore different boundaries would have 
yielded different results. The boundaries were, however, selected to be harsh, and 
the observation of less than one advert on average within urban or rural 
communities, less than 10% of selected stores selling single cigarettes or having 
POS advertising, or less than 10% of individuals reporting exposure to different 
marketing types (good compliance) allows for both measurement error and small 
amounts of peripheral or unintentional marketing, but not a sustained and 
purposeful TI marketing campaign. 
This analysis also has additional strengths to those outlined in Chapter 8. First, this 
study is the first to assess levels of regulatory compliance with tobacco marketing 
regulations using real data, and the first to do so using both observed and self-
reported data across such a wide range of countries. Second, the OGCSs were 
based on observed and self-reported EPOCH data, which is likely to be more 
accurate than the WHO compliance score which is instead based on scores 
assigned by a panel of five tobacco control experts. Third, this analysis combined 
regulation on national TV and radio marketing and international TV and radio 
marketing into one measure, and regulation on local newspaper and magazine 
marketing and international newspaper and magazine marketing into one measure. 




This was in order to try and take account of the effect that international media may 
have on marketing exposure; only a ban on both local/national and international 
media can be expected to reduce overall marketing exposure.  
Implications for policy 
This study has shown that globally the amount of tobacco marketing regulation in 
each country varied, and that compliance was mostly poor (and exposure to 
tobacco marketing was commonly higher within countries with a full or partial ban 
compared to those without).  
Given the importance of TI marketing in smoking initiation and prevalence, this 
study highlights the urgent need for countries to implement and enforce 
comprehensive national marketing controls and the legally-binding 
recommendations contained within the FCTC. All but two of the EPOCH countries 
have ratified the FCTC, and 12 countries ratified the FCTC in 2004 or 2005 giving 
these countries the five years for implementation that the FCTC allows. The 2012 
FCTC progress report shows that multiple Parties have expressed concern with the 
implementation of restrictions on cross-border marketing and have called for greater 
international cooperation, and that many Parties have reported that they are finding 
the enforcement of bans on Internet marketing difficult[402]. It is therefore important 
that these potential difficulties are highlighted to new Parties, and assistance for 
effective implementation and enforcement is provided. Additionally, the OGCS was 
highest in HICs and ‘HIC’ was the only country income group where all countries 
within the group had over half of the ten marketing regulations in place. This 
perhaps suggests that some lower income countries lack capacity to implement and 
then enforce marketing regulations. The FCTC does, however, recognise and make 
provisions for these potential difficulties; Article 22 of the FCTC requires Parties to 
collaborate with one another to “strengthen their capacity to fulfil the obligations 
arising from this Convention, taking into account the needs of developing country 
Parties and Parties with economies in transition”[324], and Article 26 requires 
Parties to “recognize the important role that financial resources play in achieving the 
objective of this Convention” and that “Parties represented in relevant regional and 
international intergovernmental organizations, and financial and development 
institutions shall encourage these entities to provide financial assistance for 
developing country Parties and for Parties with economies in transition to assist 
them in meeting their obligations under the Convention”[324]. It is therefore 




important that lower income countries are encouraged to utilise these provisions 
and that higher income countries provide assistance where possible.  
Overall this study has highlighted that implementing regulation is only the first step 
to controlling TI marketing and that it does not necessarily have an impact within 
communities unless it is strongly enforced; studying and monitoring compliance is 
therefore of huge importance in understanding and identifying what is actually 
occurring on the ground. 




Chapter 11: The Alcohol Marketing 
Environment 
11.1 Background 
As sub-chapter 2.1 Prevalence of Tobacco and Alcohol Use, and Tobacco and 
Alcohol’s Impact on Health outlined, alcohol use is responsible for 5.9% of deaths 
globally (an estimated 3.3 million deaths)[73]. It is one of the ten leading causes of 
death in both HICs and MICs, responsible for 2% (ranked ninth) and 6% (ranked 
fifth) of deaths respectively, but does not yet feature in the top ten leading causes of 
death in LICs[9]. Alcohol use also contributes significantly to ill-health, and causes 
5.1% of all DALYs globally[73]. It is the second largest cause of DALYs in HICs, 
(responsible for 7%), the leading cause in MICs (8%), and is the eighth leading 
cause of DALYs in LICs (2%)[9].  
The alcohol ‘industrial epidemic’[91, 92] is predominantly spread by AI 
marketing[21-23, 315] (aiming to connect alcohol with “all the good things in 
life”[16]). Although there are still a large number of smaller local and national alcohol 
producers, alcohol is increasingly globalised and branded spirits especially are 
exported globally[16]. Most modern trade agreements are built on the idea of a 
global free-trade economy, and as they treat alcohol as any other commodity (i.e. 
not one that has the potential to damage health) national alcohol control policies 
aiming to curb the harm caused by alcohol consumption are “under pressure 
because of decisions at the international level”[14]. Due to globalisation and lack of 
capacity to regulate alcohol it is predicted that the proportion of DALYs and deaths 
related to alcohol will continue to increase in MICs and LICs as consumption will 
increase[341, 582].  
Part 1 showed that the products produced by the TI and AI both have a negative 
impact on health and are marketed in similar ways, and Chapters 5-7 showed that 
the TI and AI use similar tactics and arguments when attempting to influence policy, 
however despite these commonalities there is currently no WHO FCTC-equivalent 
for alcohol. There have been calls from a range of sectors for a comparable treaty 
(for example a FCAC[338-340])[341], and in 2010 the WHA made an important step 
forward and adopted the ‘Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol’[65]. 
However, unlike the FCTC, the Global Strategy only provides guidelines (some of 
which relate to alcohol marketing) and does not need to be ratified. Understanding 




the extent to which, and how, alcohol is marketed is key to mitigating the potentially 
harmful effects of alcohol use[137], yet, as sub-chapter 3.3 The Extent and Impact 
of Tobacco and Alcohol Industry Marketing showed, very little is known about levels 
of marketing globally.  
This chapter aims to provide a broad assessment of the global alcohol marketing 
environment. Due to the large differences in alcohol sales and consumption 
between HICs, MICs and LICs, and urban and rural communities (as sub-chapter 
2.1 Prevalence of Tobacco and Alcohol Use, and Tobacco and Alcohol’s Impact on 
Health showed), all analysis will focus on country income group and urban/rural 
comparisons. Specifically this chapter aims to determine the extent and nature of 
alcohol marketing (through both observed and self-reported measures) in order to 
assess levels of marketing and whether these differ between countries, country 
income groups, and urban and rural communities. The hypotheses are that 
marketing levels will be highest in higher income countries given their long history of 
alcohol use[9, 338], and that more marketing will be seen in urban communities 
compared to rural communities given higher population densities (and therefore 
potential for higher return) and easier access[554]. This chapter addresses current 
gaps in the literature and in doing so will be important in identifying countries or 
community types with particularly high levels of certain types of marketing.  
11.2 Methodology 
11.2.1 Data source 
Data from the EPOCH study were used for this analysis (see Chapter 8 for study 
description). 
The EPOCH sample used in this thesis includes 16 countries covering all four 
income groups in the World Bank 2006 classification[536]. However, this study only 
includes 13 of these countries as three (Iran, Pakistan and the UAE) have very 
restrictive alcohol policies – Iran forbids the drinking, selling and distribution of 
alcohol, and in Pakistan and the UAE only non-Muslims are legally allowed to 
consume alcohol[583-585]. The marketing of alcohol in these countries is also 
banned to varying degrees[583-585].  
11.2.2 Measures of marketing 
EPOCH records both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ marketing. Push marketing aims to increase 
product availability[555, 556] and was measured in EPOCH 1 by the number of 




alcohol outlets (counted during the 1km walk). Pull marketing encourages 
customers to seek out a product through advertising and promotion[555, 556] and 
was measured using both observation via EPOCH 1 (the number of alcohol adverts 
counted during the 1km walk) and self-report via EPOCH 2 (whether or not 
individuals recalled seeing tobacco advertising on different types of media in the 
past six months); see Appendix 6. The Global Strategy makes some 
recommendations regarding alcohol marketing, but they are mostly non-specific 
referring instead to “direct or indirect marketing”[65]; a broad range of marketing 
forms are therefore included in this analysis. The Global Strategy does, however, 
explicitly mention outlet density and sponsorship, both of which are assessed in this 
study. 
11.2.3 Community-level analysis (EPOCH 1) 
Averages of the number of alcohol outlets and adverts per community were 
calculated for each country and country income group (each split by urban and rural 
communities). The data were then tabulated and graphed. 
To examine differences in the number of observed alcohol outlets and alcohol 
adverts between urban and rural communities and country income groups negative 
binomial multilevel regression models were used; statistical tests showed that the 
outcome data were highly overdispersed (large variance), hence negative binomial 
regression models rather than Poisson regression models were used. The number 
of outlets or adverts was the outcome variable, with categorical explanatory 
variables for country income group (4 categories: HIC, UMIC, LMIC, and LIC) and 
community type (2 categories: rural and urban), and a random effect for country. 
IRRs were obtained by exponentiating the regression coefficient and these are 
presented along with corresponding CIs and p-values (95% significance).  
11.2.4 Individual-level analysis (EPOCH 2) 
To examine differences in self-reported marketing levels between urban and rural 
communities and across country income groups 13 binary (yes/no) outcome 
variables were considered. These included whether or not individuals reported 
seeing alcohol marketing on 11 different mediums: posters, signage, TV, radio, print 
media, cinema, sponsorship, on other products, Internet, free samples, and 
vouchers. The first six and last five marketing types were then also combined into 
‘traditional marketing’ and ‘non-traditional marketing’ variables respectively, and the 
percentage of individuals who saw 0 and 1 or more of these traditional or non-
traditional marketing types were tabulated and graphed. 




A logistic multilevel regression model was applied to each of the 13 binary outcome 
measures and included categorical explanatory variables for country income group 
(4 categories: HIC, UMIC, LMIC, and LIC) and community type (2 categories: rural 
and urban), and random effects for country and community. Each model was 
adjusted for potential confounders – sex, age, education, drinking status, having 
close friends who drink, access to the Internet, TV ownership and radio ownership – 
to assess whether the differences between communities and country income groups 
were explained by these covariates (see Appendix 7). Based on existing 
literature[215, 220, 236, 262, 279-285], all of these factors were deemed potentially 
important in explaining differences in individuals’ exposure to alcohol marketing. 
ORs are presented along with corresponding CIs and p-values (95% significance). 
All of the models were fitted in R 3.0.2, using the glmmadmb and glmer functions 
from the glmmADMB and lme4 packages.  
11.3 Results 
The sample used for the community-level analysis comprises 435 communities in 
13 countries, of which 221 were urban communities and 214 rural (Table 29). The 
number of communities surveyed in each country ranges from just three in 
Zimbabwe to 88 in India and 101 in China; the large numbers in China and India 
reflects their population size and diversity[533]. 
The sample used for the individual-level analysis comprises 10,518 individuals (who 
resided in the observed communities and were interviewed); 5,219 individuals in 
urban communities and 5,299 in rural communities. This is a slightly smaller sample 
than used in the tobacco analysis (Chapter 9) due to the addition of a variable 











Table 29: The EPOCH sample used in the alcohol marketing environment analysis 
 Number of communities Number of participants 
Country Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
All countries 435 221 214 10,518 5,219 5,299 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada 46 31 15 1,144 806 338 
Sweden 23 20 3 573 489 84 
All HIC 69 51 18 1,717 1,295 422 
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina 20 6 14 539 170 369 
Brazil 14 7 7 387 202 185 
Chile 5 2 3 126 51 75 
Malaysia 33 18 15 1,117 568 549 
Poland 4 1 3 89 26 63 
South Africa 6 3 3 176 94 82 
Turkey 38 25 13 1,207 795 412 
All UMIC 120 62 58 3,641 1,906 1,735 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China 101 39 62 2,939 1,167 1,772 
Colombia 54 31 23 247 128 119 
All LMIC 155 70 85 3,186 1,295 1,891 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
India 88 37 51 1,901 698 1,203 
Zimbabwe 3 1 2 73 25 48 
All LIC 91 38 53 1,974 723 1,251 
 
 
11.3.1 Observed marketing: push 
Alcohol outlets 
There are marked differences in outlet type and density between countries and 
country income group (Table 30, Figure 38a). The total number of outlets selling 
alcohol (general stores and pubs/bars) peaked substantially in LMICs with 4.8 on 
average per community, compared to 1.6 on average per community in HICs, 2.9 in 
UMICs and 0.8 in LICs. This large peak in LMICs was due to the higher numbers of 
general stores selling alcohol; there were 3.8 general stores selling alcohol on 
average per community in LMICs, compared to 1.6 on average in UMICs and less 




than 1 on average per community in HICs (0.9) and LICS (0.5). The number of 
pubs/bars per community peaked in UMICs (1.3 on average per community), 
followed by LMICs (1.0), HICs (0.7) and LICs (0.3). 
Across all countries combined, general stores selling alcohol were more common in 
urban (2.4 on average per community) than rural (1.7) communities, as were 
pubs/bars (1.1 on average per urban community, 0.7 per rural community), although 
urban/rural differences varied somewhat by country income group (Table 30, Figure 
38a). 
A multilevel negative binomial regression model controlling for community type and 
country income group showed that compared to HICs, there were over 4 times more 
outlets per community in LMICs (IRR=4.07 (95% CI=1.10-15.07), p=0.036); the 
number of outlets in UMICs and LICs were not significantly different (p>0.05). 
Additionally, across all countries there were, on average, 52% fewer outlets selling 
alcohol in rural than urban communities (IRR=0.48 (CI=0.36-0.63), p<0.001; Table 
31).  
11.3.2 Observed marketing: pull 
Community adverts  
Alcohol adverts were common in HICs, UMICs and LMICs but were almost non-
existent in LIC communities; 4.1 adverts were observed on average per community 
in HICs, 4.0 in UMICs, 6.9 in LMICs, compared to just 0.7 on average per 
community in LICs (Table 30, Figure 38b). Across all country income groups adverts 
were more common in urban (5.9 per community) than rural communities (2.7).  
A multilevel negative binomial regression model controlling for community type and 
country income group showed that compared to HICs, the number of adverts in 
UMICs, LMICs and LICs was not significantly different (p>0.05), but across all 
countries there were, on average, 61% fewer adverts in rural than urban 




































All (435) 2.9 2.1 0.9 4.3 
Urban (221) 3.5 2.4 1.1 5.9 
Rural (214) 2.4 1.7 0.7 2.7 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada 
 
Urban (31) 2.2 1.4 0.8 4.1 
Rural (15) 1.6 0.8 0.8 1.4 
Sweden Urban (20) 0.9 0.4 0.5 6.1 
Rural (3) 0.7 0.7 0 4.3 
All HIC All (69) 1.6 0.9 0.7 4.1 
Urban (51) 1.7 1.0 0.7 4.9 
Rural (18) 1.4 0.8 0.7 1.9 
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina Urban (6) 4.0 2.7 1.3 2.0 
Rural (14) 2.9 2.0 0.9 0.8 
Brazil 
 
Urban (7) 9.9 0.3 9.6 13.6 
Rural (7) 4.6 1.0 3.6 7.1 
Chile 
 
Urban (2) 0.5 0 0.5 3.5 
Rural (3) 2.3 1.7 0.7 2.7 
Malaysia Urban (18) 3.2 2.0 1.2 2.1 
Rural (15) 1.6 1.6 0 1.8 
Poland 
 
Urban (1) 8.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 
Rural (3) 1.3 1.0 0.3 2.3 
South 
Africa 
Urban (3) 2.3 1.0 1.3 2.0 
Rural (3) 2.0 1.7 0.3 2.3 
Turkey 
 
Urban (25) 2.7 2.4 0.3 7.6 
Rural (13) 0.2 0.2 0 1.0 
All UMIC All (120) 2.9 1.6 1.3 4.0 
Urban (62) 3.8 2.0 1.8 5.7 




Rural (58) 2.0 1.3 0.7 2.1 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China Urban (39) 3.9 3.6 0.4 8.0 
Rural (62) 0.9 0.9 0.0 2.7 
Colombia Urban (31) 8.4 6.5 1.9 11.9 
Rural (23) 12.0 8.5 3.5 9.6 
All LMIC All (155) 4.8 3.8 1.0 6.9 
Urban (70) 5.9 4.9 1.1 9.7 
Rural (85) 3.9 2.9 1.0 4.5 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
India 
 
Urban (37) 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.8 
Rural (51) 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Zimbabwe Urban (1) 0 0 0 0 
Rural (2) 7.5 4.5 3.0 15.0 
All LIC All (91) 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.7 
Urban (38) 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.8 
Rural (53) 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.6 
 




Figure 38: Differences in observed alcohol marketing exposure between country income 
groups and urban and rural communities 
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Observed marketing: A) Average number of 
outlets selling alcohol (general stores, 
pubs/bars, and combined); B) Average 
number of alcohol adverts. Each graph 
presents data by country income group and 
community type (all communities, and split 
into urban and rural). 




Table 31: Negative binomial multilevel regression models showing incidence rate ratios for the 
observed levels of push and pull alcohol marketing 
 Push marketing: 
Average number of 
alcohol outlets 
(general stores & 
pubs/bars) 
Pull marketing: 









Urban 1 1 




HIC 1 1 
UMIC 2.52 (0.83-7.60) 0.99 (0.26-3.77) 
LMIC 4.07 (1.10-15.07)* 2.16 (0.43-10.82) 
LIC 1.37 (0.33-5.65) 0.47 (0.09-2.57) 
a
IRRs were obtained by exponentiating the regression coefficient. Models 
control for community type and country income group, with a random 




11.3.3 Self-reported marketing: pull 
Traditional marketing 
Across country income groups, individuals in HICs were most likely (apart from TV 
and radio for which individuals in LMICs were most likely) and individuals in LICs 
were least likely to report exposure to each form of traditional marketing (Table 32, 
Figure 39a-f, Figure 39l). TV marketing was the most common form of traditional 
marketing seen (56.8% individuals reported seeing TV marketing in the previous six 
months) followed by print media (34.5%), posters (33.8%), signage (31.1%), radio 
(19.0%), and cinema marketing (7.1%). All forms of traditional marketing and 
exposure to at least one form were less common in rural than urban communities. 
Multilevel logistic regression models controlling for potential confounders including 
TV and radio ownership showed the odds of individuals seeing at least one form of 
traditional marketing were not significantly different between country income groups 
when comparing to HICs (p>0.05; Table 33a). However, compared to HICs, the 
odds of exposure were significantly lower for print media marketing in LICs (94% 
lower; OR=0.06 (CI=0.01-0.57), p=0.015), and the odds of exposure were 




significantly lower for cinema marketing in UMICs (89% lower; OR=0.11  (CI=0.06-
0.20), p<0.001), LMICs (52% lower; OR=0.48  (CI=0.27-0.85), p=0.012), and LICs 
(86% lower; OR=0.14  (CI=0.07-0.29), p<0.001) (Table 33a). The remaining country 
income group comparisons to HICs were not significant (p>0.05).   
These same logistic regression models also showed that compared to urban 
residents, the odds of individuals in rural communities reporting exposure to at least 
one form of marketing were significantly lower (55% lower; OR=0.45 (CI=0.31-0.64), 
p<0.001) as were all of the six traditional marketing types measured – poster (72% 
lower; OR=0.28 (CI=0.18-0.42), p<0.001), signage (73% lower; OR=0.27 (CI=0.18-
0.41), p<0.001), TV (49% lower; OR=0.51 (CI=0.38-0.70), p<0.001), radio (44% 
lower; OR=0.56 (CI=0.37-0.84), p=0.005), print media (65% lower; OR=0.35 
(CI=0.25-0.49), p<0.001), and cinema (64% lower; OR=0.36 (CI=0.23-0.57), 
p<0.001; Table 33a).  
Non-traditional marketing 
Non-traditional marketing was considerably less frequently observed than traditional 
marketing. Alcohol marketing on other products (such as umbrellas) was the most 
common form of non-traditional marketing (21.5% individuals reported seeing 
marketing on other products), followed by sponsorship (18.2%), Internet marketing 
(14.5%), vouchers (10.7%), and free samples (8.1%; Table 32, Figure 39g-k). 
Again, across country income groups, individuals in HICs were most likely and 
individuals in LICs were least likely to report exposure to each form of non-
traditional marketing (Figure 39m), and all forms of traditional marketing and 
exposure to at least one form were less common in rural than urban communities. 
Multilevel logistic regression models controlling for potential confounders, including 
Internet access, showed that the odds of individuals seeing at least one form of non-
traditional marketing were not significantly different between country income groups 
when comparing to HICs (p>0.05; Table 33b). However, compared to HICs, the 
odds of exposure to Internet marketing were significantly lower in UMICs (79% 
lower; OR=0.21 (CI=0.06-0.72), p=0.013) and LICs (99% lower; OR=0.01 (CI=0.00-
0.03), p<0.001), as were the odds of exposure to free samples and vouchers in 
LICs (97% lower; OR=0.03 (CI=0.00-1.02), p=0.052; and 98% lower; OR=0.02 
(CI=0.00-0.41), p=0.012) (Table 33b). The remaining country income group 
comparisons to HICs were not significant (p>0.05). 




These same logistic regression models also showed that compared to urban 
residents, the odds of individuals in rural communities reporting exposure to at least 
one form of non-traditional marketing were significantly lower (78% lower; OR=0.22 
(CI=0.14-0.32), p<0.001) as were all of the five non-traditional marketing types 
measured – sponsorship (77% lower; OR=0.23 (CI=0.15-0.35), p<0.001), on other 
products (71% lower; OR=0.29 (CI=0.20-0.44), p<0.001), Internet (77% lower even 
after controlling for Internet access; OR=0.23 (CI=0.14-0.38), p<0.001), free 
samples (73% lower; OR=0.27 (CI=0.17-0.40), p<0.001), and vouchers (70% lower; 
OR=0.30 (CI=0.20-0.45), p<0.001; Table 33b).  
  
 
Table 32: Percentage of individuals who reported seeing each type of alcohol marketing within the previous six months 








































































































































Country and community type (number of 
individuals) 
All countries All (10,518) 33.8 31.1 56.8 19.0 34.5 7.1 67.3 18.2 21.5 14.5 8.1 10.7 32.4 
Urban (5,219) 45.0 39.8 60.9 22.5 47.9 10.6 74.7 26.3 30.5 21.8 12.0 15.1 46.2 
Rural (5,299) 22.8 22.6 51.8 15.7 21.3 3.6 60.0 10.2 12.6 7.3 4.3 6.4 18.9 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada 
 
Urban (806) 61.5 51.2 80.8 34.0 81.5 14.0 94.7 56.2 46.7 29.9 22.2 23.5 75.2 
Rural (338) 53.3 45.0 77.5 32.8 73.1 11.2 90.8 50.0 42.9 25.4 15.7 23.4 64.5 
Sweden Urban (489) 30.7 20.3 64.8 6.6 82.2 14.8 91.0 25.3 32.0 36.2 6.4 7.0 55.7 
Rural (84) 14.5 14.5 63.9 9.6 85.5 8.4 91.6 14.5 25.3 27.7 2.4 2.4 37.4 
All HIC All (1,717) 48.9 39.4 74.8 24.8 80.2 13.4 92.7 44.2 40.7 30.7 15.5 17.7 65.7 
Urban (1,295) 49.9 39.6 74.7 23.7 81.8 14.3 93.3 44.6 41.1 32.3 16.2 17.2 67.9 
Rural (422) 45.6 39.0 74.8 28.3 75.5 10.7 91.0 43.0 39.4 25.9 13.1 19.2 59.1 
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina Urban (170) 42.4 45.3 90.0 2.9 31.8 0 92.4 1.8 0 1.8 0 4.1 7.7 
Rural (369) 4.6 46.6 85.9 1.1 23.0 0 87.8 0.5 0 0.5 0 3.8 4.9 
Brazil Urban (202) 55.0 6.9 92.1 16.8 76.7 7.4 95.5 20.8 5.9 19.3 1.5 1.5 37.6 
  
 
 Rural (185) 31.9 1.6 89.7 6.0 35.1 0 92.4 3.2 0 0 0 0 3.2 
Chile 
 
Urban (51) 19.6 52.9 100.0 39.2 21.6 0 100.0 11.8 66.7 17.7 5.9 7.8 66.7 
Rural (75) 38.7 30.7 78.7 37.3 32.0 0 86.7 4.0 9.3 4.0 2.7 1.3 14.7 
Malaysia Urban (568) 38.7 33.6 39.4 32.0 41.2 7.4 48.8 23.6 29.4 40.1 4.4 9.2 41.6 
Rural (549) 30.6 29.1 31.3 26.6 31.3 3.6 37.0 21.0 22.2 28.8 5.8 12.0 32.1 
Poland 
 
Urban (26) 34.6 34.6 61.5 26.9 46.2 15.4 65.4 38.5 26.9 11.5 0 15.4 46.2 
Rural (63) 38.1 34.9 57.1 17.5 33.3 17.5 65.1 30.2 34.9 15.9 4.8 15.9 39.7 
South Africa 
 
Urban (94) 74.5 79.8 87.2 66.0 81.9 26.6 97.9 56.4 63.8 33.0 56.4 63.8 84.0 
Rural (82) 61.0 63.4 90.2 73.2 48.8 3.7 95.1 26.8 32.9 2.5 24.4 22.0 56.1 
Turkey 
 
Urban (795) 24.5 35.2 22.8 2.5 27.8 1.6 55.7 13.3 23.9 6.5 4.9 2.8 27.9 
Rural (412) 7.8 13.8 16.3 1.9 17.2 0.5 38.1 5.6 8.5 2.9 0.7 0.2 11.4 
All UMIC All (3,641) 29.3 31.9 49.0 16.4 34.1 3.7 62.3 14.9 18.8 15.2 5.0 7.2 27.5 
Urban (1,906) 36.0 35.3 46.9 17.3 40.1 5.2 64.5 18.6 24.7 19.2 6.5 8.0 35.3 
Rural (1,735) 21.8 28.2 51.4 15.5 27.6 2.1 59.9 11.0 12.3 10.8 3.5 6.3 19.0 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China Urban (1,167) 64.7 55.3 88.5 34.5 43.3 18.7 91.4 28.5 40.3 28.7 19.8 31.1 60.3 
Rural (1,772) 21.8 19.6 73.6 16.8 12.2 4.3 77.9 3.6 9.7 4.3 3.1 5.0 16.2 
Colombia Urban (128) 78.9 74.2 93.0 75.8 58.6 6.3 97.7 42.2 50.8 10.9 43.0 32.0 60.9 
Rural (119) 78.2 68.9 86.6 75.6 58.8 10.9 95.0 63.0 61.3 10.9 47.9 47.9 70.6 
All LMIC All (3,186) 41.9 36.7 80.3 27.9 27.2 9.9 84.3 16.5 24.5 13.7 12.5 17.2 36.2 
Urban (1,295) 66.1 57.1 88.9 38.6 44.8 17.4 92.0 29.9 41.4 26.9 22.1 31.2 60.4 
Rural (1,891) 25.3 22.7 74.4 20.5 15.2 4.7 78.9 7.4 13.0 4.7 5.9 7.7 19.6 





Urban (698) 19.9 19.5 20.6 4.0 11.5 6.2 35.1 5.9 5.4 0.9 1.2 1.2 8.7 
Rural (1,203) 10.0 6.4 9.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 18.7 0.3 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.0 
Zimbabwe Urban (25) 84.0 64.0 100.0 36.0 72.0 12.0 100.0 64.0 64.0 4.0 0 4.0 68.0 
Rural (48) 77.1 75.0 39.6 75.0 58.3 0 85.4 47.9 43.8 0 2.1 0 54.2 
All LIC All (1,974) 16.1 13.4 15.5 4.7 7.4 3.4 27.2 4.3 4.9 0.4 0.5 0.5 6.5 
Urban (723) 22.1 21.0 23.4 5.1 13.6 6.4 37.3 7.9 7.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 10.8 
Rural (1,251) 12.6 9.0 10.9 4.5 3.8 1.8 21.3 2.2 3.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 4.0 
a 
Posters (for example billboards, pasted on walls, visible on the sides of taxis, buses etc); 
b 
Permanently sponsored signage on shops or other buildings; 
c 
Print media such as newspapers/magazines; 
d 
Sponsorship of sporting, music, other events; 
e 
On products such as umbrellas, ashtrays, shopping bags, 
clothing, or any other products; 
f 
Promotional vouchers that allow discounts 
 




Figure 39: Differences in self-reported alcohol marketing exposure between country income 
groups and urban and rural communities 
A                 B                      
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Self-reported marketing: Percentage of individuals reporting A) seeing poster marketing; B) seeing signage marketing; C) 
seeing TV marketing; D) hearing radio marketing; E) seeing print media marketing; F) seeing cinema marketing; G) seeing 
sponsorship; H) seeing marketing on other products; I) seeing Internet marketing; J) seeing free samples; K) seeing 
vouchers; L) seeing 1+ types of traditional marketing; M) seeing 1+ types of non-traditional marketing in previous six 





Table 33: Logistic multilevel regression models showing odds ratios for the percentage of individuals who reported seeing each type of alcohol marketing within 
the previous six months 
a: traditional forms of marketing 
Posters Signage TV Radio Print media Cinema 1+ traditional 
OR
 a
 (95% CI) OR
 a
 (95% CI) OR
 a
 (95% CI) OR
 a
 (95% CI) OR
 a
 (95% CI) OR
 a
 (95% CI) OR
 a
 (95% CI) 
Community 
type 































































b: non-traditional forms of marketing 
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 (95% CI) OR
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Models control for community type, country income group, sex, age, education, drinking status, friends who drink, Internet access, TV 
ownership, radio ownership, with a random effect for country and community. 95% CIs also shown 
*p<0.05; **p<0.001 




Overall self-reported exposure 
In total, 68% of individuals across all countries and communities reported exposure 
to at least 1 type of alcohol marketing over the previous six months (range 19-
100%), and 22% reported exposure to at least 5 types (range 0-77%; Table 34). 
The percentage of individuals who reported seeing at least 5 types of marketing was 
lowest in LICs (4%) and highest in HICs (44%). 
 
Table 34: Percentage of individuals who reported seeing 0 and 1+ (split into 1-4 and 5+) types of 





1+ types of 
marketing 
 




All (435) 31.7 68.3 45.9 22.4 
Urban (221) 24.1 76.0 43.5 32.5 
Rural (214) 39.3 60.7 48.2 12.5 
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
Canada Urban (31) 4.2 95.8 39.3 56.5 
Rural (15) 8.0 92.0 42.3 49.7 
Sweden Urban (20) 7.8 92.2 66.1 26.2 
Rural (3) 8.4 91.6 78.3 13.3 
All HIC All (69) 6.2 93.8 49.4 44.4 
Urban (51) 5.6 94.4 49.4 45.0 
Rural (18) 8.1 91.9 49.4 42.5 
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
Argentina Urban (6) 7.7 92.4 90.0 2.4 
Rural (14) 12.2 87.8 87.5 0.3 
Brazil Urban (7) 4.5 95.5 82.2 13.4 
Rural (7) 7.6 92.4 92.4 0.0 
Chile Urban (2) 0.0 100.0 76.5 23.5 
Rural (3) 13.3 86.7 76.0 10.7 
Malaysia Urban (18) 50.2 49.8 13.6 36.3 
Rural (15) 61.0 39.0 10.2 28.8 
Poland Urban (1) 26.9 73.1 38.5 34.6 
Rural (3) 34.9 65.1 36.5 28.6 
South Africa Urban (3) 2.1 97.9 21.3 76.6 
Rural (3) 3.7 96.3 47.6 48.8 




Turkey Urban (25) 41.0 59.0 46.8 12.2 
Rural (13) 61.4 38.6 35.2 3.4 
All UMIC All (120) 36.4 63.6 45.3 18.3 
Urban (62) 33.7 66.3 43.9 22.4 
Rural (58) 39.3 60.7 46.9 13.8 
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
China Urban (39) 7.8 92.2 44.2 47.9 
Rural (62) 21.5 78.5 71.0 7.6 
Colombia Urban (31) 2.3 97.7 39.8 57.8 
Rural (23) 5.0 95.0 28.6 66.4 
All LMIC All (155) 15.1 84.9 58.3 26.6 
Urban (70) 7.3 92.7 43.8 48.9 
Rural (85) 20.4 79.6 68.3 11.3 
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
India Urban (37) 63.9 36.1 31.0 5.2 
Rural (51) 80.8 19.2 18.8 0.4 
Zimbabwe Urban (1) 0.0 100.0 36.0 64.0 
Rural (2) 12.5 87.5 37.5 50.0 
All LIC All (91) 72.1 27.9 23.8 4.1 
Urban (38) 61.7 38.3 31.1 7.2 
Rural (53) 78.2 21.8 19.5 2.3 
 
11.4 Discussion 
This study makes a number of important findings in relation to alcohol marketing. 
First it identifies very high levels of exposure to alcohol marketing:  68% of all 
individuals recalled seeing at least one form of alcohol marketing in the last six 
months, and 22% reported seeing 5+ types of marketing (only 4% in LICs, but 44% 
in HICs). Second, it identifies that all forms of observed and self-reported marketing 
were least common in LICs (although most of the differences compared to HICs 
were not statistically significant); this may in part reflect the greater existence of 
informal markets such as the production of home-made and home-brewed 
alcohol[14, 73, 586] which would not be marketed. Third, marketing exposure was 
significantly lower in rural than urban communities for all measures of marketing, 
ranging from 44% (self-reported radio) to 77% lower (self-reported Internet and 
sponsorship). The greater amount of urban marketing suggests that the AI may 




focus its marketing and distribution on areas with the greatest potential impact, i.e. 
areas with higher density populations[277, 570, 571], and on cost-effective, 
accessible areas (rural communities can present different challenges than urban 
ones[554, 587]). 
Global per capita consumption of alcohol since 1990 has been stable, with only a 
slight increase[588]. However sales of alcohol (litres) between 2007 and 2012 have 
increased in all of the countries in this study (no data for Zimbabwe), particularly in 
some UMICs and LMICs such as China (32% increase), Malaysia (27%), Brazil 
(21%), but also in India (LIC; 73%)[589]. AI sales have also increased in all three of 
the countries where alcohol is banned (Iran 221%, Pakistan 34%, the UAE 
35%[589]), although their markets remain small and the rises are in part due to vast 
increases in sales of non-alcoholic beer[583] and increases in tourism[585]. 
Marketing is key to increasing drinking prevalence[21-23], and although the more 
traditional types of marketing are still very common and it is thought that the trend 
“is for traditional media to give way to new approaches”[137], this analysis shows 
that in all country income groups a higher percentage of individuals reported seeing 
at least one type of traditional marketing than non-traditional types. The difference in 
the percentage of individuals seeing at least one type of traditional and non-
traditional marketing was highest in LMICs (difference of 48%). Perhaps due to the 
lack of a legally-binding global treaty to regulate marketing, distinct patterns such as 
the AI having to move away from the traditional forms of marketing in higher income 
countries because of regulation (as was seen with the TI) has not been identified. In 
fact, the globally high levels of marketing may reflect lack of national regulation or, 
where there is regulation, a failure to enforce compliance; countries such as 
Sweden and Canada with relatively high alcohol policy scores (Sweden had a 
maximum score for advertising; Figure 26)[349] still had significant levels of alcohol 
marketing. 
Alcohol is culturally embedded in many societies, especially in the West[14, 338], 
and unlike the consumption of tobacco, infrequent, small amounts of alcohol are not 
commonly thought to be harmful, and even thought to provide some health 
benefits[49-56] (although there is more recent evidence questioning these health 
benefit assertions[59-62] and showing, for example, that the risk of cancer 
increases from zero units[63, 64]); it has therefore been harder to subject alcohol to 
stringent regulations. However, with research suggesting that the AI operates in 
similar ways to the TI[334], the current approach regarding cooperation with the AI 




by the WHO[65] and individual nations[590] may not necessarily be in the best 
interest of public health[10].  
There are some limitations to EPOCH which were outlined in Chapter 8. But there is 
an additional limitation specific to the analysis presented in this chapter; although 
diverse[549], only 13 countries (fewer than the 16 included in the tobacco marketing 
environment analysis (Chapter 9)) were included in the analysis as three countries – 
Iran, Pakistan and the UAE – had very restrictive alcohol policies[583-585] so were 
excluded. This means that the country income group comparisons may not be 
robust, especially as three of the country income groups (HIC, LMIC and LIC) 
contained only two countries each. Subsequently the results cannot reliably be 
extrapolated to other countries in any of the income groups, and the findings from 
the statistical analysis must be treated with some caution.  
There are also strengths to EPOCH (outlined in Chapter 8), and also to this 
particular study.  First, the present study is the first to compare the levels of multiple 
types of observed and self-reported alcohol marketing across such a wide range of 
countries. And second, although differences in self-reported exposure to marketing 
will reflect access to certain types of media, Internet access, TV and radio 
ownership were controlled for in the individual-level models. 
Implications for policy 
This study has shown that alcohol marketing is widespread. Although the Global 
Strategy makes recommendations that all WHO Member States (of which there 
were 194 in 2014[591], including all of the EPOCH countries) restrict alcohol 
marketing, the Global Strategy is not legally binding and alcohol marketing levels 
are very high globally and within a number of countries. AI marketing was found to 
be least prevalent in LICs which, given that alcohol is not yet a major cause of death 
and disability in these countries (see sub-chapter 2.1 Prevalence of Tobacco and 
Alcohol Use, and Tobacco and Alcohol’s Impact on Health), policymakers have the 
opportunity to introduce marketing regulations in LICs now in order to help minimise 
the spread of the alcohol epidemic.  
In summary, given evidence that AI marketing plays a significant role in drinking 
initiation and prevalence[21-23], these findings highlight the urgent need for 
countries to introduce or strengthen marketing regulations, and supports calls for a 
legally-binding FCTC-equivalent for alcohol. 




Chapter 12: Alcohol Marketing 
Regulation and Levels of Alcohol 
Industry Compliance 
12.1 Background 
In the absence of an FCTC-equivalent for alcohol, Chapter 11 showed very high 
levels of alcohol marketing. The high levels of marketing observed and self-reported 
could be due to a number of interconnected reasons, most notably government 
failure to implement or enforce regulation and/or AI failure to comply. While it would 
be ideal if the AI simply complied with regulation and governments did not have to 
spend limited resources on monitoring and enforcement, existing evidence shows 
that the AI commonly circumvents both statutory and voluntary marketing 
regulations[137, 395, 408-415]. Despite the importance of marketing regulation in 
controlling alcohol consumption, there is very little literature on national levels of 
marketing regulation and on levels of industry compliance with marketing 
regulations globally (as shown in sub-chapter 4.2 Policy Influence and Compliance).   
This chapter therefore aims to assess the presence of marketing regulation within 
the EPOCH countries, examine the extent of AI compliance with regulation, and 
identify factors which are associated with good compliance. It is hypothesised that 
compliance will be poorer in lower income countries primarily due to their lower 
budgets for monitoring and enforcement, and that higher country income, greater 
expenditure on health, and good governance (such as low levels of corruption and 
good government stability), in particular, will be significant factors in good 
compliance. It is difficult to hypothesise whether compliance will be better in urban 
or rural communities because, on the one hand it might be expected that 
compliance will be poorer in rural than urban communities given access 
difficulties[554] potentially making enforcement harder and relatively less cost 
effective, but on the other hand it might be expected that compliance will be poorer 
in urban communities as AI marketing is greater in urban areas (as shown in 
Chapter 11). 
This work will be important in identifying countries that need to implement further 
marketing controls, and countries or community types with poor levels of 




compliance with existing marketing regulations. This analysis will help policymakers 
effectively focus resources to better ensure compliance. 
12.2 Methodology 
12.2.1 Data sources 
The same sample size as Chapter 11 was used (see Table 29).  
Regulation 
Data on the extent and nature of marketing regulation relating to the data collected 
in EPOCH was obtained from the WHO[592]. Regulatory data were obtained for the 
year 2010 (the year the majority of EPOCH data were collected), but where this was 
not possible, the nearest year was used.  
Unlike the tobacco regulations which are predominantly ‘ban’ or ‘no ban’ (Chapter 
10), alcohol regulations tend to differ by alcohol type; beer, wine, and spirits. In this 
analysis, a country was only classed as having a ban in place if all types of alcohol 
were included in the restriction; EPOCH did not collect data on which type of alcohol 
the marketing was related to, so it is not possible to assess levels of compliance for 
specific alcohol types. 
Marketing and compliance 
Data covering nine forms of marketing were obtained from EPOCH: observed 
outdoor advertising (EPOCH 1), and self-reported advertising on posters, TV, radio, 
print media, cinema, sponsorship, Internet, and free samples (EPOCH 2). Although 
additional marketing types were included in Chapter 11, only these nine forms of 
marketing were used in this analysis as they relate to regulation that the AI could 
choose to either adhere to or ignore; outlet density was not assessed as it cannot 
be assumed that industry has control over this. Additionally, marketing on signage, 
other products and vouchers are not assessed because no data on regulation were 
available from the WHO[592] for these forms of marketing. The measures of 
marketing are the same as those used in Chapter 11 and so will not be outlined in 
detail again here (see Appendix 6).  
These nine measures of marketing were then linked to national regulation. 
Information on national regulation in eight marketing areas was required as 
regulation on ‘billboard advertising’ was compared to both observed outdoor 




advertising and self-reported exposure to poster marketing. National regulation was 
used in this chapter, but as EPOCH collected data at the community level 
compliance in both urban and rural communities will be examined. 
In Chapter 11 Iran, Pakistan and the UAE were removed from the analysis as they 
each have very restrictive alcohol policies – Iran forbids the drinking, selling and 
distribution of alcohol, and in Pakistan and the UAE only non-Muslims are legally 
allowed to consume alcohol – and the marketing of alcohol in these countries is also 
banned to varying degrees[583-585]. However, this chapter focuses on compliance 
with regulations and so these countries are now included. However, there is no 
WHO[592] data available on alcohol marketing regulations in the UAE, so the UAE 
could not be included. 
Explanatory variables 
Data on six explanatory variables – GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, 
government effectiveness, government stability, and government expenditure on 
health – were collated from the World Bank[540, 577] and the UN[579]. More 
information can be found in Appendix 8. 
12.2.2 Analysis 
Presence of regulation 
First the presence of regulation was examined by country and country income 
group. 
Compliance scores 
Where a country did have a specific piece of regulation in place, compliance with 
that regulation was assessed using data on the levels of marketing obtained via 
EPOCH (presented in Table 30 and Table 32). Compliance was categorised into 
either ‘good’ or ‘poor’ compliance, the exact definition of which varied by measure: 
 For the average number of observed adverts: 
o Good compliance: <1 advert observed 









 For all other data (presented as percentages):  
o Good compliance: <10% of individuals reported seeing marketing 
(posters, TV, radio, print media, cinema, sponsorship, Internet, and 
free samples) 
o Poor compliance: 10%+ of individuals reported seeing marketing 
(posters, TV, radio, print media, cinema, sponsorship, Internet, and 
free samples) 
Compliance scores were calculated for urban and rural communities within each 
country (i.e. each country was assigned two scores).  
An overall good compliance score (OGCS) was also calculated as an indicator of 
country-level compliance as follows: 
 Number of marketing types subject to regulation – nine marketing types 
were included in the analysis (see 12.2.1 Data sources). For each marketing 
type subject to regulation, a country was categorised as having either good 
or poor compliance for both urban and rural communities. 
 Urban good compliance score (UGCS) – this reflects the proportion of 
marketing types subject to regulation that had good compliance within urban 
communities. 
 Rural good compliance score (RGCS) – this reflects the proportion of 
marketing types subject to regulation that had good compliance within rural 
communities. 
 Overall good compliance score (OGCS) – this is the UGCS and RGCS 
combined into one average measure. If all urban and rural communities had 
good compliance for all marketing types subject to regulation, then a country 
would have a score of 100%. 
Example  
The compliance scores for Turkey were calculated as follows: 
 Six marketing types were subject to regulation in Turkey.  
 UGCS: across urban communities, three of the six marketing types subject 
to regulation were given a good compliance score. Therefore, the proportion 
of marketing types subject to regulation that had good compliance (the 
UGCS) was 50%. 




 RGCS: across rural communities, four of the six marketing types subject to 
regulation were given a good compliance score. Therefore, the proportion of 
marketing types subject to regulation that had good compliance (the RGCS) 
was 66%. 
 OGCS: combining the UGCS and RGCS gives Turkey an overall good 
compliance score (OGCS) of 58%. 
Results and the determinants of compliance 
For each specific marketing measure, graphs were produced to show the average 
amount of marketing observed or self-reported within each urban and rural 
community (as presented in Table 30 and Table 32) with countries split into those 
with a full ban, those with some restrictions, and those with no ban. Within the ‘full 
ban’ and ‘some restrictions’ sections on each graph, a line is included to show the 
threshold between good and poor compliance (i.e. above the line is poor 
compliance). These graphs are used to examine levels of compliance for each 
marketing measure. 
Also for each specific marketing measure, the average amount of observed and 
self-reported marketing was calculated for countries with a full ban in place, those 
with some restrictions, and those with no ban in order to provide an overall 
comparison of marketing levels and to give an indication of whether or not specific 
marketing bans are sufficiently complied with to make them effective. This was 
calculated by averaging the EPOCH data collected in all countries and communities 
in each regulatory category (i.e. not averaging the means presented in Table 30 and 
Table 32). 
The OGCS was then used to examine overall levels of compliance with marketing 
regulation by country and country income group. Pearson’s correlations were also 
run between the OGCS (continuous) and the following country-level explanatory 
variables: GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, government stability, government 
effectiveness, and government expenditure on health (all continuous variables; see 
Appendix 8). These correlations were used to provide an idea of the relationship 
between overall compliance and a range of explanatory variables. Correlations were 
calculated in StataMP 12[580], and the correlation coefficients are presented along 
with corresponding p-values (95% significance).  





12.3.1 Presence of regulation 
The number of full statutory marketing regulations in place in each country ranged 
from zero (ten countries) to eight (Sweden and Iran), out of a possible eight (Figure 
40, Table 35). Iran and Pakistan, which both have very restrictive alcohol 
policies[583, 584], both had multiple alcohol marketing regulations in place; Iran had 
all eight in place, and Pakistan had seven. Additionally, in 2012 (the closest data to 
2010 available), Canada, Sweden and Zimbabwe each had government monopolies 
on alcohol sales[593], but this does not appear to have influenced the number of 
marketing regulations in place; Sweden had all eight pieces of regulation in place, 
compared to zero in both Canada and Zimbabwe. As so many countries did not 
have any full bans on alcohol marketing, there are no trends in the number of 
regulations in place by country income group and averages cannot be calculated.  
Bans on billboard, national and cable TV, and national and local radio were the 
most common advertising bans, and were each in place in five countries (all in place 
in Sweden, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan). The least common marketing ban was 
on sponsorship of sporting and youth events where only three countries (Sweden, 
Iran and India) had a ban in place. The remainder of the bans were in place in four 
countries.  
Although Table 35 show that ten countries did not have any full alcohol marketing 
bans in place in 2008, it also shows that many countries had partial statutory or 
voluntary restrictions on all or some types of alcohol, or had full bans on some types 
of alcohol but not others. For example, Poland had a partial statutory restriction on 
billboard advertising, national and cable TV advertising, national and local radio 
advertising, print media advertising, cinema advertising, and Internet advertising for 
beer, and a full ban for wine and spirits. Additionally, some countries had different 
sponsorship regulations for different types of alcohol. For example, Malaysia had a 
partial statutory restriction on the sponsorship of sporting events for beer and wine 
but a voluntary restriction on the sponsorship of sporting events for spirits, and a 
partial statutory restriction on sponsorship of youth events for all types of alcohol. 
These examples highlight the complexities associated with understanding and 
analysing alcohol marketing regulations. 
 
 














































































































































































































High income countries 
Canada X* X* X* X* X* X X* X 0 
Sweden         8 
UAE no data 
Upper-middle income countries 

























 X 0 
Chile X X X X X X X X 0 
Malaysia X
#



































Lower-middle income countries 
China X X*
2
 X** X X X X X 0 
Colombia X X** X X X X X X 0 
Iran         8 
Low income countries 




























**partial statutory restriction for all alcohol on national marketing only 
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data from 2002; 
2
cable TV data from 2012; 
3
cable TV data from 2002; 
4












12.3.2 Levels of regulatory compliance 
12.3.2.1 Level of compliance with observed marketing 
As shown above, there is no information available on alcohol marketing regulation in 
the UAE. The UAE is therefore not included in the analysis in this sub-chapter. 
Alcohol adverts  
Only five of 15 EPOCH countries had a ban on billboard advertising for all alcohol 
types (Table 35). Overall, compliance was poor (although fewer alcohol adverts 
were observed in countries with a ban than those with some restrictions or no ban); 
on average 2.1 alcohol adverts were observed in communities within countries with 
a full ban on billboard advertising, compared to 3.4 in communities within countries 
with some restrictions, and compared to 6.7 in communities within countries without 
no ban. 
Poor compliance was found in both urban and rural communities in the one HIC with 
a ban (Sweden) and the one UMIC with a ban (Turkey); Sweden had the poorest 
compliance with 6.1 adverts observed on average per urban community and 4.3 per 
rural community (Figure 41).  
Of the five countries with some restriction in place, compliance was poor in all 
communities except rural Argentina (0.8 adverts on average per community; a 



































































































Brazil had the worst compliance (partial statutory restriction that applied to wine and 
spirits, and a voluntary restriction for beer); 13.6 adverts were observed on average 
per urban community, and 7.1 were observed on average in rural communities.  
 
Figure 41: Compliance with observed alcohol marketing 
Average number of alcohol adverts, split into countries with and without a ban on billboard advertising 
for all alcohol types and countries with some restrictions in place 
 
(the red line represents the poor/good compliance threshold; above the line = poor compliance) 
 
 
12.3.2.2 Level of compliance with self-reported traditional marketing 
As shown above, there is no information available on alcohol marketing bans in the 
UAE. The UAE is therefore not included in the analysis in this sub-chapter. 
Additionally, no self-reported data was collected on exposure to alcohol marketing in 
Iran. Iran is therefore also excluded from the following analysis. 
Posters 
Only four of 14 EPOCH countries had a ban on billboard advertising for all alcohol 
types (Table 35). Overall, compliance was poor (although exposure to poster 
marketing was lower in countries with a ban than those with some restrictions or no 
ban); on average 19% of individuals reported exposure to alcohol poster marketing 
in communities within countries with a full ban on billboard marketing, compared to 
41% in communities within countries with some restrictions, and compared to 44% 
in communities within countries with no ban.   
Poor compliance was found in both urban and rural communities in the one HIC with 
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(UMIC) had mixed compliance; poor compliance in urban communities and good in 
rural communities.  
Of the five countries with some restrictions in place, poor compliance was seen in all 
communities except rural Argentina (4.6% of individuals reported exposure to poster 
marketing in the last six months; partial statutory restriction for all alcohol types). 
Exposure to poster marketing was above 30% in the remainder of urban and rural 
communities. 
TV 
Only four EPOCH countries had a ban on national and cable TV advertising for all 
alcohol types (Table 35). Overall, compliance was poor (although exposure to TV 
marketing was lower in countries with a ban than those with some restrictions or no 
ban); on average 24% of individuals reported exposure to alcohol TV marketing in 
communities within countries with a full ban on national and cable TV marketing (of 
all marketing measures, this is the highest average percentage in countries with a 
full ban), compared to 73% in communities within countries with some restrictions 
(of all marketing measures, this is also the highest average percentage in countries 
with some restrictions), and compared to 83% in communities within countries with 
no ban. 
Poor compliance was found in urban and rural communities in the only HIC with a 
ban (Sweden) and the only UMIC with a ban (Turkey); Sweden had particularly poor 
compliance, 64.8% of individuals reported exposure to TV marketing in the last six 
months in urban communities, as did 63.9% in rural communities (Figure 42b). 
Mixed compliance was found in one of two LICs with a ban (India; good compliance 
in rural communities).  
Poor compliance was seen in all seven countries with some restrictions in place. 
Over 80% of individuals in urban and rural Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, and 
urban Canada and China reported exposure to TV marketing in the last six months. 
Although compliance was still poor, Malaysia (partial statutory restrictions on all 
alcohol types) had the lowest exposure; 39.4% of individuals in urban communities 
and 31.3% in rural communities reported exposure.  
Radio 
Only four EPOCH countries had a full ban on national and local radio advertising 
(Table 35). Overall, compliance was good; on average 4% of individuals reported 




exposure to alcohol radio marketing in communities within countries with a full ban 
on national and local radio marketing (of all marketing measures, this is the (joint) 
lowest average percentage in countries with a full ban), compared to 24% in 
communities within countries with some restrictions, and compared to 66% in 
communities within countries with no ban. 
All countries with a full ban had good compliance. Although still categorised as 
‘good’ compliance, individuals in Sweden (HIC) reported the highest level of 
exposure to radio marketing of countries with a ban in place (6.6% urban, 9.6% 
rural) (Figure 42c). 
Compliance was poor in all of the six countries with some restrictions in place, 
except urban and rural communities in Argentina (UMIC; partial statutory restrictions 
on all alcohol types) and rural Brazil (UMIC; partial statutory restrictions on wine and 
spirits radio marketing and voluntary restrictions for beer) 
Print media 
Only three EPOCH countries had a ban on print media advertising for all alcohol 
types (Table 35), Overall, compliance was poor (although exposure to print media 
marketing was lower in countries with a ban than those with some restrictions or no 
ban); on average 22% of individuals reported exposure to alcohol print media 
marketing in communities within countries with a full ban on print media marketing, 
compared to 46% in communities within countries with some restrictions, and 
compared to 34% in communities within countries with no ban. 
Poor compliance in urban and rural communities was only found in the one HIC with 
a ban (Sweden); 82.2% of individuals in urban communities and 85.5% in rural 
communities reported exposure to tobacco print media marketing in the last six 
months (Figure 42d). Mixed compliance was found in one of two LICs with a ban 
(India; good compliance in rural communities). 
Poor compliance was seen in each of the four countries with some restrictions in 
place. Exposure was highest in Canada (HIC; partial statutory restriction for all 
alcohol types) where 81.5% of individuals in urban communities and 73.1% in rural 
communities reported seeing print media advertising.  
 
 





Only three of 14 EPOCH countries had a ban on cinema advertising for all alcohol 
types (Table 35). Overall, compliance was good; on average 6% of individuals 
reported exposure to alcohol cinema marketing in communities within countries with 
a full ban on cinema marketing, compared to 7% in communities within countries 
with some restrictions, and compared to 8% in communities within countries with no 
ban.  
Compliance was good in the two LICs with a full ban (India and Pakistan). Only the 
one HIC with a ban (Sweden) had mixed compliance; 14.8% of individuals in urban 
communities reported exposure to cinema advertising (poor compliance), as did 
8.4% in rural communities (good compliance) (Figure 42e). 
Of the five countries with some restrictions in place, compliance was mixed. Poor 
compliance was found in urban and rural communities in the one HIC with some 
restrictions (Canada; partial statutory restriction for all alcohol types) and one of four 
UMICs with some restrictions (Poland; partial statutory restriction for beer, and a full 
ban for wine and spirits). 
 
Figure 42: Compliance with self-reported traditional alcohol marketing 
a) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing poster alcohol marketing within the previous six 
months, split into countries with and without a ban on billboard advertising for all alcohol types and 
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b) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing TV alcohol marketing within the previous six months, 
split into countries with and without a ban on national and cable TV advertising for all alcohol types and 
countries with some restrictions in place 
 
c) Percentage of individuals who reported hearing radio alcohol marketing within the previous six 
months, split into countries with and without a ban on national and local radio advertising for all alcohol 
types and countries with some restrictions in place 
 
d) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing print media alcohol marketing within the previous six 
months, split into countries with and without a ban on print media advertising for all alcohol types and 
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e) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing cinema alcohol marketing within the previous six 
months, split into countries with and without a ban on cinema advertising for all alcohol types and 
countries with some restrictions in place
 
 (the red line represents the poor/good compliance threshold; above the line = poor compliance) 
 
 
12.3.2.3 Level of compliance with self-reported non-traditional marketing 
As per above, the UAE and Iran are excluded from the following analysis. 
Sponsorship 
Only two EPOCH countries banned alcohol sponsorship at sporting and youth 
events (Table 35). Overall, compliance was good; on average 8% of individuals 
reported exposure to alcohol sponsorship in communities within countries with a full 
ban on the sponsorship of sporting and youth events, compared to 15% in 
communities within countries with some restrictions, and compared to 26% in 
communities within countries with no ban. 
Poor compliance was found in urban and rural communities in the one HIC with a 
ban (Sweden) and good compliance was found in urban and rural communities in 
the one LIC with a ban (India) (Figure 43a).  
Of the six countries with some regulations in place, compliance was again mixed. 
Poor compliance was found in urban and rural communities in two of four UMICs 
with some restrictions (Malaysia (partial statutory restriction for beer and wine and a 
ban on spirits for sponsorship of sporting events and a partial statutory restriction for 
all alcohol types for sponsorship of youth events) and Poland (partial statutory 
restriction for all alcohol types for sponsorship of sporting events and partial 
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of youth events)) and one of two LICs with some restrictions (Zimbabwe; voluntary 
ban for beer and wine (but no ban on spirits) sponsorship of sporting events and a 
voluntary ban for all alcohol types sponsorship of youth events). Mixed compliance 
was found in Turkey; poor compliance in urban communities and good compliance 
in rural. 
Internet 
Only three EPOCH countries had a ban on Internet advertising for all alcohol types 
(Table 35). Overall, compliance was poor (although exposure to Internet marketing 
was lower in countries with a ban than those with no ban); on average 14% of 
individuals reported exposure to alcohol Internet marketing in communities within 
countries with a full ban on Internet marketing, compared to 9% in communities 
within countries with some restrictions, and compared to 18% in communities within 
countries with no ban.   
Poor compliance was only found in urban and rural communities in the one HIC with 
a ban (Sweden); 36.2% individuals in urban communities and 27.7% of individuals 
in rural communities reported exposure to Internet marketing (Figure 43b).  
Of the five countries with some restrictions in place compliance was again mixed. 
Poor compliance was found in urban and rural communities in the one HIC with 
some restrictions (Canada; partial statutory restriction for all alcohol types) and one 
of three UMICs with some restrictions (Poland; partial statutory restriction for beer, 
and a ban for wine and spirits). Brazil had mixed compliance, poor in urban 
communities and good in rural. 
Free samples  
Only three EPOCH countries had a full ban on pubs/bars offering free alcohol 
(Table 35). Overall, compliance was good; on average 4% of individuals reported 
exposure to free alcohol samples in communities within countries with a full ban on 
pubs/bars offering free alcohol (of all marketing measures, this is the (joint) lowest 
average percentage in countries with a full ban), compared to 2% in communities 
within countries with some restrictions (of all marketing measures, this is the lowest 
average percentage in countries with some restrictions), and compared to 14% in 
communities within countries with no ban.   
Compliance was good in all three countries with a full ban (Sweden, Turkey and 
Pakistan). Aside from urban Sweden where 6.4% of individuals reported exposure 




to free samples, fewer than 5% of individuals in all of the communities reported 
exposure (Figure 43c). Compliance was also good in each of the four countries with 
some restrictions on free samples (each under 6%).  
 
Figure 43: Compliance with self-reported non-traditional alcohol marketing 
a) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing alcohol sponsorship within the previous six months, 
split into countries with and without a ban on sponsorship of sporting and youth events for all alcohol 
types and countries with some restrictions in place 
 
b) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing Internet alcohol marketing within the previous six 
months, split into countries with and without a ban on Internet marketing for all alcohol types and 
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c) Percentage of individuals who reported seeing free alcohol samples within the previous six months, 
split into countries with and without a ban on pubs/bars offering free alcohol for all alcohol types and 
countries with some restrictions in place 
 
(the red line represents the poor/good compliance threshold; above the line = poor compliance) 
 
 
Overall compliance and determinants 
This analysis has found that the majority of countries had no full alcohol marketing 
bans in place, and that compliance levels with regulation was mixed, both by 
country, country income group, and by marketing type/ban. Table 36 provides a 
summary of overall compliance.   
Patterns in the overall good compliance score (OGCS) by country income group 
cannot be assessed due to the majority of countries having no full bans in place, nor 
can country income group averages be calculated. Only Pakistan and Iran had an 
OGCS of 100%. This is in comparison to Sweden which had an OGCS of 28%, 
Turkey which had an OGCS of 58%, and India which had an OGCS of 71%. 
Additionally, among countries with at least one full ban in place, the rural good 
compliance score (RGCS) was higher than the urban good compliance score 
(UGCS) in three countries (Sweden, Turkey, and India) and equal in two (Iran and 
Pakistan), therefore suggesting that if there are differences, compliance is usually 
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HIC Canada 0 - - - - - 
Sweden 9 2 22% 3 33% 28% 
UAE** - - - - - - 
HIC total 9/18  
(50.00%) 
2 11% 3 17% 28% 
UMIC Argentina 0 - - - - - 
Brazil 0 - - - - - 
Chile 0 - - - - - 
Malaysia 0 - - - - - 
Poland 0 - - - - - 
South 
Africa 
0 - - - - - 





3 50% 4 66% 58% 
LMIC China 0 - - - - - 
Colombia 0 - - - - - 
Iran*** 1 (of 1) 1 100% 1 100% 100% 
LMIC total 1/19 
(5.26%) 
1 100% 1 100% 100% 
LIC India 7 4 57% 6 86% 71% 
Pakistan 8 8 100% 8 100% 100% 
Zimbabwe 0 - - - - - 
LIC total 15/27 
(55.56%) 
12 80% 14 93% 87% 
*these regulations are applied to both urban and rural communities 
**The UAE was not included in the calculations in this table as there were no data available 
on marketing bans 
***No self-reported EPOCH data were collected for Iran, so only the one observed variable 
and associated ban is included 
 
 
Each country’s OGCS (from Table 36) was then correlated with a range of potential 
determinants. Only five countries with at least one full ban in place were included in 
the correlations. All of the Pearson correlation coefficients were statistically 
significant (p<0.001), and all were moderate or fairly strong correlations (Table 37). 
The weakest correlation was with HDI rank (0.4879) and the strongest with 
government effectiveness (-0.9564). The correlations show that an increasing 
OGCS was correlated with a decreasing GDP per capita, increasing HDI ranking 
(i.e. better level of development), decreasing percentile rank of corruption (i.e. more 




corrupt), stability (i.e. less stable) and effectiveness (i.e. less effective), and 
decreasing government expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Table 37: Pearson correlation coefficients between the overall good compliance score for 




GDP per capita -0.7177 <0.001 
HDI rank 0.4879 <0.001 
Corruption -0.9180 <0.001 
Government stability -0.8031 <0.001 
Government effectiveness -0.9564 <0.001 




The analysis found that the majority of countries (10 of 15) had no full marketing 
bans in place. The extent of marketing regulation did not appear to be linked with 
country income group; among HICs, Canada had no bans whereas Sweden had all 
eight in place, the only UMIC (Turkey) with any bans had five in place, the only 
LMIC (Iran) with any bans had all eight in place, and two of three LICs with bans - 
India and Pakistan - had six and seven bans in place respectively. Sweden and Iran 
were therefore the only EPOCH countries that had all of the eight bans in place.  
The analysis also found that, where bans existed, compliance with marketing 
regulation was mixed and varied by country, country income group, community type, 
and by marketing type/ban. However, overall, for all of the nine alcohol marketing 
types assessed, lower levels of marketing were seen within countries with a full ban 
or some restrictions in place compared to those without a ban. This suggests that 
restrictions on alcohol marketing are effective at reducing marketing levels, or that 
regulations have been predominantly introduced by countries where rates of specific 
types of marketing are already low. 
The analysis presented in this chapter has also identified some potentially important 
variables in understanding what factors determine good regulatory compliance, 
namely GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, government stability, government 
effectiveness, and government expenditure on health. The correlations were not as 
expected – the OGCS increased with less wealth, worse governance, and less 




spending on health, although the correlation with HDI rank was as expected (i.e. the 
OGCS increased with a better level of development). This could be for the following 
reasons. First, only five countries were included in the correlations, meaning there 
was little data to base the associations on. Second, both Iran (LMIC) and Pakistan 
(LIC) had an OGCS of 100% but only one ban was included in the Iranian analysis 
(as there was no self-reported data collected by EPOCH to compare to) meaning 
compliance may have been lower if additional data were available, and both Iran 
and Pakistan have very restrictive alcohol policies (Iran forbids the drinking, selling 
and distribution of alcohol, and in Pakistan only non-Muslims are legally allowed to 
consume alcohol, and both ban alcohol marketing to varying degrees[583, 584]) 
meaning that the perfect compliance scores in these two lower income countries are 
not necessarily representative of other lower income countries. Third, because 
alcohol consumption is greater in higher income countries (Figure 9) and AI 
marketing is much more developed and prevalent in HICs and MICs (as found in 
Chapter 11), there is perhaps little incentive for the AI operating in these countries 
to comply with regulations, especially if enforcement is poor.  
Strengths and limitations 
Alongside EPOCH’s strengths and limitations outlined in Chapter 8, this work has 
some additional strengths and limitations.  
As this chapter used the same methodology as the tobacco compliance analysis, 
the same main limitations as outlined in the discussion of Chapter 10 also apply to 
this analysis; they are therefore not repeated here. There is, however, one 
additional limitation specific to the alcohol compliance analysis: the marketing bans 
typically differed by alcohol type (beer, wine and spirits) however EPOCH did not 
collect information on which type of alcohol marketing exposure was related to. This 
means that, although many countries had marketing bans on some form of alcohol, 
for it to be classed as a ‘ban’ in this analysis, all forms of alcohol had to be included; 
this is a significant factor in why only five countries were shown to have any alcohol 
marketing regulations in place. 
This analysis also has additional strengths. First, this study is the first to assess 
levels of regulatory compliance with alcohol marketing regulations, and the first to 
do so using both observed and self-reported data across such a wide range of 
countries. Second, this analysis combined bans on national TV marketing and cable 
TV marketing into one measure, bans on national radio marketing and local radio 
marketing into one measure, and bans on sponsorship sporting events and youth 




events into one measure. Only broad bans can be expected to reduce overall 
marketing exposure.  
Implications for policy 
This study has shown that there was a general lack of comprehensive alcohol 
marketing regulations within the EPOCH countries, but that many countries had 
marketing bans which applied to only some forms of alcohol. This lack of 
comprehensive regulations is despite the 2010 Global Strategy having 
recommended that all WHO Member States (which includes all of the EPOCH 
countries) restrict alcohol marketing. Where there were full bans in place 
compliance was often poor, although in all cases levels of marketing were lower in 
countries with a full ban or some restrictions compared to those with no bans.  
Given the importance of AI marketing, and the known effectiveness of marketing 
bans, this study highlights the urgent need for countries to develop and then enforce 
comprehensive alcohol marketing regulations, and supports calls for an FCTC-
equivalent for alcohol.  
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Chapter 13: Parallels in Tobacco 
and Alcohol Industry Marketing 
and Compliance  
This chapter builds on the findings from Chapters 9-12 by comparing, in turn, levels 
of TI and AI marketing in the EPOCH countries, amounts of tobacco and alcohol 
marketing regulation, and levels of TI and AI compliance with regulation. 
13.1 The Tobacco and Alcohol Industry Marketing 
Environment 
Chapters 9 and 11 explored the global tobacco and alcohol marketing 
environments. They are the first to present data on the level of observed and self-
reported marketing between and within 16 (13 for the alcohol analysis) diverse 
countries, and are the first to formally compare these marketing levels. All of the 
measures, except the sale of single cigarettes and the existence of POS advertising 
within tobacco-selling stores, are comparable between the two industries; observed 
number of outlets and the number of adverts, and self-reported exposure to posters, 
signage, TV, radio, print media, cinema (also combined into a composite measure: 
exposure to 1+ self-reported traditional marketing types), sponsorship, marketing on 
other products, Internet, free samples, and vouchers (also combined into a 
composite measure: exposure to 1+ self-reported non-traditional marketing types). 
These self-reported measures were also combined into two further composite 
measures: overall exposure to 1 or more marketing types, and overall exposure to 5 
or more marketing types. This section will attempt to draw the tobacco and alcohol 
findings together. 
13.1.1 Observed marketing  
Observed exposure to tobacco and alcohol marketing varied by measure (Table 
38). Across all countries combined, tobacco outlets were more common than 
alcohol outlets (4.2 tobacco outlets on average per community compared to 2.9 
alcohol outlets) and the prominence of tobacco outlets increased with declining 
country income group; in HICs, outlet density was similar (1.7 tobacco outlets on 
average per community compared to 1.6 alcohol outlets), in UMICs and LMICs 
there were 0.5 more tobacco than alcohol outlets on average per community 
(UMICs 3.4 tobacco, 2.9 alcohol; LMICs 5.3 tobacco, 4.8 alcohol), but in LICs the 
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difference was much larger (5.2 tobacco outlets compared to just 0.8 alcohol 
outlets). Both tobacco and alcohol outlets were significantly less common in rural 
than urban communities (there were 27% (p<0.001) fewer tobacco outlets on 
average per rural community, and 52% (p<0.001) fewer alcohol outlets). When 
compared to HICs, only LMICs had a significantly greater number of both tobacco 
and alcohol outlets per community; there were over 2.5 times more tobacco outlets 
and over 4 times more alcohol outlets per community in LMICs compared to HICs 
(the other country income group comparisons were not significant in both the 
tobacco and alcohol analysis so cannot be compared).  
Across all countries combined, alcohol adverts were more common (4.3 on average 
per community) than tobacco adverts (1.3). This prominence of alcohol adverts was 
seen across all country income groups (HICs: 4.1 alcohol, 0.2 tobacco; UMICs: 4.0 
alcohol, 1.1 tobacco; LMICs: 6.9 alcohol, 1.0 tobacco), other than LICs where 
tobacco adverts outnumbered alcohol adverts (0.7 alcohol, 2.8 tobacco). Both 
tobacco and alcohol adverts were significantly less common in rural than urban 
communities (there were 60% (p<0.001) fewer tobacco adverts on average per rural 
community, and 61% (p<0.001) fewer alcohol adverts). None of the country income 
group comparisons for alcohol adverts were significant meaning no comparisons to 
the prevalence of tobacco adverts can be drawn.  
In summary, tobacco outlets were more common than alcohol outlets, but alcohol 
adverts were more common than tobacco adverts. 
 
Table 38: Comparison of the observed tobacco and alcohol marketing environment 
 
Tobacco Alcohol 
Number of outlets 
All countries 4.2 2.9 
HIC 1.7 1.6 
UMIC  3.4 2.9 
LMIC  5.3 4.8 
LIC 5.2 0.8 
Number of adverts 
All countries 1.3 4.3 
HIC 0.2 4.1 
UMIC  1.1 4.0 
LMIC  1.0 6.9 
LIC 2.8 0.7 
(the largest figures between tobacco and alcohol marketing are in 
bold) 
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13.1.2 Self-reported marketing 
Self-reported exposure to alcohol marketing was much greater than self-reported 
exposure to tobacco marketing (Table 39). Across all countries combined, a greater 
number of individuals reported exposure to at least one type of alcohol (68%) than 
tobacco (45%) marketing, and at least five types of alcohol (22%) than tobacco 
(10%) marketing.  
Self-reported exposure to 1+ types of alcohol marketing was much greater than 
exposure to 1+ types of tobacco marketing in all country income groups (HICs: 94% 
alcohol, 43% tobacco; UMICs: 64% alcohol, 41% tobacco; LMICs: 85% alcohol, 
50% tobacco), except in LICs where exposure was much lower (28% alcohol, 47% 
tobacco). Similarly, self-reported exposure to 5+ types of alcohol marketing was 
greater than exposure to 5+ types of tobacco marketing in all country income 
groups (HICs: 44% alcohol, 3% tobacco; UMICs: 18% alcohol, 15% tobacco; 
LMICs: 27% alcohol, 11% tobacco), except in LICs where exposure was lower (4% 
alcohol, 6% tobacco).  
Across all countries combined, there was much greater exposure to 1+ types of 
traditional tobacco and alcohol marketing (67% alcohol, 42% tobacco) than 1+ types 
of non-traditional marketing (32% alcohol, 18% tobacco) (Table 39). These data 
also show that more individuals reported exposure to 1+ types of traditional and 
non-traditional alcohol marketing than 1+ types of traditional and non-traditional 
tobacco marketing. 
Exposure to the individual types of self-reported alcohol marketing was much higher 
than exposure to the individual types of self-reported tobacco marketing across all 
countries, in HICs, and in UMICs (although there was greater exposure to tobacco 
than alcohol cinema marketing and free samples in UMICs) and LMICs, but much 
lower in LICs. The largest difference in exposure was seen in TV marketing in HICs 
(difference of 66%; tobacco 9%, alcohol 75%; Table 21 and Table 32), and the 
smallest differences in exposure were seen in Internet marketing in LICs (difference 
0.5%; tobacco 0.9%, alcohol 0.4%) and cinema marketing in UMICs (difference 
0.5%; tobacco 4.2%, alcohol 3.7%).  
The odds of exposure to at least one form of traditional tobacco and alcohol 
marketing were significantly lower in rural than urban communities (tobacco 28% 
lower (p=0.036), alcohol 55% lower (p<0.001)), as were the odds of exposure to at 
least one form of non-traditional tobacco and alcohol marketing (tobacco 62% lower 
(p<0.001), alcohol 78% lower (p=0.014)). The difference in urban and rural 
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exposure to traditional and non-traditional alcohol marketing is therefore greater 
than the difference in urban and rural exposure to traditional and non-traditional 
tobacco marketing. This pattern could also be seen for all but one (vouchers) of the 
comparative individual forms of marketing. For example, the odds of individuals 
reporting exposure to alcohol TV marketing was 49% lower in rural than urban 
communities, compared to 14% lower exposure to tobacco TV marketing in rural 
than urban communities.  
The only country income group comparison that was significant in both the tobacco 
and alcohol analysis was cinema marketing in LICs; the odds of individuals in LICs 
reporting exposure to tobacco and alcohol cinema marketing in the last six months 
were 3 times higher (p=0.003) and 86% lower (p<0.001) respectively. None of the 
other country income group comparisons for tobacco and alcohol marketing were 
significant.  
 




1+ marketing types 
All countries 45.2 68.3 
HIC 42.7 93.8 
UMIC  40.6 63.6 
LMIC  49.6 84.9 
LIC 47.1 27.9 
5+ marketing types 
All countries 10.0 22.4 
HIC 3.2 44.4 
UMIC  15.1 18.3 
LMIC  10.6 26.6 
LIC 6.2 4.1 
Traditional marketing 
Poster 
All countries 19.8 33.8 
HIC 8.9 48.9 
UMIC  22.2 29.3 
LMIC  19.2 41.9 
LIC 25.2 16.1 
Signage 
All countries 16.4 31.1 
HIC 10.8 39.4 
UMIC  17.9 31.9 
LMIC  14.1 36.7 
LIC 22.2 13.4 
TV 
All countries 29.6 56.8 
HIC 8.6 74.8 
UMIC  29.5 49.0 
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LMIC  38.9 80.3 
LIC 30.2 15.5 
Radio 
All countries 12.4 19.0 
HIC 1.8 24.8 
UMIC  16.3 16.4 
LMIC  15.9 27.9 
LIC 8.4 4.7 
Print media 
All countries 16.5 34.5 
HIC 25.4 80.2 
UMIC  20.0 34.1 
LMIC  12.6 27.2 
LIC 10.7 7.4 
Cinema 
All countries 4.8 7.1 
HIC 2.9 13.4 
UMIC  4.2 3.7 
LMIC  5.0 9.9 
LIC 7.0 3.4 
1+ traditional 
marketing types 
All countries 42.4 67.3 
HIC 34.6 92.7 
UMIC  37.9 62.3 
LMIC  47.5 84.3 
LIC 46.9 27.2 
Non-traditional marketing 
Sponsorship 
All countries 9.0 18.2 
HIC 10.7 44.2 
UMIC  11.8 14.9 
LMIC  7.9 16.5 
LIC 5.0 4.3 
Other products 
All countries 12.4 21.5 
HIC 11.7 40.7 
UMIC  15.1 18.8 
LMIC  14.3 24.5 
LIC 5.5 4.9 
Internet 
All countries 7.9 14.5 
HIC 8.1 30.7 
UMIC  12.7 15.2 
LMIC  7.6 13.7 
LIC 0.9 0.4 
Free samples 
All countries 4.2 8.1 
HIC 0.6 15.5 
UMIC  5.7 5.0 
LMIC  5.8 12.5 
LIC 1.6 0.5 
Vouchers 
All countries 4.2 10.7 
HIC 0.9 17.7 
UMIC  5.9 7.2 
LMIC  5.7 17.2 
LIC 1.3 0.5 
1+ non-traditional 
marketing types 
All countries 18.1 32.4 
HIC 23.6 65.7 
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UMIC  20.7 27.5 
LMIC  19.6 36.2 
LIC 7.1 6.5 
(the largest figures between tobacco and alcohol marketing are in 
bold) 
 
13.2 Marketing Regulation and Regulatory Compliance 
Chapters 10 and 12 outlined the extent of tobacco and alcohol marketing 
regulations in 16 diverse EPOCH countries, and presented the first analysis of 
levels of compliance with these regulations. The regulations explored are mostly 
comparable between the two industries. The tobacco marketing regulations that 
were included were: the sale of single cigarettes, billboard/outdoor advertising, POS 
advertising, national and international TV and radio advertising, local and 
international newspaper and magazine advertising, sponsored events, non-tobacco 
products identified with tobacco branding, internet advertising, free distribution, and 
promotional discounts. And the alcohol marketing regulations included were: 
billboard advertising, national and cable TV advertising, national and local radio 
advertising, print media advertising, cinema advertising, sponsorship of sporting and 
youth events, internet advertising, and free samples. This section will attempt to 
draw the findings together. 
13.2.1 Levels of marketing restrictions 
There were large differences in the number of tobacco and alcohol marketing bans 
in place within the EPOCH countries. All but four countries had over half of the 10 
tobacco marketing bans in place, but Pakistan only had four, China only had two, 
and Argentina and Zimbabwe (which were the only two countries which had not 
ratified the FCTC) had one and zero respectively. Eight countries also had partial 
bans in place (a ban on national but not international TV and radio advertising 
and/or a ban on local but not international newspaper and magazine advertising). 
This generally high number of tobacco marketing bans is in stark comparison to the 
number of full alcohol marketing bans in place. Only five EPOCH countries had any 
full bans (Sweden, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan), but all of these had over half of 
the eight bans in place. In addition, 11 countries had some restrictions in place 
(which were a combination of bans, partial statutory restrictions, voluntary 
restrictions, on all or some alcohol types (wine, beer, spirits)) (Table 40).  
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Only Sweden, Iran and Pakistan had proportionally more full alcohol than tobacco 
marketing bans in place; Sweden had 70% of tobacco marketing bans in place and 
100% of alcohol marketing bans, Iran had 80% of tobacco and 100% of alcohol 
marketing bans, and Pakistan had 40% of tobacco and 88% of alcohol marketing 
bans in place. Zimbabwe was the only country to have no full bans on either 
tobacco or alcohol marketing. 
 
Table 40: Comparison of the number of tobacco and alcohol marketing bans 

















HICs Canada 6 2 0 6 
Sweden 7 1 8 - 
UAE 6 2 no data 
UMICs Argentina 1 0 0 8 
Brazil 6 2 0 5 
Chile 8 1 0 0 
Malaysia 9 0 0 6 
Poland 7 1 0 8 
South Africa 6 2 0 0 
Turkey 8 0 5 2 
LMICs China 2 0 0 2 
Colombia 10 0 0 1 
Iran 8 1 8 - 
LICs India 8 0 6 2 
Pakistan 4 0 7 1 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 1 
*data from 2010; **data predominantly from 2008; ***only 
applicable to bans on national/international TV and radio 




Bans on sponsored events and the free distribution of tobacco were the most 
common tobacco marketing bans within the EPOCH countries (both were in place in 
13 countries), followed by billboard/outdoor advertising and single cigarette sale 
bans (both in place in 12 countries). Bans on billboard, national and cable TV, and 
national and local radio marketing were the most common alcohol marketing bans in 
place within the EPOCH countries (all three were in place in five countries).  
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13.2.2 Regulatory compliance 
Having formal regulation in place is the first step to controlling levels of marketing, 
but whether or not the regulations are complied with is of vital importance to their 
effectiveness. Regulatory compliance with both tobacco and alcohol regulations 
were found to be mixed by country, country income group, community type, and by 
regulation. 
The tobacco OGCS did not follow a pattern by country income group, although the 
OGCS was clearly higher in HICs – HICs had an OGCS of 89%, compared to an 
OGCS of 51% in UMICs, 35% in LMICs, and 68% in LICs. At the country level only 
the UAE had an OGCS of 100%, although it only had six of ten marketing bans in 
place (one of these bans applied to two EPOCH measures). Argentina had the 
lowest OGCS (0%, and it only had one ban in place), followed by Colombia which, 
although it had all ten bans in place (including two that applied to two EPOCH 
measures) only had an OGCS of 4%. Patterns in the alcohol OGCSs could not be 
assessed by country income group as only five countries had any full bans in place. 
At the country level, both Iran and Pakistan had an alcohol OGCS of 100%, 
although Iran was only assessed on compliance with one ban and both Iran and 
Pakistan ban alcohol to varying degrees[583, 584]. Sweden was shown to have the 
lowest OGCS; 28%, although it did have all eight bans in place (one of which was 
applied to two EPOCH measures). Due to the significant differences in the number 
of countries with full bans in place, it is hard to draw comparisons between the two 
industries. However, both sets of analysis show that simply having regulations in 
place does not automatically mean that they will have an impact; they must be 
strictly enforced for marketing to be reduced. 
Correlation coefficients between OGCSs and a range of potential determinants 
(GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, government stability, government 
effectiveness and government expenditure on health, plus tobacco control budget 
per million population and tobacco production for tobacco marketing only) were all 
significant for both tobacco and alcohol. For tobacco marketing, the correlations 
were all weak to moderate; the weakest with HDI rank (-0.2291) and the strongest 
with GDP per capita (0.5007). Each of the correlations were in the direction 
expected, i.e. that the OGCS increased with greater wealth, better governance, 
greater spending on health and tobacco control, and less reliance on tobacco 
production, apart from HDI rank which showed the opposite (although as showed 
above, this was a very weak correlation). For alcohol marketing, the correlations 
were stronger; the weakest with HDI rank (0.4879) and the strongest with 
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government effectiveness (-0.9564). However, the correlations were not in the 
direction expected and showed that OGCSs increased with less wealth, worse 
governance, and less spending on health, apart from HDI rank which was as 
expected (although as showed above, this was the weakest correlation). The 
possible reasons for this were outlined and included the small number of countries 
included, the perfect OGCSs in two LMIC/LIC countries with strict alcohol 
consumption restrictions (Iran and Pakistan), and the greater alcohol consumption 
and alcohol marketing levels in HICs and MICs compared to LICs. The Pearson 
correlation coefficients give an indication of the relationship between good 
compliance and a range of potential determinants, but only offer limited detail about 
the associations. Despite attempts to use regression models to further develop this 
analysis, the models were not reliable and hence were not included in Chapters 10 
and 12 (the methods, results and problems encountered are briefly outlined in 
Appendix 9 for interest). 
When looking at average marketing exposure by regulation type (Table 41), of the 
12 tobacco marketing types assessed only five showed a lower average rate of 
tobacco marketing within countries with a full or partial ban in place compared to 
those without a ban. This is in contrast to alcohol where all of the nine alcohol 
marketing types assessed showed a lower average rate of alcohol marketing within 
countries with a full ban or some restrictions in place compared to those without a 
ban. Additionally, levels of six of these alcohol marketing types increased as alcohol 
restrictions weakened; for example the number of alcohol adverts observed 
increased from 2.1 on average in countries with a full ban, to 3.4 in countries with 
some restrictions, to an average of 6.7 within countries with no ban.  
Alcohol had better compliance (lower exposure) than tobacco for most individual 
marketing types when average exposure in countries with full bans are compared 
(Table 41). Compliance was better for alcohol than tobacco for self-reported posters 
(18.9% alcohol, 20.5% tobacco), TV (23.5% alcohol, 34.4% tobacco), radio (3.5% 
alcohol, 14.1% tobacco), sponsorship (7.8% alcohol, 10.3% tobacco) and free 
samples (4.0% alcohol, 4.6% tobacco), whereas compliance was only better for 
tobacco than alcohol for observed adverts (1.6 tobacco, 2.1 alcohol), and for self-
reported print media (14.5% tobacco, 21.8% alcohol) and Internet (3.9% tobacco, 
14.2% alcohol). However, when countries with partial/some restrictions were 
combined with countries with full bans, better compliance was seen for tobacco than 
alcohol. Compliance was better for tobacco than alcohol for observed adverts (1.6 
tobacco, 2.6 alcohol), self-reported posters (20.5% tobacco, 29.0% alcohol), TV 
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(29.6% tobacco, 54.8% alcohol), radio (12.4% tobacco, 16.2% alcohol), print media 
(16.5% tobacco, 34.4% alcohol), sponsorship (10.3% tobacco, 11.6% alcohol) and 
Internet (3.9% tobacco, 10.8% alcohol), whereas compliance was only better for 
alcohol than tobacco for self-reported free samples (2.7% alcohol, 4.6% tobacco). 
 

























Full ban 2.1 
No ban 32.5% Some  3.4 
Adverts 
Ban 1.6 No ban 6.7 




Full ban 18.9% 
No ban 27.4% Some  41.2% 




Full ban 23.5% 
No ban 18.25% Some  73.4% 
TV 





Full ban 3.5% 
No ban 30.3% Some  24.2% 
Radio 





Full ban 21.8% 
No ban 11.8% Some  46.0% 
Print media 





Full ban 6.0% 
No ban 15.8% Some  7.4% 
Sponsorship 
Ban 10.3% No ban 7.7% 
No ban 6.1% 
Sponsorship 
Full ban 7.8% 
Other 
products 
Ban 12.9% Some  14.7% 




Full ban 14.2% 
No ban 12.0% Some  9.2% 
Free 
samples 
Ban 4.6% No ban 18.3% 
No ban 3.2% 
Free 
samples 
Full ban 4.0% 
Vouchers 
Ban 5.8% Some  2.1% 












PART 4: DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION 
 




Chapter 14: Discussion and 
Conclusion 
The TI and AI are similar in that they both produce products that are harmful to 
health and are subjected, to a greater or lesser degree, to regulations regarding the 
marketing of their products. Tobacco, however, is a product that has been severely 
stigmatised in a way that alcohol has not yet been; in many countries alcohol is 
ingrained into society and social practices, evidence relating to its negative health 
effects is not as developed, conclusive, or as long-standing as that for tobacco, and 
evidence relating to its political activity is also far less substantial.  
As stated in a recent editorial[10], there is “a pressing need to improve our 
understanding of how corporations contribute to this [the NCD] disease burden, both 
directly through the promotion of products damaging to health and indirectly through 
influence over public policy”; this thesis has addressed both of these elements.  
The main findings from all three major sections of this thesis (the systematic reviews 
of TI and AI political activity, the analysis of the tobacco and alcohol marketing 
environment, and the analysis of tobacco and alcohol regulation and industry 
compliance) will first be outlined, followed by a discussion of the thesis’ limitations 
and recommendations for future research. The chapter will then revisit the initial 
objectives of the thesis and outline how these were met, and conclude with a final 
comment on the policy implications of the work presented in this thesis. 
14.1 Summary of Findings 
14.1.1 Main findings and policy implications of the systematic 
reviews 
Significant commonalities were identified between TI and AI political activity, 
supporting previous research that suggests that ‘Big Tobacco’ and ‘Big Booze’ may 
operate in similar ways[334]. Between the two reviews, six main strategies were 
identified (information, constituency building, policy substitution, legal, constituency 
fragmentation and destabilization, and financial incentive) as were five main frames 
(negative unintended consequences, legal, regulatory redundancy, insufficient 
evidence, and complex policy area), with significant overlap between the two 
industries. For example, although the counting element of the reviews must be used 
with caution, some of the most commonly used tactics by both industries were direct 




lobbying, developing/promoting voluntary codes, and internal constituency building, 
and one of the most commonly used arguments was that there is insufficient 
evidence. Additionally, many of the arguments used by the TI and AI fitted within a 
cost-benefit meta-frame, where the costs of a proposed policy are overplayed and 
the benefits underplayed. Compared to these similarities, differences were minimal. 
For example, there was no evidence of the AI using the ‘constituency fragmentation 
and destabilization’ strategy or the TI using the ‘complex policy area’ frame. The 
main difference was that many of the arguments used by the AI were supported by 
CSR activities; this is perhaps due to the AI being at an earlier policy stage than the 
TI and therefore still able to use CSR activities globally to boost their credibility and 
form relationships ahead of regulation.  
Through the completion of these two systematic reviews, two novel taxonomies 
were developed; one for the categorisation of strategies/tactics and one for the 
categorisation of frames/arguments. These mark the first attempt to develop 
comprehensive, evidence-based taxonomies of corporate political activity. The 
reviews highlighted the weakness of Hillman and Hitt’s[357] framework by showing 
the naivety of the exchange theory-based approach, and found that the TI and AI 
use a wider range of tactics and arguments than existing taxonomies demonstrate. 
The work also showed that the tactics and arguments used were not geographically 
specific, suggesting they are transferable.  
In summary, the systematic reviews presented in Chapters 5 and 6 have confirmed 
substantial commonalities between TI and AI political activity, and found that TI and 
AI tactics and arguments are used across jurisdictions. The similarities of TI and AI 
political activity demonstrates that the taxonomies could also be applied to other 
policy areas or industries. The implications of these findings are as follows. First, 
policymakers and public health advocates now have detailed information regarding 
how the TI and AI may try to influence future marketing-related (and perhaps other) 
regulation. This information can potentially be used to prepare effective counter 
strategies and allow them to better target their limited resources in order to minimise 
industry’s impact on public health policy. Second, as tobacco policy is ahead of 
alcohol policy, the findings could potentially be used as an indication of the AI’s 
future political activity. This again means that resources can be better targeted, and 
perhaps means that AI political activity can be pre-empted and therefore countered 
more quickly. And finally, the similarities between TI and AI political activity 
highlights that perhaps the two industries should be treated in the same way, and 
similarities such as the use of misleading arguments and pushing for ineffective 




voluntary (rather than binding) regulation suggests that alcohol policy would benefit 
from excluding the AI from policy discussions and enhancing transparency 
(supporting calls for an FCTC-equivalent for alcohol). Enforcing the 
recommendations of global treaties is paramount to their success, but six years 
after strong guidelines were adopted in 2008[330] for the implementation of Article 
5.3 of the FCTC (which focuses on removing the TI from the policymaking process 
(Box 3)) there are concerns that many governments are still engaging with the 
TI[376]. Although the FCTC is seen as the “most powerful tool” available for tackling 
NCDs globally[328], and its reference to the role that industry plays was 
unprecedented, an FCTC-equivalent for alcohol will only work if its 
recommendations are embraced globally and enforced (and it has been argued that 
the political will to implement such strong policies does not currently exist[328]).  
14.1.2 Main findings and policy implications of the tobacco and 
alcohol marketing environment analysis 
High levels of tobacco and alcohol marketing were found globally, although alcohol 
marketing (both observed and self-reported) was much more prevalent than tobacco 
marketing in the EPOCH countries. Specifically, for almost all measures (including 
the composite measures) there was more alcohol than tobacco marketing across all 
countries combined, in HICs, UMICs and LMICs. Only in LICs did tobacco 
marketing outweigh alcohol marketing. The number of outlets observed was the 
only measure that did not fit this overall pattern; there were more observed tobacco 
than alcohol outlets across all countries combined and in all country income groups.  
The lower level of tobacco marketing may reflect the impact of FCTC restrictions on 
tobacco advertising, and the lack of binding global, and in many cases national, 
restrictions on alcohol advertising. However, the Global Strategy does recommend 
that all WHO Member States (which includes each of the EPOCH countries[591]) 
restrict alcohol marketing. As shown above, the only marketing measure that was 
not lower for tobacco was observed outlets. This may reflect the fact that the FCTC 
does not address outlet density, meaning there are no requirements for countries to 
restrict the number of tobacco outlets, and the lower number of alcohol outlets is 
perhaps due to some nations having restrictions on alcohol sales (in the form of 
monopolies and licences). The lower levels of observed and self-reported alcohol 
marketing in LICs compared to other country income groups may also reflect their 
earlier stage of the alcohol epidemic, and the greater existence of informal markets 
such as the production of home-made and home-brewed alcohol[14, 73, 586]. 
These types of products would not be marketed, and would not therefore be 




captured by EPOCH – the level of marketing does not, therefore, necessarily reflect 
product availability.  
Some of the significant results from the statistical analysis were as follows. 
Compared with HICs the observed number of tobacco adverts per community was 
81 times higher in LICs, the observed number of tobacco outlets per community was 
2.5 times higher in both LICs and LMICs and the observed number of alcohol 
outlets was over 4 times higher in LMICs, and the odds of self-reported exposure to 
at least one form of traditional tobacco marketing were almost 10 times higher in 
LICs. It was also found that for all but two tobacco measures (self-reported TV and 
radio marketing), there was significantly less tobacco and alcohol marketing in rural 
than urban communities, and that this urban/rural difference was greater for alcohol 
than tobacco marketing for all but one measure (vouchers). Overall the findings 
showed high levels of both tobacco and alcohol marketing. Across all countries 
combined, 10% and 22% of individuals reported seeing five or more types of 
tobacco and alcohol marketing respectively in the last six months, and 45% and 
68% of individuals reported seeing at least one type of tobacco and alcohol 
marketing respectively.  
The implications of the EPOCH analysis presented in Chapters 9 and 11 are as 
follows. First, the high levels of tobacco marketing globally, despite FCTC 
ratification, indicate to the WHO and to national policymakers that the legally binding 
controls on marketing included within the FCTC are not, in many cases, being 
enforced or complied with. This therefore provides policymakers with the necessary 
information about where enforcement needs to be strengthened and in which 
countries compliance needs to be carefully monitored. Similarly, the very high levels 
of alcohol marketing indicate to policymakers that countries need to urgently restrict 
alcohol marketing. This is despite the 2010 Global Strategy having made 
recommendations that all WHO Member States (which includes all of the EPOCH 
countries) restrict alcohol marketing. Second, tobacco marketing was found to be 
highest in lower income countries, which perhaps indicates that some lower income 
countries lack capacity to implement and enforce controls on tobacco marketing. It 
is therefore important that these countries are encouraged to utilise the provisions 
within the FCTC (Articles 22 and 26) that require richer Parties to collaborate and 
provide financial assistance to developing or transitional countries to help them fulfil 
their FCTC obligations. Alcohol marketing was found to be least prevalent in lower 
income countries which, given that alcohol is not yet a major cause of death and 
disability in LICs, policymakers have the opportunity to introduce alcohol marketing 




regulations now in order to help minimise the spread of the alcohol epidemic. 
Overall, the high levels of marketing show that there is an urgent need for countries 
to develop, implement, and enforce comprehensive controls on tobacco and alcohol 
marketing.  
14.1.3 Main findings and policy implications of the analysis of 
tobacco and alcohol marketing regulation and levels of industry 
compliance 
The FCTC appears to have had a positive impact on the extent of tobacco 
marketing regulation, as the two EPOCH countries which had not ratified the FCTC 
had the fewest marketing regulations in place. However, the number of tobacco 
marketing regulations that a country had in place did not appear to increase with the 
number of years since FCTC ratification. The analysis also found that two thirds of 
included countries had no full alcohol marketing bans in place. The extent of 
tobacco and alcohol marketing regulation did not appear to be linked with country 
income group. 
Where tobacco and alcohol marketing bans were in place, compliance was often 
poor. Exposure to tobacco marketing was frequently higher in countries with full or 
partial bans in place compared to those without a ban, although the results were 
mixed. This suggests that either some specific tobacco marketing restrictions are 
harder to enforce or deliberately not complied with, or perhaps that regulation has 
recently been introduced in countries with particularly high rates of specific types of 
marketing and enforcement is still being refined. Comparatively, exposure to all nine 
types of alcohol marketing was lower in countries with full bans or some restrictions 
in place compared to those without a ban. This suggests that restrictions on alcohol 
marketing are effective at reducing marketing levels, or that regulations have been 
predominantly introduced by countries where rates of specific types of marketing 
are already low. Causality cannot be inferred from this cross-sectional study, but 
there is a wealth of evidence regarding the effectiveness of tobacco and alcohol 
marketing bans[2, 14, 17, 158, 163, 164, 221, 317-319, 345].  
The implications of the EPOCH analysis presented in Chapters 10 and 12 are as 
follows. First, the number of tobacco marketing bans in each country varied, and 
compliance was mostly poor (exposure to tobacco marketing was also commonly 
higher within countries with a full or partial ban compared to those without). This 
highlights that there is an urgent need for countries to implement and then properly 
enforce national regulations and the legally binding controls on marketing included 




within the FCTC. Second, there was a general lack of comprehensive alcohol 
marketing regulations, and where there were comprehensive bans compliance was 
often poor (although exposure to all forms of alcohol marketing was lower in 
countries with a full ban or some restrictions compared to those with no restrictions). 
Due to the significant role that alcohol consumption plays in the major NCDs, this 
highlights an urgent need for countries to implement and then enforce marketing 
regulations, such as with the introduction of an FCTC-equivalent for alcohol. 
Additionally, many countries had restrictions on the marketing of only some forms of 
alcohol, but given that all types of alcohol are harmful policymakers should work to 
ensure marketing restrictions are applied to all alcohol products. Overall, the 
analysis showed that simply having regulations in place does not necessarily have 
an impact unless they are strongly enforced. The continued monitoring of 
compliance is therefore of huge importance in understanding and identifying what is 
actually occurring on the ground. 
14.2 Limitations and Future Research 
14.2.1 Limitations  
The aim of this thesis was to develop understanding of the tobacco and alcohol 
industries as determinants of health. This has been achieved through focussing on 
the main way in which the TI and AI communicate with potential and current 
customers: marketing. TI and AI marketing has been explored through the 
completion of two systematic reviews investigating how the two industries attempt to 
influence marketing-related regulation, and through analysis of their marketing 
practices and levels of compliance with marketing-related regulation. However, 
there are many difficulties in attempting to measure the impact of industry on health. 
The limitations of each piece of analysis presented in this thesis were outlined within 
each chapter’s discussion section, and the limitations of EPOCH (the data upon 
which Chapters 9-12 are based on) were outlined in Chapter 8.  
The limitations of the systematic reviews highlighted the significant problems 
encountered when attempting to examine and comprehend the plethora of tactics 
and arguments used globally by the TI and AI. For example, publication bias 
affected which tactics and arguments were ultimately included within the reviews, 
and the lack of information regarding industry’s attempts to influence marketing 
regulations within the included articles meant that little context was provided and the 
success or failure of individual tactics and arguments could not be assessed.  




The limitations of the EPOCH data and subsequent analysis showed some of the 
difficulties of attempting to quantify and understand the corporation as a determinant 
of health, and the difficulties of attempting to measure the prevalence of industry 
marketing and levels of industry compliance with regulation across and within 
multiple jurisdictions. For example, one limitation of the EPOCH study is that, 
although diverse[549], the 16 countries included were not necessarily representative 
of LICs, MICs, and HICs generally, nor were the selection of communities within 
each country necessarily representative of all communities meaning that the results 
could not reliably be extrapolated to all communities within a country or to other 
countries in any of the income groups. A second limitation is that the sample size 
(both the number of communities and number of individuals) varied by country and 
more uncertainty would be expected in an estimate for a country in which only a few 
communities are sampled. And third, ensuring that the sampling and data collection 
methods were comparable and equal between countries and communities was not 
simple, however researchers were trained and a detailed manual was produced to 
try and minimise any country- or community-level differences. 
However, despite the limitations, the systematic reviews have significantly added to 
the sparse literature on TI and AI political activity, and have led to the development 
of two novel and comprehensive taxonomies which now also have the potential to 
be applied to other policy areas or industries, and the results from the EPOCH 
analysis have added significantly to the sparse existing literature on levels of TI and 
AI marketing and levels of regulatory compliance. 
14.2.2 Suggestions for future research 
In order to build upon the significant and important findings of this thesis, there are a 
number of suggestions for areas of future research. 
First, the two systematic reviews presented in this thesis both focussed on 
marketing regulations, and so it is now hoped that the new taxonomies developed 
can be expanded to cover other policy areas related to tobacco and alcohol. It is 
also hoped that the taxonomies can then be applied to additional industries related 
to NCDs, such as the food industry which also produces products with the potential 
to damage health.  
Second, as with the systematic reviews, it is now hoped that the EPOCH analysis 
presented within this thesis can be applied to the marketing of other products that 
have an impact on NCDs such as food industry marketing (data on which is also 
collected in the EPOCH study). EPOCH is due to be repeated every five years, 




within the same countries and communities, and with the same individuals, 
therefore ultimately becoming a longitudinal study. It is therefore hoped that the 
analysis presented in this thesis will be repeated, incorporating the new rounds of 
data collection in order to assess marketing trends over time. Longitudinal data 
would also allow the relationship between marketing levels and the impact on health 
behaviours such as smoking or drinking to be explored, thereby advancing 
understanding of the importance of industry (through industry marketing) as a 
determinant of health. Causality is difficult to accurately infer, but this analysis would 
be interesting across such a wide range of diverse countries. Additional countries, 
such as Bangladesh and Palestine, are also now part of EPOCH (data from these 
countries were not available in time for this work) so the analysis presented could 
also be repeated with inclusion of these additional countries, as additional countries 
will help to ensure robustness. The regression models attempted with the EPOCH 
compliance data could also be repeated once additional countries are added to the 
study. Overall, as this thesis has focused on providing an overview of the marketing 
environment and levels of industry compliance with marketing regulations across 
and within multiple countries, future research could now aim to develop 
understanding of why the results are as they are at the national level. International 
agencies, such as the WHO, or national governments may wish to investigate why, 
for example, a particularly high percentage of individuals reported exposure to print 
media tobacco marketing in Sweden, or why there are such large differences in the 
amount of alcohol marketing regulation between countries of a similar income. 
In light of some of these limitations, and because secondary data analysis relies on 
the necessary data having been collected, there are also some recommendations to 
further develop and improve future EPOCH data collection. First, individuals were 
only asked whether or not they saw certain types of marketing in the last six 
months, not how often they saw it. By also asking how often each type of marketing 
was observed, researchers and policymakers would have a much better indication 
of total marketing exposure. Second, as the self-reported data is entirely 
retrospective it would be beneficial for some prospective data to be collected, for 
example through the completion of a diary over a week or month. This would 
eliminate or significantly reduce the possibility of recall bias. Third, EPOCH only 
includes adults from age 35, but as individuals who smoke or drink usually begin 
doing so in adolescence, it would be beneficial to also include a younger population 
so that the relationship between levels of marketing and smoking/drinking initiation 
could be explored. Forth, as there are limits to how well a 1km walk can represent 




an entire community, it would be beneficial for a longer walk, or multiple walks, to 
take place within each community. This is, however, both finance and time 
dependent. Finally, it would be helpful if additional data were collected regarding the 
marketing observed and reported, specifically which type of alcohol the AI marketing 
related to. This information would have been extremely beneficial when attempting 
to assess AI regulatory compliance as the majority of alcohol marketing regulations 
are specific to alcohol type. 
14.3 Addressing the Initial Objectives 
This thesis has met all of its original objectives: 
1. To collate and describe background information and data relevant to 
objectives 2-6. 
This objective was met in Part 1 through an extensive literature review covering the 
relevance of tobacco and alcohol (and the TI and AI) to health outcomes, TI and AI 
marketing practices and marketing’s impact on smoking and drinking initiation and 
prevalence, and the global tobacco and alcohol marketing-related regulatory 
environment and how the TI and AI attempt to influence it. This Part showed why 
the TI and AI should be considered determinants of health, and highlighted gaps in 
the literature for this thesis to address. 
2. To use the existing literature to systematically review the ways in which the 
tobacco and alcohol industries have attempted to influence marketing 
policies globally, identifying similarities and differences by industry and 
geography. 
This objective was met in Part 2 through the completion of two novel systematic 
reviews. The research collated for objective 1 showed that, although there had been 
multiple attempts to list and categorise corporate tactics, and minimal work 
exploring corporate arguments, systematic reviews of the arguments and tactics 
used by the TI and AI when attempting to influence marketing regulations had not 
previously been completed. Both of the reviews presented in Part 2 have been 
published or are under review by peer-reviewed journals (the TI review has been 
published in PLOS ONE and the AI review is under review at Addiction). 
Significant commonalities were identified between TI and AI political activity. It was 
found that the TI and AI use a similar narrow range of consistent, and non-
geographically specific, tactics and arguments when attempting to influence 




marketing regulation. It was also found that many of the arguments used by the TI 
and AI fit within a cost-benefit meta-frame, where the costs of a proposed policy are 
overplayed and the benefits underplayed. The more advanced nature of tobacco 
control policy also means that the TI systematic review can potentially be used as 
an indication of the AI’s future political activity, especially when they are less able to 
rely on CSR-related strategies as they do currently. The findings from these 
systematic reviews provide policymakers with a greater understanding of the range 
of tactics the TI and AI may use when attempting to influence policy, and the types 
of arguments they are most likely to make when they do. 
3. To develop taxonomies to categorise the tactics and arguments used by 
the tobacco and alcohol industries when they attempt to influence 
marketing policies, and to develop the taxonomies in a way which allows 
them to be applied to other policy areas and industries. 
This objective was also met in Part 2, through the development of two taxonomies; 
one for industry strategies/tactics and another for industry frames/arguments. The 
research collated for objective 1 showed that, although there had been multiple 
attempts to list and categorise corporate tactics, and minimal work exploring 
corporate arguments, taxonomies of corporate tactics and arguments had not been 
developed. 
Through the application of these taxonomies to two industries (initially the TI, 
followed by the AI), this thesis has demonstrated the ability of the taxonomies to be 
applied to different industries, and has demonstrated the political and scholarly 
value of doing so. It is understood (through personal correspondence between my 
primary supervisor, Professor Anna Gilmore, and Dr Gary Sacks and Professor 
Boyd Swinburn at Deakin University, Australia) that the taxonomies are currently 
being applied to the activities of the food industry. 
4. To use new data to examine levels of tobacco and alcohol industry 
marketing across and within a diverse range of countries, the nature of this 
marketing, and the extent to which it varies by industry, country, level of 
development (high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, 
and low income), and urban and rural communities. 
This objective was met in Chapters 9 and 11. The research completed for objective 
1 showed that there was very little literature on the amount of tobacco and alcohol 
marketing globally, and no studies which formally compared levels of marketing 




across and within a diverse group of countries. EPOCH data were used to examine 
levels of observed and self-reported tobacco marketing between and within 16 
countries, and observed and self-reported alcohol marketing between and within 13 
countries (three countries were removed due to their significant alcohol restrictions). 
Data were presented for individual countries (split into urban and rural communities) 
and for country income groups. Statistical tests were also used to formally compare 
marketing levels between urban and rural communities and between country 
income groups. The tobacco marketing environment chapter (Chapter 9) will shortly 
be submitted to The Lancet for consideration. 
High levels of tobacco marketing were identified, despite the FCTC having been 
ratified in all but two EPOCH countries; 45% of individuals reported exposure to one 
or more types of marketing, and 10% of individuals reported exposure to five or 
more types. Tobacco marketing was highest in LICs, and highest in urban 
communities. Even higher levels of alcohol marketing were identified across the 
EPOCH counties; 68% of individuals reported exposure to one or more types of 
marketing, and 22% of individuals reported exposure to five or more types. Alcohol 
marketing was lowest in LICs, and highest in urban communities. The findings from 
this analysis showed that both TI and AI marketing was highly prevalent across the 
EPOCH countries and that, in order to protect health, there was an urgent need for 
countries to implement and enforce comprehensive controls on marketing. 
5. To explore the extent of tobacco and alcohol marketing regulations across 
a diverse range of countries. 
This objective was met in Chapters 10 and 12. Data regarding the presence of 
marketing regulation was collected from official sources for the 16 EPOCH 
countries. 
It was found that tobacco marketing regulation was present in all but one country, 
but there was no pattern in the amount of regulation by country income group. The 
FCTC appeared to have had a positive impact on the extent of marketing regulation, 
as the two countries which had not ratified the FCTC had the fewest marketing 
regulations in place in 2010. It was also found that comprehensive alcohol 
marketing regulation was absent from two thirds of the EPOCH countries, and again 
there was no pattern by country income group. This research showed that more 
tobacco and alcohol marketing regulation needed to be implemented across the 
EPOCH countries, even including more tobacco marketing regulations in counties 
which had ratified the FCTC five or more years earlier. 




6. To use new data to explore the extent to which the tobacco and alcohol 
industries comply with marketing regulations across and within a diverse 
range of countries, identifying whether this varies by industry, country, level 
of development (high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, 
and low income), and urban and rural communities. 
This objective was also met in Chapters 10 and 12. The research completed to 
meet objective 1 showed that there was minimal existing literature on TI and AI 
compliance with marketing regulations globally. Where marketing bans were in 
place, EPOCH data were used to assess levels of compliance with regulation; each 
country was assigned two compliance scores (one for urban communities and one 
for rural).  
Compliance with tobacco and alcohol marketing regulations was mixed by country, 
country income group, community type, and by regulation. There were no distinct 
patterns by country income group, although compliance with tobacco marketing 
regulations appeared to be best in HICs. Exposure to tobacco marketing was 
frequently higher in countries with full or partial bans in place compared to those 
without a ban, although the results were mixed, whereas exposure to all nine types 
of alcohol marketing was lower in countries with full bans or some restrictions in 
place compared to those without a ban. A range of potentially important 
determinants of good compliance with tobacco and alcohol marketing regulations 
were also identified, although the associations were not in the direction expected for 
alcohol. Overall this analysis showed that much more needs to be done to enforce 
tobacco and alcohol marketing-related regulations and to ensure industry 
compliance. 
7. To explore the implications of the findings for global tobacco and alcohol 
control policy. 
This chapter and the discussion sections of Chapters 5, 6, and 9-12 meet this 
objective.  
14.4 Overall Policy Implications and Final Comment 
Corporate profit and public health currently fundamentally conflict. Corporations are 
required, by law, to maximise profits for their shareholders and the TI and AI are 
therefore legally required to sell as many tobacco and alcohol products as possible, 
“regardless of the often harmful consequences it might cause to others”[99], and 




must actively oppose regulation that could reduce sales or affect profits. 
Corporations have no obligation to consider public health in any of their decision 
making, and will only do so if it is beneficial to their bottom line.  
The TI and AI are increasingly globalised and are able to operate across multiple 
jurisdictions thanks, in part, to international trade treaties. Their vast size means that 
they have huge resources available to them, for example TI revenue in 2010 was 
more than the GDP of all but 18 countries[116]. Neither public health advocates nor 
policymakers can match the level of resources available to the TI and AI, and this 
makes countering TI and AI political activity very difficult. It is therefore vital that 
public health advocates and policymakers are armed with as much knowledge 
about the activity of the TI and AI as possible so that they can target their limited 
resources effectively to have the largest impact. The systematic reviews presented 
in Part 2 have significantly contributed to this knowledge by showing that the two 
industries use a similar narrow range of consistent, and non-geographically specific, 
tactics and arguments when attempting to influence marketing regulation. The more 
advanced nature of tobacco control policy also means that the TI systematic review 
can potentially be used as an indication of the AI’s future political activity, especially 
when they are less able to rely on CSR-related strategies as they do currently (as 
shown by the AI systematic review). 
Analysis of EPOCH data presented in this thesis has also found that levels of TI and 
AI marketing are high globally. The ubiquitous nature of tobacco marketing was in 
spite of FCTC ratification (all but two of the included countries had ratified the 
FCTC). Statistical analysis found that tobacco marketing was greatest in lower 
income countries and in urban, rather than rural, communities. Alcohol marketing 
was found to be even more common than tobacco marketing, and was lowest in 
LICs and again highest in urban communities. The high levels of marketing 
identified were in part due to poor compliance with tobacco marketing regulations 
and a complete lack of comprehensive alcohol marketing-related regulations in 
almost all of the included countries. Given what this thesis has shown, governments 
need to ensure that there is sufficient regulation in place and that it is appropriately 
enforced to ensure that TI and AI marketing is minimised. As “any outcome other 
than profit for investors is immaterial”[11], corporations need to be compelled, 
through effective regulation, to prevent or reduce activities (such as marketing) that 
drive profits but have a negative impact on public health.  




This thesis began with reference to the 2011 UN High-Level Meeting on NCDs 
which had identified tobacco and alcohol use as two of the four major risk factors 
common to all four of the main global NCDs. In December 2013, the UN released a 
report which outlined the progress that had been made by countries in addressing 
the objectives agreed at the Meeting to “reduce premature mortality and avoidable 
morbidity of non-communicable diseases, and mitigate their impacts”[319] in 
preparation for a comprehensive review to begin in 2014. Restricting or banning 
tobacco and alcohol marketing were identified as two of the most cost-effective 
interventions available. Almost all of the countries surveyed had a plan in place to 
address tobacco use, whereas many fewer countries had a plan in place to address 
the harmful use of alcohol[319]. The UN acknowledged that progress to reduce 
NCDs “has been insufficient and highly uneven” and recommended that countries 
should implement cost-effective interventions such as restrictions on 
marketing[319]; this thesis supports these findings. 
Many academics have suggested that countries should work towards a ‘tobacco 
endgame’[594-599] where, for example, smoking prevalence is zero (or close to 
zero), sales of tobacco are banned, and tobacco use is denormalised within society. 
Although the FCTC is seen as the “most powerful tool” available for tackling NCDs 
globally[328] and has the potential, through its numerous Articles, to end or 
significantly reduce tobacco consumption globally, this is only likely if its 
recommendations are implemented and actively enforced. Although, through 
analysis in this thesis, TI marketing levels were found to be lower than levels of AI 
marketing, compliance with tobacco marketing regulations was still often poor. Much 
has been achieved with the development of the FCTC but, despite having 179 
Parties[326], this thesis has shown that in 2010 there was still much more to do; 
additional tobacco marketing regulation needed to be implemented in many 
countries which had ratified the FCTC, and the WHO, national governments, and 
public health groups need to focus on significantly improving enforcement of the 
legally-binding marketing-related recommendations of the FCTC. 
Currently it would be almost impossible to remove alcohol from society and ban its 
consumption as in many countries alcohol is ingrained into society and social 
practices. Perhaps the ‘endgame’ for alcohol should instead be to reduce 
consumption levels and eliminate highly dangerous binge drinking. However, as 
this, in many countries, would require a shift in cultural norms perhaps consumers 
need to be made more aware of the harmful effects of even minimal alcohol 
consumption (through, for example, mass-media campaigns) to firstly help reduce 




levels of dangerous alcohol consumption, and secondly to give policymakers 
additional constituent support to assist in the implementation of alcohol-related 
policy. As this thesis has shown, AI marketing has been linked to increases in 
drinking initiation and prevalence. By banning alcohol marketing, or at very least 
restricting it to responsible marketing (for example, banning marketing that targets 
youth (including products such as alcopops and advertising at times and on 
mediums with a large youth audience), selling products below cost, and selling and 
packaging products in ways that encourage purchasing and consuming larger 
amounts) huge benefits to health could be seen; the alcohol systematic review 
showed that the responsible consumption of alcohol is even something that the AI 
themselves claim to promote. Research presented in this thesis has shown that in 
2010 there was comparatively little alcohol marketing in LICs. This means that 
national governments and the international community have the opportunity to 
intervene and restrict marketing in these countries now, as this could prevent 
alcohol marketing from increasing in these countries and the alcohol epidemic from 
escalating further globally. Due to the globalisation of the alcohol epidemic, a global 
approach is needed; AI marketing needs to be controlled globally and regulations 
need to be enforced. 
Both tobacco and alcohol consumption cause a large proportion of global deaths 
and disability. The two systematic reviews presented in this thesis showed that both 
the TI and AI actively attempt to influence the development of policy globally 
through the use of similar and often underhand tactics and arguments. Due to their 
legal obligation to maximise profits for their shareholders, this is not unexpected; 
both the TI and AI must work to stop, diminish, or delay any regulation that would 
potentially be detrimental to their business and profits. Part 1 showed that the TI 
and AI use similar methods to market their products, and analysis of EPOCH data 
showed that tobacco and alcohol marketing was very high globally. It also showed 
that compliance with marketing regulations was often poor. This thesis has therefore 
shown that, in order to reduce the harm cause by tobacco and alcohol products, the 
vector of these epidemics (the TI and AI) must urgently be considered as a 
significant factor in the ‘determinants of health’, echoing recommendations from 
academics such as Wiist[11] and Freudenberg[13, 88]. This thesis has also shown 
the importance and necessity of keeping both industries away from the development 
of policy, and to strongly enforce marketing policy globally; it cannot be assumed 
that the TI or AI will comply with regulations.  




In light of these huge similarities, it seems surprising that the global community 
deals with the two industries in such different ways. Until the AI is removed from the 
policymaking process and there is a global approach to tackle AI marketing, the 
alcohol epidemic will likely worsen. I therefore echo calls for the introduction of an 
FCTC-equivalent for alcohol (a FCAC), as if it is properly enforced, it would compel 
countries to protect policymaking from the vested interests of the AI and to 
implement comprehensive alcohol marketing restrictions. It is recommended that 
the AI be subjected to similar regulations as the TI sooner rather than later, as 
waiting will allow the AI to further influence national and international policy and 
allow them to market their products even more widely. Alcohol policy also has the 
opportunity to learn from the difficulties and successes associated with international 
tobacco control policy and the development of the FCTC.  
As research into the health impacts of alcohol consumption is not as developed, 
conclusive, or as long-standing as that for tobacco, it is hoped that more large-scale 
studies will be completed over the coming years to add to this body of literature. 
Similarly, additional studies of AI political activity are needed to add to the limited 
existing literature on how the AI attempts to influence policy. Without definitive and 
indisputable findings in both of these areas, developing and implementing national, 
and especially global, policy to reduce the harm caused by alcohol (for example 
through the curbing of industry marketing and removal of the AI from the policy-
making process) will be difficult. It would also be likely to be met with strong 
opposition from the AI, associated industries, and even from governments due to 
the reduction of an often large and important revenue stream. 
In summary, this thesis has shown the value of studying how the TI and AI operate 
globally, and the vital importance of monitoring levels of marketing and compliance 
with marketing-related regulation. Further work and analysis of this type will be 
important in the future to build on this thesis’ findings, to ensure better compliance 
with the legally-binding recommendations of the FCTC, and to help support calls for 
















Appendix 1: Tobacco Industry Systematic Review Data 
Extraction 







What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
In 1991, proposals for national legislation to introduce health warnings [on 
packs] resurfaced. 
Tactics used 
In 1994, the Philippines Industry Association commenced a lawsuit against 
regulation requiring that the side panel health warning be replaced by back 








What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General youth access regulations 
Tactics used 
The tobacco industry and retailers anticipated from the program’s inception 
that We Card could be used to block stronger policies restricting youth 
access to tobacco. Industry surveys in 1996 found that retailers saw this as 
an excellent use of the program…. Similarly, Tobacco Institute lobbyists 
viewed the program as primarily political, noting in a 1997 report: ‘‘Once 
again, work by the WE CARD Coalition has been instrumental in state 
efforts to enact reasonable youth access laws.’’ As an example of 








What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
1. UK: The Health Act (2008/9) 
2. Canada: Plain packaging (1993) 
3. Hong Kong: Plain packaging (1995) 
4. European Union: Ban on ‘light’ and ‘mild’ (2000) 
5. UK: Tessa Jowell’s Private Members Bill and the Lewis Bill (1994) 
6. UK: Tobacco Advertising Bill (2000) 
Tactics used 
1.  
When Alan Johnson, former secretary of state for health, launched the 
consultation on the future of tobacco control in Britain in may 2008, the 
tobacco companies, Philip Morris, British American Tobacco, Imperial 
Tobacco and Japan Tobacco  International responded to the consultation 
paper to argue the case against the introduction of plain packaging….Front 
groups also made the same arguments: The European Communities Trade 
Mark Association (ECTA), The International Trademark Association (INTA), 
British Brands Group, The Anti Counterfeiting Group, Business Action to 
Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP), Trans Atlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD), Global Intellectual Property Centre, Tobacco Control 
Accountability Initiative, Markenverband, Nude Brand Creation. 
 
Imperial Tobacco wrote to the Department of Health and members of the 




legislation barring branded packs.  
 
2.  
The tobacco companies acted together. In 1993 a “Plain Pack Group” was 
formed representing British American Tobacco, RJR Tobacco International, 
Gallaher, Reemtsma, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges, Imperial, Rothmans 
International Services and Philip Morris International. 
 
The tobacco companies came together in 1993 to counter the threat of plain 
packaging in Canada and developed a common strategy. They decided to 
create a ‘plain packs bible’. John Luik was commissioned by the Plain Pack 
Group to do this. 
 
Other “front men” recruited by the Plain Pack Group included John Murphy 
and Iain Mills. Mills was a Conservative Party politician in the United 
Kingdom, and in 1994 Mills advised Rothmans on how to influence 
parliamentarians against packaging reform. This was during a period when 




The Lewis-Jowell Working Group was convened, with all the major tobacco 
companies taking their part in setting out a plan of action. It was decided 
that the TMA would write to all potential supporters, while the companies 
would contact those MPs with whom they already had a relationship. They 
listed MPs they planned to target for support and advice from both sides of 
the house but notably John Carlisle, who later became the TMA’s Public 
Affairs Director, and Iain Mills who offered them advice around the time of 
the Barron Bill. 
 
6. 
The tobacco industry also encouraged a range of other organisations 
including the British Brands Group, Association of Convenience stores and 
the Advertising  Association to lobby the Government on the economic 
impact of an advertising ban…. seeing the writing on the wall in 2001, the 




Imperial Tobacco wrote to the Department of Health and members of the 
house of lords giving notice that it would seek judicial review of any 
legislation barring branded packs. The letter stated, “Imperial Tobacco is 
also concerned about the continued erosion and potential expropriation of 
our valuable intellectual property rights… Regulation that requires plain 
packaging will expropriate valuable corporate assets in which the company 
and its shareholders have invested for more than a century and risks 
placing the UK government in breach of a range of legal and treaty 
obligations that relate to intellectual property rights, international trade and 
EU law.” ... Japan Tobacco international (JTI) responded saying that plain 
packaging would be “in breach” of TRIPs and the Paris Convention.... BAT 
responded saying that Intellectual property rights are ‘a cornerstone of 
economic activity’, hence both their significant value to their owners and the 
wider economy and the need for them to be protected effectively at both the 
domestic and international levels. 
 
The UK Government is not entitled to interfere with trade mark and related 
intellectual property rights in respect of lawful products by reference to the 
nature of those products, because such an interference would be contrary 
to the harmonised EU and international system of trade mark protection 








Together tobacco companies developed key messages including: 
 “Plain packaging will do nothing to achieve its [the Canadian 
Government’s] anti smoking objectives at considerable potential cost 
in jobs, international trade problems and smuggling”  
 “Plain packaging may be illegal” 
 Plain packaging is “merely harassment of smokers”  
 There was no evidence that plain packaging would reduce smoking 
and “ could, in fact, have the opposite effect of that intended”  
 “The assumption is that changes in the packaging will lead to changes 
in behaviour. There is no clear evidence that removing the trade mark, 
or dispensing with the pack design, will affect behaviour.” 
 “Prohibiting the use of trademarks is contrary to GATT” 
 “Banning the use of any registered logo, design, pattern or trade mark 
amounts to censorship”  
 “ ...a trademark to be registered and protected, must be used. If use is 
prohibited, the protection afforded by registration may not be 
available.” 
 Compromising tobacco trademarks would interfere with an ‘orderly 
tobacco market’, result in increased counterfeiting and smuggling and 
have significant economic consequences 
 if adopted this would be an approach that might eventually be applied 
to alcohol and other products 
 
3.  
In 1995 the Tobacco Institute of Hong Kong told the Hong Kong 
government that its proposed smoking (Public health) (Amendment) Bill 
would diminish commercial value of trademarks and may violate the Paris 
Convention, GATT and TRIPS. 
 
4. 
In 2000 The Confederation of European Community Cigarette 
Manufacturers ltd briefed the EU in response to the proposed ban on light 
and mild descriptors and claimed it was a violation of TRIPS and the Paris 






What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Government efforts to regulate tobacco promotion and health warnings 
Tactics used 
One strategy proposed the adoption of codes of practice for cigarette 
marketing, TMD advertising, sponsorship, and sampling. In December 1992 
the members of CMTM, namely Rothmans of Pall Mall (M), Malaysian 
Tobacco Company, RJ Reynolds (M), and Godfrey Phillips (M) signed an 








What policy is the TI attempting to influence 








US First Amendment for protection against advertising restrictions on both 
alcohol and tobacco products. “Truthful advertising about legal products is 





What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General youth restrictions 
Tactics used 
In 1991 the Philip Morris group began ongoing work on a PMI marketing 
code of practice. This involved PMI’s presidents and vice presidents, senior 
counsel, regional presidents, field marketing staff, and senior management 
at PM Corporation. The code was intended to be used, particularly in 
lobbying, to gain a public relations advantage by promoting PMI as 
responsible towards youth, and to  simultaneously protect PMI’s ability to be 
‘‘competitive and creative’’ in its marketing. 
 
The public version of PMI’s youth policy was instead encapsulated in a 
brochure, entitled ‘‘A global commitment to responsible marketing’’, for 
‘‘legislators, journalists and decision makers from around the world’’. 
 
In 1998 PMI went into negotiations with RJ Reynolds Tobacco International 
and BAT, after which they were ‘‘hopeful that we will be able to implement a 
greatly expanded joint international industry youth access and marketing 
code to which all major industry participants will voluntarily adhere’’. 
Arguments used 
The [public version of PMI’s youth policy] brochure intended to show that 
advertising did not cause youth smoking, and that PMI, with their marketing 







What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
In 1991, the Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy (MCDS) directed its 
Tobacco Issues Committee to examine the case for introducing new health 
warnings. 
Tactics used 
PM was ‘‘appointing a top man and devoting considerable resources to the 
matter’’ and asked if (BAT’s) Wills would ‘‘upgrade their effort and work with 
us to create an industry platform’’. 
 
In 1992, the industry decided that their main chance was to promote the 
adoption of the proposed European Economic Community (EEC) health 
warnings. These warnings were at the bottom of the pack, comparatively 
small, and non-explicit, and under EEC agreements, nations would be able 
to select from between two and six out of 15 optional warnings. Heavily 
influenced by local tobacco industry lobbying, the three most popular 
warnings selected by the European nations were ‘‘Smoking when pregnant 
harms your baby’’ (nine nations adopting); ‘‘Protect children: don’t make 
them breathe your smoke’’ (six nations); and ‘‘Don’t smoke if you want to 
stay healthy’’ (six nations). Significantly, none chose ‘‘Smoking causes 
addiction.’’ 
 
The industry believed it could use its influence within the new incoming 
conservative Liberal party to stop the regulations becoming law. The NSW 
Liberal Premier (and future BAT Australia chairman) Nick Greiner was one 
who was targeted. PM’s then international president Australian ex-patriot 
Bill Murray, wrote ‘‘as an Australian’’ to Greiner requesting that he bring ‘‘a 
sense of balance and common sense back into the regulation of tobacco in 





In 1992, a lobbyist was ‘‘employed, gaining support of such allies as 
Business Council of Australia, Confederation of Australian Industry, media, 
unions, advertising, growers, suppliers’’. The Victorian Premier received 
over 35 000 letters that year, presumably initiated by the industry. 
 
In 1992, in response to the CBRC’s [Centre for Behavioural Research in 
Cancer] report proposing third generation warnings, the industry 
commissioned a series of critiques of the CBRC report through its lawyers. 
With these as ammunition, on 18 June 1992, the TIA filed legal proceedings 
against the Anti Cancer Council of Victoria (authors of the CBRC report on 
labelling) seeking declaration that the report was misleading and deceptive 
and seeking an injunction to prevent its further distribution. 
Arguments used 
PM’s Henry Goldberg wrote to Jeff Kennett [Victorian Liberal opposition 
leader] noting that the MCDS recommendations were contrary to the 
position Kennett had stated publicly would be Victoria’s position (that is, 
adopting the EEC warnings). Goldberg argued that ‘‘proposals to radically 
alter packaging will do nothing to increase this awareness [of the health 
risks of smoking] and will do nothing to address concerns about smoking 
incidence in young people’’ as well as appealing to Kennett’s strongly 
conservative political agenda by framing warnings as an unfair burden on 
business. 
 
When PM’s Bill Murray attempted to persuade the NSW Premier on the 
industry’s position in 1992, he argued that it was only ‘‘…‘nanny’ states as 
we refer to them, which have taken a position similar to that advocated for 
Australia’’. Henry Goldberg also drew on bad-for-business arguments when 
writing to Kennett stating: ‘‘…[the warnings proposal] …imposes on 
cigarette manufacturers an extremely burdensome and expensive regime 
for the packaging of their products which is without precedent. It constitutes 
one of the most egregious attacks upon commercial freedoms of business 
in Australia… Victoria has an obligation to a business such as PM, which is 
contributing substantially to the economy of this State, to ensure that its 
commercial freedom is safeguarded.’’ 
 
In 1990, a ‘‘questions and answers’’ sheet for use by PM lobbyists 
rehearsed answers to ‘‘Why don’t the companies provide additional 
information and warnings about constituents on the cigarette package 
labels?’’ suggesting that the proliferation of warnings on consumer goods 
could cause ‘‘warning overload’’—that is, a tendency on the part of 
consumers to begin to ignore warning labels entirely. And that ‘‘one study 
found that consumers thought products with rather elaborate warning labels 
were safer than those without them’’. 
 
In Murray’s letter to Greiner in 1992, he insisted that the warnings would be 
‘‘a defacement of the cigarette package and trademarks’’ 
 
Industry law firm Clayton Utz commissioned a national poll about smokers’ 
‘‘awareness of health warnings about smoking’’, known as the ANOP study 
after the market research company that conducted the interviews. The 
study asked respondents three questions ‘‘seeking spontaneous health 
associations with smoking’’, including two which probed specifically for 
health risks (‘‘have you heard, read or seen anything about smoking and 
health?’’ and ‘‘Can you think of anything at all that you have heard about 
smoking and health?’’). Not surprisingly, 99.7% of the sample, under such 
questioning, were able to say that they had ‘‘heard’’ something about 
smoking and health. This exercise produced a predictable result that 
allowed the industry to support its claim that awareness of the harmfulness 
of smoking was all but universal, thus negating the need for new warnings. 




2001 [454] USA 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Tobacco internet sales; New York State passed a law banning internet, 
mail, and telephone cigarette orders from being sent directly to consumers, 
which was scheduled to take effect on 1 January 2001. 
Tactics used 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco challenged the law… and a federal judge 
ruled that the law did violate the commerce clause of the US Constitution. 
Arguments used 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco challenged the law claiming that “The 
Constitution prohibits any one state from regulating avenues of national 





USA (New York) 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
1. 1990 anti-tobacco campaign including vending machine ban, ban on 
advertising on taxis, buses, subways, pro-health advertising etc 
2. Intro 2-A / Tobacco Product Regulation Act (1991) – including 
requirement of one public health message for every four tobacco 
advertisements in or on municipally-owned or leased property and 
transportation facilities  
Tactics used 
1 
Philip Morris Chairman and C.E.O. Hamish Maxwell responded to the 
announcement with a biting letter to Dinkins [New York mayor]… 
Arguments used 
1 
Philip Morris Chairman and C.E.O. Hamish Maxwell responded to the 
announcement with a biting letter to Dinkins [New York mayor], stating, 
“The financial and other support which Philip Morris has given to public and 
other institutions in this city appears to me to be acknowledged by the city, if 
at all, as grudgingly and ungraciously as possible”.  Maxwell concluded with 
an implied threat to move Philip Morris headquarters from the city: “It could 
be reasonably concluded that your Administration has decided that Philip 
Morris’ continuing presence in New York City is one of the city’s dozens of 
embarrassments that it can do without” 
 
2 
[The industry] worried that the costs associated with displaying an anti-
smoking ad would discourage leasing agents from accepting cigarette 







What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
In 1992, Congress enacted legislation to encourage states to adopt 
restrictions on the sale of tobacco to minors 
Tactics used 
The industry’s opposition to a requirement that states enforce their laws is 
reflected in the actions of congressman Thomas Bliley… Bliley represented 
a district in which Philip Morris was the largest employer, and he received 
$111,476 in tobacco industry contributions from 1985 to 1994. 
 
The Tobacco Institute and congressman Bliley argued to the DHHS that, 
because the word “significantly” does not appear in the final language, the 
DHHS cannot issue regulations that would require states to make significant 
progress in reducing illegal sales. 
Arguments used 
The tobacco industry’s public stance is that they are opposed to children 




According to Yancey W Ford Jr, executive vice president of the RJ 
Reynolds Tobacco Company: “the most important factors influencing youth 
smoking are peer influences, the example of family members and the 
accessibility of cigarettes – better voluntary enforcement of minimum-age 
purchase laws currently on the books can reduce youth smoking by at least 
half”. 
Epps-




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Vending machine legislation 
Tactics used 
A Tobacco Institute report entitled, “1991 Legislative Analysis: Iowa” 
explained that a preemptive vending machine law was necessary in order to 
“stop a hodge-podge of local ordinances and to prevent the State 
Legislature from enacting a total vending machine ban.” … The Tobacco 
Institute was successful in achieving their ideal legislative outcome by co-
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Geography 
Transnational 





The industry denies that packaging has an impact on consumption. For 
example, the Tobacco Institute of New Zealand argued ‘package stimuli, 
including the use of trademark, are of no interest to people not already 
within the market for that specific product’.  
 
The tobacco industry also attempted to complicate the issue by suggesting 
that tobacco control agencies were unclear about what plain packaging 
would require. Arguments that a ‘laundry list’ of items had been suggested 
by ‘packaging non-professionals’ were presented as an unworkable barrier 
to implementation. 
 
They also argue that plain packaging would set a dangerous precedent for 
other products, such as those containing high amounts of sugar, chocolate, 
fat or additives. 




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
1994 Health Decree 30: aim to ban tobacco advertising and smoking in 
public places and introduce health warnings 
Tactics used 
Within 24 hours [of learning about the health decree] BAT had coordinated 
counter arguments from its corporate affairs and smoking issues teams and 
met with Mr Mahsudov from the Cabinet of Ministers. It then met Mr 
Iskandarov and other health officials a few days later.  
 
Since Mr Iskandarov refused to withdraw the decree, BAT sought extensive 
amendments. An amended decree was rapidly circulated alongside highly 
confidential briefing notes… An order to be issued by Mr Djurabekov on the 
Cabinet of Minister’s behalf, requiring the Ministry of Health to amend 
decree 30 was faxed from BAT’s Tashkent office. Documents suggest it 
may have been drafted by BAT. It incorporated BAT’s main concerns, with 
the tar and nicotine limits and the bans on smoking in public places, 




replaced with a new code, which seems to be an even less restrictive 
version of the Russian voluntary code. 
Arguments used 
BAT sought to counter each section of the decree, repeatedly claiming to be 
a responsible manufacturer of a legal product and making three key 
assertions. Firstly, BAT depicted the decree as jeopardising foreign 
investment in Uzbekistan, while warning the health ministry that it would 
lead to “the immediate demise of the domestic cigarette industry” and 
threaten an investment supported by Karimov. Secondly, BAT refuted the 
health effects of smoking as accurately described in the decree, suggesting 
an ongoing controversy in which “smoking has not been proven to actually 
cause” diseases. Thirdly, the company portrayed Mr Iskandarov’s intended 
restrictions as “seriously interfering with...commercial freedom” and denied 
that advertising affected consumption: “World wide experience consistently 
shows that advertising bans do not reduce consumption. Advertising a 
mature product like cigarettes is not intended to increase the overall market 
but to expand company market share.” Additionally, BAT portrayed Russia’s 
recent voluntary code as epitomising the industry’s responsible approach in 
working with governments to agree adverting standards. 
Goldberg et 
al, 2006 [456] 
Geography 
USA 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 




Regardless of the amount spent on advertising, the argument advanced 
here is that advertising does not influence 
consumer behaviour, or at most, plays only a small role in the ‘‘marketing 
mix.’’ 
Q. ‘‘… [I]s advertising in the scheme of all the influences… a strong force, a 
weak force or somewhere in between with respect to influencing 
consumer behavior?’’  
A. ‘‘When we take all of the … factors that are inputted into that decision 
[whether to smoke], it ends up being a relatively weak force.’’ ‘‘There are 
many things that go into the effect [of inducing smoking initiation].…One 
of these is communication and a small part of communications [is] 
advertising.’’ 




Denial of targeting youth; insistence that only those aged 21 and over are 
targeted 
‘‘Philip Morris does not market or sell and has no intention to do so, does 
not do so, and actually takes many affirmative steps to make sure that it 
doesn’t happen, sell to either nonsmokers or to minors.’’ 
Q. ‘‘In the entire period of time you were involved with the Camel campaign, 
Mrs. Beasley, did it ever include among its demographics people under 
the age of 18?’’  
A. ‘‘No.’’ 
Q. ‘‘Did it ever do research on nonsmokers or people under the age of 18?’’  
A. ‘‘No, we did not.’’ 
 
The tobacco firms meet or exceed existing regulations. It’s part of our 
corporate culture 
Q. ‘‘Is that [Voluntary Cigarette Advertising and Promotion Code] a code 
that Philip Morris maintained in its records and followed and observed?’’  
A. ‘‘Absolutely. I mean, it’s more than a document; it’s the principle and 




years has added more to this.’’ 
Q. ‘‘Let me go to the last [point in Philip Morris’ mission statement] … Meet 
or exceed the legal and regulatory requirements that govern our 
products and business. Why was that important to put in your mission 
statement, sir?’’ 
A. ‘‘We have a product that’s associated with harm. We have to make sure 
that we’re within all the laws. And, frankly, we need to be pushing the 
envelope relative to regulation and legal issues, to make sure that, at a 






What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Plain packaging 
Tactics used 
The regulation was amended … and the legal challenge was not continued. 
Arguments used 
Tobacco companies also challenged picture warnings in Belgium, where 
they argued against the feasibility of implementing the 42 required warnings 










The tobacco industry has taken a strong stance against “plain” packaging 
regulations. Philip Morris has characterized plain packaging as “an extreme 
and disproportionate measure.” Japan Tobacco International has also 
indicated its “categorical” opposition to plain packaging, adding that it would 
be “disproportionate” and may even be “counterproductive” as a tobacco 
control measure. British American Tobacco has also stated that, in 
response to a plain packaging proposal, “we would take every action 
possible to protect our brands, the rights of our companies to compete as 
legitimate commercial businesses selling a legal product, and the interests 
of our shareholders.” The industry’s primary arguments against plain 
packaging relate to insufficient evidence that plain packaging would reduce 
smoking, and intellectual property rights and issues of international trade. 




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Transnational 
Tactics used 
In the late 1990s, the Canadian government health agencies, non-
governmental organisations, and health professionals began campaigning 
to increase the size of warning labels and include strong photographs 
depicting the damage caused by tobacco. The Canadian Tobacco 
Manufacturers Council (CTMC) tried to stop the proposed regulations by 
polishing the industry’s public image and launching a major lobbying 
programme. CTMC recognised that ‘the Industry’s agenda is simply not 
compatible with that of Canadians’ because of the public ‘perception that 
the Industry does not tell the truth’ about the health risks, and ‘markets its 
products to youth or, at least, does nothing to discourage it.’ In summer 
1999, CMTC mounted an advertising campaign claiming that the industry 
needed to be heard on issues concerning packaging and youth smoking. 
The industry launched what a 1999 memorandum in PM ﬁles described as 
a ‘full blown government relations programme’ to lobby government 
agencies, including ‘Revenue, Treasury Board, Finance, Justice, Trade 




members by CTMC representatives and individual companies. 
Arguments used 
 




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Smoke-Free Environments (Controls and Enforcement) Amendment Bill 




As well as arguing that they have a right to display their ‘legal products’, 
tobacco companies have adduced four further arguments against removing 
Point of sale (POS) displays. They claim that such a policy would reduce 
staff security (as staff would turn their back on customers to retrieve 
tobacco products), inconvenience staff, result in lost revenue and increase 
compliance costs. Collectively, they allege that these outcomes will be 
disproportionately negative relative to the likely reductions in smoking 
prevalence. 
 
Philip Morris has argued that retail staff would be seriously inconvenienced 
if these products were difﬁcult to access, while customers would allegedly 
become frustrated by increased transaction times. 
 
In addition to losing revenue, tobacco companies and interest groups have 
argued retailers would ﬁnd the costs of alternative storage units prohibitive. 
The New Zealand Association of Convenience Stores estimated that 
removing Point of sale (POS) displays would cost retailers between $45 and 






What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
AB 221: increase the minimum age to purchase tobacco, as well as all 




The opponents argue that bill is not consistent with federal law and that it 
will harm retailers and the state by shifting tobacco sales and the 
associated tax revenues to neighboring states 
Kennedy et 
al, 2011 [465] 
Geography 
USA (Florida) 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
1. SB 434 and HB 555 to Regulate Tobacco Product Placement (2000) 




In opposition to the bill, testimony was heard from the Florida Retail 
Federation (a strong tobacco industry ally in Florida), the Petroleum 




While on the Special Order Calendar, Senator Diaz de la Portilla (R, Miami, 
$6,578) a smoker with an established relationship with the tobacco industry, 
filed an amendment to the bill which would have granted sole authority to 
regulate the display and marketing of cigars, fine cut tobacco, and pipe 










What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General marketing regulations 
Tactics used 
In 1994 the tobacco industry also strengthened its self enforced tobacco 
industry advertising codes to forestall legislation: ‘‘modification of voluntary 




al, 2002 [95] 
Geography 
Transnational (mainly USA) 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General youth restrictions 
Tactics used 
In 1991 Philip Morris restated that the success of the "youth initiatives" 
would be determined by whether they led to a "reduction in legislation 
introduced and passed restricting or banning our sales and marketing 
activities" as well as "passage of legislation favorable to the industry" and 
"greater support from business, parent and teacher groups." 
 
Philip Morris also sought to enact legal age limits for cigarette sales to 
deflect blame from itself for youth smoking, saying that such age limits 
“signal [that] the ultimate responsibility [for youth smoking] belongs to 
parents and society" rather than tobacco companies. As in the United 
States, Philip Morris also sought to enact legal age limits [in the EEMA 
region] to "eliminate anti-tobacco groups' demands for ad bans on the basis 
of "protection of youth. 
 
A 1996 RJR press release argued that the FDA regulation was 
unnecessary… 
Arguments used 
Philip Morris used its Action Against Access youth program as part of its 
argument that the FDA's proposal was unnecessary. A 1996 RJR press 
release argued that the FDA regulation was unnecessary because the 






What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
A referendum on the tobacco and alcohol advertising bans were expected 
to take place late in 1993 or early in 1994 
Tactics used 
As part of its effort to oppose advertising restrictions, the tobacco and 
advertising industries organized a “public hearing” to generate negative 
press for the idea of advertising restrictions. 
 
Our [PM] Corporate affairs strategy is to fight both the initiative and the 
Federal counter-project by offering a reasonable alternative to authorities 
and Swiss voters through the voluntary advertising restriction agreement 
came into force on September 1, 1992 
Arguments used 
 




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Mid-1990s proposal for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate 
tobacco, which included restrictions on sport sponsorships 
Tactics used 




Coalition for Entertainment and Sports Sponsorship (ACESS)… which 
included RJR, US Tobacco, Penske, and International Speedway 
Corporation… The organization presented itself as a broad coalition of sport 
sponsors and event promoters, but internally, the stated goal of the 
organization was ‘‘to defend tobacco sponsorship.’…The group opposed a 
mid-1990s proposal for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate 
tobacco, which included restrictions on sport sponsorships, by encouraging 
sports fans to write letters to the FDA against this legislation and sponsoring 
studies showing public support for corporate sport sponsorship. 
 
In 1996, Phillip Morris and US Tobacco proposed an alternative plan to the 
proposed FDA ban on sports sponsorship that would have allowed 
continued sponsorship of rodeo and motor sports. The tobacco companies 




al, 2004 [33] 
Geography 
Cambodia 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General marketing regulations: 
 
A 1991 regional  
assessment reported:  "[n]o  known  restrictions  in  any  form  for  Above-
the-line  or  Below-the-line activities. Absence  of  any  form  of  
Government  policy concerning tobacco  issues,  advertising  and  
promotion."  BAT was predictably anxious  to preserve  this  unrestricted  
marketing  environment. 
Tactics used 
The unlimited scope for advertising and promotional activities was a key 
part of the appeal of the Cambodian market.  A  1991  
regional assessment reported:  "[n]o  known  restrictions  in  any  form  for  
Above-the-line  or  Below-the-line activities. Absence  of  any  form  of  
Government  policy concerning  tobacco  issues,  advertising  and  
promotion."  BAT was predictably anxious to preserve this unrestricted 
marketing environment.  
 
An  industry  initiated programme  of  voluntary health warnings was 
developed  for  brands  across  Indochina, intended  to  "demonstrate  that  
the  industry  is  taking a  responsible  attitude  in markets  where  there  is  
no legal  requirement  for  health  warnings on product". 
Arguments used 
 









Philip Morris, the world’s largest tobacco company, has challenged 
Uruguay’s and Australia’s laws under bilateral investment treaty (BIT) 
obligations. Philip Morris alleges that Uruguay’s regulations violate 
provisions of a Switzerland---Uruguay BIT, which prohibits foreign investors 
from being subjected to unreasonable treatment under “fair and equitable 
treatment” provisions. 
Mamudu et 
al, 2008 [406] 
Geography 
Transnational 






British American Tobacco brought the 3 major tobacco companies together 
to develop a worldwide voluntary tobacco industry regulatory regime [2001 
International Tobacco Products Marketing Standards; ITPMS). 
 
Tobacco companies perceived youth smoking prevention as a way to 
"make a significant gesture that would divert attention from the FCTC, 
moderate the WHO's moves toward the FCTC and bring the tobacco 
companies together against the FCTC.  
 
After the ITPMS was announced, Cerberus Group officials worked to raise 
public awareness of it, calling on governments, United Nations agencies, 
and the World Bank to have "faith in a 'new [tobacco industry] initiative’”. 
Arguments used 
British American Tobacco considered the WHO FCTC public hearings in 
October 2000 very important, and mobilized allies to make submissions… 
The Cerberus Group companies' submissions focused on the industry's 
ability to regulate itself, the right of adults to choose to smoke, and the idea 
that youth smoking prevention should be the focus of the FCTC. 
 
On June 15, 2001, the group finalized the ITPMS. The communication plan, 
“key external messages” and the questions and answers the Cerberus 
Group developed for the ITPMS conveyed the public message that the 
tobacco industry could regulate itself and that smoking should be limited to 
adults. 




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
European Union’s Tobacco Products Directive (2001/37/EC) 
Tactics used 
Detailed strategies for contesting the directive were developed carefully 
both by individual companies and various pan-European membership 
organisations, with lobbying targeted according to the audience and the 
stage of the directive’s legislative passage. 
 
Tobacco  House was a venture spearheaded by PM, Societé Nationale 
d’Exploitations Industrielle des Tabacs et Allumettes (SEITA), International 
Union of Tobacco Growers, Federation Europeenne des Transformateurs 
de Tabac (FETRATAB) and Confederation Europeenne des Detaillants en 
Tabac (CEDT) (but notably, not BAT) to bring together a far broader group 
of tobacco sector interests than present in existing pan European 
organisations, a move seen as strategically advantageous at a time when 
the industry was under pressure. 
 
The unions, who were to be told that manufacturers were being “forced” to 
consider relocating production, played a key role in lobbying, particularly in 
presenting economic arguments, generating  press interest and enlisting 
political support.  The UK Tobacco Workers Alliance (TWA), a cooperative 
of several trade unions, was described as “unrelenting in their [sic] efforts” 
to  lobby against the directive,  and, along with other unions, played a role in 
organising protests against the directive. The Transport and General 
Workers Union and Britain’s General Union also played a role…At an EU 
level the industry managed to obtain support from the European Committee 
of Food, Catering and Allied Workers Unions, which issued a press release 
highlighting the “massive negative social effects on employees in the 
tobacco sector“….Public relations formed a key component of the industry’s 
strategy and plans to use the media at local, national and European levels, 
with a focus on  employment aspects,  were successfully implemented. In 
the UK, press releases highlighted (and local and national media coverage 
subsequently focused on) the alleged job losses associated with the TPD, 




own articles, advertisements and letters within the media to generate further 
coverage. 
 
A tripartite meeting in July 1998 to discuss the proposed directive brought 
together representatives from DG SANCO, health organisations and the 
industry. CECCM’s view of the meeting was that the health representatives 
did not believe the industry and challenged their integrity. After the event, 
Paul Sadler of BAT, wrote to Dr Hunter (Director of DG SANCO) to express 
his disappointment in the meeting and his belief that tobacco company 
views were not appreciated. 
 
Byrne rejected the economic and employment claims made by BAT, a fact 
which  chairman Martin Broughton claimed to find astonishing, warning 
Byrne in a letter that the draft directive: “deserves to be challenged in the 
Courts”. 
 
Lobbying of such officials occurred through two routes: general meetings 
between industry and DG SANCO members, and separate technical 
consultations on scientific and technical elements of the directive. The 
agreement to hold these technical consultations on four key topics, (yields, 
labelling, descriptors, and additives, measurement methods and 
toxicological testing),  had been secured at a meeting between industry 
representative and DG SANCO officials on 23rd November 1999 and was 
described by the industry as “a major step forward”  which would enable 
them  to engage the Commission in detailed discussion on the directive. 
 
The VdC [German tobacco manufacturers association] had sympathetic 
German contacts in Kurt Lechner, rapporteur of the Legal Committee and 
Werner Langen, rapporteur for the Industry Committee… As members of a 
group of 39 MEPs, they tabled several amendments to the directive 
including a deletion of the export requirement, a smaller size and weaker 
specification for the health warnings, and the use of misleading descriptors 
in most circumstances, all key changes the industry desired. 
 
BAT instead produced its own economic impact study, focusing on potential 
job losses in the UK. Entitled “Have you ever felt unfairly singled out?”… 
conveyed a message that the TPD would bring significant job and trade 
losses whilst providing no health gains.  Indeed, the report claimed the 
directive would “wipe out” UK tobacco manufacturing and included headline 
figures which claimed that around 8,300 jobs were at risk at just two sites, 
even though the small print showed that the total employment in BAT’s UK 
factories was only 1,565…The UK economic impact study published jointly 
by BAT and several trade unions in September 2000, stimulated written 
questions to the Commission from MEPs, such as Glyn Ford (UK Labour 
Party), on whether the Commission itself had carried out a comprehensive 
assessment. 
 
In 2000, before the  directive had passed into law,  BAT filed an access 
case to the Court of First Instance, requesting access to the international 
scientific research the Commission had considered and based its proposals 
on. 
 
The Commission did eventually append a brief impact assessment form to 
their draft TPD proposal in 1999 which fulfilled its obligations, given that at 
that time,  only limited guidance on undertaking impact assessments 
existed (interview with European Commission official, September 2008). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly (given that the impact assessment the Commission 
produced was supportive of the TPD proposals), BAT and its 
representatives were not satisfied and labelled the assessment as 





In the UK, press releases highlighted (and local and national media 
coverage subsequently focused on) the alleged job losses associated with 
the TPD. 
 
He [BAT’s lawyer] pushed for the Committee to state that the proposed 
directive was unconstitutional and that legislation should await the ECJ 
judgement on the advertising ban. 
 
BAT’s Chairman and Director of Corporate and Regulatory Affairs sent 
letters voicing their concerns to the Secretary of State for Health, Alan 
Milburn and the Permanent Secretary, Chris Kelly. In line with BAT’s efforts 
to re-position itself as a responsible company, these letters stressed that 
BAT was in favour of sensible regulation, but claimed the directive was “far 
from sensible”, highlighting concerns about the directive’s legality, impacts 
on jobs and ability to achieve health benefits. 
 
Once the product content and labelling provisions appeared settled, BAT 
appealed for a longer transition period…. [BAT] claimed the technical 
requirements, including additional testing, yield reductions and new 
Labelling, would impose financial costs on business that would threaten the 
viability of smaller firms. 
 
They established pan-industry working groups to develop argumentation 
against key aspects of the proposals and collectively lobbied against them 
claiming, for example, that there was no rationale for  such European  
tobacco control measures,  which were  instead  a matter for Member 
States, and that the legal basis was suspect. 
 
Initially, in response to the 1998 consultation, the industry tried to negate 
the need for further legislative measures by claiming that harmonisation had 
already been completed in the areas of tar yields and labeling. 
 
A number of arguments were raised in relation to economic impacts. First, 
the threat to employment and balance of trade within the EU was raised, 
with the directive being described as an “own goal for the EU economy” that 
would drive jobs and investment outside the Union. Various figures were 
produced and widely used in lobbying including a claim that in the UK alone 
up to 8,300 jobs were at risk. Others claimed that 9,000 tobacco 
manufacturing jobs in the EU and at least a further 30,000 jobs in 
companies supplying tobacco manufacturers were at risk. Second, BAT 
argued that the directive would particularly disadvantage Europe-based 
manufacturers operating in international markets, claiming that the TPD 
would involve “handing a competitive advantage to the world’s largest 
cigarette manufacturer, US-based Philip Morris”. 
 
BAT instead produced its own economic impact study, focusing on potential 
job losses in the UK. Entitled “Have you ever felt unfairly singled out?”… 
conveyed a message that the TPD would bring significant job and trade 
losses whilst providing no health gains.  Indeed, the report claimed the 
directive would “wipe out” UK tobacco manufacturing and included headline 
figures which claimed that around 8,300 jobs were at risk at just two sites, 
even though the small print showed that the total employment in BAT’s UK 
factories was only 1,565 
 
Despite inconsistencies in the legal advice and having received at least one 
clear indication that the directive was consistent with EU law, BAT and 
others acting on its behalf, notably Scott Crosby of the legal firm Kemmler 
Rapp Böhlke, quickly sought to assert that the directive was incompatible 





Looking to replicate successful industry campaigns that used trade 
arguments to prevent the adoption of plain packaging regulation in Canada 
and critically undermine provisions for ingredients disclosure in Thailand, 
BAT generated a legal analysis that depicted the TPD as potentially 
breaching WTO requirements, which could therefore expose EU member 






What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Since 2000, Philip Morris (PM)...has been aggressively pursuing US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of tobacco products - it came to 
regard ‘‘reasonable’’ regulation as a way to end its isolation and redefine 
the company as socially responsible 
Tactics used 
PM also explained both publicly and privately that it regarded some sort of 
regulation as inevitable. The company [PM] predicted that the Republican 
party controlled Congress of 2001 was more likely to enact what it regarded 
as ‘‘reasonable’’ regulation than any Democratic party controlled future 
Congress… PM argued that it was better to act now than to risk more 
onerous regulations. 
 
PM’s law firm Arnold and Porter had written several drafts of model 
legislation. PM had also provided members of Congress with bill language. 
 
To achieve its goal of ‘‘tough’’ but ‘‘reasonable’’ regulation, PM employed a 
number of different strategies. First and foremost, company representatives 
worked with legislators, meeting with staff to explain PM’s views, helping to 
write legislation, and lobbying on behalf of legislation PM supported. 
Initially, company representatives worked most closely with Republicans, 
who PM saw as more inclined to produce acceptable legislation. 
 
PM also engaged in an extensive public relations campaign to advance its 
goal of ‘‘reasonable’’ regulation. PM executives and consultants wrote op-
eds and letters to editors of both major and local newspapers, participated 
in editorial board meetings, gave interviews to journalists, and had speaking 
engagements at local community organisations such as Rotary and the 
Chicago Mexican American Chamber of Commerce. 
 
PM’s media campaign had a grassroots element as well. PM mobilised its 
field action teams, lobbyists and consultants in all 50 states whose job was 
to enlist supporters for a variety of PM causes. In a three month period, 
team members met with representatives of 650 different organisations, 
including hospitality, beverage, grocery, retail, and convenience store 
associations, wholesalers, chambers of commerce, and one health 
organisation (the Utah Nurses Association). At these meetings, team 
members briefed organisation representatives on PM’s position on FDA 
regulation and asked for an official show of support—by contacting 
members of Congress, writing letters to local newspapers, or asking the 
national organisation to endorse FDA regulation of tobacco. 
 
PM also communicated its views…through individual letters, one-on-one 
and group meetings, and mass mailings. The mailings might include PM’s 
white paper on FDA regulation, a question and answer document, a fact 
sheet on the MSA, or copies of op-eds by PM executives. In June 2001, the 
company launched Tobacco Connections, a newsletter devoted to tobacco 
policy issues of importance to tobacco growers. The inaugural issue, mailed 
to 130 000 farmers, was devoted to explaining PM’s position on FDA 





In a further effort to claim the ‘‘reasonable’’ middle ground of the debate, 
PM portrayed opponents of what it regarded as moderate legislation as 
extremists or obstructionists. In an August 2001 interview in The Wall Street 
Transcript, PM lawyer Mark Berlind expressed surprise at some public 
health groups’ opposition to the Frist and Davis bills. He asserted that these 
groups, in supporting only ‘‘the most radical, extreme kind of medical 
product  regulation’’ were working against the passage of reasonable and 
effective legislation. 
Arguments used 
PM’s white paper also advocated the continued use of product descriptors 
like ‘‘light’’ and ‘‘ultra light’’. In November 2001, the National Cancer Institute 
(NCI) released a comprehensive report showing that despite the tobacco 
industry’s marketing claims, light or low tar cigarettes did not reduce health 
risks. In response, the major health groups (ACS, AHA, ALA, and CTFK) 
called on tobacco companies to eliminate these terms from cigarette 
packages and advertising. PM refused, asserting in a press release that, for 
smokers, such descriptors ‘‘serve as useful points of comparison for 
cigarette brands regarding strength of taste and reported tar yield’’. 
 
In terms of marketing restrictions, PM advocated codifying those contained 
in the MSA, which limited tobacco advertising seen by children; however, 
the company rejected restrictions on marketing seen predominately by 
adults. The company wanted to continue communicating with what it termed 
‘‘verified’’ adult smokers through direct mail, events in adult only facilities, 






What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General marketing regulations 
Tactics used 
PM’s corporate affairs executive Jeannine Dowling asserted in 1984 that 
‘‘women might be…our natural enemies’’ due to their negative feelings 
about tobacco… 
 
Another benefit of tobacco company contributions to women’s organizations 
was the creation of allies who could be called upon to defend the industry 
from regulation…. That same year [1990], at the “behest” of PM and “out of 
gratitude” for the company’s support, American Women in Radio and 
Television wrote letters to Congress opposing a bill to limit cigarette 
advertising. 
 
If women’s organizations could not be secured as outspoken allies, PM 
regarded it as important to ‘‘freeze’’ them in neutral mode so that they did 
not support policies, such as cigarette advertising bans, that conflicted with 
tobacco company business objectives…Funding women’s organizations 
was regarded as key to “neutralizing” them. 
 
When a funded organization spoke out against PM, continued funding could 
be jeopardized, as was evident in 1999, when the national Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA), whose local chapters had received more 
than $70,000 in PM grants that year, signed a public letter calling on the 
company to change its cigarette marketing practices. PM’s vice president of 
corporate affairs, Ellen Merlo, noted in an internal e-mail that ‘‘[W]e certainly 
do not require that worthy recipients speak out for us, but if they are publicly 







USA (Hollywood, California) 




Promotion of tobacco through entertainment media 
Tactics used 
The cigarette companies claimed to solve the problem by modifying their 
voluntary Cigarette Advertising and Promotion Code. In 1990, they added: 
“No payment shall be made by any cigarette manufacturer or any agent 
thereof for the placement of any cigarettes, cigarette packages, or cigarette 









What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Marketing restrictions and health warnings 
Tactics used 
The industry supported a voluntary code in Lebanon to delay or prevent 
binding regulation. 
 
Documents suggest intense industry lobbying again delayed and weakened 
the proposed revision [1992, PHC began discussing stronger warnings 
which would be rotated, occupy 20% of pack size and extend to broadcast 
media]: ‘‘[f]ollowing discussion with the tobacco companies and advertising 
agencies, the government has made no moves to introduce it. 
Industry/government talks on an ongoing informal basis aim to slow down 
the possible introduction of further legislation’’. 
Arguments used 
 
Neuman et al, 
2002 [451] 
Geography 
Europe (mainly Germany, UK, Netherlands, Denmark) 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Through Council Directive 98/43/EC, the European Community (EC) sought 
to end all tobacco advertising and sponsorship in EC member states by 
2006. Initially proposed in 1989, the directive was adopted in 1998, and was 
annulled by the European Court of Justice in 2000 following a protracted 
lobbying campaign against the directive by a number of interested 
organisations including European tobacco companies. A new advertising 
directive was proposed in May, 2001. 
Tactics used 
Germany 
Philip Morris sought to maintain strong political alliances within Germany, 
and to provide German legislators with a variety of arguments against the 
advertising ban…. Industry documents reveal that the German tobacco 
industry viewed former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl as a close ally from 
as early as 1978. 
 
Industry documents suggest that the industry worked with Germany to 
introduce a weak proposal designed to replace the proposed, stronger EC 
advertising ban. According to industry documents, this proposal was drafted 
by the tobacco industry and was intended to be submitted, without 
acknowledgment of its true origin, through German representatives to the 
EC. The proposal was produced by the Confederation of European 
Community Cigarette Manufacturers (CECCM), an organisation that the 




In 1990, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher denounced the EC 
advertising directive as “meddling” in the domestic affairs of member states. 
Philip Morris’ documents state that in July, 1992, shortly after she left office 




consultant for a fee of US$250 000 per year and an annual contribution of 
US$250 000 to the Margaret Thatcher Foundation. As reported by The 
Times (London),  a March 31, 1992, memorandum from Geoffrey Bible, 
executive Vice-President of Philip Morris Companies, described key areas 
in which Philip Morris sought to use Thatcher’s international experience. 
These included the proposed EC ban on tobacco advertising 
 
In 1992, Philip Morris also considered Kenneth Clarke, the Secretary of 
State for Education and Science at the time and Secretary of State for 
Health from 1988 to 1990, as an ally in opposition to the ban. Panel 3 
shows a 1992 correspondence between Clarke and Philip Morris’ Ian 
Sargeant in which Clark assures Sargeant that he will do his best to ensure 
that the Tory government maintains its opposition to the EC advertising ban. 
Clarke’s links to the tobacco industry have continued to the present. 
Beginning in 1998, Clarke received UK£100 000 a year to serve as a 
deputy chairman of British American Tobacco while also holding a seat in 




Philip Morris lobbying efforts in the Netherlands employed a strong publicity 
campaign against the advertising ban. The 1991 Philip Morris-EEC 
corporate affairs agenda describes a tobacco industry-organised “local 
coalition of opinion leaders in the Netherlands, ‘Multiple Choice’, which 




Philip Morris sought to preserve Denmark’s opposition to the ban through 
the creation of the Committee for Freedom of Commercial Expression, a 
group designed to cultivate opposition to the ban in Danish social and 
governmental circles. The committee was to be “managed at arm’s length—
distanced from Philip Morris”. The Committee thus could have appeared to 
the public as an independent third party. In building the committee, industry 
recruited “more than 50 prominent Danes, including a leading Constitutional 
lawyer, the President of a major brewery, a leading Danish writer and 
philosopher and a well-known architect”. 
 
EU-wide 
The tobacco industry established alliances with groups representing various 
industries on a pan-European level… By 1991, Philip Morris had built 
coalitions with International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe, two pan-European 
lobbying bodies. The 1991 Philip Morris-EEC corporate affairs agenda 
reports that “the ICC’s General Secretary sent letters to key EC officials” in 
opposition to the proposed advertising directive. 
 
Philip Morris also activated the communications and business communities 
“in the defense of marketing freedoms for tobacco”, producing position 
papers encouraging media and advertising groups “to raise their voices” 
before local governments and the EC.  
 
Through the Adam Smith Institute (ASI), a British policy institute based in 
London, the tobacco industry commissioned two “separate but 
complementary projects . . . within a total budget of £30,000”. These 
resultant reports would argue against the EC advertising directive by 
placing “the EC anti-tobacco proposals in the context of a host of proposals 
which progressively restrict personal freedom”. 
 




tobacco industry developed a voluntary code of practice for tobacco 
advertising and sponsorship. On May 12, 1992, Philip Morris’ Ian Sargeant 
described a plan to create “an EC-wide industry code of conduct on 
advertising that would reassure the politicians that the industry had put its 
own house in order and would remove the political pressure to legislate”. 
Like the industry draft directive on harmonisation, the voluntary code was 
produced by CECCM in 1992 and proposed minimal restrictions, primarily 
prohibiting tobacco advertising and sponsorship “directed towards persons 
who are under eighteen years of age”. 
Arguments used 
Germany 
A 1993 Philip Morris marketing freedoms presentation describes Philip 
Morris’s proposals to defeat the EC advertising ban though cooperation with 
Kohl: “Use all possible German influence to prevent a weakening of the 
blocking minority. Work with Chancellor Kohl to put ad ban directive on 
commission subsidiarity list.” The principle of subsidiarity pertains to policy 
areas in which the EC as well as individual member states may both have 
competence to act. In these areas, the EC may only take action if the 
proposed objective cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states. The 
tobacco industry recognised subsidiarity as a potential basis on which to 
have the advertising ban abandoned. Kohl’s inclusion of the advertising ban 
on the subsidiarity list would constitute an attempt to veto the ban on the 
basis of infringing on national sovereignty. Philip Morris claimed success in 
securing German opposition to the advertising directive on the basis of 
subsidiarity in a 1993 memo prepared in part by David Greenberg, a 
Corporate Affairs Executive for Philip Morris in the EEC region: “the 
German Government has included the EC ad ban in its list of directives to 







What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General marketing regulations 
Tactics used 
As in the West, self regulating the marketing of cigarettes was used to avoid 
legislation as well as to portray industry responsibility. “If done honestly and 
with the concurrence of government authorities—and in advance of 
restrictive government proposals—industry codes can be accepted instead 
of legislation.” RJR considered the utility of a voluntary code, to 
demonstrate that: “American tobacco manufacturers adhere to the 
advertising laws and regulations of the countries in which they operate.” 
Arguments used 
As in the West, the TTCs ran a public line on their declared position of not 
targeting non-smokers, particularly women and children:“Although some 
advertisements appeal to young adults who smoke, American tobacco 
manufacturers do not target any advertisements towards children . . 
.Moreover, research reveals that smoking initiation is a complex process, 





What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
The Tobacco Control Act (2009) made three changes to cigarette warnings. 
First, existing warnings on cigarette packages must be replaced with nine 
new specified verbal warnings. Second, nine new graphic images must be 
paired with the textual warnings on a rotating basis. Finally, companies 
must move the warnings from the side of the package and devote at least 
the top 50% of both the front and back panels to the government-mandated 
messages. 
Tactics used 
The case decided in November, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA, 














What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
1. General advertising restrictions in the Latin American region 
2. 1991 - Caracas, Venezuela: ban on outdoor advertising (tobacco and 
alcohol) 
3. 1991 – Honduran proposal for advertising ban 
Tactics used 
1 
As pressure for greater regulation and restrictions grew, the cigarette 
companies employed diverse resistance tactics. As well as developing 
alternative marketing and promotional strategies such as brand stretching 
and nightclub promotions to stay ahead of the law, the companies found an 




The companies [BAT and PM] also joined forces to oppose legislation that 
restricted tobacco advertising. In 1991, when the city of Caracas, 
Venezuela, passed an ordinance banning all outdoor advertising of 
cigarette and alcohol, BAT’s Bigott and PM’s Catana, allying themselves 
with outdoor advertising agencies, explored legal and other options to 
counter the ban. 
 
3 
A successful lobbying effort occurred in 1991 when the tobacco companies 
and their advertising allies managed to block a Honduran proposal for an 
advertising ban, gaining agreement from the Minister of Health that the 








Transnational (mostly Canada) 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
1. Canada 1992-4: Tobacco Products Control Act 
2. Australia 1992-5: plain packaging and on-pack health warnings 
3. Canada 2000: health warnings 
4. Canada 1997-9: plain packaging 
5. Finland 1993: proposal to strengthen the 1977 law banning tobacco 
advertising 
6. South Africa 1994: 25% pack health warnings 
7. Hong Kong 1996: Smoking Public Health Amendment Bill, restricting 
advertising and requiring health warnings 
8. New Zealand 1997: increase size of health warnings 
9. South Africa 1998: Tobacco Products Control Amendment Bill 
10. Sri Lanka 1999: proposed National Authority on Tobacco and Alcohol 
11. EU 2000-1: EU Directive on Tobacco Advertising  
12. FCTC 2003 
Tactics used 
1 
On May 20 1993, Rothmans senior lawyer responsible for regulatory affairs, 
James Seddon invited his colleagues in the other for-profit multinational 
companies to consider a joint approach to plain packaging and larger health 
warnings…. By late summer his proposed group had met, and by 
November had fully taken shape. 
 




by BAT into writing a strongly worded letter to Canada’s trade minister, 
opposing plain packaging in Canada on trademark grounds. Despite 
WIPO’s advice to the contrary only a month before, the ICC maintained this 
would be a serious breach of Canada’s obligations under the Paris 
Convention. 
 
A month later, with hearings about to begin, McDonald again wrote the 
Plain Pack group (on April 5, 1994). This time he had more specifics to 
report on the CTMC’s strategy, which closely followed the Plain Pack Group 
strategic outline: 
 They worked to prompt an energetic public debate.  (Their campaign 
manager, David Small, coordinated messaging through frequent 
bulletins and an aggressive media campaign). 
 They created their own body of evidence by publishing their own 
materials and papers. They soon commissioned market research from 
Decima and hired university-based researcher, Zalton Amit, to counter 
the findings of the Canadian Cancer Society). 
  They created their own experts.  (They engaged John Luik coordinate 
‘academics who would argue against plain packaging,’  and engaged 
former Mountie Rod Stamler to say that plain packaging would lead to 
contraband). 
 
This campaign would continue to involve third-party allies. In the first week 
of July 1994, 30 representatives of “packagers, retailers, growers, printers, 
suppliers and their workers” were brought together to work on the next 
steps of the campaign. 
 
Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds engaged former U.S. trade representative, 
Carla Hills, and former Deputy Trade Representative, Julius Katz. 
 
When the Cancer Society appeared before the committee to offer its 
research findings, the CTMC countered with a review they had 
commissioned from Concordia professor, Zalton Amit, which eviscerated 
the CCS-funded study.   
 
2 
The companies also approached the vice-consul (commercial) of the British 
Consul General in Sydney, Peter Hughes to request assistance from the 
U.K. government in their “dealings with government in Australia” over 
package reforms. A letter was sent in August 1992, and a meeting was held 
with him the following April. Mr. Hughes obligingly made an inquiry of the 
British industry ministry, but the answer he received and forwarded in July 
1993 was consistent with virtually all the external advice the companies 
received: there were no trade barriers to restraining the use of trademarks 
on cigarette packages. To think otherwise, in the opinion of the British 
government, would require several “large and imaginative leaps”. 
 
3 
BAT director of Corporate and Regulatory Affairs wrote the EU 
Commissioner for Enterprise and Information Society, Erkki Liikanen, to 
protest the new Canadian health warnings. 
 
6 
“These are serious infringements of valuable property rights which will 
expose the South African government to legal challenge.” 
 
9 
The response of the Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa to this legislative 







Their position [was] that the law was beyond federal jurisdiction and that it 
was inconsistent with Charter-protected freedoms of expression. 
 
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was among those recruited 
by BAT into writing a strongly worded letter to Canada’s trade minister, 
opposing plain packaging in Canada on trademark grounds. Despite 
WIPO’s advice to the contrary only a month before, the ICC maintained this 
would be a serious breach of Canada’s obligations under the Paris 
Convention. 
 
They were not shy to describe their strategy to their multinational 
Colleagues… To accommodate their Canadian operations, the European 
headquarters of the Canadian companies followed this strategy and worked 
behind the scenes to get an object filed by the European Union under GATT 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) procedures. On May 24, 1993, their efforts 
paid off when the EU GATT Inquiry point wrote the Canadian authorities to 
say that the new 25% warnings were “excessive” (they said the EU 
warnings which were only of 4 to 6% of the package worked just as well). 
 
Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds engaged former U.S. trade representative, 
Carla Hills, and former Deputy Trade Representative, Julius Katz to tell the 
Canadian Commons Committee that plain packaging would be an “unlawful 
expropriation” of their trademark rights and that “the compensation claims of 
affected foreign trademark holders would be staggering, amounting to 
hundreds of millions of dollars.” 
 
On Thursday, May 14, 1994 the last set of 6 witnesses were heard, and the 
last word was given to the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council. Plain 
packaging, they said, would lead to contraband, would make cigarettes 
cheaper and more available to youth, would result in the direct loss of 1,200 
jobs, would expose the government to “billions of dollars” of compensation 
claims and would be an abuse of process, in light of the industry’s  
constitutional challenge to the Tobacco Products Control Act. 
 
2 
In January 1994, BAT’s Australian subsidiary nonetheless took these large 
and imaginative leaps and told a government commission of inquiry into the 
tobacco industry that “The Company does not oppose a review of health 
warnings, only pack design regulations which take no account of 
registration of trademarks and pack designs, intellectual properties and 
rights advocated by GATT”. 
 
A year later, in February 1995, BAT’s Australian subsidiary, WD & HO Wills, 
provided the Senate Inquiry into the Tobacco Industry and the Costs of 
Tobacco Related Illnesses with a supplementary submission, focused 
entirely on generic packaging. This strongly worded submission concluded 
that plain packaging would violate “the legal and constitutional rights of the 
manufacturers who own them. Loss of brand rights would lead to 
substantial claims for compensation.”   
 
4 
The industry again responded with a flurry of trade objections, including a 
repetition of their claim, against WIPO advice, that the regulations would 
“expose Canada to legitimate and well-founded complaints under World 
Trade Organization agreements such as the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Paris Convention 






The Finnish Tobacco Manufacturers Association told parliament that “The 
prohibition against the use of symbols combined with a prohibition to 
register the trademark of a tobacco product as a trademark for a product 
other than tobacco product would be incompatible with the fundamental 




In a letter to the health ministry, Philip Morris claimed that the proposed 
larger health warnings would infringe their property rights. “Protection of 
International Property Rights has provided assurances to international 
consumer products companies that their trademark rights will be respected 
and protected against infringement or expropriation. Yet the proposed 
regulations, which would obscure 25% of the front package and 50% of the 
back package, would seriously infringe these trademark rights, causing 
consumer confusion as to source, weakening brand identification and 




The Tobacco Institute of Hong Kong protested that “The Bill's proposals 
also would effectively diminish the commercial value of trademarks lawfully 
registered and used in Hong Kong, without any compensation to the trade 
mark owner. They may also violate the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Intellectual Property and that part of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) dealing with Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). This would send a powerful message to the  
international community concerning the respect which Hong Kong has for 
intellectual property rights”. 
 
8 
In a submission to the government, the Tobacco Institute of New Zealand 
charged that the proposals were “an unwarranted and unjustifiable 
interference with the intellectual property rights of tobacco companies and 
“contrary to New Zealand's international obligations undertaken in the 




The response of the Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa to this legislative 
proposal was to claim that the measures were a technical barrier to trade. 
“The implementation of this Bill will probably result in a violation of some of 
South Africa's international obligations… A state cannot escape its 
international legal obligations vis à vis other states by relying on its 
domestic law. … Severe embarrassment and even international litigation 
could result”.  
 
10 
BAT’s subsidiary, the Ceylon Tobacco Company, challenged the proposed 
law as raising “serious issues … under a number of international 
agreements to which Sri Lanka is a signatory, including the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Agreement on 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights and Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.) 
 
11 
In a meeting with the European Parliament Committee on Environment, 
Public Health and Consumer Policy, the industry said that because 




of use of such a combined trademark would violate the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Paris Convention.” The industry commissioned an extensive 
argument regarding trade agreement impediments to implementing the 
directive. 
 
Japan Tobacco International filed a complaint in mid-September 2001 with 
the European Court of First instance claiming that the ban on ‘light’ and 
‘mild’ was a violation of intellectual property laws. 
 
12 
British-American Tobacco's Submission to the WHO's Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control warned that “ The WHO's proposals to ban 
tobacco advertising and descriptors such as 'Lights', could infringe 
commercial and intellectual property rights guaranteed in international law 
and could clash with provisions embodied in national constitutions 






What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General marketing regulation 
Tactics used 
As in the United States, the industry's Latin American "educational" 
programs concentrated on promoting "adult choices"…. Anticipating new 
regulations on tobacco marketing activities outside the United States. 
Geoffrey C Bible, the chairman of the board and chief executive officer of 
Philip Morris, the parent company, asked PMLA, as well as other regional 
officials of PMI, to prepare a report describing what had been done on the 
issue of preventing youths' access to tobacco… All PMI regions were 
requested to demonstrate they had "credible youth smoking prevention] 
programs in place, and that [they] work cooperatively with governments on 
the issue,"' In response, in August 1997, Leiber prepared for Bible the "Latin 
America Report: Youth Access Prevention and Education Programs." … As 
a public relations tactic to achieve this support, Leiber said, PMLA 
representatives "regularly meet with presidents, first ladies, prime ministers, 
ministers of education, ministers of health and presidents of congressional 
commissions to seek their support, endorsement and, ... their co-
sponsorship." 
 
Using the 1993 PMI Marketing Code as a model, the company's Latin 
American subsidiaries issued codes that promised to "market their 
cigarettes responsibly and only to adults" to prevent the approval of 
effective governmental tobacco control regulations. Generally, the codes 
were endorsed by the local national manufacturer's association, the local 
advertising agency association, the International Advertising Association, 
and the media trade association, and were signed by PMI and BAT. 
 
On September 11, 1997. the Lower House of Paraguay passed a bill to 
regulate tobacco and alcohol advertising and promotion… As a 
counterproposal, CERNECO offered to work with the minister of education 
to continue implementing the tobacco industry's education program "Yo 
Tengo PO,D.E.R," ("I Have Power") and the retailer program "Es lo 
Correcto" ("It's the Right Thing"). 
Arguments used 
 




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
General marketing regulation 
Tactics used 




legislation as ‘‘a constructive counter-proposal’’ to protect their interests. 
According to PMLA’s vice president,‘‘[the] tobacco industry maintained 
frequent contact with Senate Health Committee to discuss alternative 
proposals which culminated in the preparation of substitute bills by several 
senators for consideration by the committee’’. 
 
In November 1992, Senator Pedro Molina, President of the Public Health 
Committee, introduced an ‘‘alternative bill’’ in the Senate that was 
consistent with the industry’s voluntary advertising code. 
 
The industry also sought to pre-empt meaningful anti-tobacco education 
with its own ‘‘youth smoking prevention’’ programmes. The PMI’s five point 
‘‘Youth Access Prevention & Education Programs’’ (including local 
marketing codes, sampling guidelines, minimum age of purchase laws, 
education and retailer programmes) were developed for Latin America by 
1997, to shift the focus away from the industry’s advertising and marketing 
(as in other countries). 
Arguments used 
 




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
1992 Consumer Protection Act. A further advertising ban was passed in 
December 1993, and government started working on a new advertising law 
in March 1994. 1994–1995, the Czech Parliament approved an amendment 
to the Law of Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Drug Addictions 
Tactics used 
PM... pursued ‘‘all available means to obtain a favourable amendment’’ 
 
It used a previously established organisation, Libertad, which, although fully 
funded by PM, positioned itself as not-for-profit. Supported by the global 
public relations company Burson-Marsteller, Libertad helped frame freedom 
to advertise tobacco products as a matter of commercial free speech. The 
campaign was successful and the advertising ban was formally cancelled in 
July 1993. PM subsequently worked to produce a voluntary code of 
conduct, presumably to decrease the likelihood that another legislative ban 
would be proposed 
 
However, to PM’s apparent surprise, a further advertising ban was passed 
in December 1993, which PM again worked ‘‘to reverse’’, promoting self-
regulation as an alternative. In February 1994, a vote on relaxing the ban 
was passed, allowing existing tobacco advertising contracts to run until 
December 1994 or until a new law was passed, meaning that, although 
tobacco advertising was technically banned, it still existed throughout the 
country. Just days prior to this vote, PM had taken five Czech Members of 
Parliament (MPs) to a two-day all-expenses paid ‘‘briefing trip’’ to 
Switzerland. 
 
The government started working on a new advertising law in March 1994, 
and by April 1994, PM had become directly involved with its development. 
The new law was approved in October and in line with PM’s objective, relied 
on self-regulation. 
 
PM documents note that a ‘‘behind the scenes approach’’ helped them 
achieve success. A key component of this approach was the establishment 
of the Council for Advertising, an organisation made up of advertisers and 
the media which was charged with administering an industry marketing 
code, closely modelled on PM’s own internal code. At least two documents 
suggest PM was involved in establishing the Council for Advertising and 





By 1994–1995, the Czech Parliament approved an amendment to the Law 
of Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Drug Addictions, which included a 
ban on day-time TV and radio advertising for tobacco products. However, 
the law was rejected by President Havel, following ‘‘several weeks of 
intensive lobbying by the industry’’. 
Arguments used 
 




What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Public Law 470: bill to regulate tobacco displays and sales targeted towards 
children 
Tactics used 
In an email from Kent Wold, RJ Reynolds Office of Government Affairs, to 
Roger Mozingo, Senior Vice President of RJ Reynolds, the tactic was 
described as requiring a one-time only license for cigarette retailers, which 
in return, “the industry obtained local government preemption for self 
service displays and advertising.” The bill was passively supported by the 
Maine Grocers Association and the Maine Retail Merchants Association. 
The legislation was lobbied by the industry, which argued it was a good 








What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Advertising ban 
Tactics used 
As early as 1992 PM promoted the establishment of a working group aimed 
at studying “the issues involved in liberalising the current ad ban” with 
representatives of the industry, ministries, and the Hungarian association of 
cigarette producers. In spite of the repeated violation of advertising rules by 
TTCs – such as with BAT addressing direct mails to children -, high-level 
government ofﬁcials decided to commence negotiations with the industry: 
“Despite the damage done by the BAT’s direct main campaign… Deputy 
Secretary of State Schagrin agreed to go ahead  with a December 3rd 
[1992] meeting to discuss a constructive solution to the problems with 
interpretation of existing legislation on tobacco advertising”. 
 
The law governing the advertising ban was administered by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MTI) with the Health Ministry – always among the 
weakest portfolios of successive Hungarian governments – also invited to 
participate in discussions in late 1992. TTCs sought urgent liberalisation of 
advertising rules and offered a voluntary marketing code; they knew that “if 
done honestly and with the concurrence of government authorities – and in 
advance of restrictive government proposals – industry codes can be 
accepted instead of legislation”. 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) supported PM’s effort in using the working 
group as a forum “to negotiate the development of a decree which will serve 
as a more practical interpretation of the Trade Law [one of the regulations 
on tobacco advertising]”. Members of the working group included the 
representatives of the Hungarian TTCs, but also delegates of the alcohol 
industry. The latter was another partner interested in the amendment of the 
1978 decree since alcohol advertising was also banned at that time. 
 
Meanwhile, the Hungarian Association of Cigarette Manufacturers (HACM), 
soon after its establishment by TTCs in 1994, took up the leadership in 




operating Hungarian TTCs (PM, BAT, Reemtsma and R.J. Reynolds) put 
together a more detailed “industry proposal for modernisation of the 
regulatory environment regarding the marketing of tobacco products”, in an 
attempt to “reopen discussions with the government”. The voluntary code, 
“proposed and elaborated by PM”, was integral part of this document….The 
document package was accepted and signed by representatives of TTCs 
on 27 October 1994. The MTI was chosen as the “initial avenue” for 
lobbying since “their legal department drafted the versions A and B of the 
former law proposal”. In addition, Andreas Gembler of PM Europe had 
already lubricated the process by discussing the issue with László Pál, then 
trade minister during the Hungarian Grand Prix (37). The HACM also 
engaged itself in a lobbying tour promoting a weak law, which allowed 
enough room for industry self-regulation: “The Hungarian Association of 
Cigarette Manufacturers (HACM) gave a presentation on the economic 
impact of the tobacco industry in Hungary and presented the HACM 
position on tobacco advertising to representatives of the legal sections on 
the Ministries of Industry & Trade, Labour, Finance, Culture & Education, 
and Health. The meeting was successful and will foster further dialogue. In 
particular, the representative of the Ministry of Health called for a 
compromise on the two versions of the tobacco advertising law draft, an 
industry voluntary code and an enforceable regulatory regime on 
advertising”. 
 
HACM: As well as direct lobbying of ministry ofﬁcials, MPs and 
parliamentary committees, it also communicates industry positions in the 
news media. It commissions studies and economic analyses to support 
industry views and actively promotes these among key decision makers. 
 
The Self Regulatory Advertising Board (SRAB), ostensibly established to 
protect the public from deceptive advertising, seemed to be the most faithful 
supporter of the TTCs. The organisation, established on March 1996, just a 
few months before the launching of the parliamentary debate of the 
advertising bill, is a vocal supporter of self-regulation, claiming that it 
provides more effective and ﬂexible solutions to the regulation of the 
advertising industry itself and to the control of conﬂicts between the industry 
and the public. Both BAT and PM were founding members of the 
organisation, along with advertising agencies with close links to tobacco 
companies. Moreover, both BAT and PM have had their representatives 
elected members of SRAB’s governing bodies. 
Arguments used 
PM considered the Hungarian tobacco industry “a signiﬁcant and steady 
source of government tax revenue if healthy and prosperous” and claimed 
that the freedom to advertise was essential for the continuous inﬂux of 
capital to be used for the modernisation of the Hungarian tobacco industry:  
“A critical factor for the successful implementation of the Philip Morris 
proposal to modernise the Hungarian tobacco industry is the complete 
freedom of manufacturers to advertise their products… consumers must be 
provided with the essential characteristics of the product entries in an 
impactful way”. 
Tsoukalas et 
al, 2003 [460] 
Geography 
USA (Minnesota) 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
HF 117 – youth access legislation 
Tactics used 
A few days after HF 117 was introduced, the tobacco industry put in place a 
plan to have what it called “a retailer alternative” bill to refer to the House 
Commerce Committee. The tobacco industry’s troops on this were the 
Minnesota Grocers Association, the Minnesota Retailers Association, and 
the Minnesota Petroleum Marketers Association. By January 24, 1997, 




retailers with claims such as “HF 117 could severely restrict your ability to 
sell tobacco to your adult customers,” and “If this bill becomes law, it could 
have a negative economic impact on your business”. The phone bank 
surveyor was then directed to urge the tobacco retailers to call their state 
representative to oppose HF 117 (Philip Morris’ phone bank objective was 
to have the retailers target the entire State House of Representatives). 
Another tactic Philip Morris used was to have its chief midwest lobbyist, 
Jack Lenzi, place calls to all House Commerce Committee members using 
them to oppose HF 117. 
 
Philip Morris’ phone bank sought to encourage retailers to push their 
legislators to adapt preemptive laws to eliminate local government’s ability 
to enact tougher youth access related ordinances. On February 6, 1997, the 







What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Advertising ban 
Tactics used 
Tobacco industry interference is a major obstacle that African countries face 
in their efforts to ban tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship. A 
formerly secret industry document belonging to BAT revealed that a 
“proposed ad ban in Sierra Leone, taken out of the Cabinet at voting stage” 
was an example of “marketing freedoms in Africa maintained through 









What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Senate Bills 622 (TI supported) and 637 (Tobacco Prevention Coalition 
supported) – legislation to comply with the requirements of the federal 
Synar amendment (federal requirement for states to pass laws restricting 
the sale of tobacco to minors) 
Tactics used 
Senate Bill 622 was drafted and backed by the tobacco industry. 
 
Senate Bill 622 as originally introduced gave sheriff departments and law 
enforcement organizations the responsibility for conducting the random 
inspections of tobacco merchants and reporting of compliance with state 
law restricting the sale of tobacco products to minors. SB 622 also sought to 
introduce what would be later be called super preemption, which was 
legislation preventing local governments from imposing more stringent 
restrictions on anything related to tobacco, specifically the smoking, use, 








What policy is the TI attempting to influence 




In 1988, the three local chapters of voluntary agencies, American Cancer, 
Heart, and Lung joined together to create the Tobacco-Free Young 




national tri-agency Smoke-Free Class of 2000 program in Kentucky.  The 
Smoke-Free Class of 2000 program was a 12-year  program designed 
specifically to target children in the first grade in 1988, with a with tobacco  
prevention, awareness and education, in an effort to prevent youth smoking. 
The tobacco industry monitored the activities of the national program and 
used the program activities to develop arguments to oppose advertising 
restrictions in 1998 by claiming that youth were well aware about the 
dangers of smoking as a result of the national Smoke-free Class of 2000 
program. 
Welle et al, 
2004 [463] 
Geography 
USA (North Dakota) 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
Vending machine restrictions (1992) 
Tactics used 
The Tobacco Institute outlined their strategy in a “Pro-Active Proposal” 
created prior to the beginning of the 1991 legislative session. 
 
According to the Tobacco Institute: “The tobacco wholesalers have 
expressed some interest in pushing for a state-wide preemptive bill”. 
 
Wolf (Tobacco Institute lobbyist) stated that he would be providing Waltman 
and Carlson (vending machine company owners) with information to use 
when talking with council members and “alternate language that could be 
used to seek a compromise with the proponents of the City Commission. 
Arguments used 
Following the standard tobacco industry strategy of predicting that tobacco 
control measures would hurt the economy, Dave Schwann, president of 
Schwann Wholesale (vending machine dealer), Devils Lake, provided loss 
of business statistics including “56 vending machines would be lost, 21% of 
the total [Devil’s Lake]. $45,000 would be lost in gross profit, and one job 




Middle East (UAE and Lebanon) 
What policy is the TI attempting to influence 
1. UAE – 1990 proposed ban on outdoor advertising, promotions and 
sampling 
2. Lebanon – 2000 advertising ban 
Tactics used 
1 
In 1990, the tobacco industry in the United Arab Emirates successfully 
defeated proposals to ban outdoor advertising, promotions and sampling. 
“Working within and with the United Arab Emirates Chapter of the IAA, 
META members with their advertising agencies and suppliers, were able to 
sensitise key decision makers on the potential implications of the ban ….”  
 
In order to forestall government restrictions on tobacco advertising, the 
companies devised and promoted voluntary codes on advertising. The goal 
of such codes, according to META, was “the goodwill to be gained with the 
UAE authorities to the beneﬁt of the industry from being able to point to a 
voluntary ‘in-house’ document formalizing – in an informal way – standards 





A copy of a 20 March 2000 memo from Bisharah Baroudi of Philip Morris to 
Nicolas Hobeiche details steps that BAT and Philip Morris were taking in 
reaction to proposals in Lebanon for an advertising ban. Beginning with an 
“informal approach” by Ramzi Najjar of Bates-Rouge (BAT’s advertising 




been trying to play on the Minister’s concern for youth smoking by 
proposing joint government-industry cooperation on youth smoking 
prevention. In the memo, Baroudi proposes “constructive engagement and 
cooperation with the Ministry of Health in addressing youth smoking”, 




“Working within and with the United Arab Emirates Chapter of the IAA, 
META members with their advertising agencies and suppliers, were able to 
sensitise key decision makers on the potential implications of the ban on 
local businesses and Dubai’s eﬀorts to become a centre of tourism in the 
GCC. This mobilization under the IAA’s umbrella succeeded in suspending 
the implementation of the proposed ad ban and proved that Industry action 
through the local Chapter of the IAA can be very eﬀective in defending 






Appendix 2: Alcohol Industry Systematic Review Data 
Extraction 






What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing - A stoush has broken out between the newly-formed 
Alcohol Advertising Review Board (AARB) and the AANA, with the body 
representing some of the biggest advertisers in the country claiming that the 





Jeremy Griffith (Corporate affairs director, Carlton United Brewers): 
As tempting as it is to allow the health lobby to decide what is funny and 
proper, we think the current approach to advertising self-regulation gets it 
right. The Alcoholic Beverages Advertising Code (ABAC) is robust and 
effective and meets with community standards. The health lobby's 
approach is to ban everything, and if it cannot be banned, regulate it 
severely. It pays no regard to whether the current system actually works. 
The ABAC is well enshrined in the industry – from the creative and 
scripting stages to the filming and placement process. It achieves what it 
intends – to ensure that alcohol is marketed responsibly. As a result, only 
4% of complaints received by the ASB each year relate to alcohol 
advertising. Most importantly, the system has teeth. As signatories to the 
code, when complaints to the ABAC are upheld, we pull those 
campaigns. This can cost millions of dollars. We always encourage 
responsible consumption of our beers, but we certainly won't step away 
from using humour or nice-looking amber liquid in carefully frosted 
glasses to sell it. Finally, we welcome anybody to visit us to review our 
ads and approval process to ensure we are completely aligned with 
community standards. 
Alina Bain (Director of codes, policy and regulatory affairs, Australian 
Association of National Advertisers): 
There is no need for greater regulation of alcohol advertising as there are 
already a number of regulatory protections in place in terms of messaging 
and placement of alcohol advertising. The current self-regulatory system 
is effective and underpinned by a responsive and transparent complaints 
handling system. A system that delivers responses to consumer 
complainants within 30 days and covers all forms of advertising, including 
new media. The Alcoholic Beverages Advertising Code (ABAC) is co-
regulatory with a government representative on the management 
committee. ABAC'S independent adjudication panel is led by former 
Attorney General Professor the Hon Michael Lavarch, and is run at arm's 
length from the industry. It should be noted that alcohol advertisements 
have to be approved against the code before they go to market, by an 
independent pre-vetter. The low level of consumer complaints about 
alcohol advertising demonstrates the system is delivering for the public. 
According to the Advertising Standards Bureau, alcohol advertising 




Leela Sutton (External relations director, Lion): 
A couple of months ago, mid-strength beer XXXX GOLD became 
Australia's leading beer. Most new beers released by the major brewers 
are now brewed at considerably less than 5% alcohol and over the last 
two decades there has been a significant reduction in average alcohol 
content. Without marketing and sports sponsorship it would be close to 
impossible to establish these new beers in the marketplace. While 
irresponsible advertising should not be tolerated, responsible advertising 
can have a positive cultural impact. The inflexible ideology of those 
behind the AARB would have us believe that sports sponsorship will 
make Australians think they will achieve sporting success if they drink - 
but we don't think they are that dim. We associate our brands with sport 
because the audience is mainly adult males and they tend to enjoy a 
beer when they watch it. Alcohol marketing is already highly regulated. 
Advertisements have to be approved by an independent pre-vetter before 
they go to market and, since 2008, the ABAC complaints panel has made 
151 determinations with 35% upheld. All forms of regulation need to 
move with the times and the ABAC system must continue to evolve with 
the changing media landscape. Rather than confusing genuine 
complainants and wasting money on PR stunts, those behind the AARB 
would be better served working with industry to reduce alcohol misuse 






What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
National alcohol policy drafts (not just marketing) 
Tactics used 
A comparison was conducted of four draft National Alcohol Policy 
documents from Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda and Botswana.  The comparison 
indicated that the four drafts are almost identical in wording and structure 
and that they are likely to originate from the same source. 
 
The properties information of two of the MSWord documents indicated that 
the ‘author’ was ‘mramsay’ from the ‘company’ SABMiller Africa Asia, 
possibly Mitch Ramsay, Policy and Issues Manager, SAB-Miller Africa. His 
later comment that ‘at the invitation of the workshop attendees, I was invited 
to prepare a record of the workshop policy proposals in local policy format’ 
may explain this (RamsayM., unpublished observations). 
The initiative to develop an alcohol policy came from the Ugandan 
parliament and the task was entrusted to the Ministry of Health. The alcohol 
industry came on board only later [12]. In the other cases the initiative 
seems to have come from the drinks industry. 
 
All four documents have the same core of policy measures and some key 
formulations that we would expect the alcohol industry wants to see 
included. The Lesotho and Malawi documents are almost identical. The 
Botswana document is also very similar to the two discussed above. Some 
sections were moved, some removed and other changes had been 
incorporated. The Uganda document differed somewhat more from the 
three others. Many of the paragraphs are the same, although the structure 
is somewhat different. 
 
The documents describe that senior representatives of government 
agencies, NGOs and representatives of civil society groups have been 
invited to attend workshops and consultations. Reportedly, the workshops 
were facilitated by Mitch Ramsay of SABMiller and Mr Keith Evans. In 
another capacity Mr Evans is the Director, Primary Health Care and Drug 
Strategy, South Australian Department of Health. He is also listed as a 




Policies (ICAP). ICAP is funded by the largest multi-national beverage 
alcohol producers ... to operate as an agent for industry interests in global 
and national policy arenas. Neither the draft policy documents nor the other 
sources analysed indicate clearly whom Mr Evans represents. 
 
According to Mr Evans himself, he acted as an independent facilitator in the 
workshops at the request of the relevant government departments of the 
countries concerned. 
 
In personal communication and later written comments (unpublished), Mr 
Mitch Ramsay, Policy and Issues Manager of SABMiller, informed that 
SABMiller made it possible for Keith Evans to facilitate the workshops. 
 
The last part of the draft guidelines for implementation places the 
responsibility for implementation of the policy with a ‘National Alcohol 
Council’, on which representation is reserved for the industry: ‘[The Council] 
will draw its membership from Government Ofﬁcials, representatives of the 
academic and Public Health Community, representatives of the Non-
Government Sector and Civil Society and representatives from the 
Beverage Alcohol Industry’. According to the proposal, the council will also 
be responsible for monitoring and for reviewing the National Alcohol Policy 
every 4–5 years. The policy drafts state the reason for the industry’s 
integral involvement in the policy process by citing its ‘vested interest’ in 
reducing alcohol misuse: ‘The Government will encourage active 
participation by all levels of the beverage alcohol industry as a key partner 
in the policy formulation and implementation process. The beverage alcohol 
industry has a vested interest in ensuring that alcohol misuse is 
substantially reduced, and has a unique capacity to access those 
responsible for promoting and selling alcohol as well as to those who 
consume their products’. 
 
According to the facilitators a tripartite model addressing supply, demand 
and harm reduction strategies was presented (Evans K., unpublished 
observations) and there were ‘signiﬁcant discussions about population-
based measures and references to relevant WHO sponsored research’ 
(RamsayM., unpublished observations).What-ever the content of these 
discussions in the workshops, the draft national alcohol policies take 
essentially the same approach proposed in ICAP’s publication Drinking in 
Context, where the emphasis rests upon the need to manage drinking 
patterns and strengthen industry/government/public health partnerships... 
The draft policy documents are devoid of any reference to Alcohol: No 
Ordinary Commodity or other compilations of the international evidence 
base on alcohol prevention developed by independent alcohol researchers 
working on behalf of the WHO. 
 
Priority area four—patterns and availability—basically upholds the need to 
‘develop and implement a transparent self-regulatory system by the alcohol 
beverage industry’ and conduct public education campaigns. 
 
In this section there is also a mention of the need to regulate alcohol 
promotions concluding by subscribing to the preferred industry approach: 
‘The Government supports the need for self-regulation by the alcohol 
beverage industry as the most suitable way to manage marketing and 
promotions’ 
 
... according to Mr Ramsay (unpublished observations), social and 
economic deprivation were reportedly discussed in the workshops, those 
perspectives are not addressed in the policy documents, nor are other 
speciﬁc challenges to developing countries such as alcohol and its relations 




deﬁciency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), gender-based violence, child rights and 
others 
 
We have documented above how the focus of the industry’s draft policy is 
towards the economic and social contribution of alcohol in the society. The 
key issues and policy measures in the documents indicate that they 
promote industry self-regulation, for instance with regard to marketing. Their 
fear of restrictions on alcohol advertising and other marketing activities at a 
time when the multi-national beer producers are increasing their presence 
in many African countries might be an important impetus for the present 
industry initiatives. As long as they can relegate marketing activities to self-
regulation, they can use advanced marketing techniques to promote 
drinking among new segments of the population in these countries. 
Arguments used 
...the Lesotho draft policy begins with the premise that the National Alcohol 
Policy ‘recognises the role alcohol plays in Lesotho, both in terms of its 
social and economic contribution and in terms of its signiﬁcant capacity, 
when misused, to impose unacceptable costs on individuals and the 
community as a whole’. This and other documents emphasize speciﬁcally 
that: ‘[t]he Government acknowledges that alcohol enjoys popularity and a 
place of signiﬁcance in Lesotho society. Alcohol when used in moderation 
has a positive role to play in socialisation and the industry is a major 
contributor to the economy of Lesotho’. One of their key guiding principles 
enshrines ‘the right of the alcohol industry to conduct legitimate and legal 
business in a responsible way’. 
 
The last part of the draft guidelines for implementation places the 
responsibility for implementation of the policy with a ‘National Alcohol 
Council’, on which representation is reserved for the industry: ‘[The Council] 
will draw its membership from Government Ofﬁcials, representatives of the 
academic and Public Health Community, representatives of the Non-
Government Sector and Civil Society and representatives from the 
Beverage Alcohol Industry’. According to the proposal, the council will also 
be responsible for monitoring and for reviewing the National Alcohol Policy 
every 4–5 years. The policy drafts state the reason for the industry’s 
integral involvement in the policy process by citing its ‘vested interest’ in 
reducing alcohol misuse: ‘The Government will encourage active 
participation by all levels of the beverage alcohol industry as a key partner 
in the policy formulation and implementation process. The beverage alcohol 
industry has a vested interest in ensuring that alcohol misuse is 
substantially reduced, and has a unique capacity to access those 
responsible for promoting and selling alcohol as well as to those who 
consume their products’. 




What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing restrictions: advertising and labelling regulations 
Tactics used 
Partnerships and consultation between alcohol, tobacco and allied 
companies have also assisted in the development of industry strategies to 
resist legislative and regulatory measures. To counter advertising and 
labelling regulations, the MBC five year plan (1992-1996) intended to 
“coordinate response efforts to proposed restrictions with the entire alcohol 
beverage industry. 
Arguments used 
As part of PM’s defence of advertising, a recurring theme is reference to the 
US First Amendment for protection against advertising restrictions on both 
alcohol and tobacco products. “Truthful advertising about legal products is 
protected by the First Amendment”. PM’s position on advertising restrictions 




“What about proposals to restrict advertising? Numerous credible studies 
conclude that advertising does not cause alcohol abuse; therefore ad bans 
will not stop it. Studies conducted by government and independent 
researchers conclude advertising affects brand performance, not 
consumption or abuse” 
 
The BI claim that alcohol advertising “does not cause alcohol abuse or 
underage drinking. Contrary to what some believe, there is no evidence to 
support that link” . The Distilled Spirits Council of the United States 
(DISCUS) also maintains that “there is no direct linkage between exposure 
to alcohol ads and the total consumption of alcohol beverages” . DISCUS 
further states: “The economic effects of a restrictive ban on alcohol 
advertising would be discriminatory and would adversely affect the 
legitimate right of an industry, which maintains a good record of social 
responsibility, to market its products”. PM argue that the company 
advertises its beer to encourage consumers of legal drinking age to select 
the Miller brand over other brands. It also aims to “remind drinkers about 
the importance of consuming products responsibly” 
 
A further alcohol industry concern identified from the documents related to 
mandated labelling of alcohol products including health warnings. An 
‘Advertising Warning Legislation’ information sheet developed by the BI 
asks readers to “consider the facts”. The BI asserts:  
 
“There is no empirical evidence that warnings would have any effect on the 
drinking patterns of Americans of any age, especially among alcohol 
abusers. Worse, these types of warnings could undermine the credibility of 
other government campaigns to provide information about serious risks 
which are not commonly known.” 
 
PM’s argument on mandated health warnings is:   
 
“Could you detail your opposition to legislation which would mandate health 
warnings on alcohol advertising? Numerous studies demonstrated that 
these warning messages do not reduce alcohol abuse among any segment 
of the population. These proposals divert attention and resources from 
other effective programs that we support to combat abuse. Advertising does 
not cause alcohol abuse, and there is no evidence to support that link” 
 
In response to concerns about under-age consumption, the 2000 CEO 
Issues Book emphasised that MBC advertise and market their products to 
appeal only to adults of legal drinking age. They also maintained that 
advertising products to underage people has no effect:  
 
 “Doesn’t Miller’s advertising appeal to underage people? While we 
understand your scepticism, sound research shows that advertising has a 
negligible effect on youth consumption; on its own, advertising doesn’t 






What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing 
Tactics used 
Alcohol policy has been safeguarded from the effect of trade agreements in 
other situations. France’s alcohol policy law, Loi Evin, which restricts 
alcohol advertising, was challenged by the European Commission and the 
UK. However, the European Court decided that the law was justified on the 
grounds that it protected health and was an effective strategy. Similarly, 
after a challenge to Sweden’s regulations on alcohol advertising, Sweden 




clearly that the policy was necessary to achieve public health goals. 
 
Alcohol producers are well organised and effective lobbyists for industry-
friendly policies both internationally and nationally. Representatives of the 
global alcohol industry, especially the distilled spirits sector, were strong 
supporters of trade treaties that expanded their access to rapidly emerging 
markets. The World Spirits Alliance lobbied for the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), seeking liberalisation or elimination of barriers to 
tariffs and non-tariffs, including all restrictions on distribution and 
advertising. 
 
A major focus of industry lobbying is to campaign against effective 
strategies and for ineffective strategies— examples in which this lobbying 
has been successful are documented. For example, in Brazil, at a time 
when the government was reviewing the law on advertisement of alcohol 
products, the largest brewer (AmBev) initiated a publicity campaign against 
driving while under the inﬂuence of alcohol, a partnership with taxi drivers, 
and an educational programme against drinking by minors—none of which 
has evidence for effectiveness. 
 
ICAP was established in 1995, and has promoted industry interests in a 
relative absence of international public health activity. ICAP’s activities are 
similar to those of organisations representing other globalised industries—
including participation in scientiﬁc and policy agendas; and support for 
research, publications, and conferences. A major ICAP focus is on the 
development of working partnerships with alcohol research and public 
health. ICAP’s position is that the industry has a part to play in developing 
alcohol policies in emerging markets. In 2006 and 2007, three regional 
meetings promoting voluntary codes in advertising were held in key 
emerging alcohol markets—Asia Paciﬁc (China, Vietnam, Laos, India, and 
Thailand), Africa, and Latin America. Promotion of voluntary codes and 
strong arguments against regulation of marketing has been a major focus 
for ICAP and for the industry in general. A clear distinction can be made 
between the policies promoted in ICAP publications and those that are 
assessed as effective in non-industry funded reviews. 
Arguments used 
 










Advertising restrictions: unnecessary for a responsible industry 
In this news frame, advertising restrictions were positioned as 
unwarranted by a responsible drinks industry that was said to be already 
actively managing alcohol risk. Such framing emphasised existing 
guidelines as more than adequate, raised examples of the industry 
reacting swiftly to complaints and policing its own promotional material, 
denied that the industry caused harm directly or targeted children and 
stressed their importance to community as funders of events. This angle 
sought to re-frame the public health position on advertising restrictions as 
unnecessary punishment of moderate drinkers for the behaviour of a few 
people and cheap political point-scoring at the industry’s expense. 
Advertising restrictions as an attack on legitimate commercial activity 




advertising would be an attack on the advertising industry. Negative 
consequences such as job losses, erosion of commercial freedom, the 
stifling of creativity and negative impact on the economy were highlighted. 
Such framing included calls to lobby the government directly to oppose 
the policy. No mention was made of alcohol-associated harms and 
supporters of restrictions were derided as seeking a “quick fix”. 
Restrictions as ineffective and ‘nannyist’ 
Here, advertising restrictions were deemed ill-conceived and ineffective. 
This was often taken to be self-evident, with no argument advanced. 
Where explanation was offered, the policy was dismissed as poorly-
targeted and statements asserted that alcohol advertising does not affect 
consumption and that consumption was more proximally influenced by 
other factors, like price. Such framing predicted that that the policy would 
be automatically rejected by the public as an example of the “nanny 
state” needlessly interfering with people’s choices. In keeping with this 
assertion, members of the public often stated that the government was 
too bound by vested interests or political donations to even consider it, 





What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
1) Canada: 1995 warning label proposal.  
2) USA: Sensible Advertising and Family Education (SAFE) Act, a US bill 
requiring health warnings in alcohol ads (early 1990s) 
Tactics used 
1 
When broadcast and alcohol industry groups realized the imminence of a 




The alcohol industry argued that research conducted elsewhere did not 
demonstrate effectiveness in reducing problems and that other methods 






What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
Alcohol advertising regulations (early 2000s) 
Tactics used 
The drinks industry rejected some of the most effective policy measures, 
while calling for more education. The Drinks Industry Group of Ireland 
submitted a minority report that clearly illustrated their opposition to 
effective alcohol policy measures. In essence they 
 Questioned the scientific evidence  
 Opposed reducing overall consumption 
 Opposed increasing alcohol taxes 
 Opposed lowering the BAC level 
 Favoured more educational programmes 
 
One hour after the Ministerial launch in Government buildings, the Drinks 
Industry Group of Ireland (DIGI) had their own “Press Launch” ... The DIGI 
press release went on to say ... 
 
The alcohol industry continued to lobby against the public health approach 
and in particular ... the proposed legislation on marketing restrictions to 





An insight into the drinks industry approach can be seen in a letter sent 
from the Managing Director of Diageo Ireland to the Minister for Health and 
Children and copied to the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and Tanaiste 
(Deputy Prime Minister). While the letter was ostensibly to complain 
regarding comments made by the Minister for health and Children about 
Diageo’s sports sponsorship, the letter also stated that: “Diageo has 
welcomed the recent alcohol harm reduction strategy published by the 
British Prime Minister’s Office. It seeks a partnership across government ... 
We believe such an approach should be considered in Ireland as opposed 
to what we perceive as the one-dimensional approach currently being 
pursued.”  
 
Non-compliance with the voluntary industry codes had already been raised 
by some industry members. A complaint with two TV alcohol 
advertisements that they claimed contravened both the industry code and 
the TV code, as outlined in a letter to the Minister for Health and Children, 
met with no satisfaction over a two-year period. The wider Drinks Industry 
Group of Ireland acknowledged to the Department of Health and Children 
that there was justifiable concern at the ‘slippage’ which had occurred in 
relation to the implementation of the advertising code and suggested that 
the new Advertising code (ASAI) was a solid base to move forward. 
However, the ‘new’ code retained the clause, “advertisements should not be 
directed at minors or in any way encourage them to start drinking”, which is 
extremely difficult to prove thus making it inoperable. 
 
The drinks industry and advertising industries met the Minister within weeks 
to explain their efforts to improve self-regulation. In May 2003, the 
Taoiseach speaking at the European Brewery Convention in Dublin, 
outlined the proposed alcohol marketing legislation to protect young people. 
It included restricting alcohol advertising on public transport, in youth 
centres and at sporting events where young people are participants. He 
also indicated the legislation would restrict alcohol advertising both on TV 
with a watershed of 22.00 hours and in cinemas and that all promotional 
material would carry a health warning about the risks associated with 
alcohol....The Minister for Health and Children was critical of the 
sponsorship by Diageo of the Guinness All Ireland Hurling Championship, a 
popular national game, as sending out the wrong message to a society 
attempting to curb alcohol abuse and suggested that the GAA should show 
leadership by looking elsewhere for sponsors. The Managing Director of 
Diageo in a letter to the Minister for Health and Children complained about 
his comments on the GAA Diageo sponsorship and said “I am both 
surprised and dismayed that the Guinness sponsorship of the All Ireland 
Hurling championships has been singled out by you once again as an 
example of ‘undesirable’ sponsorship of sports”. He rejecting the criticism, 
saying it was ‘totally unfair’ and damaging to their business reputation and 
copied the letter to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
During the three-year period (2003 to 2005) a wide range of alcohol 
industry and media businesses lobbied for self-regulation and extensive 
discussions took place between the industry and the Department of Health 
and Children. Meanwhile, in the public arena, there was much talk of the 
promised legislation but no sign of the legislation. The second STFA Report 
was published in September 2004 and called for the immediate enactment 
of the proposed legislation restricting alcohol marketing to protect 
children..... In December 2004, a new Voluntary Code on alcohol 
advertising was announced by the industry with the apparent approval of 
the Department of Health and Children 
Arguments used 
One hour after the Ministerial launch in Government buildings, the Drinks 




press release went on to say ...Regarding the STFA recommendation on 
alcohol advertising, which called for enactment without delay of the alcohol 
marketing legislation to protect children, the DIGI stated that “advertising 
has little effect on overall alcohol consumption but rather is focused on 
promoting the industry’s brands amongst existing consumers” 
 
An insight into the drinks industry approach can be seen in a letter sent 
from the Managing Director of Diageo Ireland to the Minister for Health and 
Children and copied to the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and Tanaiste 
(Deputy Prime Minister). While the letter was ostensibly to complain 
regarding comments made by the Minister for health and Children about 
Diageo’s sports sponsorship, the letter also stated that: “Diageo has 
welcomed the recent alcohol harm reduction strategy published by the 
British Prime Minister’s Office. It seeks a partnership across government ... 
We believe such an approach should be considered in Ireland as opposed 
to what we perceive as the one-dimensional approach currently being 
pursued.”  
 
Non-compliance with the voluntary industry codes had already been raised 
by some industry members. A complaint with two TV alcohol 
advertisements that they claimed contravened both the industry code and 
the TV code, as outlined in a letter to the Minister for Health and Children, 
met with no satisfaction over a two-year period. The wider Drinks Industry 
Group of Ireland acknowledged to the Department of Health and Children 
that there was justifiable concern at the ‘slippage’ which had occurred in 
relation to the implementation of the advertising code and suggested that 
the new Advertising code (ASAI) was a solid base to move forward. 
However, the ‘new’ code retained the clause, “advertisements should not be 
directed at minors or in any way encourage them to start drinking”, which is 









What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing 
Tactics used 
Q308  - Are you saying that Tesco now puts health awareness information 
in their alcohol aisle? 
Mr Beadles: Can I step in and say that the Wine and Spirit Trade 
Association working with the DrinkAware Trust, which is the industry-funded 
charity, developed point of sale materials which reﬂected the Chief Medical 
Officer’s health advice and also gave sensible drinking tips for the industry. 
They were produced towards September and have rolled out in a number of 
stores. They are not in every store yet, there is no doubt about that, but 
there are a number of store groups that have developed them. It is an 
ongoing process and we will be building it. 
 
Q314: Do you think it is all right to promote alcohol, and I am not saying that 
Tesco does this but a major supermarket did, at the end of a children’s 
clothes aisle 
Mr Beadles: I do not believe that it is appropriate to sell alcohol and to 
market it there. In fact, the industry codes on the subject say that alcohol 
should not be promoted alongside anything that would appeal to children. 
There will always be instances where store managers get it wrong, and we 
have dealt with a number of those over the past six months where 
consumers have complained to us that they think a product has been 
inappropriately placed, and in all instances we have stepped in and the 
retailer has removed and changed the product location. 
 
Q388 : The other Jeremy, in relation to the Sheffield report. 




studies by CeBR and Oxford Economics that I think should be taken into 
account by this committee. We certainly take the view that the people who 
misuse alcohol are the least responsive to price changes. We do not argue 
at all that there is a relationship between price and consumption, but we do 
think that there is a lot of evidence to suggest that there is not a direct link 
between price and alcohol misuse. 
 
Q814: I imagine you are using these new media more and more. Is that 
growing? 
Mr Fennell: Yes. 
 
Q815: That is going to be the case in the future? 
Mr Fennell: Commensurate with how consumers are changing their 
behaviour. 
Mr Oak: With regard to new media, in terms of advertising and advertising 
on sites, speciﬁcally we only advertise and the rules are that we can only 
advertise on sites where 75% of the audience is over 18. That is 
independently veriﬁed. For the sites that we have advertised Lambrini on, a 
minimum of 88% of the consumers are over 18. 
 
Q816: That means 25% are under. 
Mr Oak: I accept that point. 
 
Q817: There is always going to be an overlap, is there not? 
Mr Oak: Yes. 
Mr Fennell: That is why we need multiple safeguards. 
Ms Carter: Today we have touched on the challenge that all age related 
categories have and I do not think this is just the UK. The internet is global. 
Potentially, somebody could be sat in a living room in America and set up a 
website in the space of ﬁve minutes. That is why we created our own digital 
code two years ago in the absence of anything else. There has been some 
good work going forward since then but we would certainly welcome any 
more help in that area.  
 
Q818: Mr Fennell, in what way does the Diageo code which I have not seen 
but which has been spoken of considerably this morning differ at all from 
the ICAP codes on advertising for alcohol? 
Mr Fennell: It is consistent. The code in the exact form of words is a 
consistent code for Diageo around the world. The ﬁrst provision in our code 
is to make sure that we comply with local regulation. The form of words and 




The Drinkaware Trust (Drinkaware) is an independent charity established in 
January 2007 as a UK wide, public-facing body with the objective of 
positively changing public behaviour and the national drinking culture to 
help reduce alcohol misuse and minimise alcohol-related harm, funded by 
voluntary donations from across the alcohol industry. 
 
There is continued debate about the most effective methods of reducing 
excessive alcohol consumption. Legislation, regulation, self-regulation and 
enforcement all have an important part to play. However, education should 
always have a central role. 
 
National Association of Cider Makers 
It is misplaced to focus on the availability and affordability (price and 
promotion) of alcohol as the sole and root cause of misuse. The real drivers 
behind harmful drinking, binge drinking behavior and under 18’s alcohol 




calling for a combination of long-term measures such as improving 
education, awareness campaigns, etc 
 
NACM ﬁrmly believes that any policy considerations, by the Government, to 
address the speciﬁc misuse of alcohol by problem drinkers, should be: 
1. Based on robust evidence (ensuring that studies are peer reviewed) that 
is relevant to equivalent environments, as opposed to deploying convenient 
data to ﬁt an argument. 
 
A key point that comes across in the School of Health and Related 
Research at Sheffeld University (ScHARR) Study on “Price, Promotion and 
Harm” is that very little research has been conducted in the UK that throws 
light on individual behaviour with regard promotional activity of alcoholic 
drinks and harms. A signiﬁcant amount of the material ScHARR draws on 
derives from the USA. A basic sociological critique of the ScHARR report 
would immediately pick up on the “situational relevance” of those studies to 
the UK. 
 
The Sheffield University review failed to provide compelling evidence that 
would warrant the Government to introduce controls on promotions and 
advertising. The review cited publications and references making causal 
links but some of these documents have not been peer reviewed. NACM 
reiterates its position that evidence should be robust. 
 
Diageo 
Diageo has proposed to Government the creation of three important new 
initiatives: 
— a new mandatory code on retail promotions, within a framework of co-
regulation, under the auspices of The Portman Group; 
— a co-regulatory approach on mandatory labelling of alcohol, also under 
the auspices of The Portman Group; and 
— an industry-wide signiﬁcant new social marketing partnership, aiming 
towards changes in attitudes and behaviour among certain target groups in 
the UK. 
 
Scotch Whisky Association and the Gin & Vodka Association 
We believe in a targeted approach aimed at “at risk” populations. We 
consider that working in partnership with all stakeholders is fundamental to 
tackling the issue and that education coupled with robust enforcement and 
responsible marketing and promotion are key elements to creating and 
underpinning a culture of responsible drinking. 
 
Education in its widest sense is fundamental to a better appreciation of the 
risks associated with the misuse of alcohol. It can be used to target a range 
of problem drinkers: Alcohol education should be introduced in schools at 
an early and formative age and be a compulsory part of the curriculum and 
we welcome the DCSF’s recent commitment to introduce this measure. 
Children should be given sufficient information about alcohol to be able to 
discuss with their parents issues around alcohol consumption (much as 
children have done in relation to smoking or recycling). As well as running 
individual social responsibility programmes and supporting the Drinkaware 
Trust, an independent charity set up to help consumers make informed 
decisions about alcohol, the alcohol industry has responded to the 
Government’s call to use marketing expertise to develop a campaign to 
tackle alcohol-misuse—particularly among young people age 18–24. 
Alcohol education should be reinforced in adult life through effective 
Government multi-media campaigns, supported by the industry and other 
stakeholders. Better communication of responsible drinking messages to 
the adult drinking population through measures, such as on-label 






We consider, however, that better education, providing early advice and 
support to problem drinkers... The industry has an obligation to market its 
products responsibly so as not to encourage their misuse. It has a further 
obligation to use its reasonable endeavours to educate consumers and 
proactively encourage responsible drinking. 
 
We are committed to regularly reviewing our Code rules through public 
consultation involving key stakeholders to ensure that the Code evolves 
and that it is indeed offering a proper balance between protecting the public 
from irresponsible drinks producer marketing while at the same time 
allowing companies reasonable commercial marketing freedoms. 
 
Educational Initiatives: The Portman Group and its member companies 
have pioneered a number of inspiring alcohol responsibility initiatives which 
include: Drinkaware website, labelling, Drinkaware Trust  
 
Education and campaigning can successfully challenge potentially harmful 
perceptions surrounding drinking. This is why social marketing is of 
fundamental importance and explains why the Portman Group is such an 
ardent supporter of the Drinkaware Trust 
 
Scottish and Newcastle 
We strongly believe that industry can be a valuable partner in tackling 
alcohol misuse, by marketing its products responsibly, providing consumers 
with information—demonstrated by our full compliance with the voluntary 
label—and delivering education and responsible drinking programmes. 
 
S&N UK believes that industry self-regulation can effectively ensure 
alcoholic drinks are advertised and promoted responsibly. We are a 
founding member of the Portman Group, a self-regulatory organisation that 
encourages and challenges the industry to promote its products 
responsibly. The recent KMPG report commissioned by the Department of 
Health recognised the Portman Group had delivered considerable 
improvement in alcohol marketing. The Portman Group’s Marketing Code of 
Practice was introduced in 1996 and is the basis of S&N UK’s Responsible 
Marketing Policy. It provides guidance to everyone involved in marketing 
and selling our products to ensure our commercial communications do not 
contribute to excessive consumption or abuse. We always ensure that our 
policy goes beyond the requirements of industry voluntary codes. 
 
S&N UK welcomes more investment in education and information on 
sensible drinking. We believe the industry has a vital role to play in 
providing consumers with relevant information about their products. 
Originally created by the Portman Group, the Drinkaware Trust is an 
educational charity that aims to positively change the UK drinking culture. It 
is a unique partnership between industry and the voluntary and public 
health sectors. The Trust receives its funding from voluntary donations by 
the drinks industry. 
 
Wine and Spirits Trade Association 
Studies have shown the importance of education from a young age and 
from a variety of sources. Positive messages must not only come from 
teachers and public health campaigns but from friends and family. Family 
attitudes have also been shown to be important in prevalence of drinking. 
 
Increasing consumers’ knowledge and appreciation of alcoholic products, 
through tastings and education courses also plays an important role in 




Wines and spirits can be a fascinating area of interest and teaching 
consumers to appreciate this is a more effective way of encouraging mature 
attitudes to alcohol than by demonising it through measures such as 
separate checkouts and tobacco style health warnings. 
 
Providing information to the consumer is a key part of changing culture and 
to this end, the drinks industry fund the Drinkaware Trust 
 
SABMiller 
SABMiller is proactive in providing consumers with accurate and balanced 
information about alcohol through our innovative website, 
www.TalkingAlcohol.com. This award-winning website, the ﬁrst of its kind 
from a major alcohol producer, describes in detail the health and social 
considerations of drinking alcohol such cancer, liver disease, and stroke 
among others are all discussed in a factual, balanced manner.... Elsewhere, 
industry has worked to provide relevant and factual information to 
consumers in accessible means such as through initiatives undertaken by 
the Drinkaware Trust of which SABMiller was the ﬁrst corporate member. 
 
SABMiller recently commissioned Centre for Economics and Business 
Research (CEBR) to evaluate the ScHARR review of alcohol pricing and 
promotion effects on consumption and harm. The CEBR research found 
that... minimum pricing is an incredibly blunt instrument which imposes 
signiﬁcant costs across large sections of society, whilst having very limited 
beneﬁts in terms of curbing the excesses of the minority. 
 
Arguments used 
Q314: Do you think it is all right to promote alcohol, and I am not saying that 
Tesco does this but a major supermarket did, at the end of a children’s 
clothes aisle 
Mr Beadles: I do not believe that it is appropriate to sell alcohol and to 
market it there. In fact, the industry codes on the subject say that alcohol 
should not be promoted alongside anything that would appeal to children. 
There will always be instances where store managers get it wrong, and we 
have dealt with a number of those over the past six months where 
consumers have complained to us that they think a product has been 
inappropriately placed, and in all instances we have stepped in and the 
retailer has removed and changed the product location. 
 
Q385 : Minimum pricing. This is for Everyone who wants to come in on this. 
The Sheffield report on minimum pricing, especially in relation to elasticity 
of demand for alcohol, Jeremy Blood: do you accept the ﬁndings of the 
Sheffield report? Would you be in favour of minimum pricing? 
Mr Blood: We are not in favour of minimum pricing. I have read the 
Sheffield report. It draws conclusions about affordability and price. We 
accept some of the conclusions. Other independent economic advice draws 
slightly different conclusions from it. As with all research, there is a range of 
conclusions that can be drawn from what is a complex set of data. Why do 
we, in principle, not support minimum pricing? We believe that where 
misuse is happening and where people are drinking more than is good for 
them or using alcohol in the wrong way, those are the people that will not 
change their behaviour if you apply minimum pricing, they will carry on 
misusing, and you will not address the proper concerns that society has got 
about the misuse of alcohol through that blanket approach 
 
Q388 : The other Jeremy, in relation to the Sheffield report. 
Mr Beadles: We take the same view, and we think there are other economic 
studies by CeBR and Oxford Economics that I think should be taken into 
account by this committee. We certainly take the view that the people who 




at all that there is a relationship between price and consumption, but we do 
think that there is a lot of evidence to suggest that there is not a direct link 
between price and alcohol misuse. 
 
Q418: Mr Beadles can start with this but it is really for everyone. For quite a 
long time now since there has been concern about excessive alcohol 
consumption, the trade has been interested in voluntary arrangements and 
voluntary agreements, saying that they want to do something about it. You 
will all be familiar with the recent KPMG evaluation of voluntary 
agreements, and they showed extensive breaches of the voluntary code. 
Why do you think these voluntary approaches fail? 
Mr Beadles: I do not think they fail, ﬁrstly. I think KPMG actually showed a 
lot of very good practice. I think the issue with a totally voluntary approach 
is that it only applies to the people who are in and sign up to it. When we 
looked at the businesses from an off-trade perspective, which, therefore, 
would fall within our membership and the producer side and their 
compliance, their compliance level was very high, but when you are trying 
to take that voluntary approach down to small independent businesses and 
people who are genuinely not interested in this stuff, then it is very tricky. I 
think a voluntary approach has an advantage. It tends to be faster and it 
gets to the core of big business quicker, but it is not going to ever get 
overall coverage. Having said that, there is lots of legislation that is not 
complied with by lots of business as well. So I think voluntary approaches 
have a hugely important role to play, but you have always got to recognise 
that there will be some people who sit outside them. 
 
Q559Dr Taylor: As the Portman Group is funded by the drinks industry I 
admit a conﬂict of interest in that I have a very small number of Diageo 
shares. I shall not enlarge on that.Mr Lewis, you are quite an experienced 
witness; you have appeared before us in other inquiries in the not too 
distant past. You mentioned the effctiveness of the Drinkaware Trust which 
is to promote sensible drinking. Could it be that the Portman Group is 
looking to reduce your funding because you are being effective in promoting 
sensible drinking which is what we want but not what the drinks industry 
wants? 
Mr Lewis: The Portman Group has been the most stalwart group in funding 
the trust. 
 
Q560 Dr Taylor: So far? 
Mr Lewis: Yes. 
 
Q561 Dr Taylor: But you are so good that they will remove it? 
Mr Lewis: The Portman Trust has made no suggestion that it will reduce its 
commitment. We always hope that it may increase it. An important point to 
dwell upon for a moment is that the trust is an independent organisation 
with a very speciﬁc remit which is to provide information and education. It is 
evidence-based so that the consumers of alcohol and other interested 
parties can make informed judgments about how they use it. The question 
sometimes raised is whether that is possible when the funding comes from 
the alcohol industry and we have on our board people who are employed by 
it, but the trust does defend its independence with great rigour. We view the 
presence of people on its board from the alcohol industry as helpful 
because it brings a considerable amount of expertise, but they are in a 
minority. When they are on the board they are there to represent the 
interests of the trust, not their parent organisations. 
 
Q569:Mr Poley, in the past I have had numerous discussions with 
representatives of the Portman Group. They argue that the drinks industry 
engage in advertising in order to encourage the consumption of one brand 




alcohol consumption overall. I just think it is very unlikely that that is true, 
but what do you think of it in the context of what we have just been talking 
about?  
Mr Poley: ... To turn to the question of the advertising effect, there is a 
wealth of evidence to demonstrate that the predominant effect of 
advertising is to cause brand switching. Even the report from the University 
of Sheffield commissioned by the Department of Health last year found that 
the evidence for the effect of alcohol advertising upon consumption was 
relatively weak. At best it will have a slight effect. 
 
 Q576: What is the attitude of the witnesses to health warnings on alcohol 
products? 
Mr Poley: All of our member companies are committed to putting certain 
information on their drinks packaging; that is to say, they have information 
that they put on voluntarily about the number of alcohol units they contain. 
They also put on the Drinkaware Trust website address and they will also 
have a responsible drinking message such as “Please drink responsibly”. I 
do not believe it is necessarily appropriate to have a health warning on a 
drink of alcohol. Alcohol is not like cigarettes; it is capable of being misused 
but when drunk in moderation it is perfectly compatible with a healthy 
lifestyle. For certain groups when drunk in moderation it has health 
advantages. To put on a soundbyte in the form of a health warning label 
seems to me to be an unbalanced way to convey the complex information 
about the health effects of drinking 
 
Q780: I have a question to all of you. You will be aware that the Royal 
College of Physicians estimate that the number of deaths caused by alcohol 
misuse in the UK is about 40,000 a year and with the social cost put at 
billions of pounds. Last week the British Medical Association called for a 
complete ban on alcohol advertising and the introduction of minimum unit 
pricing. Do you think the time has come to restrict the availability, price and 
promotion of alcohol?  
Ms Carter: One of the ﬁrst things we would like to pick up on, particularly 
with regard to an advertising ban, one of our overriding thoughts would be 
that an alcohol advertising ban would not actually stop people going out to 
pubs on a Saturday night, having alcohol with their barbeques or dinner 
parties. So I think one has to look at the wider marketing mix of alcohol. 
Additionally there are other alcohol categories that are not big alcohol 
advertising spenders but actually see strong growth. The wine industry 
would be an industry in which we have seen some phenomenal growth in 
the last 15 years but in relative terms has actually been a small alcohol 
advertising spender. So you have seen that there are lots of different 
dynamics in the marketing mix that could affect that. So we would say that 
you would have to look at all the elements together and an advertising ban 
would not really help. We would also be worried about the potential 
unintended consequences of that and might it push some producers to shift 
some of that money in their competition to gain volume share into more 
price activity, not necessarily in terms of depth of deal but maybe frequency 
of it. 
Mr Oak: Adding to what Deborah has said, ultimately the advertising 
industry is heavily regulated already. Price and advertising are just but two 
elements within that and if you ban advertising you then have to look at all 
the other elements like PR, sponsorship, etcetera and there is no guarantee 
and no evidence to state that if you ban advertising you will prevent misuse, 
which is ultimately what we are all here talking about today. I think in terms 
of minimum pricing, yet again it has been clearly documented that pricing 
can help reduce per capita consumption—I think that came out in the 
Sheffield Report, but it did not say that it could help reduce misuse. One of 
the concerns I particularly have with regard to Lambrini is that Lambrini is 




women are on a low budget—62% of them earn £17,000 a year and I would 
have the concern that minimum pricing could make alcohol become quite 
an elitist product, and that is not the case and should not be the case for 
people drinking it responsibly. 
 
Q782: You have all said that banning advertising would not have the effect 
in terms of binge drinkers but what effect would it have on sales? What 
lessons can be learned from the restrictions of alcohol advertising in 
countries like France with their Loi Evin? Presumably you have looked at 
that?  
Mr Fennell: Yes, we have and we should learn from our experience from all 
around the world. The evidence suggests that advertising does not have an 
effect on total consumption  whether it is present or not. The trends when 
legislation has changed have broadly stayed the same. Indeed, the total 
alcohol market in this country has been ﬂat or declining for years. Our job 
and the role of our advertising place is to take business off each other. It is 
a zero sum game. All of our advertising should promote, as Simon said, 
responsible consumption and it is intended to win market share. As a result 
Smirnoff only constitutes 3% of the market here in the UK so we see a 
considerable growth for our brands without any growth in the market.  
 
Q795 :A quick point on the Lambrini. If you walk round almost any town it 
seems to be quite a favourite of underage teenage girls, so would not 
minimum pricing help reduce that market? You probably do not make an 
assessment of what teenagers drink because they are not supposed to be 
drinking. 
Mr Oak: We do not support or promote drinking to underage girls. For many 
of those people that you described that may be drinking alcohol very often 
that alcohol has been purchased by someone else. I do not believe in that 
sense that you are talking to the consumer or the purchaser of the alcohol, 
so price has a different bearing in that instance  
 
Q805: Let us focus on the misusers, which is absolutely right. We have to 
focus on the misusers. In your submission you have listed who they are. 
How do we focus on them? How do we get at them? How do we control 
them?  
Mr Fennell: That is a great question.  
 
Q806: Yes. Have you an answer?  
Mr Fennell: ... I also think we should enforce rigorously the high level of 
regulation that we already have in the UK...... We should enforce that more 
ﬁrmly. I wish we could ensure that we give the police the powers to sort out 
social disorder when it happens immediately and quickly and deal with it. It 
is a combination of enforcing the regulations that we have, education and 
ensuring that our code, to which we subscribe, is rigorously employed 
internally and has the right backstop of independent measures associated 
with it.  
 
Q814: I imagine you are using these new media more and more. Is that 
growing? 
Mr Fennell: Yes. 
 
Q815: That is going to be the case in the future? 
Mr Fennell: Commensurate with how consumers are changing their 
behaviour. 
Mr Oak: With regard to new media, in terms of advertising and advertising 
on sites, speciﬁcally we only advertise and the rules are that we can only 
advertise on sites where 75% of the audience is over 18. That is 
independently veriﬁed. For the sites that we have advertised Lambrini on, a 





Q816: That means 25% are under. 
Mr Oak: I accept that point. 
 
Q817: There is always going to be an overlap, is there not? 
Mr Oak: Yes. 




The ﬁrst Online Reputation report was written on 16 November 2007...of 
over 500 Facebook sites that mention the word Smirnoff, only 36 have more 
than 100 members. The total reach of these 36 sites is c. 15k people (and 
Facebook has over 3 million users in GB). 
 
In producing the report, Splendid has looked at each Facebook site with 
references to Smirnoff and the extent to which the material contained 
therein would have breached Diageo’s Marketing Code. However, unlike 
Diageo generated online content which is subject to the Diageo Marketing 
Code and approval process, dealing with problematic user generated 
content on third party Internet sites is, by the very nature of the internet, 
almost impossible given the ease with which such content can be spread 
and replicated on different sites and forums and the resource that would be 
required to try and continuously monitor and police content. 
 
However, one action that we believe has helped in this area is the creation 
of our own official Smirnoff Facebook page. This currently numbers over 
61,000 members and we are able to monitor and remove content from this 
page that would breach the Diageo Marketing Code. A further development, 
which we believe should also assist in reducing, at least on Facebook, the 
amount of inappropriate content, is that Facebook has recently asked 
Diageo for the URL details of all official Smirnoff Facebook pages so that all 
other pages can be closed down by them. We would encourage site 
operators to adopt similar strategies. Our primary means of enhancing the 
online reputation of our brands, is to actively create positive consumer 
experiences that will result in positive posts. The kinds of action that we 
have undertaken in this area are encouraging consumers to attend Smirnoff 
events around the country, at which responsible consumption messages 
play a key part, and then subsequently post their comments, pictures and 
videos online on our official Facebook page, and hosting brieﬁngs for 
bloggers and providing them with exclusive information that they may 
choose to post in their blogs. 
 
Portman Group 
the Committee seems to be under the impression that there is a “regulatory 
gap” in respect of on-line marketing and sponsorship... I recognise that the 
regulatory system is complex but the fact is that all drinks producers’ 
marketing activity is subject to the same strict standards of regulation; there 
are no “gaps”. 
 
For historical reasons, three regulators are involved: Ofcom, the Advertising 
Standards Authority (ASA) and the Portman Group. The different regulatory 
systems, however, while they operate independently of one another, adopt 
similar standards and complement one another to ensure strict supervision 
of all drinks producer marketing activity... the Portman Group seeks to 
regulate any marketing which is not otherwise regulated by Ofcom/ASA 
 
Constellation Europe (wine) 
Constellation believes that the majority of the public in England, who 





Wine suppliers like Constellation consider that they can play a market 
based role in encouraging a more responsible approach to alcohol 
consumption among the public, where this is desired. 
 
Such a strategy entails investing in the category through brand building and 
consumer education in order to encourage consumers to trade up to better 
wines and with it drive a better drinking experience. 
 
This move to adopt a different drinking behaviour would also have a 
positive impact on consumption and misuse. Similar strategies have been 
successful in the United States. 
 
Constellation does not support moves to further ban advertising and 
promotion of wine, rather to use marketing strategies to promote a more 
responsible approach to alcohol consumption. 
 
Drinkaware Trust 
The Drinkaware Trust (Drinkaware) is an independent charity established in 
January 2007 as a UK wide, public-facing body with the objective of 
positively changing public behaviour and the national drinking culture to 
help reduce alcohol misuse and minimise alcohol-related harm, funded by 
voluntary donations from across the alcohol industry. 
 
There is continued debate about the most effective methods of reducing 
excessive alcohol consumption. Legislation, regulation, self-regulation and 
enforcement all have an important part to play. However, education should 
always have a central role. At the root of the alcohol misuse problem in the 
UK is behaviour ingrained in our culture for thousands of years. The public 
cannot be expected to accept attempts to change these deep-rooted social 
habits without clear information about the extent of the problem, and how it 
applies to them. 
 
Molson Coors 
It is our view that our marketing and advertising practices, whilst constantly 
under review, demonstrate our determination to behave in a responsible 
manner. 
 
We do not know deﬁnitively whether the introduction of minimum pricing in 
the United Kingdom is the right way to go. As Committee Chairman, you will 
be well aware of the very diverse views on this subject. Price is, in our 
opinion, certainly not a sole or decisive factor in addressing alcohol abuse . 
Certainly there are no single measures that, by themselves, will solve the 
problem. 
 
... while we generally do not support Government price controls, we believe 
that social reference pricing may be helpful in the exceptional case of 
extremely low prices in the UK. To this end, I have made a number of public 
comments suggesting that a more detailed examination of the issue of 
minimum pricing would be desirable and that we would wish to take an 
active part in such consideration. 
 
Molson Coors is a family brewer, I am a family man, behaving properly is an 
integral part of our collective and my personal commitment to operating to 
the highest standards. My Company and I are proud of our product and will 
champion it wherever we can. Part of that championing is to make sure that 
we actively seek new ways of ensuring that our product is always 
consumed responsibly. I am very pleased to be able to take this 
opportunity, on behalf of my Company, to offer every assistance to your 





National Association of Cider Makers 
A review of published reports in the public domain produced by the UK 
Government and other bodies, quite clearly demonstrates that no one 
alcoholic drink is responsible for alcohol misuse—misuse is caused by 
certain drinkers who clearly misuse alcohol and by some under 18s who are 
clearly breaking the law. This therefore is not a problem about problem 
drinks but about problem drinkers. 
 
It is misplaced to focus on the availability and affordability (price and 
promotion) of alcohol as the sole and root cause of misuse. The real drivers 
behind harmful drinking, binge drinking behavior and under 18’s alcohol 
misuse tend to get overlooked as a consequence. This means adopting or 
calling for a combination of long-term measures such as improving 
education, awareness campaigns, etc and short-term measures which can 
also be effective such as enforcing the legislation that already exists. 
 
NACM acknowledges that Government has committed resources to 
initiatives in this area as indeed has industry. NACM is a supporter of the 
Drinkaware Trust and of “Project 10” a £100 million (over ﬁve years) 
industry education initiative. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the distinction must be made and 
maintained to ensure that whatever means are introduced they are targeted 
at preventing harmful drinking without punishing the majority of people who 
drink responsibly. The industry is concerned that the introduction of 
measures that have a broader impact and go beyond targeting problem 
drinkers will bring with it unintended consequences. 
 
To this end industry has a legitimate role to play in working with 
Government in reaching solutions. 
 
NACM ﬁrmly believes that any policy considerations, by the Government, to 
address the speciﬁc misuse of alcohol by problem drinkers, should be: 
1. Based on robust evidence (ensuring that studies are peer reviewed) that 
is relevant to equivalent environments, as opposed to deploying convenient 
data to ﬁt an argument. 
2. Given that the majority of the public drink sensibly and that alcohol is 
misused by a minority of drinkers, general population measures such as 
increasing taxes or other means of raising prices (curbing promotions, 
introducing minimum pricing etc.) are not the appropriate means for tackling 
misuse—it penalises the majority of sensible drinkers without necessarily 
dealing with alcohol misuse. People’s lives are already being negatively 
impacted by problem drinkers and it seems ironic that this negative impact 
should be doubly visited upon them by having to endure restrictions, 
inconvenience, and ultimately higher prices, as set out in the consultation 
document, to deal with the problem drinkers. 
3. Dealt with, in the many instances of misuse, by better/more effective 
enforcement. No new legislation is required. NACM believes that the 
Government should focus on maximising the effective use of existing 
legislation to target problem drinkers and that it should avoid using one-
size-ﬁts-all measures that just punish everyone. 
4. There is a need to ensure that measures proposed do not in fact work 
against the Government’s overarching objective of reducing alcohol related 
harm.  
 
A key point that comes across in the School of Health and Related 
Research at Sheffeld University (ScHARR) Study on “Price, Promotion and 
Harm” is that very little research has been conducted in the UK that throws 




drinks and harms. A signiﬁcant amount of the material ScHARR draws on 
derives from the USA. A basic sociological critique of the ScHARR report 
would immediately pick up on the “situational relevance” of those studies to 
the UK. 
 
Notwithstanding these short-comings ScHARR has failed to recognise that 
promotional activity provides a direct and more effective way to introduce 
consumers to new products and product variants. Restricting promotions 
will inhibit new product introductions. The average strength of cider in the 
UK has reduced. There are also plans to introduce into the UK market 
signiﬁcantly lower strength cider but before the product is put on sale more 
widely it is being trialed/promoted in a limited number of retail outlets. 
However, without the ability to promote such new products, producers will 
not be able to introduce them to the public at large. Of concern is that 
inevitably the market will stagnate and will become characterized by lower 
quality and cheaper products. 
 
Advertising is already strictly regulated. NACM does not believe that any 
further restrictions on advertising will address any particular misuse issues. 
The consequences of further restrictions will be to shut down a further 
avenue for bringing to market newer and better quality products. 
 
The Sheffield University review failed to provide compelling evidence that 
would warrant the Government to introduce controls on promotions and 
advertising. The review cited publications and references making causal 
links but some of these documents have not been peer reviewed. NACM 
reiterates its position that evidence should be robust. 
 
As mentioned above members of the NACM are introducing the labelling 
scheme information on bottles and cans. However, this can only be done 
with planned label changes over a period of time to avoid writing off (and 
additionally creating its own waste issues) £ms of packaging materials. 
 
NACM is aware that the Government is holding legislation in reserve to 
secure a greater uptake of the labelling scheme information. If this 
approach were to be actively pursued it would halt, in its tracks, any further 
voluntary introduction of the key components of the labelling scheme 
because it would introduce uncertainty as to what would be speciﬁcally 
required to be included on cans and bottles re exact wording, use or non 
use of the pregnancy logo, dimensions of characters, positioning of 
statements etc. The industry would not want to write off two sets of 
packaging. Furthermore legislation would recognise the industry’s legitimate 
request for a period of 12 to 18 months for transition period to permit 
existing non complying packaging to be sold through. 
 
Penalising the industry and the general population is not an appropriate 
way forward in either seeking to bring about the desired changes in 
reducing alcohol harm or dealing with alcohol misuse (the problem 
drinkers). 
 
Furthermore before any action is considered with regard to promotions and 
advertising it is vital that research is undertaken that is situationally relevant 
to the UK to avoid ill-considered policy proposals: proposals that could 
undermine efforts to promote a cultural change if new products are not 
provided a route to market. 
 
To restate, there are no problem drinks, only problem drinkers and 
therefore measures need to be targeted at these misusers. Furthermore 
NACM believes that the panoply of powers available to the police and local 




who misuse alcohol and those who willfully seek to break the law in 




As a leading premium drinks producer, we recognise that responsible 
drinking is important both to our business interests and to society’s 
interests, and that we have a role to play in raising awareness and seeking 
to inﬂuence attitudes and behaviour among consumers of our products. 
 
We believe that alcohol policy should be fair, effective, proportionate, 
consistent and evidence-based, and that it should not have unintended 
economic or social consequences. We do not believe that effective alcohol 
policy automatically or necessarily involves new legislation or regulation. 
 
Diageo believes that the potential for harm is preventable and that a 
valuable and sustainable place in society exists for alcohol beverages. 
Diageo believes that better enforcement of existing laws and regulations 
and better partnership working can deliver a more responsible drinking 
culture. This requires the skills, experience and contributions of all 
stakeholders to be leveraged more effectively. Clarity on their sphere of 
inﬂuence and interaction is key. 
 
A wide range of stakeholders have a role to play and include: individual 
consumers... national government... alcohol producers and retailers 
Diageo has proposed to Government the creation of three important new 
initiatives: 
— a new mandatory code on retail promotions, within a framework of co-
regulation, under the auspices of The Portman Group; 
— a co-regulatory approach on mandatory labelling of alcohol, also under 
the auspices of The Portman Group; and 
— an industry-wide signiﬁcant new social marketing partnership, aiming 
towards changes in attitudes and behaviour among certain target groups in 
the UK. 
 
Responsible drinking is also at the heart of our business interests. Our 
reputation as a business and the reputation of our brands are damaged 
when our products are misused. We do not want to be targeted as a cause 
of anti-social behaviour, of drunkenness or of damage to our consumers’ 
health. We understand that governments, regulators and society will rightly 
act to curtail alcohol misuse where it occurs, but that inappropriate or 
ineffective legislative and regulatory actions may cause disproportionate 
damage to our business interests. 
 
The relationship between individuals and alcohol is ultimately a personal 
one: individuals decide for themselves if, when, where, how much and how 
often they drink. But a wide range of stakeholders have a role in inﬂuencing 
that individual decision and enabling the consumer to make informed 
choices. Clarity on their sphere of inﬂuence and interaction is key. 
 
We have identiﬁed three key priorities for responsible drinking within 
Diageo: 
— set world-class standards for responsible marketing and innovation; 
— combat alcohol misuse, working with others on initiatives to reduce 
alcohol-related harm; and 
— seek to promote a shared understanding of what it means to drink 
responsibly. This is underpinned by our use of our marketing insight and 
skills in an attempt to transform consumers’ attitudes to alcohol. 
 




delivering a mandatory code as well as respond positively to the other 
initiatives outlined in this submission, and that other stakeholders will also 
act, so that we can have a positive, collective effect in raising awareness 
and shifting attitudes and behaviours on alcohol and reducing alcohol 
misuse among the speciﬁc minority groups most at risk of alcohol-related 
harm. 
 
Scotch Whisky Association and the Gin & Vodka Association 
The Scotch Whisky Association (SWA) and Gin & Vodka Association (GVA) 
are committed to working in partnership with Government and other 
stakeholders to tackle alcohol misuse. It is the minority that misuse alcohol. 
Adoption of a blanket “one-size” ﬁts all approach does nothing to support 
the responsible majority—whether consumer or trader. 
 
We believe in a targeted approach aimed at “at risk” populations. We 
consider that working in partnership with all stakeholders is fundamental to 
tackling the issue and that education coupled with robust enforcement and 
responsible marketing and promotion are key elements to creating and 
underpinning a culture of responsible drinking. 
 
We recognise and share the desire to tackle alcohol misuse. Indeed, the 
SWA and the GVA have been active in promoting responsible drinking for 
some 40 years. The alcohol industry—alongside other stakeholders—
clearly has a role to play in encouraging and promoting the responsible 
consumption of its products to protect the long-term sustainability of the 
industry. 
 
The drinks industry has a long history in promoting responsible drinking... 
Both Associations and our members are committed to helping foster a step 
change in cultural attitudes to the consumption of alcohol in the UK, which 
recognises that responsible, moderate consumption is part of a modern, 
healthy society and that alcohol misuse is unacceptable. 
 
Tackling alcohol misuse and achieving cultural change in attitudes to 
alcohol requires a long-term commitment, close collaboration and a 
concerted effort by a wide range of public and private stakeholders. It 
requires tough enforcement of existing alcohol laws, a sound regulatory 
framework, as well as an innovative approach to social marketing which 
reaches the right sections of the population. We welcome the government’s 
decision to consult on its alcohol strategy and look forward to responding to 
the forthcoming consultation on the Government’s proposed mandatory 
code of practice on alcohol promotions. 
 
The majority of consumers do drink responsibly. We believe that an 
approach targeting “at risk” populations and potentially harmful contexts 
and drinking patterns will be most effective. 
 
We embrace a partnership approach with Government and all stakeholders, 
focusing action on evidence–based measures. Such an approach breaks 
down barriers between the various stakeholders, fosters co-operation and 
allows the different stakeholder groups to share their experiences and build 
on best practice. 
 
A fundamental deliverable from producers is responsible marketing and 
promotion of their brands. Advertising, promotions and sponsorship are a 
legitimate part of commercial activity in every industry. They play an 
important part in competition between brands, and are well governed by 
Codes of Practice/Conduct such as Broadcast Committee of Advertising 
Practice (BCAP)/Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) and the Portman 




Alcohol Drinks. The Code of Practice, which is supported by over 140 
companies, is strongly enforced through an independent robust complaints 
process which includes the power to enforce sanctions for breaches of the 
Code. 
 
We welcome the recognition by Government that the majority of retailers 
and consumers do act responsibly, and that the responsible majority should 
not be penalised. We believe a clear deﬁnition of what is meant by 
“irresponsible promotion” within different retail environments would be 
beneﬁcial. 
 
It is important to recognise that promotions are a very important tool and 
take many forms (ie on pack promotions such as a free glass or opportunity 
to enter a competition/prize draw, or opportunity to receive a money off 
voucher on a new brand when purchasing a bottle).We do not believe such 
promotions are irresponsible or lead to irresponsible consumption. An issue 
which has been receiving much attention is price-based promotions. The 
SWA and GVA are not opposed to appropriate price-based promotions. 
They are important in contributing towards brand awareness and 
introducing new products to the market. Without such mechanisms, 
established brands have an advantage and this can lead to market 
stagnation. The SWA and GVA would like to make clear our view that we 
oppose any sort of minimum pricing as a matter of principle, and question 




The Portman Group (TPG) was set up in 1989 by the UK’s leading alcohol 
producers. Its purpose was to promote sensible drinking; to help prevent 
alcohol misuse; to encourage responsible marketing; and to foster a 
balanced understanding of alcohol-related issues. 
 
A dilemma facing Governments is whether to use alcohol policies to reduce 
the amount of alcohol that all drinkers consume in order to impact upon 
harmful drinking even though, by its very design, this approach penalises all 
drinkers alike. We believe that attempting to tackle problems through 
reducing per capita consumption (eg through taxation or restrictions on 
availability) is untargeted and unfair. 
 
We strongly believe the focus should be on reducing alcohol misuse. It is 
possible, indeed very probable, that reducing alcohol misuse will actually 
result in a net decrease in the nation’s alcohol consumption but that doesn’t 
mean that reducing overall consumption is an appropriate goal in itself. 
 
We consider, however, that better education, providing early advice and 
support to problem drinkers, and a more robust approach to alcohol law 
enforcement across the UK would deliver further improvements. 
The industry has an obligation to market its products responsibly so as not 
to encourage their misuse. It has a further obligation to use its reasonable 
endeavours to educate consumers and proactively encourage responsible 
drinking. 
 
Drinks producers are comprehensively regulated by the BCAP/CAP 
Advertising Codes (overseen by the Advertising Standards Authority) and 
the Portman Group’s Code of Practice on the Naming, Packaging and 
Promotion of Alcoholic Drinks. These codes (except for the BCAP 
Advertising Code) are self-regulatory and are therefore sometimes referred 
to as “voluntary”. This term needs to be clariﬁed, however, as it is 
potentially misleading. The codes are voluntary in so far as the industry has 




however, compliance with the codes is mandatory; there is no opt-out for 
any drinks manufacturer. 
 
The reason drinks companies advertise is to encourage brand switching. 
Studies have demonstrated that responsible advertising can have a 
powerful effect on the type of alcohol people prefer but does not encourage 
either the onset of drinking or potentially harmful drinking behaviour. 
 
The Portman Group’s Code of Practice applies to the naming and 
packaging of alcoholic drinks and the promotional activities of drinks 
producers, including press releases, websites and sponsorship. It ensures 
that such activities are carried out in a socially responsible way. All 
complaints made under our Code are heard by an Independent Complaints 
Panel. This Panel is chaired by Sir Richard Tilt, former Director General of 
the Prison Service; none of the Panel works in the alcohol industry... Failure 
to comply with our Code results in a drink being removed from sale... This 
sanction provides a strong commercial threat to companies, encouraging 
them to ensure that their marketing is responsible. 
 
Some commentators claim that the problem of alcohol misuse in the UK is 
made worse by the price is manipulated to encourage sales. Pricing is, of 
course, controlled by retailers not producers. Producers are nonetheless 
interested in the way in which their products are priced and promoted by the 
retailer. In general, we do not accept that price is the main contributory 
factor in harmful drinking. 
 
Price and total consumption are undoubtedly closely related in that price 
hikes will usually lead to a fall in a nation’s consumption. But the effect of 
price rises on the behaviours of the heaviest drinkers is ambiguous. There 
are nonetheless some speciﬁc pricing tactics by retailers, such as below-
cost selling and volume-related discounts, which raise potential concerns. 
The Portman Group, however, is unable to offer any regulatory intervention 
to prevent such tactics or any other aspect of retailers’ pricing structures. 
Furthermore, retailers themselves may ﬁnd it difficult to self-regulate on 
pricing because of fears of breaching competition law.... In the off-trade, 
however, the purchase of extra volume does not necessarily impact on 
drinking patterns; instead, consumers may choose to store their purchase 
and consume it at their leisure over weeks or months. For this reason, we 
are not convinced that action is required to curb volume-related discounts in 
the off-trade. Any restriction on volume-related discounts in the off-trade 
risks possible unintended side-effects. Retailers may compete instead by 
further reducing basic prices or there may be a move to larger-sized stock-
keeping units (SKUs); either of these might undermine the intent of the 
restriction. 
 
Educational Initiatives: The Portman Group and its member companies 
have pioneered a number of inspiring alcohol responsibility initiatives which 
include: Drinkaware website, labelling, Drinkaware Trust 
 
No single policy action would transform our drinking culture overnight. 
Instead, alcohol harm reduction success depends on strong leadership from 
Government and a properly co-ordinated approach involving the medical 
profession, teachers, those working in the criminal justice system, 
regulators, media, parents, retailers and producers. The effect of pricing, 
advertising and availability are insigniﬁcant next to the effect of cultural 
stereotyping, peer inﬂuence and role modelling... We strongly believe that, 
given accurate and full information, the vast majority of consumers will 
make healthier lifestyle choices. With others, we need to use more forceful 
powers of persuasion. In some areas of the UK, the alcohol laws could be 





Scottish and Newcastle 
We are absolutely committed to working together with the Government, the 
public health community and industry colleagues to tackle the abuse of 
alcohol in our society and to promote the responsible consumption of our 
products. 
 
S&N UK believes the most effective alcohol strategies should concentrate 
on tackling alcohol misuse and not consumption per se. Any measures 
which focus on total consumption obscures differences in how people drink 
and the outcomes they are likely to experience. 
 
S&N UK does not believe that new laws or codes are the most effective 
way to bring about change. There is already a full range of laws in 
existence to tackle disorder and sales to those who are underage or drunk. 
We believe strong and consistent enforcement of these laws will be the 
most effective way forward. 
 
We strongly believe that industry can be a valuable partner in tackling 
alcohol misuse, by marketing its products responsibly, providing consumers 
with information—demonstrated by our full compliance with the voluntary 
label—and delivering education and responsible drinking programmes. 
 
However, integral to the success of the strategy is the role of individual 
responsibility. From Government, to industry to the individual, all parties 
have a role to play. 
 
Wine and Spirits Trade Association 
It should not be overlooked that there is a signiﬁcant body of evidence from 
many global studies that show that moderate alcohol consumption can 
bring a range of health beneﬁts and therefore tackling alcohol misuse 
should not be to the detriment of moderate consumers.  
 
There are difficult problems that link alcohol abuse with social deprivation, 
unemployment, poor education, poor housing, poor nutrition and other 
major social issues. As the availability and price of alcohol is the same 
through the UK, these problems clearly have more complex causes than 
the freedom with which alcohol can be accessed. It is essential that the 
underlying causes of these problems be addressed and not solely the 
regulation of the alcohol industry. 
 
A targeted approach such is necessary to address the minority that are 
misusing alcohol without penalising moderate consumers. Whole population 
approaches to alcohol that concentrate on restricting supply across the 
board may reduce overall alcohol consumption, but these reductions tend to 
take place among the wider population rather than the problem drinkers 
whose consumption puts them at risk of harm. 
 
Personal responsibility is clearly a key principle when tackling alcohol 
misuse and one notoriously difficult to foster. We believe that this is best 
done by greater enforcement of the laws relating to alcohol, quality school 
education and public health campaigns to promote a responsible attitude to 
drinking. 
 
Increasing consumers’ knowledge and appreciation of alcoholic products, 
through tastings and education courses also plays an important role in 
ensuring people drinks for the right reasons and do so in a healthy way. 
Wines and spirits can be a fascinating area of interest and teaching 
consumers to appreciate this is a more effective way of encouraging mature 




separate checkouts and tobacco style health warnings. 
 
Industry has often shown that its initiatives are able to outpace legislation, 
as has recently been seen with the implementation of Challenge 21 and 
Challenge 25 policies, and we believe the Government can secure its policy 
objective in a more timely and cost-effective way by working with industry 
rather than against it. Government can support and encourage these 
voluntary initiatives by avoiding placing additional burdens on industry. 
 
While industry is involved in a large number of voluntary schemes to reduce 
the harms caused by alcohol misuse and promote its responsible 
consumption, it also take seriously the responsibility of marketing its 
products in a way that does not encourage their misuse. Drinks producers 
are comprehensively regulated by the BCAP/CAP Advertising Codes 
(overseen by the Advertising Standards Authority) and the Portman Group’s 
Code of Practice on the Naming, Packaging and Promotion of Alcoholic 
Drinks. The Portman Group’s Code of Practice applies to the naming and 
packaging of alcoholic drinks and the promotional activities of drinks 
producers, including press releases, websites and sponsorship. It ensures 
that such activities are carried out in a socially responsible way. 
Enforcement of the Independent Complaints Panel’s decisions is provided 
by retailers who do not sell any drink found to be in breach of the Code until 
that drink’s marketing has been altered to comply with the Code. This 
sanction provides a strong commercial threat to companies, encouraging 
them to ensure that their marketing is responsible. 
 
Changing the culture of alcohol consumption in the UK is a complex task 
that requires the partnership of a range of stakeholders. There is no silver 
bullet that will solve the problems of alcohol misuse, but by pursuing 
evidence based policies that target harmful drinkers, addressing problems 
through better use of the legislation that already exists and by promoting 
responsible use of alcohol in the population through education, the 
Government, in partnership with industry and other stakeholders, will be 
able to make a impact. 
 
SABMiller 
In general terms, moderate drinking is associated with a number of health 
beneﬁts in some people. Harmful outcomes, on the other hand, are 
generally associated with heavy drinking patterns and alcohol abuse. But it 
is important to note that some researchers associate health risks for some 
people with even moderate levels of consumption. 
 
The alcohol producer’s role includes providing consumers with accurate 
and balanced reminders about its products, and ensuring that these 
products are marketed in a way that does not condone or promote 
irresponsible drinking.... Producers, retailers and government also need to 
accept that tackling harmful drinking patterns will only be effective if people 
accept their individual responsibility towards their own alcohol consumption. 
 
SABMiller supports the Government’s voluntary labelling code and was the 
ﬁrst alcohol producer to commit to fully implement the Government’s 
voluntary code on labelling... Labelling should be a reminder about levels of 
unit consumption and key health messages, reinforcing the consumer’s 
existing understanding of responsible alcohol consumption developed from 
the full provision of accurate, factual information. 
 
Though we recognise that consumers are ultimately responsible for their 
own drinking decisions, our advertising will not present refusal, abstinence 
or moderate consumption in a negative light, suggest that alcohol has 




people. In addition to compliance with the legislative codes, SABMiller 
adheres to the Code on Non Broadcast Advertising, Portman Group Code 
and the SABMiller Policy on Commercial Communications. When combined 
with the legislative codes, these voluntary codes help strike the balance 
between society’s expectation for responsible advertising, our right to 
advertise a legal product in a free and competitive market, and the adult 
consumer’s right to have information about our brands. 
 
The initial ﬁndings of the University of Sheffield’s ScHARR Review of the 
Effects of Alcohol, Price and Promotion raised the concept of “ﬂoor prices”. 
These have also been proposed by the Scottish Government in their report 
Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol. We consider these to be 
both disproportionate and unnecessary. Minimum prices interfere with the 
underlying principles of a free market economy. The process of setting 
minimum prices is arbitrary to which there is no end, and it is predicated on 
the improbable assumption that raising the price of alcohol will make the 
minority of drinkers who misuse alcohol and/or engage in anti-social 
behaviour act differently. Minimum prices are most likely to impact the 
drinking behaviour of those adults who enjoy drinking alcohol and who do 
so in a legal, moderate, and socially-acceptable way. In much of continental 
Europe, the price of alcohol is far cheaper than in the UK but there are not 
the same problems; societal tolerance (or intolerance) of those who drink 
irresponsibly or illegally appears to be a greater determinant of the extent to 
which a country will experience alcohol harm than the price of alcohol.  
 
A recent study found that the wide availability of social sources, including 
parents and relatives, meant that reducing availability of alcohol from 
commercial sources has only a moderate impact on the amount of alcohol 
consumed by underage drinkers. SABMiller welcomes the British Chief 
Medical Officer’s Guidance on the Consumption of Alcohol by Children and 
Young People published in January 2009 which advises parents on how to 
encourage their children, and themselves, to develop a responsible attitude 
to drinking. This guidance is an important contribution to reducing the harm 
caused by underage drinking and will hopefully discourage parents, friends 
and relatives from providing alcohol to those under the legal drinking age. 
 
Instead of seeking to tackle alcohol misuse through blanket measures such 
as high prices that unfairly penalise the vast majority of adult drinkers who 
consume alcohol sensibly and legally, the UK should target the small 
minority who harm themselves or others when drinking alcohol. 
 
Tackling harmful drinking patterns will only be effective if people accept 
their individual responsibility. Increased pricing and restrictions on retailing 
will not solve the problem of alcohol misuse. These are a small part of a 
wider issue which has individual judgement and accountability at its heart. 
While government, public services and industry have a role to play in 
raising awareness about the potential harm of excessive alcohol 
consumption, much of the information about alcohol is conveyed through 
informal channels. In particular, family and peers play a key role in the 
development of attitudes, awareness and behaviours around drinking. 
Government and industry initiatives should seek to support them in their 
role. Parents play a crucial role in teaching their children about the 
responsible consumption of alcohol. By strengthening their knowledge 
about alcohol consumption they can ensure that their children grow up to be 
responsible. Providing parents with accurate and balanced sources of 
information, such as TalkingAlcohol.com, means they can feel more 
conﬁdent in carrying out this responsibility. Several of SABMiller’s 
businesses offer resources for parents to talk with their children about not 
drinking, such as Let’s Keep Talking in the United States and We Can All 








What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing 
Tactics used 
Other voluntary measures in the United Kingdom are managed by the 
Portman Group, which was set up in 1990 by the eight major UK drinks 
manufacturers. Its specific goals are to promote sensible drinking, reduce 
alcohol-related harm and develop a better understanding of alcohol misuse. 
It undertakes educational work, much of which is directed at young people. 
An early initiative of the Portman Group is the launch of its proof-of-age 
card scheme to help licensees detect under-age drinkers 
 
Government legislation has been slow to respond to the growth in the youth 
drinks sector. The industry has taken the lead, with the Portman Group 
announcing new industry guidelines for alcoholic soft drinks. The voluntary 
code recommends the following: a ban on the use of characters or imagery 
that appeal to under-18s; a ban on containers in anti-social shapes and 
names that suggest aggression, violence, danger or sexual success; and a 
requirement that retailers restrict the display of drinks containing alcohol to 








What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing 
Tactics used 
This growing concentration of the beer and distilled spirits industries has 
created an unprecedented concentration of resources at global and national 
levels for participating in and inﬂuencing policy debates regarding alcohol... 
To this end, in 1995, 10 of the world’s largest distilled spirits and beer 
marketers at that time (Allied Domecq Spirits and Wine [as of 2006 split up 
between Pernod Ricard, Diageo, and Beam Global Spirits and Wine], 
Bacardi-Martini, Brown-Forman, Coors Brewing Company, Guinness PLC 
[now part of Diageo], Heineken NV, International Distillers and Vintners 
[now part of Diageo], Miller Brewing Company [now controlled by SAB-
Miller, a conglomerate formed by joining Miller with South African 
Breweries, with the Philip Morris successor company Altria retaining a 20% 
interest], Joseph E. Seagram & Sons [whose spirits brands were acquired 
primarily by Pernod Ricard and Diageo in 2000], and South African 
Breweries [now SABMiller]) banded together to found the ICAP....Miller’s 
involvement in the ICAP as follows: 
 
As Miller continues to expand internationally, we will need a better grasp on 
how different governments may regulate our products ... [this is] the latest 
initiative in managing worldwide issues, and assisting our sales and 
marketing group in an increasingly competitive marketplace. 
 
In a letter announcing the formation of the ICAP in 1995, Grant outlined 4 
goals for the new organization: (1) elaborating a more integrated approach 
to alcohol policy, involving all interested sectors; (2) developing a common 
language for promoting more effective dialogue; (3) encouraging initiatives 
designed to meet the needs of developing countries; and (4) promoting 
responsible lifestyles – A subsequent ICAP brochure described the ﬁrst 
goal as an effort to reassess ‘‘current theories with a primary focus on the 
differences between positive and negative patterns of drinking.’’ This 
emphasis on the patterns of drinking (as opposed to population levels of 




focus in its ﬁrst decade, developed in a 1998 conference titled ‘‘Permission 
for Pleasure,’’ and a subsequent edited collection of essays titled, Alcohol 
and Pleasure: A Health Perspective. ‘‘Involving all interested sectors’’ would 
in practice mean pushing for and engaging in active alcohol industry 
involvement in public health policymaking regarding alcohol, directing 
debate over alcohol policy into areas where the alcohol industry could 
agree, and thus focusing on education and identiﬁcation and treatment of 
the heaviest drinkers (among the least effective and least cost-effective 
approaches to alcohol problems) and staying away from population-level 
strategies such as increased taxes or restrictions on marketing or physical 
availability. The second goal would seek to remove phrases troubling to the 
industry such as ‘‘alcohol and other drugs’’ from the ofﬁcial lexicon...The 
third would aim to protect the industry’s ability to expand in areas where its 
potential for growth was greatest, by inﬂuencing and encouraging weak 
alcohol policies in this region. The fourth goal would in practice mean 
promoting drinking and the drinker’s right to obtain alcohol. 
 
Much of the ICAP’s activities have focused on countering the inﬂuence of 
the WHO and leading alcohol researchers by essentially functioning like a 
WHO unit on alcohol, with certain key omissions. Building on Grant’s 
decade of experience at the WHO in creating and distributing edited 
collections of contributions by scholars from around the world, the ICAP 
would commission and produce 10 such book-length collections between 
1998 and 2010, as well as 2 other monographs, 6 brieﬁn papers for 
consultation with the WHO, 20 brief issue reports, 4 in-depth ICAP reviews 
of issues in alcohol policy, 5 periodic reviews of drinking and culture, 8 
peer-reviewed journal articles written by ICAP staff and paid consultants, 1 
special issue of a journal devoted to alcohol and harm reduction, and 22 
charters, working papers, progress reports, and other brief policy 
statements or guides to policy implementation. It also produced 4 policy 
guides, 9 health brieﬁng papers, 8 issue brieﬁng papers, and 4 policy tool 
kits, ‘‘guides for implementation of interventions to reduce harmful drinking.’ 
 
Although the WHO was producing fewer publications during this period, 
several ICAP publications seemed to attempt to counter or pre-empt similar 
WHO publications. For instance, in 1994 the European ofﬁce of the WHO 
had sponsored a group of 17 scientists from 9 countries to produce a 
comprehensive review of the global research literature on alcohol and 
public health. The book made a strong, evidence-based argument for 
population-level strategies such as excise tax increases and controls over 
physical availability. The ICAP’s ﬁrst policy manifesto appeared in 1998, 
and was titled Drinking Patterns and Their Consequences. It sought to 
reframe the debate from societal measures to individual patterns of 
drinking, which could be harmful or beneﬁcial. This reframing also shifted 
the focus from the product and the practices of the industry to the behavior 
of individual drinkers..... Whereas WHO estimates have placed alcohol’s 
role in the global burden of disease on a par with that of tobacco, the ICAP, 
in a publication of its own titled Alcohol Consumption and the Burden of 
Disease, focused on the limitations of the study, including claiming 
(incorrectly) that the estimates had failed to take into account different 
patterns of drinking....Two other ICAP publications directly addressed the 
well-documented public health strategies of increasing alcohol taxes and 
restricting physical availability. 
 
The ICAP has also produced a series of brieﬁng papers, reviews of alcohol 
policy issues that claim to be surveys of the research literature... The ICAP 
papers focus on the disagreements and inconclusiveness of alcohol policy 
research. For instance, the ICAP brieﬁng paper on health warning labels on 
alcohol reﬂects ‘‘the equivocal nature of the contemporary HWL [health 




interest in promoting alcohol consumption. For instance, the ICAP report on 
safe drinking levels concludes by noting that ‘‘both the UK and the US 
guidelines draw attention to the health beneﬁts of moderate alcohol 
consumption.’’  
 
The ICAP developed its own ‘‘blue book,’’ an Internet-based set of 
‘‘practical guides for alcohol policy and targeted interventions.’’ ...Described 
as ‘‘a new way to address the role of alcohol in society,’’ the blue book 
offers 23 ‘‘modules’’ for policy development. Conspicuously missing from 
these modules is any mention of 3 of the most effective policy approaches 
to alcohol problems: taxation, restrictions on advertising and marketing, and 
limits on physical availability. 
 
Finally, the industry must consistently emphasize alcohol education. As 
Miller’s vice president of corporate relations told a meeting of alcohol 
industry executives in 1996, when the beer company was still under the 
control of Philip Morris, “First, we must continue to educate consumers to 
drink our products responsibly ... . Second, we must continue to educate 
the public ... that there is a vast difference ... between consumption ... and 
abuse ... of our products ... and between alcohol ... and illegal drugs ... . 
And third, we must continue to educate policy makers ... that we ... and the 
100 million Americans who drink alcohol beverages ... don’t need higher 
taxes ... and more restrictive regulations ... . For our industry, a positive 
image ... based on accurate information about our products ... is not a 
luxury ... but a necessity ... a necessity for survival ... . This is hardball ... 
and we’ve got to play to win.’’ 
Arguments used 
A CDC systematic review of the literature on the relationship between 
physical availability of alcohol and health outcomes found “sufﬁcient 
evidence of a positive association between outlet density and excessive 
alcohol consumption and related harms to recommend limiting alcohol 
outlet density through the use of regulatory authority (e.g., licensing and 
zoning) as a means of reducing or controlling excessive alcohol 
consumption and related harms”. Again, other reviews of the global 
literature have corroborated this ﬁnding. The ICAP review of the same 
literature states that ‘‘a debate has been developing around the 
effectiveness of availability control measures,’’ claims that ‘‘[t]here is 
evidence that efforts by those desiring to circumvent existing controls has 
fueled organized crime’’ (with the cited source being an article by a Diageo 
employee published in another ICAP collection) 
 
A subsequent ICAP brochure described the ﬁrst goal as an effort to 
reassess ‘‘current theories with a primary focus on the differences between 
positive and negative patterns of drinking.’’ This emphasis on the patterns 
of drinking (as opposed to population levels of consumption) and positive 
effects of alcohol use would be a major ICAP focus in its ﬁrst decade, 
developed in a 1998 conference titled ‘‘Permission for Pleasure,’’ and a 
subsequent edited collection of essays titled, Alcohol and Pleasure: A 
Health Perspective. ‘‘Involving all interested sectors’’ would in practice 
mean pushing for and engaging in active alcohol industry involvement in 
public health policymaking regarding alcohol, directing debate over alcohol 
policy into areas where the alcohol industry could agree, and thus focusing 
on education and identiﬁcation and treatment of the heaviest drinkers 
(among the least effective and least cost-effective approaches to alcohol 
problems) and staying away from population-level strategies such as 
increased taxes or restrictions on marketing or physical availability. 
 
The ICAP report on drinking age limits states that some ‘‘argue that a 
minimum drinking age of 21 is impractical’’ and that ‘‘the emphasis should 










What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
In July, 1997 ... proposal that most tobacco and alcohol advertisements on 




Mike Brophy, communications director for Miller Beer, expressed concern 
for reducing access to cigarettes and alcohol to children, but found it odd 
that the alderman would introduce a proposal that would “demonize” a 





What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing 
Tactics used 
Diageo initiated a sophisticated public relations program during the same 
period that it launched the Smirnoff brand campaign. Its purpose was to 
convince policymakers, public health and medical groups, and the public 
that the company was committed to deterring underage drinking and other 
social harms associate with its products. Diageo hired Guy Smith, a former 
vice president of Philip Morris, a veteran of the tobacco wars, and a former 
advisor to President Clinton, to head up its marketing public relations 
division, which would design and implement the campaign. The following 
strategies were used. 
 
1. Establish a self-regulatory structure to monitor the company’s alcohol 
advertising. Diageo established its own responsible marketing code, which 
it describes as ‘‘a beacon for responsible marketing and brand innovation’’ 
according to DrinkIQ. The code, established in1997, is periodically updated 
and states that the company’s advertising must 
Be aimed only at adults and never target those younger than the legal 
purchase age for alcohol [and] be designed and placed for an adult 
audience, and never be designed or constructed or placed in a way that 
appeal primarily to individuals younger than the legal purchase age for 
alcohol. 
 
2. Broadcast ‘‘responsibility’’ advertisements. Between 2001 and 2005, 
Diageo spent 17.7% of its advertising budget on responsibility television 
advertising, which is focused primarily on educating viewers about how to 
prevent underage drinking and drunk driving– –far more than any other 
alcoholic beverage producer. Even so, underage youths were far more 
likely to see a Diageo product advertisement than a responsibility 
advertisement during this period. 
 
3. Fund prevention programs that focus on education, public awareness, 
and responsible retail practices. According to Diageo’s 2009 Corporate 
Citizenship Report, 
We support practical programmes in many of our markets to tackle 
particular examples of harm from alcohol misuse... .This year we led or 
supported over 130 such initiatives in over 40 countries. The Diageo 
Responsible Drinking Fund, which had resources this year of £400,000, 
provided ﬁnancial support, backed up by expert guidance. 
 
Examples include DrinkIQ, a Web site providing information on alcohol and 
alcohol problems, programs focused on responsible alcohol retail practices, 





4. Build partnerships with medical and public health organizations and 
government agencies. According to Diageo, most of its funded programs 
are  
undertaken in partnership with other organizations including governments, 
non-governmental organizations, universities, researchers, physicians, 
[and] law enforcement.  
 
Medical and public health groups are a high priority for building 
partnerships; governmental agencies are equally important. For example, 
Diageo has reached out to the Federal Trade Commission, which regulates 
alcohol advertising and called for the industry to support the Federal Trade 
Commission’s ‘‘We Don’t Serve Teens Campaign.’’ The company’s 
cooperation with governmental agencies on prevention efforts dovetail with 
Diageo’s extensive political lobbying activities. Diageo and other distillers 
have also sponsored scientiﬁc research and sought to inﬂuence public 
perceptions regarding research ﬁndings. 
 
5. Establish industry-based ‘‘social aspects’’ organizations. Over the past 
decade, Diageo has helped organize and fund 14 social aspects 
organizations worldwide, including the Century Council and the 
International Center on Alcohol Policy in the United States. These industry-
member organizations sponsor programs similar to those funded by the 
Diageo Responsible Drinking Fund and further the goals of the Diageo 
public relations campaign. Social aspects organizations serve the long-term 
marketing interests of their industry members.  
 
These components ﬁt a strategy used by several industries that have 
products with potential public health harms: they promote ineffective self-
regulatory programs, discourage governmental regulation, broadcast a 
message of corporate responsibility, fund programs with public relations 
value that do not interfere with marketing, recruit potential opponents with 
corporate funds, and seek opportunities to cooperate with governmental 
agencies that might otherwise interfere with marketing goals. 
Arguments used 
The code, established in1997, is periodically updated and states that the 
company’s advertising must Be aimed only at adults and never target those 
younger than the legal purchase age for alcohol [and] be designed and 
placed for an adult audience, and never be designed or constructed or 
placed in a way that appeal primarily to individuals younger than the legal 






What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
2003 - Ministerial Council on Drug Strategy (MCDS) reviewed the 
effectiveness of ABAC (Alcohol Beverages Advertising Code) 
Tactics used 
2003 review: The ad hoc National Committee for the Review of Alcohol 
Advertising (NCRAA) concluded that ABAC ‘does not address public health 
concerns about alcohol advertising and use’ ..... NCRAA determined that 
the ASB did not have sufﬁcient understanding of public health concerns 
about alcohol advertising to make adequate judgements about speciﬁc 
advertisements 
 
Rather than impose a different system, MCDS allowed the industry to 
continue to conduct an ABAC system that was ‘revised’ and ‘strengthened’ 
by 25 amendments 
Arguments used 
Alcohol advertising in Australia has been self-regulated by peak industry 
bodies through the ABAC since 1998 [National Health Policy on Alcohol 




failed] ....... The decision in 2003 by the Ministerial Council on Drug 
Strategy (MCDS) to review the effectiveness of ABAC indicated it had lost 
conﬁdence in the code, and the subsequent investigation found the ABAC 
system was deﬁcient, even dysfunctional. Yet throughout 5 years of 
operation the ABAC principals had maintained the system represented best 
practice and could not be improved. The Distilled Spirits Industry Council of 
Australia (DSICA) had proclaimed: ‘. . .Australia has a comprehensive self 
regulatory system in place that speciﬁcally prevents advertising directed at 
young people’; ‘. . . the Pre-vetting system has been extraordinarily 
successful’ and it had ‘. . . proved ground breaking internationally with 
several countries adopting the model’. The rigour of the system was lauded: 
‘the industry’s voluntary code and its complaints system was one of the 
world’s most stringent’; and ‘Australian brewers . . . lead the world in strong 










The standard response from the alcohol industry has been that advertising 
affects brand and beverage shares, and content issues can be dealt with 





What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
Ministry gave the go-ahead for taking up the issue of restrictions on alcohol 
advertising in 2002–04 
Tactics used 
They joined forces with the Freedom of Commercial Speech Trust ... This 
Trust was established in 1997 soon after the health minister had announced 
her decision to regulate tobacco marketing. 
Arguments used 





What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing 
Tactics used 
In 2006, alcohol industry representatives, together with the entertainment 
venues surrounding a University, declared a code of practice not to sell 
alcohol to students in uniform during the daytime. This was intended to 
demonstrate self-regulation as an alternative to the total advertising ban 
which was being considered at the time. 
 
Many stakeholders can alter the implementation outcomes by acting as the 
co-implementers. These include the role of the alcohol industry and related 
sectors in marketing self-regulation, the alcohol industry as a partner of the 
DDD Foundations, and the media in public campaigns. However, many see 
that these approaches may be designed to divert policy direction and to 
promote the corporate image.  
 
In many instances, alcohol entrepreneurs negotiated ‘trade-offs’ with policy 
makers, such as ‘using sport as a hostage’. They threatened to withdraw 
sports sponsorship in retaliation for the advertising ban. 
 
The Federation on Alcohol Control of Thailand (FACT) was established 
during the formulation process for the FDA advertising ban regulation, in 




beginning. Its members include alcohol producers, sellers and distributors, 
the Thai Retail Association, The Marketing Association of Thailand, the Thai 
Hotel Association, the Thai Restaurant Association, and the Tourism 
Association..... FACT opposed the regulation in an aggressive fashion, 
including warning on the impacts to employment, criticising it as rushed, 
fishy, and unfair. They also threatened to petition the Administrative court. 
 
Foreign alcohol entrepreneurs have had a more explicit role in the alcohol 
policy process including lobbying for their participation. They were key 
particiapants in the meeting of 30 entrepreneurs in July 2003 to oppose 
advertising regulation and were criticised for delaying the decision. 
 
In mid 2006, the US Ambassador took tobacco and alcohol entrepreneurs 
to meet with the Health Minister. In late 2006, the French Ambassador 
together with a few alcohol companies submitted their request to delay the 
regulation of advertising: “The alcohol companies, including whiskey giant 
Johnnie Walker, said they wanted to have a say in the public hearings on 
the new Bill being drafter to completely ban all forms of alcohol advertising” 
[Minister of PH after meeting with US Ambassador and alcohol industry 
representatives, 2006]. 
 
In many cases, alcohol operators used windows of opportunity in the 
alcohol policy process to undermine their business opponents, for example 
by deviating policy direction during the advertising ban formulation to 
advocate for White spirits tax rate increases. 
 
Following the collective movement against the partial advertising ban, six 
foreign alcohol operators established REACT (Responsible & Ethical 
Alcohol Consumption in Thailand) in 2004... one particularly innovative 
approach from REACT was to use technical mechanisms such as 
organising technical seminars, announcing a study of the impact of alcohol 
advertising and the effectiveness of the advertising ban... 
Arguments used 
A decrease in alcohol-generated benefits, of the negative impacts of alcohol 
policy particularly in economic terms, is a common policy discourse for the 
industry. For example, the CEO of an alcohol company claimed that a total 
advertising ban would create 100,000 unemployed: “These measures do 
not attack the root cause of the problem. They will destroy alcohol industry 
by the misconception that all beverages are bad and are the cause of all 
problems... The advertising sector will lose 1.5 to 2 billion Baht (by the ACC 
Bill)... Related sectors such as bottle shops, restaurants and tourism will be 
affected by at least 10% of about ten billion Baht” (Suthabodi Sattabut – 
Assistant Manager Boonrawd Brewery) 
 
The alcohol industry used this position (advertising ban is counter to the 
concept of trade competition, individual freedom and trade freedom) to 
oppose the ACC Bill. 
 
A group of alcohol importers protested to the Thai Government, claiming 
that the advertising regulations were contrary to the WTO agreement.  
The alcohol industry have used the example of increasing overall 
consumption in some countries that have banned alcohol advertising to 
oppose such interventions.  
 
“We advocate for a self regulatory system among alcohol producers as we 
know that advertising bans are ineffective from experience of New Zealand, 
US, Sweden and Denmark” (an administrator of an international alcohol 
company, 2005) 
 




and later called for its repeal. 
 
...alcohol entrepreneurs used the failure to reduce traffic accidents in the 
2004 New Year to call for the repeal of the partial advertising ban 
 
Most policy players seem to agree about the situation of poor policy 
enforcement. However the alcohol industry’s agenda in calling for stronger 
enforcement is possibly to avoid the enactment of stronger alcohol 
legislation. For example, industry representatives recommended that the 
government strengthen the enforcement of the existing laws in a lobby 
against the 2003 partial advertising ban. 
 
Foreign entrepreneurs ...labelling the Thai government a dictatorship 
because of the advertising ban 
 
A Riche Monde administrator claimed that REACT’s self-regulation has 
proved its effectiveness, and it a better alternative to the total ban [on sports 
advertising] 
 
FACT opposed the regulation in an aggressive fashion, including warning 
on the impacts to employment, criticising it as rushed, fishy, and unfair. 
van Hoof et 
al, 2008 [243] 
Geography 
Netherlands 
What policy is the AI attempting to influence 
General marketing 
Tactics used 
In the current Dutch situation, happy hours and other alcohol discounts in 
the catering industry are subject only to self-regulation. The Dutch 
Foundation for the Responsible Use of Alcohol (STIVA), an organization of 
alcohol industries representatives, has formulated an Advertising Code 
containing rules for alcohol promotions. According to the Advertising Code, 
alcohol promotions are not allowed in premises where 25% or more of the 
visitors are minors. Nor are premises permitted to offer alcoholic beverages 
for free or to sell them for less than half of the normal price, to offer more 
than one discounted drink per customer, or to combine alcohol discounts 









Appendix 3: The Tobacco Marketing Environment – 










During the 1km walk, the number of vendors/street stands 
and number of general stores selling tobacco were counted. 
These were combined in this analysis to form a new 
variable of the total number of tobacco outlets. 
 
The ‘Manual for conducting EPOCH’[534] outlines what 
should be counted: 
From the Start Point, walk slowly down the street, 
noting down all the advertisements and shops 
you see... Depending on the density of the area 
you choose, the whole walk may take about 40 
minutes. 
 
• Each store should be put into one category 
only. Do not count a shop more than once.  
• If a store seems to fit into more than one 
category, categorize it into the best option 
available.   
• If convenience stores/ general stores sell 
cigarettes mark in: “Convenience 
store/general stores (with cigarettes)” only   
• If convenience stores/ general stores do not 
sell cigarettes mark in: “Convenience 
stores/general stores” only 
 
The average number of outlets seen in each country (split 
into urban/rural communities) and in each country income 








One store selling tobacco was visited during the 1km walk 









cigarettes The ‘Manual for conducting EPOCH’[534] outlines what 
should be counted: 
Identify a store or outlet that sells cigarettes on 
your Community Observation Walk. If no outlets 
are seen, visit the nearest place that sells 
cigarettes. If more than one outlet is seen, visit 
the store closest to the Start Point. 
 
A single unit cigarette = Cigarettes sold 
separately. You can buy one cigarette at a time 
 
The percentage of communities with a selected tobacco 




The number of tobacco adverts were counted during the 
1km walk. 
 
The ‘Manual for conducting EPOCH’[534] outlines what 
should be counted: 
From the Start Point, walk slowly down the street, 
noting down all the advertisements and shops 
you see... Depending on the density of the area 
you choose, the whole walk may take about 40 
minutes. 
 
Categorise all advertisements you see. For 
example include:  
• Advertisements on poster boards, pasted on 
walls, pasted on bus stops, pasted on bus or 
cars that go by you as you do the walk  
• Permanent advertisements on buildings or 
public facilities  
• Advertisements on shop windows and 
advertisements just inside windows within ~ 1 
metre of the window that are clearly visible by 
people walking by the shop (A4 paper size or 
greater)  
• If you see advertisements pasted on boxes 
pressed against shop windows or on the 
pavement, include if advertisement is easily 






• If there are multiple advertisements of the 
same type stuck one on top of each other 
count as one advertisement.   
• If two or more advertisements are adjacent to 
each other on a single surface count as two 
or more advertisements if they are 1 or more 
metres apart.   
• Apply a similar rule when advertisements are 
clustered together for other reasons. For 
example a group of shopping trolleys in a line 
in front of a store may all have the same 
advertisement and could be counted as one.   
• If a poster board is two sided, with the same 
or different advertisement on each side, count 
this as two advertisements. 
 
The average number of adverts seen in each country (split 
into urban/rural communities) and in each country income 







One store selling tobacco was visited during the 1km walk 
and it was noted whether or not there was POS advertising. 
 
The ‘Manual for conducting EPOCH’[534] outlines what 
should be counted: 
Identify a store or outlet that sells cigarettes on 
your Community Observation Walk. If no outlets 
are seen, visit the nearest place that sells 
cigarettes. If more than one outlet is seen, visit 
the store closest to the Start Point. 
 
Point-of-Sale advertising = Advertising at or near 
the store counter which is usually inside the store. 
 
The percentage of communities with a selected tobacco 




Individual level (EPOCH 2) 
Poster Individuals were asked to recall whether or not they had 











The ‘Manual for conducting EPOCH’[534] outlines what 
should be counted: 
This is the first of a series of questions asking 
where participants have seen or heard different 
types of advertising. Participants are asked to 
report ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to whether they have seen 
cigarette/ tobacco advertisements in a list of 
different types of media.   
 
On posters = This includes posters pasted on 
billboard, walls, windows, taxis, buses etc. 
Permanently sponsored signage on shops or 
other buildings = This refers to a more 
permanent style of advertising. A company may 
buy a building or sponsor a facility and put their 
signage on this building or facility 
TV = Any advertisement seen on TV 
Radio = Any advertisement heard on radio 
Print media such as newspapers/magazines = 
May include other print media such as flyers, 
local papers, booklets, books 
At cinemas = Commercials prior or during 
movies seen at the cinema 
Sponsorship of sporting, music or other events 
= Companies may advertise their name or 
products through sponsoring sporting or other 
major events.   
On products such as umbrellas, ashtrays, 
shopping bags, clothing, or any other products = 
Companies may advertise their name or 
products by putting their name or products on 
items that are often given for free.   
On the Internet = This includes any type of 
advertising seen while surfing the net or on 
email 
Free samples = Free sample of a product e.g. a 
cigarette, or a chocolate bar, or tissues carrying 
an advertisement 











Vouchers that allow a discount on a product 
 
The percentage of individuals who reported seeing 




The number of individuals who reported having seen the 
following types of marketing were totalled: 
poster, signage, TV, radio, print media, cinema. 
 
The totals were then split into the percentage of individuals 
who had seen none of the marketing types, and those who 







The number of individuals who reported having seen the 
following types of marketing were totalled: 
sponsorship, on other products, Internet, free samples, 
vouchers. 
 
The totals were then split into the percentage of individuals 
who had seen none of the marketing types, and those who 








Appendix 4: The Tobacco Marketing Environment – Exposure 










This was noted in EPOCH 1 
 






This was categorised in PURE according to the 2006 






Gender This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 




Age This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
Age (continuous) [601] 
Continuous 
Internet access This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
Do you have access to the Internet? (Mark all that apply) 
– At home, At work, In community for free, In community 
but need to pay, At a friend/relatives house, Other place, 
No access to the Internet [601] 
 
Only the final part of the question was used “No access to 
the Internet” – if this had been ticked then the individual 
was classed as not having access to the Internet, if it was 
left blank then the individual was classed as having 






TV ownership This was asked in PURE Household 
 
Does the household own any of the following? TV [602] 
 
This household-level variable was applied to each 











This was asked in PURE Household 
 
Does the household own any of the following? 
Stereo/transistor/radio [602] 
 
This household-level variable was applied to each 







Education This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
What is the highest level of school you attended? (check 
highest level completed only) – Primary, Secondary, 
Higher [601] 





Smoking status This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
Smoking status? Current, Former, Never [601] 







This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
Thinking of your five closest non-related friends, how 
many of them currently smoke? (written number 0-5) 
[601] 
 
This categorical variable (0, 1, 2 etc) was recoded into a 
binary variable to signify having close friends who smoke, 
or not having close friends who smoke. 
Binary – 
1=None, 






Appendix 5: Compliance with Tobacco Marketing 
Regulations – Exposure and Confounder Variables 
Exposure variable Collection 
Format of 
variable 




HDI rank HDI ranking, ranging from 1-187 (the number of 
UN countries). Data from 2010[579]. A ranking of 
1 = best, and 187 = worst. 
 
Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite 
measure of life expectancy, education, and gross 
national income per capita used to rank countries 
in terms of their human development. 
Continuous 
Corruption Control of corruption. Percentile rank (0-100), 
compared to all countries. Data from 2010[577]. 





Government effectiveness including commitment 
to policy. Percentile rank (0-100), compared to all 
countries. Data from 2010[577]. A percentile rank 
of 0 = not effective, and 100 = effective. 
Continuous 
Government stability Political stability / violence. Percentile rank (0-
100), compared to all countries. Data from 
2010[577]. A percentile rank of 0 = not stable, 
and 100 = stable. 
Continuous 
Government 
expenditure on health 
Public and private expenditure on health (% 
GDP). Data from 2010[540]. 
Continuous 
Tobacco control 
budget per million 
population 
Budget spent on tobacco control per million 
population (thousand US$ per million population). 
Data used for calculation: 
 Population in 2010[539] 
 Annual budget for tobacco control (US$). 
Data mostly from 2010, except Brazil 
(2003), China and Poland (2008), Iran 
and Pakistan (2007); no data available 






Step 1: ‘Tobacco control budget (US$) per million 
population’ =  
Annual budget for tobacco control (US$) 
Population 
 
Step 2: ‘Tobacco control budget (thousand US$) 
per million population’ =  




(production of tobacco) 
Production of unmanufactured tobacco (thousand 
















During the 1km walk, the number of general stores selling 
alcohol and the number of pubs/bars were counted. These 
were combined to form a new variable, the total number of 
alcohol outlets. 
 
The ‘Manual for conducting EPOCH’[534] outlines what 
should be counted: 
From the Start Point, walk slowly down the street, 
noting down all the advertisements and shops 
you see... Depending on the density of the area 
you choose, the whole walk may take about 40 
minutes. 
 
• Each store should be put into one category 
only. Do not count a shop more than once.  
• There may be one exception that is for ‘stores 
that sell alcohol.’ If the supermarket sells 
alcohol, mark it down as ‘supermarket’ and 
also as a ‘store that sells alcohol’   
• If a store seems to fit into more than one 
category, categorize it into the best option 
available.   
 
The average number of outlets seen in each country (split 
into urban/rural communities) and in each country income 






The number of alcohol adverts were counted during the 1km 
walk. 
 
The ‘Manual for conducting EPOCH’[534] outlines what 
should be counted: 






noting down all the advertisements and shops 
you see... Depending on the density of the area 
you choose, the whole walk may take about 40 
minutes. 
 
Categorise all advertisements you see. For 
example include:  
• Advertisements on poster boards, pasted on 
walls, pasted on bus stops, pasted on bus or 
cars that go by you as you do the walk  
• Permanent advertisements on buildings or 
public facilities  
• Advertisements on shop windows and 
advertisements just inside windows within ~ 1 
metre of the window that are clearly visible by 
people walking by the shop (A4 paper size or 
greater)  
• If you see advertisements pasted on boxes 
pressed against shop windows or on the 
pavement, include if advertisement is easily 
visible (e.g. A4 paper size).   
• If there are multiple advertisements of the 
same type stuck one on top of each other 
count as one advertisement.   
• If two or more advertisements are adjacent to 
each other on a single surface count as two 
or more advertisements if they are 1 or more 
metres apart.   
• Apply a similar rule when advertisements are 
clustered together for other reasons. For 
example a group of shopping trolleys in a line 
in front of a store may all have the same 
advertisement and could be counted as one.   
• If a poster board is two sided, with the same 
or different advertisement on each side, count 
this as two advertisements. 
 
The average number of adverts seen in each country (split 
into urban/rural communities) and in each country income 





Individual level (EPOCH 2) 
Poster Individuals were asked to recall whether or not they had 
seen each type of alcohol marketing within the previous six 
months. 
 
The ‘Manual for conducting EPOCH’[534] outlines what 
should be counted: 
This is the first of a series of questions asking 
where participants  
have seen or heard different types of 
advertising. Participants are asked to report 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to whether they have seen alcohol 
advertisements in a list of different types of 
media.   
 
On posters = This includes posters pasted on 
billboard, walls,  
windows, taxis, buses etc. 
Permanently sponsored signage on shops or 
other buildings = This refers to a more 
permanent style of advertising. A company may 
buy a building or sponsor a facility and put their 
signage on this building or facility 
TV = Any advertisement seen on TV 
Radio = Any advertisement heard on radio 
Print media such as newspapers/magazines = 
May include other print media such as flyers, 
local papers, booklets, books 
At cinemas = Commercials prior or during 
movies seen at the cinema 
Sponsorship of sporting, music or other events 
= Companies may advertise their name or 
products through sponsoring sporting or other 
major events.   
On products such as umbrellas, ashtrays, 
shopping bags, clothing, or any other products = 
Companies may advertise their name or 
products by putting their name or products on 

















given for free.   
On the Internet = This includes any type of 
advertising seen while  
surfing the net or on email 
Free samples = Free sample of a product e.g. a 
cigarette, or a  
chocolate bar, or tissues carrying an 
advertisement 
Promotional vouchers that allow discounts = 
Vouchers that allow a discount on a product 
 
The percentage of individuals who reported seeing 
each type of marketing was tabulated. 
Traditional 
marketing 
The number of individuals who reported having seen the 
following types of marketing were totalled: 
poster, signage, TV, radio, print media, cinema. 
 
The totals were then split into the percentage of individuals 
who had seen none of the marketing types, and those who 







The number of individuals who reported having seen the 
following types of marketing were totalled: 
sponsorship, on other products, Internet, free samples, 
vouchers. 
 
The totals were then split into the percentage of individuals 
who had seen none of the marketing types, and those who 








Appendix 7: The Alcohol Marketing Environment – Exposure 










This was noted in EPOCH 1 
 






This was categorised in PURE according to the 2006 






Gender This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 




Age This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
Age (continuous) [601] 
Continuous 
Internet access This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
Do you have access to the Internet? (Mark all that apply) 
– At home, At work, In community for free, In community 
but need to pay, At a friend/relatives house, Other place, 
No access to the Internet [601] 
 
Only the final part of the question was used “No access to 
the Internet” – if this had been ticked then the individual 
was classed as not having access to the Internet, if it was 
left blank then the individual was classed as having 






TV ownership This was asked in PURE Household 
 
Does the household own any of the following? TV [602] 
 
This household-level variable was applied to each 











This was asked in PURE Household 
 
Does the household own any of the following? 
Stereo/transistor/radio [602] 
 
This household-level variable was applied to each 







Education This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
What is the highest level of school you attended? (check 
highest level completed only) – Primary, Secondary, 
Higher [601] 





Drinking status This was asked in PURE 
 
What best describes your history of alcohol use? – 
Formerly used alcohol products, Currently use alcohol 
products, Never used alcohol products [603] 








This was asked in EPOCH 2 
 
Thinking of your five closest non-related friends, how 
many of them currently drink alcohol regularly? (written 
number 0-5) [601] 
 
This categorical variable (0, 1, 2 etc) was recoded into a 
binary variable to signify having close friends who drink, 










Appendix 8: Compliance with Alcohol Marketing Regulations 
– Exposure and Confounder Variables 
Exposure variable Collection 
Format of 
variable 




HDI rank HDI ranking, ranging from 1-187 (the number of 
UN countries). Data from 2010[579]. A ranking of 
1 = best, and 187 = worst. 
 
Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite 
measure of life expectancy, education, and gross 
national income per capita used to rank countries 
in terms of their human development. 
Continuous 
Corruption Control of corruption. Percentile rank (0-100), 
compared to all countries. Data from 2010[577]. 





Government effectiveness including commitment 
to policy. Percentile rank (0-100), compared to all 
countries. Data from 2010[577]. A percentile rank 
of 0 = not effective, and 100 = effective. 
Continuous 
Government stability Political stability / violence. Percentile rank (0-
100), compared to all countries. Data from 
2010[577]. A percentile rank of 0 = not stable, 
and 100 = stable. 
Continuous 
Government 
expenditure on health 
Public and private expenditure on health (% 






Appendix 9: Determinants of Tobacco and Alcohol Industry 
Compliance with Marketing Regulations 
Methodology 
Determinants of overall compliance  
To examine the determinants of good compliance with tobacco and alcohol 
marketing regulations, linear regression models were fitted. The outcome variable 
was the OGCS (continuous), and the model was adjusted for community type, 
country income group, clustering by country, and a range of explanatory variables: 
GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, government expenditure on health, plus for 
tobacco only: production of tobacco and FCTC ratification date, and for alcohol only: 
national alcohol policy, alcohol ban, government monopoly on production, and 
government monopoly on sales. Each of these explanatory variables was deemed 
as a potentially important determinant of industry compliance (government 
effectiveness and government stability which were used in the correlations 
presented in Chapters 10 and 12 were not included as they were too highly 
correlated with corruption, and tobacco control budget per million population and 
licence required for alcohol production/sales and production of hops/wine were not 
included as data were not available for every country). These models were fitted in 
StataMP 12[580]. Coefficients (coef) are presented along with corresponding p-
values (95% significance).  
Determinants of compliance with individual marketing legislation 
To examine the determinants of industry compliance with individual pieces of 
marketing legislation, logistic regression models were fitted. Analysis was restricted 
to countries with a ban in place, i.e. the model exploring compliance with TV 
advertising restrictions would only include the countries where there is a ban in 
place and not those where TV advertising is allowed as there would be nothing for 
industry to comply with. The aim was to determine if industry compliance with 
marketing legislation was associated with a range of factors such as country 
income, poor governance, government health-related funding, and the importance 
of the TI and AI to the national economy (as measured by tobacco production and 
hops/wine production respectively). 
For tobacco 12 separate models were run and for alcohol nine separate models 
were run, one for each of the marketing types. The outcome variable for each of the 




(tobacco)/nine (alcohol) observed and self-reported marketing types (2 categories: 
good and poor), the models were each adjusted for community type, clustering by 
country (not used as a random effect due to lack of variation), and a range of 
explanatory variables; country income group, GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, 
government effectiveness, government stability, and government expenditure on 
health, and for tobacco only: tobacco control budget per million population, 
production of tobacco and FCTC ratification date, and for alcohol only: national 
alcohol policy, alcohol banned, government monopoly on production, government 
monopoly over sales, licence requires for production, licence required for sales, 
production of hops, and production of wine. Each of these explanatory variables 
was deemed as a potentially important determinant of industry compliance. 
However, due to high correlation between each of the explanatory variables, and 
despite many different combinations being attempted, the variables could not be 
included within the same regression models (and country income group, seen in the 
models in Chapter 9 and 11, could not be included due to multicollinearity). 
Therefore individual models had to be run for each of the explanatory variables. Due 
to this, the results do not control for the other explanatory variables (only community 
type and country). 
Due to the methodological problems with the collection of data regarding the sale of 
single cigarettes and the existence of tobacco POS advertising (i.e. that only a 
single tobacco store was selected per community for investigation; see Chapter 9), 
these were excluded from this statistical analysis. 
All of these models were fitted in StataMP 12[580]. ORs are presented along with 
corresponding p-values (95% significance).  
Results 
Determinants of overall TI compliance 
Only FCTC ratification in 2006 or 2004 was a significant determinant of a country’s 
OGCS (Table 1). 
Determinants of overall AI compliance 
As only five countries with bans in place were included in the model, many of the 
variables were removed by the model due to multicollinearity (represented by gaps 
in Table 2). GDP per capita, HDI rank, corruption, and having a national alcohol 








Urban 1  




HIC 1  
UMIC 39.36 0.801 
LMIC 39.10 0.822 
LIC 60.74 0.749 
GDP per capita 0.00 0.613 
HDI rank -0.05 0.941 
Corruption -1.07 0.366 
Health expenditure 6.42 0.236 




Not ratified 1  
2008 18.05 0.797 
2006 94.94 0.008 
2005 77.59 0.059 
2004 89.76 0.032 
 
Table 2: coefficients for the determinants of a country’s alcohol OGCS 
Coef. p-
value 
Community type Urban 1  
Rural 0.00 0.261 




GDP per capita 0.00 <0.001 
HDI rank -0.04 <0.001 
Corruption -0.98 <0.001 
Health expenditure   
National alcohol policy No 1  
Yes 13.73 <0.001 











Determinants of TI compliance with individual marketing types 
Some of the variables in some of the models perfectly predicted the outcome 
meaning that the ORs/p-values could not be computed (represented by gaps in 
Table 3). Where the ORs/p-values were computed, most were not significant 
(p>0.05); only community type (observed adverts and self-reported TV, print media, 
and other products models), country income group (sponsorship model), HDI rank 




(observed adverts model), tobacco control budget per million population (self-
reported posters, sponsorship, and vouchers models), production of tobacco 
(observed adverts model), and FCTC ratification (observed adverts, self-reported 
posters, print media, sponsorship, and free samples models) were significant. 
Determinants of AI compliance with individual marketing types 
Many of the variables in each of the models perfectly predicted the outcome 
meaning that the ORs/p-values could not be computed (represented by gaps in 
Table 4). Where the ORs/p-values were computed, most were not significant 
(p>0.05); only community type was significant and only in the observed posters and 
the self-reported cinema, sponsorship and internet marketing models. As there was 
no variation in the outcome (i.e. all countries with a ban had good compliance), the 
determinants of radio and free sample compliance could not be explored. 
Main problems encountered 
The tobacco ‘OGCS’ linear model ran without problem, but as there were problems 
with the alcohol linear model neither were presented within Chapters 10 or 12. The 
main problem encountered related to the fact that so few countries had any full 
alcohol marketing bans in place, meaning only five countries had an OGCS and 
could be included in the model. The main problem encountered with the individual 
tobacco and alcohol regulation logistic models was that few countries were included 
(only countries with the particular ban in place were included in each model). Partly 
due to this the explanatory variables were very highly correlated, meaning they 
could not be included within the same model. Despite many different variable 
combinations being attempted, there was no combination that worked for multiple 
models (as different countries were included in each model). Individual models 
therefore had to be run for individual explanatory variables, meaning models did not 
control for the other explanatory variables. These problems highlight the difficulty in 
examining TI and AI determinants of compliance. 
  
 
Table 3: odds ratios for the determinants of good compliance with marketing regulations 
Observed Self-report: traditional marketing Self-report: non-traditional marketing 



















































































Urban 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 




HIC  1    1  1  
UMIC 12.14 0.080 1 0.35 0.562 0.07 0.221 
LMIC 9.57 0.280 0.22 0.441 1.50 0.841 1.22 0.911 
LIC   0.10 0.109 0.01 0.028  
GDP per capita 1.00 0.061 1.00 0.075 1.00 0.733 1.00 0.146 1.00 0.468 1.00 0.493 1.00 0.328 1.00 0.173 1.00 0.186 
HDI rank 1.08 0.004 1.04 0.017 0.98 0.656 0.96 0.315 0.98 0.179 0.95 0.064 0.98 0.233 1.00 0.908 1.00 0.893 
Corruption 0.93 0.215 0.97 0.347 0.96 0.397 1.13 0.088 1.03 0.366 1.08 0.180 1.03 0.362 0.99 0.544 0.99 0.663 
Effectiveness 0.90 0.180 0.96 0.431 0.97 0.602 1.13 0.206 1.04 0.400 1.08 0.193 1.04 0.445 0.98 0.672 0.98 0.675 
Stability 0.94 0.028 0.97 0.193 1.00 0.942 1.05 0.477 1.02 0.486 1.03 0.508 1.02 0.402 0.99 0.591 0.99 0.540 
Health expenditure 0.69 0.194 0.59 0.072 0.91 0.839 1.84 0.393 1.32 0.312 1.60 0.432 1.35 0.323 0.87 0.595 0.92 0.759 
TC budget/million pop** 0.89 0.223 1.00 0.009   0.75 0.339 1.00 <0.001 1.01 0.899 1.00 0.933 0.79 0.195 0.85 0.015 





      
2008 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2006   0.26 0.185 0.00 <0.001 
2005 0.00 <0.001 0.00 <0.001 0.00 <0.001 0.00 <0.001 2.60 0.615 0.00 <0.001 
2004 0.00 <0.001 0.00 <0.001 0.00 <0.001 0.00 <0.001  
Each explanatory variable was run as a separate model, but each was adjusted for community type (urban/rural) and clustering by country.  
Where there are gaps, the variable perfectly predicted the outcome meaning ORs/p-values could not be computed. 
*this variable was highly correlated with compliance with observed adverts, and self-reported exposure to radio marketing and other products, free samples and vouchers outcome variables, hence no OR/p-value. 
Additionally LIC was highly correlated with compliance with self-reported exposure to poster marketing, and UMIC as highly correlated with compliance with self-reported exposure to print media marketing, hence 
no OR/p-value. 
**data missing for Colombia, Malaysia and the UAE, so these countries not included in relevant models with this explanatory variable. This variable was too highly correlated with compliance with radio marketing 




Table 4: odds ratios for the determinants of good compliance with marketing regulations 
Observed Self-report: traditional marketing Self-report: non-traditional marketing 
































































Community type Urban 1 1 1  1 1 1 
Rural 0.29 0.003 0.09 0.174 0.82 0.649 0.00 0.011 0.11 <0.001 0.27 <0.001 




GDP per capita   1.00 0.809 
HDI rank 0.93 0.177 1.02 0.635 
Corruption  0.99 0.805 
Effectiveness 1.06 0.623 
Stability 1.02 0.692 
Health expenditure 0.68 0.569 
National alcohol policy No  1 
Yes 7.88 0.657 




















Production of hops 
Production of wine 
Notes 
Each explanatory variable was run as a separate model, but each was adjusted for community type (urban/rural) and clustering by country. 
Where there are gaps in the table, the variable perfectly predicted the outcome meaning ORs/p-values could not be computed.  
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